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Coastal metaphors are attractive, I’m afraid, when talking about Australia’s apparently endless underwater story. But as investigative journalist Andrew Fowler makes clear in” Nuked: The Submarine Fiasco that Sank Australia’s Sovereignty”, his excellent and excoriating analysis of the genesis of the AUKUS pact, there is n’t much room for levity otherwise.

People who doubts the correctness of former Labor giants like Paul Keating and Gareth Evans, who have argued that AUKUS is” the worst deal in all history,” should read this book.

The plan for Australia to acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines, built locally in partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom, is projected to cost up to A$ 368 billion ( US$ 249.4 billion ). However, it is not just the AUKUS project’s price that is stunning.

While some people may sigh in shame, Scott Morrison is the main designer of this gigantic folly. His reputation will be rightly diminished by the revelations made in Fowler’s meticulous analysis.

The terrible value of political authority in this country, especially on the conservative side of politics, is one issue the reserve does not address in depth.

Whatever the causes were, the end result was that

A Christian conservative past tourism marketing manager with no prior experience in corporate or foreign affairs, who was the hatcher of the huge shift in Australia’s international policy alignment, created a great gift for secrecy and deception.

The issue was the decision to renounce an agreement that sought to purchase much less expensive, probably much more appropriate, and product submarines from France in an effort to “weld Australia’s military to the United States.” In the end, it is difficult to feel how misled the French were or how foolish the switch’s justification was.

In Fowler’s see, buying the European boats would have been a “remarkable success”. It would have given Australia “more freedom and a more significant position in the world.”

It may take a different book to properly explain American policymakers ‘ reluctance to pursue strategic and foreign policy democracy. But what evidently emerges from Fowler’s consideration is how careless and self-serving Australia’s method to national surveillance became under Morrison. The death of the American people, not to mention the eternally addressed “national interest”, was of less issue than short-term social advantage.

” The fact that the increasing US military presence in the Indo-Pacific could bring Australia into a conflict”, writes Fowler,” seemed of little effect in Morrison’s want to hammer Labor on federal security”.

Of course, being painted as “weak” on security, and the US empire in particular, was the stuff of hallucinations for the Australian Labor Party. It still is.

In response, the ALP’s administration has gone to extraordinary lengths to persuade voters, as well as its own growing ranks and record, that they are equally committed to national security and that the AUKUS agreement is the best way to achieve this.

High costs, major challenges

One might have hoped that the Albanese authorities could have at least conducted a flimsy cost-benefit research given that AUKUS was the founder of a disgruntled conservative prime minister who, according to Fowler, “believed he was on a holy goal.”

After all, AUKUS is the largest single military purchase the nation has ever made. Recent defense acquisitions have come under fire for massive cost blowouts and failed to operate or arrive as planned.

But the Labor Party has not only walked into Morrison’s trap, it has willingly, even enthusiastically, “embraced a decision taken after a deeply flawed process”. Even more consequentially, as Fowler points out,” with the major parties in lockstep on AUKUS, the most complex and expensive spend in Australian military history would never be publicly investigated”.

At the very least, this is an astounding failure of good governance and accountability. Perhaps even more remarkably, it also demonstrates a singular lack of political judgement, driven by short-term political concerns rather than long-term strategic interests.

” Labor lost the one chance it had to be self-assured and courageous, and it prioritized the country’s interests over its justifiable desire to have a government,” claims Fowler. The fear that compelled the ALP leadership to embrace AUKUS without even a second thought will be with them for many years.

Serves them right. Voters, especially those of the younger generation, may be depressed about their futures when there is little discernible difference between the major political parties regarding issues of profound national significance.

Even if the fragile, unpredictable, and polarized nature of US politics is left out, it is not incontrovertible to say that the US alliance has some potential flaws and significant costs. Fighting in conflicts that have no clear strategic relevance for Australia is not the least of them.

AUKUS will further complicate Australia’s relationship with China, our major trading partner. However, there are additional significant risks. This not just because, as Opposition Leader Peter Dutton says, it is “inconceivable” that we would not fight alongside the US in any conflict with China over Taiwan.

If the Naval Base at Garden Island, off the coast of Fremantle, is not already a nuclear target, it will undoubtedly be once US and UK nuclear-powered submarines start operating there regularly. It is a mystery that has n’t been solved whether my neighbors realize they stand a chance of being taken advantage of as part of our commitment to the alliance and a “great nation-building project.”

