Yuan is internationalizing more than meets the eye

China has made clear its discontent with the role of the US dollar in the international economy and its intention to internationalize the RMB as an alternative international currency.

A popular narrative tells us that as China is now the world’s second-largest economy, the largest trading nation and the largest trade partner to 120 countries, it is inevitable that the RMB will play a larger role in the international economy. A side effect of the move to a more RMB-centric international economy will be the loss of US economic power. 

If the United States continues to weaponize its dollar hegemony, this is only bound to accelerate the diminishment of the dollar. The United States would be best served by refraining from using economic statecraft to pressure countries to adhere to its wishes.

China has already developed the “financial plumbing” required to facilitate the internationalization of the RMB. The country has developed an alternative cross-border payments system (CIPS) to rival Fedwire and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System. China’s Alipay and Tencent pay have also now been widely adopted abroad. 

And since 2020 China has been trialling its Digital Currency Electronic Payment network, which has the potential to accelerate international use of the RMB.

Perhaps more telling than what China has done to facilitate the international use of the RMB is what it has not done. As China has internationalized its own balance sheet, it has remained decidedly dollar-centric. 

China is still wedded to a policy of exchange rate targeting and requires large dollar reserves of its own — in part because of the high propensity for domestic capital flight — which is problematic when it’s promoting the greater international use of the RMB. China is yet to liberalize its capital account to make the RMB freely exchangeable — a prerequisite for reserve currency status.

China’s capital markets remain underdeveloped with both regulated and limited foreign participation. Foreign issuances denominated in RMB remain small.

Nor has China shown a willingness to become a net supplier of RMB to the world by running current account deficits, preferring instead to lend RMB to other central banks through swap arrangements. 

While China has facilitated the use of the RMB in trade, it remains a long way from having the overarching macroeconomic structure that would make it a contender for reserve currency status.

This is important because it is through trade that countries earn the foreign exchange required to service their foreign currency-denominated liabilities. Earning RMB through trade is a risky way to earn income to service a dollar-denominated debt. 

China wants its currency to rival the dollar in international trade and settlements – but it’s not that simple. Image: iStock

There is no sustainable dichotomy between the currency denomination of trade and the currency denomination of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities. The majority of the world’s foreign currency debt is denominated in US dollars and very little is denominated in RMB.

These observations strongly challenge the narrative that the dollar is in decline and the RMB will replace it in the international economy. Many of China’s largest trading partners, such as Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia, continue to operate on a de facto dollar standard. The RMB has gained the greatest traction among countries, such as Iran, that have strong geopolitical reasons for abandoning the dollar.

With the ratcheting up of Western sanctions against Russia, many countries in the southern hemisphere have expressed a desire to reduce their dollar dependency. Not least among these has been the disclosure that Saudi Arabia and Brazil will use the RMB for bilateral trade with China. In both cases, China enjoys considerable monopsony power, being the largest importer of hydrocarbons, soy products and iron ore.

Despite the speculation, China’s progress appears limited. According to SWIFT data, transactions denominated in RMB accounted for less than 1.5% in December 2022 — slightly more than those denominated in Australian dollars and less than those denominated in Swiss francs. This puts RMB in a distant 7th place. The US dollar accounts for nearly 48% of the total.

There are two reasons why the RMB’s diminutive market share in cross-border payments using SWIFT might not be a fair reflection of the RMB’s use in trade. First, not all cross-border transactions use SWIFT. Estimates by ANZ’s China research team suggest that about 20% of transactions settled using China’s own CIPS system do not use SWIFT.

Second, the total size of the cross-border payments market — around US$170 trillion per year — is about eight times larger than world merchandise exports at $22 trillion. 

If one assumes the vast majority of international RMB usage is trade-related and not asset related — which seems reasonable given the low foreign participation rate in RMB-denominated asset markets and China’s dollar-centricity when it comes to their foreign assets — it might be that about 5-7% of world trade is already denominated in RMB, though such estimates need to be treated with caution. CIPS itself saw a 75% growth in settlement volume in 2021 to about 80 trillion RMB or US$13 trillion.

Some might interpret this level of RMB usage as disappointing. But if a collateral purpose of RMB internationalization is to immunize China from potential Western sanctions while providing sanctioned countries with a workaround and to provide efficiency gains in bilateral trade, then it is highly satisfactory from a Chinese perspective. 

The US has extended its sanctions on Russia to countries that support or sell to its military. Image: Facebook

The return of Russian oil exports to above 2019 pre-war levels demonstrates that sanctions, though supported by countries representing more than half the world’s GDP, have lost some of their efficacy even while the US dollar remains hegemonic.

The ability to cut selected institutions out of the SWIFT system is a powerful tool of economic statecraft. But it must be remembered that trade took place before SWIFT was established and it is still possible — albeit more inconvenient and expensive — to conduct trade without SWIFT today. 

If China is outside the sanctions, an RMB-based financial ecosystem helps facilitate and reduce the costs of sanction circumvention — as it was, in part, designed to do.

Stewart Paterson is Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation and Head of Economic Risk at Evenstar. This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Pheu Thai to discuss House speaker post

Internal rift over plan to give role to MFP

Representatives from eight parties looking to form the next government meet to discuss the transition of national policies. This week, they discussed plans for natural disasters, water management and rising debt. (Photo: Pattarapong Chatpattarasill)
Representatives from eight parties looking to form the next government meet to discuss the transition of national policies. This week, they discussed plans for natural disasters, water management and rising debt. (Photo: Pattarapong Chatpattarasill)

The Pheu Thai Party will hold a discussion on who will get the House speaker post on Wednesday, after some of its MPs voiced their disagreement with a plan to let the Move Forward Party (MFP) take the position.

Phumpat Patcharasap, a Pheu Thai MP for Nakhon Phanom, said on Tuesday that the issue will be raised at an orientation session for MPs who have been officially endorsed by the Election Commission, which will take place later today.

