Japan reminds world why it’s stuck in QE quicksand

TOKYO – The Bank of Japan bowed to financial realpolitik Tuesday (October 31) by allowing bond yields to top 1%. But Governor Kazuo Ueda remains tethered to a level of policy unreality sure to keep the yen under strong downward pressure.

Ueda’s step was the tiniest the BOJ could have gotten away with without shoulder-checking global markets. It means far less than currency traders may think in terms of when and how Japan might exit a 23-year-old quantitative easing (QE) experiment.

The BOJ meeting “ended up somewhat confusingly but largely dovish leaving the yen still vulnerable to a further sell-off versus the dollar,” says Gary Dugan, chief investment officer at Dalma Capital.

In fact, the events of the last month might have ensured that Ueda’s team remains stuck in the QE quicksand longer than markets appreciate.

Since taking the helm in April, Ueda has been testing markets’ readiness for BOJ “tapering.” It hasn’t gone well so far. A move in late July, for example, to let 10-year bond yields rise from 0.5% to 1% sent the yen higher than Tokyo expected.

In the weeks that followed, the BOJ executed countless large and unscheduled bond purchases. That signaled to traders that the July tweak was inevitable given the surge in US yields to 17-year highs and that overall BOJ rate policies hadn’t changed. It was similar to the one-step-forward-two-steps-back maneuver the BOJ pulled off in December.

Tuesday’s tweak is more of the same. As US rates continue drifting upward, causing extreme tensions between dollar and yen rates, the BOJ has no choice but to adjust. After all, it remains to be seen how many more US tightening moves are in store for global markets. News that US gross domestic product (GDP) rose at a 4.9% annualized pace in the third quarter upped the odds the Federal Reserve will keep hiking rates.

Yet Ueda’s challenge grew markedly bigger this month for other reasons, too. One is the sudden explosion of violence in the Middle East. The Hamas-Israel war threatens to accelerate increases in oil prices, adding to inflation risks caused by Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion. Japanese inflation is running the hottest in three decades at close to 3% year on year.

Significantly, the BOJ raised its inflation forecast to 2.8% from 2.5% for fiscal 2023. For 2024, price expectations have been raised to 2.8% as well.

But even as commodity price surges warrant tighter policies, China’s economic downshift is pulling BOJ priorities in the other direction. In October, mainland factory activity slid back into contraction, while the services sector slowed more than expected.

The manufacturing purchasing managers index dropped to 49.5 from 50.2 in September. Non-manufacturing activity fell to 50.6 from 51.7.

“China’s economic activity fell to an extent, and the foundation for a continued recovery still needs to be further solidified,” says Zhao Qinghe, senior statistician at China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Economist Raymond Yeung at Australia & New Zealand Bank adds this “downside surprise” means Beijing “will still need to deliver growth-supportive policy.” 

As Japan’s top trading partner stumbles, exporters are bracing for a rough 2024. That’s dimming hopes that Japan Inc might boost wages, kicking off a virtuous cycle of income and consumption gains.

As headwinds mount, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government is rushing to roll out fresh stimulus. They include proposals for tax cuts for the middle class, reduced corporate levies and cash handouts to households facing higher inflation.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s ‘new capitalism’ looks a lot like the old. Photo: Government of Japan

The large and growing price tag for fiscal initiatives could increase pressure on the BOJ to add more, not less, liquidity. Otherwise, government bond yields might surge, adding to financial pressures on banks and households.

Yet Kishida’s latest proposals complicate Ueda’s options in another way. By shoveling fiscal money to fill economic holes, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is treating the symptoms of Japan’s troubles, not the underlying ailments.

As inflation spikes higher, Kishida’s approval ratings are plummeting, currently around 29%, to the lowest of his two years in power. Hence the rush to ramp up fiscal stimulus efforts.

Missing, though, are proposals to raise Japan’s political game. When he took power in October 2021, Kishida pledged to implement a “new capitalism” plan to spread more equitably the benefits of economic growth.