Local politicians, universities and defense representatives certainly recognize the short-term benefits that may flow from new investment. However, as a result of this, there is likely to be next to no informed discussion about the AUKUS pact, much less any opposition, no matter what the ultimate costs might be for a country that ca n’t even provide adequate housing for its own citizens. The least notable aspect of the sorry submarine saga is perhaps the lack of discussion, to say outrage, about the sheer cost of the AUKUS project.

And that is before we get to the growing doubts about the reliability, deliverability or strategic relevance of nuclear-powered submarines. Perhaps people find technical discussions stupefyingly dull or incomprehensible.

Perhaps they do n’t realize that if we spend all that money on submarines, not only will our ability to act independently be significantly eroded, as Keating and Malcolm Turnbull have claimed, but we wo n’t be able to spend the money on more immediate and tangible threats, like fixing our rapidly degrading natural environment, for example.

I am not convinced Australia needs to buy any submarines. This will no doubt strike those in Canberra’s strategic bubble as heretical, ill-informed and irresponsible. However, it is worth noting that the Collins class submarines, which were out of service for four years, did not appear to have had a negative impact on our overall security.

Even Hugh White, a widely respected expert on these subjects, has questioned the viability of AUKUS. According to White, “long delays and cost overruns are certain.” Outright failure is a real possibility”.

Drunken sailors

Fowler has written a lot of pages for a book on strategic policy.

His account occasionally makes people laugh, especially when they are confused about how the Morrison government and its group of carefully chosen, like-minded advisors, many of whom are government employees who are likely to get paid for their services, act.

Through the revolving door between government and business, many former Morrison ministers and Morrison themselves have taken lucrative positions in the defense sector. Who would have thought?

It is worthwhile to read Nuked to fully understand how Fowler comes to his damning conclusion:

the level of incompetence in the government of Australia was breathtaking, as were the repercussions. The United States would be calling every last word regarding the types of submarines that would be sold to Australia, how old they would be, how many there would be, when they would be delivered, and even if they would be sold at all.

Washington’s behavior in its own best interests was anticipated. The possibility that Morrison truly believed that what was best for America and Australia was the best was extraordinary. Just as extraordinary is the fact that the Labor Party, perhaps fearful of history, embraced the deal that made Australia so vulnerable, undermining its independence and sovereignty.

Another nautical metaphor for spending like drunk sailors comes to mind. If the country’s political leaders were n’t using our money or had other goals besides gaining quick political advantage or avoiding being wedged, it would n’t be as galling.

The good news, perhaps, is that it is difficult to imagine the nuclear-powered submarines will ever arrive. The bad news is that in the interim, we will still have to pay the Americans and the British to help them maintain their overburdened and underperforming shipyards. With friends like these, who needs to make new enemies?

It beggars belief that a nation with unmatched geographical advantages and no obvious enemies would consider it wise to invest A$ 368 billion in offensive military capabilities, which may or may not work or be delivered.

Nuked explains how this circumstance developed. However, we might have to ask psychologists why our political leaders have made us into what diplomat Alan Renouf famously called a “frightened country” and allowed such absurdities to flourish.

University of Technology Sydney adjunct professor Mark Beeson.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The recent approval of a significant change in the US nuclear weapons approach by President Joe Biden highlights how focused are China’s national security officials on their international ambitions.

The US military adjusts its proper emphasis, budgets, and planning as changes in the types of threats that the US faces. For example, after September 11, the US military switched from its Cold War focus on combating the Soviet Union to combat little terrorist and rebel groups.

Over the past century, the Pentagon’s initiatives have shifted back to preparing for what officials call “great energy competition” among the United States, Russia and China.

Concentration on deterrent is the most crucial strategic change that can be seen in strategy for great strength competition. Deterrence is the key to deterrence in traditional martial strategy because it focuses on making an adversary believe it can never achieve its objectives by using military force because the response may be crucial and overwhelming.

The report that sets out the world’s goals, objectives, and asset allocation for the next two decades, the National Defense Strategy, which was released in October 2022, directly acknowledges the possibility of tensions and open conflicts with Russia and China, and calls for “integrated deterrence” to stop them. That entails coordinated attempts from the government, intelligence, and political departments throughout the US government.

The US military forces ‘ contribution to that energy is described in the National Military Strategy, which is the military branch of the overarching National Defense Strategy. As a past assistant secretary of defense and chief of staff for the Pentagon, I observe that the government is focusing on three primary objectives to achieve integrated punishment and stop a conflict with China or Russia.