“The views and opinions of the party’s MPs and members must be taken into account. We also need to listen to what the party’s negotiators who are in talks with the MFP have to say before a conclusion is reached,” Mr Phumpat said.

“All party MPs must be allowed to vote on the matter before a decision is made,” he said.

“However, I have to admit that our party members still have differing opinions over the issue,” he noted.

The battle over who gets the House speaker post is still continuing after Pheu Thai on Monday denied having earlier agreed to let the MFP take the position.

Pheu Thai deputy leader Phumtham Wechayachai on Monday said both parties have yet to agree on the matter, despite claiming on Sunday that the MFP had agreed to give Pheu Thai two deputy House speaker posts in exchange for the House speaker position.

He backtracked on the statement he made on Sunday, saying he was merely stating his belief that the House speaker position should go to the party which won the most votes in the May 14 election.

However, by the time he issued the clarification, MFP secretary-general Chaithawat Tulathon had already thanked Pheu Thai for agreeing to step aside and let his party take the position, commending the party for taking the initiative.

Pheu Thai list-MP Sutin Klungsang said issues relating to the House speaker role must be thrashed out by Pheu Thai and the MFP together.

According to Mr Sutin, Pheu Thai has many candidates who would be suitable for the post and that whoever becomes the next speaker must have a great deal of experience in parliamentary matters.

Responding to reports that Pheu Thai leader Cholnan Srikaew is among the candidates being considered for House speaker, Mr Sutin said if Dr Cholnan does become the next speaker, he must resign as the party’s leader because the speaker must maintain neutrality.

“But that’s not a problem. We have many candidates to choose from,” Mr Sutin said.

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What China must do to revive its fading recovery

About the only thing falling faster than China’s economic prospects is the yuan.

China’s sliding currency is but the latest indicator pointing toward a year that could be the hardest yet of the Xi Jinping era. That seemed clear enough last week, when the People’s Bank of China surprised the world with a rate cut.

The PBOC eased again today, cutting the one-year loan prime rate by 10 basis points from 3.65% to 3.55% and the five-year loan prime rate by 10 basis points from 4.3% to 4.2%. Investors’ attention is now on how quickly and aggressively Xi’s government might act to pump additional stimulus into Asia’s biggest economy.

The PBOC moves reveal “growing concerns among policymakers about the health of China’s recovery,” says Julian Evans-Pritchard at Capital Economics.

Even those betting China could well exceed this year’s 5% economic growth target are lowering their forecasts. Case in point: Goldman Sachs cut its forecast to 5.4% from 6%, citing already elevated debt levels and Xi’s determination to limit property speculation

Xi’s team now faces questions on two key fronts. One is whether Beijing’s slow stimulus rollout so far puts it behind the curve. Two, whether officials risk incentivizing bad behavior that Xi’s team spent the last few years trying to discourage.

“It’s clear China’s policymakers have shifted back to supporting growth after the recovery disappointed, but less clear if they can do so without worsening old problems,” says economist Xiaoxi Zhang at Gavekal Research.

So far, Zhang argues, China’s “pivot to more dovish policy was less well telegraphed” than investors would prefer. “Though expectations for a shift had been building over the last two weeks after early indicators for May continued the disappointment of April,” Zhang says.

The latest full set of monthly data “confirmed that a sharp reversal in the property sector and a decline in exports had opened up a hole in aggregate demand,” Zhang notes.

“By cutting its short-term policy rate in response, the People’s Bank of China sent a powerful signal, as it moves interest rates only rarely. Still, there is a strong consensus domestically that more direct support for demand is necessary through fiscal policy,” Zhang says.

On June 16, at a State Council meeting, Xi’s leadership team discussed a package of measures, but has kept the details close to the vest.

Li Qiang has his work cut out for him. Image: Screengrab / NDTV

There, the council, led by Premier Li Qiang said that “in response to the changes in the economic situation, more forceful measures must be taken to enhance the momentum of development, optimize the economic structure and promote the continuous recovery of the economy.”

As Zhang sees it, “more spending on infrastructure would be the easiest and quickest way to stimulate growth, although this would disappoint advocates of structural reform.”

No reform is more important than addressing a growing crisis in China’s property sector. Since data show a critical mass of mainlanders are reluctant to invest in anything other than real estate, stabilizing the market is key to boosting household confidence.

Getting China’s 1.4 billion people to save less and spend more is the top goal for Xi’s third term. If Xi is serious about mobilizing savings, then revitalizing property, which can account for as much as 30% of gross domestic product (GDP), requires urgent attention. This means ending boom-bust cycles in the longer run.

The fragile state of the property sector is warping the underlying mechanics of China’s economy, warns US policy research firm Rhodium Group. Its analysts found that, thanks to cratering property values, more than 100 Chinese cities had difficulty servicing debts last year.

This alone risks deadening the impact of any fiscal stimulus that either the PBOC or Xi’s team might unleash in the months ahead.

In a recent report, Rhodium looked at trends in 205 mainland cities and financial data of nearly 2,900 local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). These schemes raise money to drive giant infrastructure projects aimed at boosting local GDP.

In a report last month, S&P Global Ratings warned that “China property is set for another year of softening.” Even as conditions are coming “close to normal” in some richer, upper-tier cities, S&P argues that “weaknesses in China’s tier three and four cities will keep the property recovery on an ‘L-shaped’ path. Conditions will hit the developers with heavy exposure to lower-tier cities the hardest.”

S&P notes that “we view this as the latest stage of a crisis that resulted in US$52 billion in offshore bond defaults last year, with about one in four developers brushing against insolvency. The downturn in lower-tier markets will hit a large section of the industry.”

Bottom line, S&P says, is this “strained environment will require a hard look at entities’ liquidity, especially declarations of unrestricted cash, and cash-generating capabilities. About 40% of rated developers could experience rating pressure if sales in tier-three/tier four cities fell 20% this year.”

In November, Xi’s team began telegraphing a series of measures – 16 in total – to promote the “stable and healthy development” of the sector.