Part of the strategy was addressing the unfinished business from the “Abenomics” era, reference to Shinzo Abe’s 2012-2020 premiership, the longest in Japan’s history.

Abe promised a supply-side revolution the likes of which modern Japan had never seen. It included moves to loosen labor markets, reduce bureaucracy, boost innovation and productivity, empower women and restore Tokyo’s place as Asia’s premier financial center for multinational companies and stock listings.

Mostly, Abe leaned on the BOJ to supersize QE. In March 2013, he hired Haruhiko Kuroda as governor to turbocharge an experiment that the BOJ pioneered in 2000 and 2001.

Within five years, Kuroda’s binging on bonds and stocks pushed the BOJ’s balance sheet above $4.9 trillion, topping Japan’s annual GDP. A resulting plunge in the yen boosted exports, juicing the stock market and generating record corporate profits.

Yet Abe’s team put very few reform wins on the scoreboard. Other than steps to strengthen corporate governance, the Abe era failed at nearly every turn to recalibrate growth engines, level playing fields and give chieftains confidence to fatten paychecks.

One big concern is that Tokyo’s same-old-same-old policy approach has lost potency over time. Economist Sayuri Shirai at Keio University notes that, this time a falling yen isn’t altering Japan’s export and trade deficit dynamics like in the past. Industrial production and corporate investment also “remain sluggish,” says Shirai, a former BOJ policy board member.

“While the government’s revenue is increasing due to inflation-induced income and consumption taxes, this is essentially a tax hike,” she explains. “Wage growth has not caught up with the rate of inflation. Given rising government and corporate debt, a rapid interest rate hike is likely to cause significant stress to the economy.”

But weak exchange rates leave Japan uniquely vulnerable to surging energy and food prices. This dynamic is colliding with a domestic economy that might not be ready for a shift away from ultraloose monetary policy. One big worry: the risk of a Silicon Valley Bank-like blowup amongst Japan’s 100-plus regional lenders.

Worries about another SVB abound in the US, too. As Fed Chairman Jerome Powell’s team mulls another rate hike — perhaps as soon as November 1 – investors are scouring the financial landscape for the next bank that might buckle under the pressure of rising US yields.

A relentlessly strong dollar is also raising default risks in Asia, particularly in China. It’s making offshore debt harder to manage.

“The greenback continues to draw smaller benefits from strong US data and high rate advantage than it should, likely due to its overbought status, but upside risks remain predominant,” says Francesco Pesole, an analyst at ING Bank.

Analyst Adam Button at ForexLive says the constant threat that Japan’s Ministry of Finance might intervene to support the yen is capping the dollar’s gains – at least for now. But the dollar, Button notes, “should be stronger than it is this week, and I think it’s just a matter of time until it materializes.”

In general, though, traders need to figure out where both US and Japanese rates are heading to know where risks lie. “Additional positioning doesn’t really make sense until those two key risk events are out of the way,” says Bipan Rai, currency strategy at CIBC Capital Markets.

The fragility of Japan’s sprawling regional bank network remains a clear and present danger to Asia’s second-biggest economy. Many of these lenders service rapidly aging communities in already sparsely populated areas of the country. That squeezed profits well before the banking shocks of the last 15 years, including fallout from the 2008 “Lehman shock.”

That crisis, fast-aging customer bases and an accelerating exodus of companies to Tokyo had regional banks these last 15 years hoarding government and corporate bonds instead of lending the credit the BOJ has been churning out. It was a similar practice that blew up SVB and New York-based Signature Bank.

Earlier this month, Japan’s Financial Services Agency telegraphed efforts to stress-test at least 20 banks to surface any SVB-like landmines across the nation. Part of the worry is the specter of similar social-media-fueled bank runs.

No developed economy prizes stability and financial market decorum more than Japan. And few, if any, face greater concerns about hidden cracks than Japan with scores of fragile regional banks in harm’s way.