New operating programs

Integral punishment for the military means that the armed forces will depend on where their troops are located as well as what they can do once they are in action to influence their opponents ‘ decisions regarding when, where, how, and whether to use military power against the US or its interests.

The Defense Department has developed innovative strategies in response to the shift from terrorism toward planning for a great energy conflict by acknowledging that Russia and China may struggle anywhere in the world, on property, and at sea, as well as online and in place.

The Pentagon refers to “dynamic power employment,” which involves US military forces moving quickly and without set rotational intervals. This strategy can reassure friends who are facing challenges from China or Russia.

For instance, the US has, at times, deployed as many as 10, 000 soldiers to Poland. Although the troops are not completely stationed there, a constant presence of US troops keeps Russia guessing as to how big and powerful the army is and demonstrates a commitment to supporting anxious NATO allies in Eastern Europe.

Second is a change of personnel and capabilities to what is called “multi-domain operations“, in which units with various missions across heat, land, sea, area and cyberspace plan and train up. In that manner, they can be prepared to collaborate effectively in problems.

The state can respond to challenges in a variety of ways thanks to this level of cooperation. For instance, challenges to the US Navy on the high seas do n’t need to be directly met with corresponding naval action; instead, they can be resolved with cyberattacks or space-based maneuvers.

This strategy may prompt the Taiwanese People’s Liberation Army to reconsider launching military activities against Taiwan. US digital and space operations may destroy or destroy Chinese military communications, preventing their attack, along with the possibility of a furious strong conflict between the Chinese and US.

Investments in industrialization

Recent research has revealed that China’s opportunities in its military officers and features, especially those in the air, marine, and nuclear forces, have increased exponentially over the past 20 years, to an extent that is thought to be close to par with the United States.

This has prompted the US to upgrade its own government’s related skills. For the 2024 resources, the Department of Defense allocated a staggering US$ 234.9 billion for applications to assist integrated punishment, which likely represents a 10 % increase over previous investing strategies.

Some of this money will go to developing and acquiring F-35 fighter jets and building Columbia-class, nuclear-powered submarines. When the US and its allies in the Pacific region, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, deploy these planes and submarines, they will remind potential adversaries of American military power – which is itself a deterrent against foreign aggression.

Senior US policymakers have been alarmed by China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons supply over the past ten years. Although Barack Obama, the then-President, pushed nations to create a world without nuclear weapons, he approved the most expensive and significant upgrade to the US nuclear arsenal to date.

In 2022, the Biden administration renewed a financial commitment to “field a modern, resilient nuclear triad” consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range nuclear bombers.

Advancing technology

The Space Force was established as a distinct branch of the armed forces in 2019 and has the responsibility to protect American space-based assets and uphold international law.

The Space Force collaborates closely with Cyber Command, the military branch responsible for defending the country against cyberattacks, to stop malicious hackers from hacking into global positioning systems, such as the Global Positioning System, widely known as GPS, because of the significance of satellite communications to military operations and civilian life, including internet connectivity.

Recent information suggests that China intends to attack US critical infrastructure, including the electric grid, during any conflict with China. Cyber Command is advancing its capabilities to protect US systems and businesses from cyberattacks as well as to launch attacks against systems in other nations in response to those plans.

Through a program called the Replicator Initiative, the Pentagon also tries to counterbalance China’s rapidly expanding military. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, the effort aims to create thousands of low-cost, AI-directed autonomous aircraft and boats that can be used in combat.

Integration with allies and partners

Over the past four years of the Biden administration, the US military has also made efforts to strengthen alliances with other nations.

NATO’s membership and the number and strength of troops at its disposal were both increased as a result of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By investing nearly$ 3 billion in funding for additional fighter aircraft, air-defense batteries, and munitions, the US has strengthened its commitment to NATO, increasing troop deployments in Eastern Europe, and supporting European defense initiatives.

The US has strengthened alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in Asia, both close to the Indian Ocean and across the Pacific Ocean, a vast region that the government frequently refers to as” the Indo-Pacific,” by holding numerous military exercises and increasing military support. Chinese military and political influence is being fought with strategies like the yearly Marine Aviation Support exercise.

By 2030, the US has pledged to sell up to five conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to the Australian Navy as a means of strengthening its ties with the UK and Australia.

The US has put all of these efforts into a single plan to avoid a public conflict with China and Russia. But the work is not yet done: The global political and military landscape is ever-changing, and new security challenges are always emerging.

At Harvard Kennedy School, Eric Rosenbach is a senior lecturer on public policy. Grace Jones, a master’s student in public policy and research assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, contributed research to this article.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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