China is having property troubles. Image: Twitter

Key among them was credit support for highly indebted property developers, looser purchasing rules on first homes by new city dwellers, assistance for deferred-payment loans for homebuyers and financial support to ensure completion and handover of projects to homeowners.

The plan “is much more comprehensive, ranging from addressing the liquidity crisis faced by developers to a temporary easing of a signature restriction on bank lending, from equally treating private and state-owned housing developers to re-initiating the financial funding channels for them,” notes economist Jinyue Dong at BBVA Research. “It marks all-round efforts to bail out the real estate market to secure a ‘soft landing’ after recent data showed some mild improvement.”

But it’s imperative that Beijing remembers that “sentiment matters,” Dong says. The 16-point plan, which aims “to avoid a real estate hard-landing, is still lagged behind the stimulus measures back to 2015 while the easing of zero-Covid policy is still slower-than-expected.”

“That means, without the deluge of massive stimulus on real estate to help rebuild the housing price increasing confidence, whether and how long the ongoing housing stimulus could bring the housing market out of quagmire is still questionable. 2023 might witness some mild recovery, but the long-term robust recovery needs more stamina ahead,” Dong says.

Economist Zongyuan Zoe Liu at the Council on Foreign Relations notes that “a healthy housing market is critical to China’s economic growth and financial stability, but slowing home sales, driven by pandemic restrictions and demographic shifts, has unsettled both real estate developers and home buyers.”

That’s why the PBOC over the last year “has taken a series of policy actions aimed at lowering mortgage interest rates in a bid to spur buyer demand and shore up home prices,” Liu notes. It’s taken the form of Chinese banks being allowed to offer adjustable-rate mortgages subject to a nationwide minimum interest rate floor.

Under normal circumstances, Liu explains, the mortgage interest rate floor is equal to the loan prime rate, or LPR, for first-time homebuyers and LPR plus 60 basis points for all other borrowers.

Beginning in May 2022, the PBOC “broke this convention by lowering the nationwide floor on new mortgages to 20 basis points below LPR for first-time buyers,” she says. Later in September, the PBOC announced it was “relaxing” the nationwide interest rate floor in some cities where housing prices had been trending down for the previous three months.

Yet more than fresh stimulus, China needs comprehensive property market reforms that alter incentives and make investments more stable and productive. This responsibility falls to newish Premier Li, who took China’s No 2 job in March.

His balancing act: loosening fiscal policy to stabilize growth without fueling new bubbles in unproductive borrowing and leveraging.

“China has plenty of room to boost stimulus if it so chooses,” says Michael Hirson, China economist at 22V Research LLC. “The key obstacles are concern over financial risks and the reluctance so far to leverage the central government’s balance sheet to expand fiscal stimulus.”

Analysts say China has room to pump up economic stimulus. Photo: Facebook

Ting Lu, Nomura’s chief China economist, says it’s reasonable to expect “more easing and stimulus measures.” Lu stresses that “amid a deteriorating property sector, its potentially devastating impact on government finance and the rising risk of a double-dip, we do not expect Beijing to sit idle.”

One priority needs to be working faster to get toxic and potentially sour assets off property developers’ balance sheets.

In recent years, Beijing has indeed created a network of funds that borrow some features from the Resolution Trust Company mechanism the US used to clean up the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. Japan did the same in the 1990s to end the 1980s bad-loan crisis.

Li’s charge will be to intensify efforts to ensure that financial institutions are limited in their ability to create fresh “moral hazards” that increase reliance on public bailouts in the longer run.

For now, even the International Monetary Fund thinks China has room to ramp up its stimulus-industrial complex.

“China has the policy space to keep monetary policy accommodative because inflation is very much muted,” says Krishna Srinivasan, the IMF’s director for Asia Pacific. “It also has the fiscal space to provide support.”

Yet the important thing, says Citigroup economist Xiangrong Yu, is a stimulus burst “centered on the property sector, with expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to keep up growth momentum.”

Yu adds that “we think the overall policy tone for this sector could transfer from stabilizing to cautious stimulating. More efforts would be needed to stop a downward spiral.”

Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek

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ADDX appoints former SGX leader to board | FinanceAsia

Singapore-based digital securities exchange, ADDX, has appointed former Singapore Exchange (SGX) senior managing director, Sutat Chew, as chair.

Chew brings to the firm over 25 years of experience across financial services, including 14 years spent at the Singaporean bourse, where he led the global sales origination team and helped the business expand across 10 international locations. In terms of other prior experience, he has held senior roles at Standard Chartered, OCBC Securities and DBS.

The leadership appointment offers ADDX strategic direction as it looks to expand overseas. Specifically, Chew will be responsible for driving growth and innovation, the company release stated.

Speaking to FinanceAsia, Chew said that his priorities in coming on board involve cultivating strategic collaborations and partnerships so that ADDX is “poised to advance” its mission to democratise investment for wealth creation.

“We hope to meet the needs of customers in North Asia and the Middle East in the second half of this year through appropriate partnerships and joint ventures (JVs),” he said.

Operating on a private, permissioned blockchain that is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), ADDX offers issuers access to a larger pool of capital than is available through traditional fundraising means.

The platform’s employment of sophisticated digital processing technology enables it to manage the issuance, custody and distribution of private market products at a lower administrative cost compared to traditional markets and thus, the firm is able to reduce the fundraising entry threshold, inviting a wider community of investors to participate in capital exchange.

Regulation and innovation

Reflecting on progress and innovation across Asia’s capital markets, Chew said that it is the development of new forms of market infrastructure to support the advancement of digital assets, that excites him the most.

“Initiatives such as Project Ubin, Project Orchid and Project Guardian aim to explore the potential of blockchain and distributed ledger technology (DLT) in areas such as payments, settlements, digital identity, and cross-border transactions – which should enhance efficiency, transparency, and security in the financial sector,” he told FA.