Photo. Reuters / Yuya Shino
The Bank of Japan has some tough decisions to make. Image: Asia Times Files / Reuters

At the start of 2023, SMBC Nikko Securities estimated that regional leaders were sitting on about $10.5 billion of unrealized losses on foreign bonds and other securities. That has Ueda’s team wondering how big losses might become if government bond yields rose to 2% or even higher.

The comparisons between midsize banks in the US and Japan are limited, of course. SMBC Nikko analyst Masahiko Sato argues that the average threat to capital ratios is only about 2%. Therefore, Sato does “not think potential losses are on a scale with systemic implications.”

At the same time, many of Japan’s regional lenders, like SVB, tend to prioritize bonds that can be sold rather than holding debt to maturity. But BOJ tapering or even a rate hike or two could change this calculus, and fast.

If regional banks face profit pressures with rates at zero, the fallout from a big rate pivot by Ueda could be extreme. This could explain in part why “markets are seemingly underpricing the risks of an early normalization,” says Charu Chanana, a senior market strategist at Saxo Capital Markets.

Stefan Angrick, senior economist at Moody’s Analytics, says “this doesn’t rule out the BOJ dropping negative rates at some point — we speculate this may happen in April 2024, after the spring wage negotiations that year.”

But, he concluded, “it suggests that the way forward is towards zero interest rate policy with some form of quantitative easing, rather than a sharp lift-off on the short end.”

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Billion-baht gold scam misused respected firm’s name

Billion-baht gold scam misused respected firm's name
Police arrest suspects in the “Aurora” gold investment scam, at one of 21 raided locations last week. (Photo: Central Investigation Bureau)

Police have busted a Chinese-led gang that used the name of a respected jewellery firm to lure people into a bogus billion-baht gold investment scheme.

Raids on 21 premises in Bangkok, Chon Buri and Chiang Mai over the past week resulted in the arrest of 26 suspects, six of them Chinese nationals, Central Investigation Bureau chief Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop Bhuridej said on Tuesday. There were 50 suspects in the case.

He said the scammers were based in Thailand and misused the name of a well-known jewellery manufacturing company, Aurora Design, to attract their victims.

According to the commissioner, the gang was run by four Chinese nationals and a Thai woman – Aixia Liu, 48, Long Huabiao, 38, Yangfeng Xiao, 29, Liang Wang, 28, and Sakuna Chansuk, 44. The Chinese suspects were apprehended in Bangkok and Chon Buri. The other two Chinese were not named.

The gang created a fake Facebook page in the name of Aurora Design, offering investment returns of 20-30%. When investors tried to withdraw their promised profits, they were blocked and all contact ceased.

Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop said most of the arrested suspects denied all charges. Police impounded  cryptocurrency worth about 28 million baht found in their possession for examination.

“Investigators found that the group had more than 1.2 billion baht in circulation,” he said.

The gang had Thai proxies running three front companies which processed its money.

According to the CIB chief, victims’ money was transferred through three layers of Thai mule accounts into foreigners’ accounts.

Some of the money was spent in Thailand and on goods purchased overseas. The goods were delivered to Cambodia and Laos, where they were sold for cash. The victims’ money was also used to buy into cryptocurrencies or to buy property.

Unlike call scams, which operated from neighbouring countries, this gang was based in Thailand, Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop said. The investigation was ongoing.

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Why we’re seeing shifting patterns in global manufacturing

The 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Beijing on October 18 witnessed the usual smiles and handshakes. But China’s economic landscape, dependent on robust supply-chain networks, is facing turbulent times.

The US-led trade war had already disrupted Chinese industry and supply chains before the Covid-19 pandemic further backlogged ports and exacerbated disruptions. President Joe Biden’s administration has meanwhile continued to expand policies restricting China’s access to the US market and technologies, including new restrictions on advanced chip exports announced just one day before the BRI summit.

Foreign direct investment into China also plummeted by 43% in 2022, while the United States has persuaded allies to curtail their economic collaborations with China. For instance, Italy, which joined China’s BRI in 2019, announced its withdrawal from the project this April.

Meanwhile, the Netherlands began imposing restrictions on semiconductor exports to China in March. The 2018 arrest of two Canadian businessmen, widely perceived as retaliation for Canada’s detention of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou at Washington’s request, has made foreign executives increasingly hesitant to travel to China.

The greatest concern for Beijing, however, is the threat to China’s manufacturing and export-led economic model, which has driven China’s growth for most of the 21st century. In the first half of 2023, China’s share of US goods imports stood at 13.3%, a decline from 21.6% in 2017, marking the lowest figure since 2003.

Some of this decline can be attributed to “re-shoring” policies, which are encouraging American companies to build factories in the US, with European companies also promoting local manufacturing.

Economic decoupling initiatives have also prompted Western companies to establish manufacturing infrastructure in friendly or nearby countries, often referred to as near-shoring or friend-shoring.

Countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Mexico and others are vying for Western companies’ attention, offering subsidies, tax breaks, and other incentives. The newest iPhone was assembled in India, for example, while more than half of Nike’s shoes are now made in Vietnam.

Mexico steps up

However, it is Mexico that appears poised to reap the most benefits from this “lifetime opportunity,” according to Bank of America. Its proximity to the US and the USMCA free-trade agreement with the US and Canada has driven American companies to ramp up production in Mexico.

Combined with the growing automation of the US manufacturing sector, these developments have sparked debate about whether China’s “peak manufacturing” has already passed.

Nonetheless, as the “world’s factory,” China’s dominance in manufacturing remains stable enough to support its economy. Its share of global manufacturing actually grew from 26% in 2017 to 31∞ in 2021 (aided by the global decline in manufacturing in the years leading up to and during the Covid-19 pandemic), whereas India, Mexico and Vietnam contributed only 3%, 1.5% and 0.6% respectively.

China’s share of global manufactured exports by value also grew from 17 % to 21% in the same period, and despite some declines in bilateral trade, US-China trade hit a record high in 2022.

China’s resilience to global supply-chain shifts can be attributed to strategic infrastructure investments that have streamlined its manufacturing and export operations. Efficient ports, extensive highways, reliable rail systems, well-established industrial parks, stable governance, a large working-age population, and other factors set China apart from potential competitors.

Although the value of manufacturing in the US has risen and 800,000 manufacturing jobs have been created over the last two years, for example, this has not kept up with job growth in other industries, and manufacturing’s share of US GDP has continued to decline. There are also fears that the US will have a shortage of 2.1 million skilled manufacturing workers by 2030.

India faces challenges related to competition from cheaper imports, high input costs, taxes, and regulatory hurdles, while Mexico contends with corruption and instability from cartels and Vietnam grapples with power outages and bureaucratic red tape.

Resistance to change

Instead, many of China’s manufacturing competitors have opted to collaborate with China, reinforcing traditional supply-chain dependencies that Washington is striving to break. This is exemplified most clearly in Mexico, where the advantageous conditions for US companies have also made it an attractive destination for Chinese companies seeking a nearby gateway to the US market.

Remarkably, 80% of the land leased to foreign companies in Mexican industrial parks is now in the hands of Chinese enterprises (compared with 15% for US companies), allowing Chinese goods to be delivered for final assembly before being exported to the US.

This phenomenon extends beyond Mexico. At the end of 2022, the US Department of Commerce discovered that major solar suppliers in Southeast Asia were barely altering Chinese products before they were sent to the US. Across the region, Chinese green tech companies are making significant inroads into the manufacturing infrastructure.

Even Vietnam, despite its ongoing and historical tensions with China, has cautiously embraced Chinese companies looking to drastically expand their presence in the country.

After spending billions of dollars building economic relations with their Chinese counterparts, US companies have also resisted cutting ties with their Chinese partners. A 2021 Federal Reserve research note suggested that many are underreporting their imports from China to evade tariffs imposed by Washington.