He commended the efforts of Singapore’s market regulators in supporting the city-state’s development as a “world-class global financial hub with a highly competitive and diverse financial ecosystem.”

“Regulators here have been at the forefront of technology and innovation in the financial sector, balancing it with appropriate consideration for education and investor protection,” he explained.

“The progressive stance taken by the MAS in recognising that tokenised securities should be regulated in the same way as traditional securities, gives companies like ADDX clarity to invest and innovate for global clients who can trust the regime.”

Market uncertainty

However, Chew acknowledged that the uncertain market economic climate threatens the capital market advancement.

“One of the challenges to market innovation is reduced investor confidence and risk aversion as part of the uncertain market environment. As investors become more cautious and conservative, that may result in more gradual adoption of new ideas, technologies, and investment opportunities.”

“What we have done is adapt to evolving investor sentiment and risk appetite, communicate transparently, as well as actively educate and engage investors to address their concerns, provide reassurance and offer a suite of products that meet their needs.”

As an example, he shared that the platform had helped four issuers raise more than S$650 million via commercial papers to meet near-term investment needs.

“I believe that regulators and responsible startups or fintech players can continue to work together to keep pace with emerging technologies and financial innovation, whilst striking a balance with appropriate regulatory safeguards,” he added. 

In addition to Chew, ADDX’s board comprises Oi-Yee Choo, who serves as CEO; and Inmoo Hwang, the firm’s COO.

Chew also serves as chair of ADDX’s listing committee, a position he has held since 2019; and he has been a board member of ICHX Tech – ADDX’s holding company – since 2018. MAS approved the operational transfer of ADDX from ICHX Tech in May 2022, and the platform began is regulated activities from September the same year.

ADDX’s shareholders include SGX, the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Temasek subsidiary, Heliconia Capital, the Development Bank of Japan, UOB and Hamilton Lane, among others. In April last year, it partnered with UOB to execute the largest foreign currency digital bond in Singapore to date; a sustainability-linked bond, issued by Singtel. 

Read also: Temasek-backed venture debt fund tokenises on ADDX

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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CARSOME raises undisclosed funding round, emphasises its US0mil liquidity position

Mostly existing investors with new investor, EvolutionX Debt, a SG based debt fund
Claims independent biz units have hit profitability with over 30% revenue growth

CARSOME Group announced the closing of its latest fundraising round yesterday, without disclosing the amount raised, but shared that the funding has brought its current liquidity to approximately US$200 million (RM927.9 million).
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Washington pretends to care about the debt

Pundits have been celebrating the Biden-McCarthy debt-ceiling deal for averting a calamitous US government default and demonstrating that compromise is still possible in today’s polarized Washington. Too bad the deal does so little to address the nation’s fiscal challenges.

Though called the Fiscal Responsibility Act, the deal “does nothing,” the Economist concluded, “to tackle the main sources of America’s fiscal irresponsibility.” Other economic analysts agreed.

If, like many Republicans, you see runaway spending as the nation’s big fiscal problem, there’s little to cheer in the deal. Federal spending will continue to increase during the next decade. Yes, it will be $1.5 trillion less than it would have been, but that’s not much considering total outlays will be $80 trillion.

If, like many Democrats, you see low taxes on corporations and the rich as the big problem, there’s nothing at all to cheer. The deal doesn’t address taxes. Indeed, the Democrats fear Republicans will soon renew their campaign for tax cuts.

Under the deal Washington just reached, the federal debt is headed toward $50 trillion from $32 trillion. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis graphic)
Under the deal Washington just reached, the federal debt is headed toward $50 trillion from $32 trillion. Graphic: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis

As a result of all this, a Wall Street Journal analysis projects the federal debt will rise from 97% of gross domestic product today to 115% a decade from now. Without the deal it would have reached 119%.

A big reason for this underwhelming result is that the main drivers of deficits and debt were never discussed. The negotiations focused on the 15% of the federal budget that must be appropriated annually, things like education, transportation and homeland security. (Several agriculture programs are also in this category, including rural development, research and education, and soil and water technical assistance.)

Off the table were major entitlement programs such as Medicare and Social Security, which take nearly half of the federal budget. Spending on these is expected to soar as baby boomers continue to retire. In years past Republicans have recommended cuts, but not this year. The programs are popular. Republicans feared pushing for cuts in them would cost them votes in next year’s elections.

Also off the table were defense (13% of the budget), veterans benefits (7%) and interest on the debt (7%). The eligibility requirements for food stamps were tightened for some people and loosened for others. The bottom line is that food-stamp spending could end up increasing.

As for the other big driver of deficits and debt, taxes, President Joe Biden would have liked to boost them on corporations and high earners. But tax increases, too, can hurt their proponents at the polls, and as the Republicans are dead set against them the president didn’t press very hard.

Little wonder, then, that veteran New York Times correspondent Jim Tankersley assessed the deal as “a minor breakthrough, at best.” Washington, he wrote, “is back to pretending to care about debt.”

“Pretending” sounds snarky but there’s something to the notion. What Washington cares about is not deficits and debt but spending and taxes. The Democrats want more of both, the Republicans less of both.

The ballooning federal debt is merely the result of a long period in which the Democrats have prevailed on spending and the Republicans on taxes. (The Republicans say tax cuts pay for themselves in faster economic growth but the recent ones haven’t.)

Oh, and the debt ceiling gives Republicans leverage to keep battling on the spending front. Again, it’s spending, not the debt, that they care about.

So, should we worry about the debt? It’s been growing for decades, after all, without doing the economy much apparent harm. Recently some economists have been arguing the federal debt isn’t a problem. The government, these Modern Monetary Theory advocates say, can always print money to pay it off.

Wouldn’t that risk inflation, maybe even hyperinflation? Relax, the MMT economists say. The government can always tax the surplus money out of the economy. That raising taxes is politically difficult even for the Democrats seems to have escaped them. That’s one of many reasons why mainstream economists, even those with liberal leanings, have dismissed MMT in scathing terms.