Others are encouraging their Chinese partners to establish factories in North America. Additionally, the cancellation of programs (or those slated to expire in the next few years) allowing goods from many developing nations to enter the US duty-free may leave room for China to step in as a preferred source for US distributors.

Despite the limitations of Western decoupling policies, it’s worth noting that China is also working toward a form of decoupling to reduce its dependence on the West. Announced in 2015, the Made in China (MIC25) initiative seeks to eliminate Chinese companies’ reliance on foreign nations for critical technologies and products.

Policies also continue to be introduced to expand China’s domestic market to compensate for restrictions on overseas markets.

Adjustments to Chinese policy

China’s economy will continue to be characterized by strengths and weaknesses. The rising wages of Chinese workers have steadily eroded the international competitiveness of the country’s shrinking labor pool, while an ongoing property crisis has shaken faith in China’s domestic economy. Moreover, Beijing has become less liberal with capital, opting instead to recover outstanding loans from the BRI.

However, Chinese officials and businesses are increasingly lobbying local governments with “small but beautiful projects” that negate the need for consultation with more suspicious national leaders. China also remains crucial in areas such as rare-earth minerals and is expanding its role in manufacturing higher-end products, from aviation to green tech, to compete with high-tech Western firms.

Chinese endeavors in Latin America and Southeast Asia to adopt Chinese supply chains also position it to sell to these markets.

Although it may seem that we have “already hit or passed the peak share of China in world manufacturing,” no other country has or is projected to rival China’s manufacturing power and export networks. Furthermore, neither China nor the West is able or willing to sever their economic ties.

Even amid the collapse in relations between the West and Russia since 2022, Russian energy has continued to flow to Western countries, Western technology has continued to enter Russia, and Western companies that have said they are leaving Russia have remained.

The massive disruptions required for true economic decoupling from China are unpalatable to the public and the private sector. This reality is reflected in the shifting language of US and EU officials, who now emphasize de-risking instead of decoupling from China.

Chinese and Western companies instead look to continue bypassing restrictions and conducting business, reflecting the resilience of the Chinese manufacturing sector and making it clear that US-Western economic co-dependency is a formidable bond that won’t be easily broken.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

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Govt to waive visas for Taiwan, India to boost tourism

Govt to waive visas for Taiwan, India to boost tourism
Thai and foreign tourists visit Wat Pho, a Buddhist temple complex in the Phra Nakhon District, Bangkok, on Oct 22, 2023. (Photo: Apichart Jinakul)

Thailand will waive visa requirements for arrivals from India and Taiwan from next month to May 2024, a government official said on Tuesday, in a bid to draw in more tourists as high season approaches.

Thailand in September scrapped visa requirements for Chinese tourists, the country’s top pre-coronavirus-pandemic tourism market with 11 million of the record 39 million arrivals in 2019.

From January to Oct 29, there were 22 million visitors to Thailand, generating 927.5 billion baht (US$25.67 billion), according to the latest government data.

“Arrivals from India and Taiwan can enter Thailand for 30 days,” government spokesman Chai Wacharonke said.

India has been Thailand’s fourth largest source market for tourism so far this year with about 1.2 million arrivals after Malaysia, China and South Korea.

Inbound tourism from India showed signs of growth as more airlines and hospitality chains targeted that market.

Thailand is targeting about 28 million arrivals this year, with the new government hoping the travel sector can offset continued weak exports that have constrained economic growth. 

The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) had hoped travellers from Taiwan and India will be next in line for visa waivers if visa-free entry for mainland Chinese tourists is made permanent, as proposed by Prime Minister and Finance Minister Srettha Thavisin

Mr Srettha said that the temporary visa exemption for Chinese travellers, which is scheduled to end on Feb 29, could be made permanent.

He made the comment during the signing of a letter of intent between the TAT and eight Chinese companies on Oct 19 in Beijing, where he led a Thai delegation attending the Belt and Road Forum.

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Redex Group raises  mil Series A funding led by Aramco Ventures

Investors from the Middle East, SEA & Japan also participated in this round
Funds will enable global expansion and streamline REC issuance and digitisation

Redex, Asia’s leading Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) solutions provider, announced the completion of its US$ 10 million (RM47.6 million) Series A funding round, with Aramco Ventures as the lead…Continue Reading

Loved or loathed, carbon capture is here to stay 

Energy, government, and United Nations agencies agree that carbon capture and storage (CCS) is an essential weapon in fighting climate change. The technology will be a central part of the debate at the COP28 conference starting in Dubai on Monday.

But most environmental groups – and many environmentally minded journalists – oppose it, seeking out and playing up arguments for its demise

Why is CCS so vital, yet so vilified?

Carbon capture and storage, or its close cousin, carbon capture, use and storage (CCUS), is a suite of technologies for trapping carbon dioxide, the main gas responsible for climate change, from power stations, industrial facilities, and other sites burning oil, gas, coal, biomass, or solid wastes, or emitting CO2 during production, such as in cement-making.

The carbon dioxide is then piped to a location to be safely disposed of thousands of meters underground, in depleted oil or gas fields, or within rock formations containing undrinkable saline water. It also can be used to make fuels, fertilizers, plastics, enhance plant growth in greenhouses, and even to put the fizz into drinks.

The We Mean Business Coalition, 131 companies representing nearly US$1 trillion of yearly revenues, published a letter saying, “We call on all Parties attending COP28 in Dubai to seek outcomes that will lay the groundwork to transform the global energy system towards a full phase out of unabated fossil fuels and halve emissions this decade.” Unabated, in this context, means using capture techniques to keep emissions from warming the planet.

Technology wrongly disparaged

Yet recent articles by Bloombergthe Financial Times (which reported on the coalition’s letter), The Wall Street Journal, and others address the failings, real or alleged, of various carbon-capture projects. Because the technology is promoted by the oil and gas industry, these reports start from the standpoint that CCS is somehow optional, that it must prove itself, and that it’s at best an undesirable necessity.

This is radically wrong and misleading, and dangerous for successful climate policy.

Currently, about 42.6 million tons per year of capture is operating worldwide. Another 198.2 million tons per year is under construction or in advanced or early development. The International Energy Agency’s sustainable development scenario requires an additional 600 million tons of annual capture by 2030; its net-zero scenario has almost 1 billion tons by then.

Carbon capture and storage is rapidly broadening beyond its original deployments in North America and Europe, to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Australia. Saudi Arabia plans to reach 44 million tons of annual capture at Jubail International City by 2035; the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi National Oil Company recently doubled its 2030 target to 10 million tons.

This is not an “unproven” or “risky” or “too expensive” method, as it’s often labeled; it’s a well-established technology that is accelerating into mainstream use. 

Why, one might ask, not use renewable energy entirely instead of fossil fuels with CCS?

Entirely renewable-based power systems may be theoretically possible, but they’re rare to date, used only in a few small countries (like Iceland), and largely based on hydropower, which has environmental drawbacks of its own and requires suitable geography.

Systems relying solely on high shares of wind and solar are virtually unheard of and, to the extent they exist, are reliant on significant interconnections with other grids.

Including some share of gas-based electricity in the system lowers overall costs significantly and raises reliability. New gas power stations with integrated carbon capture promise very low-cost clean power.

Even more important, many essential industrial processes don’t have a viable non-fossil alternative. These include iron and steel, cement, fertilizers, chemicals, and refining. 

In the case of cement and many chemical processes, the release of carbon dioxide is an integral part of production. Some of the others have electrical or hydrogen-based options, but these are expensive, often technologically unready, and impossible to retrofit to existing facilities. These could be introduced during the 2030s, but we need decisive action on emissions this decade to be anywhere near net-zero by the UN’s target of 2050.