The bigger the debt gets, the greater the risk it will crowd out other spending. By the end of the decade it will hit $50 trillion, up from $32 trillion now. In not too many years Uncle Sam’s interest payments will exceed spending on defense.

And one of these times, the game of chicken Washington plays every couple of years with the debt ceiling will end badly. Very badly.

This time, the president and the speaker sidestepped catastrophe. But because they were unwilling to discuss Social Security and Medicare, on the one hand, and taxes, on the other, they served up a fiscal nothing burger.

As the Economist’s headline put it, “America avoids financial Armageddon but stays in fiscal hell.”

This article, originally published on June 12 by the latter news organization and now republished by Asia Times with permission, is © Copyright 2023 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow Urban Lehner on Twitter: @urbanize

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Vietnam’s boom looking like a property bust

HANOI – Vietnam’s once-thriving real estate sector is under stress as developers default on their bonds, a market downtrend set in motion last year by a government crackdown on dubious property deals. That, in systemic turn, is putting new strains on the banking sector.

With economic growth projected to fall from 8% in 2022 to 6.3% this year – a figure that could be optimistic with rising economic uncertainty in Vietnam’s top global export markets – property sector troubles could deteriorate before they ameliorate in the months ahead. 

The property market clampdown was launched in part to curb land speculation and slow the rampant construction of luxury condominiums, where the returns are higher for developers but largely out-of-reach to average Vietnamese investors and buyers.

The market turned last October when Ho Chi Minh City-based property tycoon Truong My Lan, chairwoman of the Van Thinh Phat Holding Group, was arrested on charges of bond market fraud. Her arrest sparked a run on the Saigon Commercial Bank (SCB), where Truong allegedly has a close lending relationship.

A State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) intervention, which guaranteed to cover all SCB deposits, prevented a potential systemwide run on banks. But the central bank intervention did not, however, stop an eventual rout on Vietnam’s nascent, property-oriented bond market.

The central bank turned back a run on Siam Commercial Bank deposits. Image: Facebook

Truong was arrested due to her company’s alleged abuse of a bond issue, which banking sources say diverted funds away from its designated capital-raising purpose for land speculation.

Truong was not the only high-profile victim of last year’s anti-corruption drive, which saw the sacking of former state president Nguyen Xuan Phuc and two now ex-deputy prime ministers.

The timing of the clampdown couldn’t have been worse. The SBV was forced to raise interest rates by 200 basis points shortly after Truong’s arrest, a monetary tightening that sought to contain galloping inflation, bolster the falling dong currency, and replenish sagging foreign exchange reserves.

The interest rate hikes were a further blow to property developers and buyers and added pressure on banks. Local banking sources say there was near zero credit growth in the first three months of 2023, a reflection of enduring trouble in the property sector.   

Faced with declining sales and uncertainties about the legal status of several projects (the corruption campaign targeted questionable deed titles for urban land where several high-rise, luxury condominiums were built), property companies have defaulted on their bonds as cash flows have dried up.

In February, Novaland Investment Group, Vietnam’s second-largest property group, defaulted on a 1 trillion dong (US$43 million) bond issue.

According to a S&P Global Ratings report, as of March 17, 2023, at least 69 Vietnamese bond issuers were unable to meet their debt obligations on maturity, with a total default value of 94.43 trillion dong, representing 8.15% of the bonds’ outstanding value.

“By sector, 43 issuers are enterprises in the real estate industry with a total value of defaulted corporate bonds at 78.9 trillion dong, accounting for 83.6% of the total default value,” said the report.

Unless the tide somehow turns on the property sector, many more defaults could be on the horizon. “The real estate sector has the largest outstanding bond value of 396.3 trillion dong, which accounts for 33.8% of the total outstanding bond value,” noted S&P.

The bond market slump – new bond issues fell more than 90% year-on-year in the first quarter and there were none issued in May – has hit Vietnam’s stock market, which has underperformed the region. There are some 20 listed private property firms on the two stock exchanges, some among Vietnam’s top companies.

Novaland Investment Group is among the Vietnamese developers to default on their bonds. Image: Twitter

To be sure, credit rating analysts see upside to the government’s actions.

“Government policies were to discourage property speculation and support the affordable segment of the market,” said Fiona Chan, an assistant-director at S&P Global Ratings.

“This approach may help the Vietnam property market progress towards a more sustainable growth in the long term, but the market will need to sustain some short-term pain. For pre-sales, we estimate that aggregate sales will decline by 15-20% this year,” Chan told a recent webinar

The wave of defaults also reflects regulatory failings in the bond market, which has only taken off in the past five years, driven to a great extent by the fast-expanding property sector. All bonds are sold domestically in dong currency to mostly private investors and local banks.

“I think the bond market got ahead of the regulators, a bit,” said Barry Weisblatt, an investment strategist at SSI Asset Management Company. “They hadn’t really developed the rules so people were gaming the system,” he said.

Realizing they had been too lax on bond issuances, authorities last September issued Decree #65, which suddenly tightened regulations and required more disclosure for the private placement of corporate bonds.

The result was dramatic with a more than 90% reduction in bond issuances thereafter. In March this year, authorities essentially retracted Decree #65 and replaced it with Decree #8, which postponed the tighter regulations for at least a year. 

While the delay was welcome, in the longer term authorities will need to more vigilantly regulate the bond market, analysts say.

“The government has responded in a way which I think is conducive for the long-term development of the bond market,” said Xavier Jean, senior director/corporate sector for S&P Global Ratings. “It is a process that can take years, but I think it is a necessary first step,” he added.

Meanwhile, Vietnam’s corporate sector and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have over time become even more reliant on banks, which are suffering from their own constraints this year.

Vietnamese banks have grown their assets at 15-30% over the past decade, with a high percentage of the system’s loans going to real estate – one of the few business sectors in which the local private sector has taken off in a still largely communist-controlled economy.

“Exposure of state banks to real estate is about 27% of their books, compared to 37% for private banks – developers, construction companies and residential mortgages,” said Tamma Pebrian, an analyst for Fitch Credit Ratings in Singapore.

Vietnam’s four largest state-owned banks, which account for more than 40-45% of the banking system’s assets, have the advantage of being the exclusive source of funding for the country’s still numerous and powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Many of the more successful private banks have cultivated close ties with private property developers over the years, which allowed them to grow their books and profits in tandem with the property boom.

As developers sought more funding, and because banks face strict single-client lending ceilings, banks and their affiliated security firms helped many developers issue debt on the bond market, acting both as buyer and agent for selling the issuances to the public. There are no institutional investors such as endowments, funds or insurance companies in communist-run Vietnam.

The banks then helped real estate companies by issuing mortgages to investors interested in buying their condominiums and other property developments. This bank-client relationship was a win-win until the government intervened last year.    

In March, Moody’s Credit Ratings downgraded its outlook on Techcombank, one of Vietnam’s most profitable private banks, from “stable” to “negative.” Moody’s said the downgrade reflected an expectation that negative impacts from the real estate market will affect the bank’s “independent credit strength.”

Vietnam’s banks are highly exposed to the property sector. Image: Facebook

Techcombank is one of the main creditors to VinGroup, whose affiliate Vinhomes is the largest property group in Vietnam with developments in over 40 cities across the country. VinGroup has not defaulted on any of its bonds, yet.

SBV, instead of forcing defaulted bond issuers to pay up or go bankrupt, leaving the public out of pocket and the banks with massive non-performing loans in the form of bad bonds on their books, has taken a softer approach.

Issuers and holders have been encouraged to restructure bond repayment periods, or in some cases accept condominium units in lieu of payment.

Earlier this year, the central bank also allowed banks to lower their interest rates by 100 basis points while raising the system’s credit growth ceiling to 16%, which is still low by Vietnam’s historical standards.

After years of rapid growth and impressive profits, this year is expected to be a comedown for Vietnam’s banks. That said, most analysts do not foresee a systemic collapse in the cards.

“Vietnam’s domestic banks benefit from their external net asset position, with still-limited linkages to global markets,” S&P said in a May press release.

“However, thin capital buffers, elevated indebtedness in the economy, cross-ownerships, connected lending, and the current property market, including the wider impact on upstream construction and downstream services, could affect the banks’ asset quality,” S&P said.

Many of the better-run private banks boosted their capital adequacy ratios during the boom times, and while the big state banks still need to do so, they are in little to no danger of going under, analysts say.

“Last year the banks saw 30% profit growth, so it was a real boom period,” said Fitch’s banking analyst Pebrian. “This year we are expecting about 13% profit growth for the sector,” he said – a fallback, to be sure, but not a collapse.

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Why Japan’s stock market boom won’t last

TOKYO — Japanese stocks are having quite a moment as waves of foreign capital drive the benchmark Nikkei index to 30-year highs.

The common explanation for this year’s 30% gain is that a decade of efforts to tighten corporate governance are finally gaining traction.

There are signs indeed that companies from Canon to Toshiba to Citizen Watch are showing signs of actually listening to shareholders’ demands.

Add the fact that Japan Inc has been comparatively cheap valuation-wise during that decade and it’s not hard to understand why Tokyo shares are on a winning streak. Just ask Warren Buffett, whose 2020 bet in five Japanese trading houses is paying off handsomely.

Yet some sobriety is warranted, lest punters allow irrational exuberance to get the better of them once again. The question is whether government reforms are keeping sufficient pace with the bulls racing around Tokyo. The answer: not by a long shot.

An argument can be made that Japan Inc’s return to favor is as much a reflection of global events and domestic liquidity levels as bets on a renaissance in corporate attitudes.

Take the Bank of Japan, which is the ultimate outlier among top monetary authorities. As the US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England hit the brakes, the BOJ continues to gun the monetary engine.

For now, “the economic backdrop remains fragile,” says Stefan Angrick, senior economist at Moody’s Analytics. “Although Japan’s belated recovery has found some better footing, GDP is still below its pre-pandemic peak. Industrial production and exports have struggled as the global economy has flirted with recession.”

From a liquidity-differential standpoint, Japanese stocks — long undervalued by global investors — are gaining converts. Japan, meantime, looks like a welcome haven from the US-China trade tensions that are unnerving global markets.

Trouble is, it’s highly unclear that the underlying state of Japan’s economy warrants continued rapid stock gains. It follows that Japan, circa 2023, is a more complicated calculation than meets the eye.

In a nutshell, the market remains vulnerable to a macroeconomic backdrop less conducive to surging shares than many punters might realize.

Not to dismiss the ways in which corporate boardrooms are modernizing. They are indeed. The common analysis — and frankly the lazy one — is that the supposed reform Big Bang that then-prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched in 2013 deserves all the credit.

The late Abe deserves certain kudos, of course. In 2014, his Liberal Democratic Party enacted a UK-like stewardship code to encourage companies to give shareholders a bigger voice. The LDP prodded companies to add more outside directors, increase returns on equity and boost dividends.

Former prime minister Shinzo Abe was a so-so economic reformer. File Photo: The Yomiuri Shimbun / Kunihiko Miura via AFP

Credit where it’s due, those upgrades are playing a role in today’s Nikkei rally. But the bigger catalyst here is China.

It was just before Abe took power in 2013 that China surpassed Japan in gross domestic product (GDP) terms. And it was around that time that Japan Inc chieftains realized that circling the wagons was no longer an option.

A similar pattern played out a decade earlier, when Japanese banks finally addressed the bad loan hangover from the 1990s.

Pundits rushed to credit then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi for fixing the mess. In reality, it was the realization that China was remaking the financial playing field in Asia that sparked reform — and the urgency for Japan to get back in shape.