Carbon capture and storage is indeed backed by the oil and gas industry, just as solar power is backed by the renewables industry, and wind power by windy countries. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Norway, Britain, the United States, Australia, Canada and other important fossil-fuel producers have made it a central part of their climate strategies. This is self-interested, but also practical.

Fossil fuels will continue to be a major part of the global energy mix to 2050 and beyond, even in “net-zero” scenarios – and we are far from being on track for those. The more carbon dioxide we emit now, the more we must remove from the atmosphere in the future. Recent news coverage underlines the dismal record of most biologically based carbon offsets – saving forests that weren’t in danger or that burnt down after credits were issued. 

By contrast, CCS, and its special case, direct air capture of atmospheric carbon dioxide, offer verifiable, measurable, permanent disposal.

Instead of attacking and seeking to halt CCS, journalists and environmental campaigners should be holding oil companies and countries to account, demanding that they deliver on their CCS commitments.

They should be scrutinizing policies that fail to support CCS sufficiently, or don’t put it on a level playing field with renewables, electric vehicles, and other more politically favored climate-friendly options. 

And they should ask where some past unsuccessful projects went wrong, and how to avoid similar mistakes in the future.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

Follow this writer on X @robinenergy.

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Ukraine crunch coming: Zelensky on the rocks?

In more ways than one, Ukraine is facing a crunch that could topple the Zelensky government.  

Ukraine’s situation has worsened since the failure of the much advertised Ukrainian “counter-offensive.” Focused mainly on the Zaphorize area, but also including renewed emphasis on trying to return to Bakhmut, the entire enterprise stalled. Ukraine suffered huge casualties and equipment losses with almost nothing to show for it. Even the fighting in Bradley square, aimed at breaching the Surovikin defenses, failed.

It is now getting worse as the Russians begin their own offensive, some of it focused on Avdiivka, on the Krasny Liman area, and Kupyansk. Virtually every report indicates important Russian tactical successes despite the reinforcements Ukraine throws in. The Russian operations appear to be an effort to create effective borders for Donetsk and Luhansk while possibly preparing for even deeper thrusts elsewhere.

The Western and Ukrainian news media claim that the Russians are taking heavy losses in these operations. But it would seem that it is the Ukrainians who are rushing in reinforcements, especially around Avdiivka, suggesting the Ukrainian army is being hard pressed by the Russians.

Ukraine has also suffered heavy losses in its air force. If unconfirmed reports coming from Russia are accurate, it would seem the Russians in October were able to destroy 20 Mig-29’s, eight Su-25’s, one Su-24, and two L-39’s. (The L-39 is a trainer and light attack aircraft produced by the Czech Republic’s Aero Vodochody.)

The Mig-29 is a fourth generation jet interceptor that flies faster and turns better than the US F-16 and the F/A-18A.  After their introduction in 1983, the Soviet Union provided them to a number of Eastern European countries then in the Warsaw Pact.  Some of these planes have been handed over to Ukraine. 

MiG-29S "MiG-35S" camouflage
Mig-29.

Sergey Shoigu, Russia’s defense minister, speaking on October 25th, said, “We have received systems that have shot down 24 aircraft over the past five days.” Shoigu did not say what the “systems” were or where they were operating.

It isn’t clear how many Mig-29’s remain in Ukraine’s inventory, but probably only a handful.  

The Russians also destroyed at least three, perhaps more, Leopard tanks. The 14 US supplied M-1 Abrams tanks so far have not been seen in combat and could be a strategic reserve for Ukraine’s army. Ukraine has admitted that the Abrams tanks, like the Leopards, are vulnerable to Russian killer drones such as the improved Lancet, and also can be destroyed by artillery and mines.

The second crunch coming for Ukraine is all about money. In the US House of Representatives, the Republicans are separating aid for Israel from aid for Ukraine and intend to take legislative action on money for Israel ($14 billion) perhaps in the first week of November. They will take up Ukraine assistance separately, but it isn’t clear what a Ukraine package will look like – although it appears the amount of money, $61.4 billion, will be subjected to heavy scrutiny and the funds reduced.