In both the early 2000s and early 2010s, there was nothing new or innovative about policy shifts under Koizumi and Abe. Other than Koizumi’s bold privatization of Japan Post, most steps by their governments were obvious ones Tokyo should’ve taken decades earlier.

This gets us back to today’s stock surge. At some point, stocks long deemed as “cheap” will cease to be considered as such.

As the market becomes less cheap, investors will begin scrutinizing a macroeconomic backdrop that’s far less vibrant than to be expected after 10 years of so-called “Abenomics.”

Already, “the gains of the past month have taken Japanese equities from cheap to neutral,” says strategist Luca Paolini at Pictet Asset Management.

When Fumio Kishida rose to the premiership in October 2021, a year after Abe resigned, he called for a “new capitalism.” Kishida did so cautiously, knowing that the still-powerful Abe was looking over his shoulder.

The thrust of Kishida’s plan was to increase innovation and do a better job of spreading the benefits of growth. It was, at its core, an admission that Abenomics was less a Big Bang than a series of modest pops.

The more Kishida talked of plans to loosen labor markets, reduce bureaucracy, increase innovation and productivity, empower women and restore Tokyo’s status as a global financial center, the more he was admitting that Abe hadn’t got the job done during his nearly eight-year reign.

It was the worst-kept secret in Nagatacho, Japan’s Capitol Hill, that Abe was seething at the implication — and mulling a return to power for a third time (he was assassinated in July 2022). Now, Kishida is mulling calling an early snap election to consolidate power.

Chatter that Kishida might announce an election this week didn’t pan out. But with his approval rating in the mid-40s, Kishida could call an election at any moment.

Pundits agree Kishida’s sudden rediscovery of economic reform buttresses the early election talk. In recent days, Kishida’s government unveiled a wide-ranging package of measures to reverse a falling birthrate in the developed nation with the globe’s worst debt burden. The plan is to double childcare expenditures.

A busy shopping area in the center of Osaka. Japan’s demographics are in terminal decline. Photo: AFP / Kazuhiro Nogi

Here, too, when Kishida says “the low birthrate is a massive problem that concerns our country’s society and entire economy and can’t be put off,” it’s a tacit reminder of the to-do lost Abe’s 2012-2022 reign ignored.

This burst in childcare spending comes as Kishida is also angling to hike military spending by more than 50% over five years to around 43 trillion yen ($307 billion) to keep pace with China. The daunting bill for all these outlays will entail tax increases, including on Japan’s biggest corporations.

Another complicating factor for Nikkei bulls is that the BOJ’s decades-long quantitative easing (QE) policy is on borrowed time. Though new BOJ governor Kazuo Ueda’s team demurred this week, the clock is ticking as the worst inflation in decades becomes more ingrained.

At just over 4%, Japan’s inflation rate has been well above the 2% target. The BOJ hasn’t ended QE in part because upward price pressures reflect rising import costs of energy and raw materials, not strong demand trends. These supply-side price pressures are best addressed with steps to increase competitiveness.

Ueda’s team is in do-no-harm mode with regard to the macroeconomic scene and corporate profits. In the past, premature BOJ tightening derailed economic recoveries. One example: two rate hikes in the 2006-2007 period that had to be reversed when national growth faltered.

The legacy of such episodes might prevent Ueda from taking steps to keep inflation from embedding itself in the economy. At the same time, this year’s 3.8% average wage gain — the highest since the early 1990s — is less than the inflation rate.

“This,” argues economist Carlos Casanova at Union Bancaire Privée, “puts a damper on domestic consumption via negative real wage growth. Therefore, the BOJ will be in no rush to tweak settings.”

Of course, it’s more complicated than that. As Casanova explains, Ueda’s team at the BOJ has “flagged that a shift in corporate price-setting behavior was showing changes that could work to push up inflation, suggesting the economy was making steady progress toward hitting” preferred pace of price gains.

Yet the US Fed’s failure to act quicker to tame prices is a cautionary tale — and a warning against BOJ complacency.

As Kelvin Wong, analyst at Oanda, sees it, “overall, the improving economic backdrop in Japan with accelerating sticky inflation coupled with a buoyant stock market that is supported by foreign net inflows has opened a window of opportunity for BOJ to normalize its ultra-easy monetary policy.”

Wong notes that it would mean “at least via a further widening of the yield curve control band in the first step, perhaps in July when it publishes its latest quarterly outlook report that comes with its latest projections of inflation and economic growth trend.”

For now, though, the BOJ’s ultra-loose policies are a giant tailwind for stocks.

New Bank of Japan Governor Kazuo Ueda hasn’t touched QE yet. Image: Twitter / Screengrab

Strategist Yunosuke Ikeda at Nomura Holdings adds that “we see the recent strength of Japanese equities as arising from a combination of an accumulation of longer-term bullish stories, the evaporation of some short-term worries, and buying by nonresident investors.”

Goldman Sachs strategist Kazunori Tatebe notes that recent corporate earnings trends provide “additional fuel for investors’ bullish stance on Japanese stocks, providing some reassurance on the earnings outlook.”

Low price-to-book ratios continue to turn heads Tokyo’s way, Tatebe argues. “If progress is made in accordance with investor expectations,” Tatebe says, “Japanese stocks could see a prolonged advance over the medium term, and we continue to see risk to the upside.”

Nicholas Smith, strategist at CLSA Japan, agrees. “Japan went from bubble to anti-bubble. Its superior earnings-per-share growth and bargain-basement valuations over the last decade went unnoticed” into earlier this year.

That, Smith notes, “prompted massive buybacks that cash-bloated Japan can easily afford. That, in turn, woke up foreign investors who remain heavily underweight.”

Yet there is a risk that the BOJ might stop acting like a 24/7 no-limit ATM for global investors, which would be a devastating blow to Nikkei bulls.

“Japan is in its own virtuous economic cycle, with GDP growing solidly thanks to healthy domestic demand,” says Paolini at Pictet Asset Management. But, he adds, “the Bank of Japan might, however, start to temper this if, as we expect, it winds up its ultra-accommodative monetary stance.”