A significant part of the administration’s aid to Ukraine pays salaries for Ukrainian government employees, operating funds and even pensions. The Biden administration proposed $16.3 billion to prop up Zelensky’s government, which is $2.3 billion more than all the proposed aid for Israel.

Even if the war in Ukraine ended today, it would be years before the Ukrainian economy could generate enough revenue to cover government operating costs. That means that the US treasury would need to give Ukraine billions every year just to stay in business, for as long as the next decade. (Of course if the Russians should somehow take over, they would have to pay.)

These government operating funds are also easy targets for corruption.  Congress will probably reduce funds for government operating costs and attach conditions on the aid requiring accountability for the money sent there. There are suggestions that some of the corruption involves American companies and political partners with connections to leading Democratic party officials.

It remains to be seen how tough the conditions are and how much will survive of this $16.3 billion in the budget.

Congress may also want an exit strategy for Ukraine. Up until now, no exit strategy has been proposed, but given the state of the US economy and the rising loss of confidence that Ukraine can prevail against Russia, it is likely that demands for an exit strategy could be built into the money bill for Ukraine.

Zelensky is already reportedly having problems with his generals. There are two parts to this problem. The first was the long delay in launching the counter-offensive, which angered Pentagon and White House officials who wanted it done as a show of strength against the Russians and as a way to secure NATO support going forward.

The US, UK and NATO prepared elaborate battlefield scenarios and simulations, helped train the Ukrainian forces, equipped at least three brigades with Western equipment throughout, yet the Ukrainian army leaders feared the assaults might not be successful and that they lacked essential weapons.

Finally, the offensive got started last June and failed by September, confirming the worst fears of Ukraine’s military leaders (and draining the country of thousands of combat-trained soldiers.)

Now, again, Zelensky has made demands of Ukraine’s army, this time over his favorite hobby horse, Bakhmut while also insisting on the need to defend Avdiivka. Again the top leadership saw these two objectives as traps that would consume increasingly scarce manpower and equipment.

The fighting continues in both places, although the Russians have taken control of a strategic slag pile in Avdiivka which gives them unobstructed fire control over the city and a direct path to the massive coke plant that dominates the city’s skyline. 

Coke plant in Avdiivka. Photo: GMK Center

In Bakhmut the Ukrainians made some initial gains to the south of the city (in the north they were stopped outright), but now the Russians are getting ready to push them back. In general the prognosis is twofold: The Russians will continue to successfully push back Ukrainian forces and Ukraine will continue to lose manpower essential for its strategic reserve.

File:Oleg Tsaryov.jpg
Oleg Tsaryov

Zelensky obviously knows he could be replaced and fears that a deal might be made between the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. That may explain why Ukraine’s domestic intelligence service (SBU) attempted to kill Oleg Tsaryov, a former Ukrainian legislator who US intelligence said was being groomed to replace Zelensky last year when Russian forces attempted a takeover of Kiev.

Tsaryov was shot twice and was found unconscious in Yalta. Ukraine says he is a traitor and he is on a list of other traitors.  There have been a number of assassinations carried out by Ukraine’s SBU targeting Zelensky opponents.

The timing of the shooting of Tsaryov, an obviously high value target, suggests that Zelensky in anxious to liquidate potential challengers. Inside Ukraine he is also clamping down, arresting opponents such as Ihor Kolomoisky, a Ukrainian billionaire and banker, on charges of fraud.

Igor Kolomoisky at a court hearing in Kyiv on September 2, 2023.
Ihor Kolomoisky

If the military situation continues to deteriorate and the US Congress walks back at least some of Ukraine’s money, Zelensky’s tenure may have reached an end point. Zelensky could be on the rocks.

Stephen Bryen, who served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense
for policy, currently is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.

This article was originally published on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.

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Two dead as Bangladesh garment workers protest low pay

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