As such, “Japan is the only developed government bond market in which we hold an underweight,” Paolini says.

Stocks are another story, of course, as the bulls run Tokyo’s way from all directions. For now, at least, as the BOJ keeps filling the proverbial punchbowl as peers drain liquidity. The question is whether government upgrades catch up with enthusiasm about Japanese shares – and that’s anyone’s guess.

Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek

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NATO must prepare for intervention to safeguard ZNPP

US President Joe Biden and NATO leaders must prepare their military forces for a rapid and boots-on-the-ground intervention to stop Russia from even considering creating a nuclear incident at Europe’s largest nuclear plant, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general Rafael Mariano Grossi speaks to Capitol Intelligence/CI Ukraine using CI Glass regarding the catastrophic risk of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in occupied Ukraine — the largest nuclear plant in Europe – on March 14, 2023, in Washington.

The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Mariano Grossi, was forced to rush off to Kiev and later to Zaporizhzhia to ensure the continued safety of ZNPP after the decision, blamed by many on Russia, to blow up the Kakhovka dam in the Kherson region, one of the main sources of coolant for the plant’s nuclear reactors.

The destruction of Kakhovka, and the subsequent ecological and economical disaster for large swath of southern Ukraine, has military commanders believing Russian President Vladmir Putin may order, or at least fail to thwart, a serious nuclear incident at the ZNPP, a nuclear plant six times the size of Chernobyl.

A nuclear incident, radiating a large area around Zaporizhzhia, would not only leave some of Ukraine’s most fertile agriculture land barren for decades but would also trigger catastrophic economic events in both Russia and Europe not seen since the Great Depression.

Former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi, who only speaks when absolutely necessary, has warned that a Ukrainian defeat by Russia would be the end of the European Union.

“The European Union’s existential values are peace, freedom, and respect of democratic sovereignty. They are the values that emerged after the bloodbath of World War II. And that is why there is no alternative for the US, Europe and its allies to ensuring that Ukraine wins this war,” Draghi said in a speech to his alma mater the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston on June 9.

Alexander Shtaynberger, the New York-based Ukrainian-American chief risk officer for the London-based Laidlaw & Co wealth management group, says financial markets have greatly underestimated the risk of a ZNPP incident after having overestimated the risk a US debt default.

The lack of immediate action – both in military preparedness and new economic sanctions – by NATO allies and members of the Group of Seven has only multiplied the risk that ZNPP will be used by Russian forces as an ultimate “scorched-earth” weapon ahead of a defeat by Ukraine.

The decision to destroy the Kakhovka dam, if Russia was responsible as alleged, signifies that Putin and the Russian military command no longer believe that they will be able to defend the Crimean Peninsula, the sole reason behind the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022, and not the creation of a mythical “Novorossiya” confederation of ethnic Russians.

Saltovka, Kharkiv.

During a recent visit to the working-class neighborhood of Saltovka in Kharkiv – an area that has taken the brunt of Russian shelling – one saw residents living in half-bombed-out apartment buildings like German city dwellers in the aftermath of World War II. These residents are all ethnic-Russian Ukrainians whom Putin supposedly sought to amalgamate into his Greater Russia homeland. Russia’s single goal in the war was to make sure that Crimea could operate independently from Ukraine and thus invaded the area around the Sea of Azov and Kherson to create a land bridge with mainland Russia and guaranteed water supplies.

The destruction of the Kakhovka dam, built in the Soviet times to transform Crimea into an agricultural economy, means that Russia no longer believes it will be able to defend the area it annexed from Ukraine in 2014.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has signaled over the past weeks to the West and others that it no longer backs Russia’s lost-cause war in Ukraine and that China’s national interest lies in the strength and stability of international markets.

One prominent anti-Ukraine voice that has been removed is Fox News’ Tucker Carlson, albeit for losing Fox owner Rupert Murdoch nearly US$800 million to settle a defamation brought by the Canadian-owned Dominion Voting Systems.

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News Corp executive chairman Rupert Murdoch speaks to Capitol Intelligence/Black Business News (BBN) using CI Glass at The Wall Street Journal CEO Council Summit in Washington on November 15, 2016.

US Marine Corps Brigadier-General Mark Clingan at the Pentagon is studying Ukraine’s success in decentralized combat units and logistics for future US warfare.

The loss of Crimea and the Russian Black Sea fleet is not the least of Putin’s nightmares. A very real nightmare for Putin and any future Russian government will be ensuring the integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation post-conflict.

The vision of Russia broken up into nine new independent republics, first espoused by former US president Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, is receiving an ever more welcomed reception among some pro-Ukraine allies. In fact, the London-based leader of the Chechen resistance, Ahmed Zakayev, has been meeting with numerous Ukrainian leaders and influencers setting out his vision of a Russia broken up into new independent states.

The readiness of the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to intervene could hasten the end the war and the resignation or removal Putin from power. Many argue that Putin would agree to surrender if he could cast it as a military defeat by the United States rather than by what he sees a rogue gang of inferior Ukrainians.

He could also argue that he resigned to preserve the Russian Federation, the same reason the late president Boris Yeltsin appointed him as his successor in 1999.

Ideally, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin will be able to hold three-way talks as caretaker president with Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Camp David to end the war and forge a permanent peace agreement between Russia and its neighbor, Ukraine.  Mishustin has purposely refrained from publicly supporting Putin’s war efforts, casting himself as a technocratic manager.

The Camp David peace talks should be ultimately signed in Yalta, Germany, by President Biden, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and President Zelensky. Such a signing would erase from history the ignominious Yalta Conference agreement by an ailing Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin that divided the world between the free and unfree.

Peter K Semler is the chief executive editor and founder of Capitol Intelligence. Previously, he was the Washington, DC, bureau chief for Mergermarket (Dealreporter/Debtwire) of the Financial Times and headed political and economic coverage of the US House of Representatives and Senate.

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