The coming US-China financial divorce – Asia Times

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The United States and China’s economic ties no longer pose a hazard in the future. It is formalized, moving, and deeply disruptive around. Understanding this novel time is crucial for investors because it is not recommended.

More than just a business skirmish, the broad tariffs on Chinese imports have now been passed into law. They represent a traditional shift in the world’s supply chains, scientific ecosystems, and capital flows.

It’s not just about economy here. Control and financial power are both at play here. Investors may then adjust to a world where the fundamental principles of international commerce are being restored quickly and under pressure.

President Trump signed a broad common 10 % tax on all imports on April 2, which would increase to an extraordinary 60 % on Chinese products. These new taxes are atop an already formidable 85 % tax roof, which results in total costs of 145 % on Chinese exports to the US.

Beijing launched the initial volleys of retaliation, including banning the trade of crucial minerals that are vital to the American tech and aerospace sectors, as soon as supply chains started to splinter, and cost pressures raged across industries.

The two largest economy of the world are currently at odds with one another structurally, not in terms of strategy. Although the term” Cold War” is frequently overused, it is becoming more difficult to ignore the parallels. Realizing this is the end of the long-held notion that economic integration would act as a buffer against political issue.

What do a full-fledged economic divorce entail?

First, cash flows will become more and more polarized. Will more and more restrictions and attention been placed on dealings between American and Chinese entities, which were once thought to be routine. Actions with a dollar denomination may be restrained. US pension finances, university endowments, and index-linked ETFs could confront direct restrictions or growing political pressure to sell from Chinese goods.

This could lead to a flood of delistings from US exchanges, more stringent CFIUS reviews, and more inbound investment controls aimed at specific industries. Trump’s officials are now sending out clear warnings that the US government should not be “funding China’s fall.”

Next, the technological gap may grow and grow bigger. Firms like Huawei, ZTE, and DJI were put under a lot of stress in the past. Focus is now turning more and more toward AI, semiconductor manufacturing, clean energy platforms, and the next-generation industries. Washington is moving to wall away full innovation ecosystems, not just to limit exports.

Hope tighter registration standards, more stringent investment restrictions, and more drastic sanctions against Chinese businesses as well as those of allies that have close ties with Beijing. This is about granting China access to fundamental capabilities while imposing technical dominance.

Third, the very foundation of international funding is being challenged. The dollar-based method has been the natural arbitrator of global commerce for decades. That independence is diminishing.

China is aggressively promoting the yuan internationalization in anticipation of limits on its currency’s exposure. Its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System ( CIPS) is being touted as a SWIFT alternative, aiming to make a competing financial system less reliant on Western sanctions.

The development of parallel financial systems will alter the flow of capital, restructure trade agreements, and add new layers of complexity to currency markets.

This transition may bring volatility but even opportunity for investors.

On the one hand, nations that are close to the United States will be a source of corporate capital. As businesses expand their manufacturing operations away from China, there are already important outflows from India, Vietnam, Mexico, and some parts of Eastern Europe.

Reshoring and friendshoring, once considered commercial words, have evolved into obvious government policy, supported by strong economic bonuses and political will. On the other hand, China is repositioning rather than retreating.

President Xi Jinping’s effective romance of the Global South highlights Beijing’s plan to strengthen relationships with developing countries that are under pressure from American isolationism.

Through partnerships in 5G, AI, clean energy, and superior production, Xi’s new visits to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, which are nations that are directly impacted by Trump’s tariffs, highlight Beijing’s effort to integrate these nations into its sphere of influence.

Buyers must be aware that this is no longer about military tariff fights or headline-driven ruckus.

It’s about a fundamental restructuring that will affect every aspect of index content, foreign exchange approach, ESG frameworks, and capital allocation. The outdated notion that industrialization was a push invincible is being broken down in front of us.

The speed behind the economic divorce suggests it is about to become inevitable, even though it is not yet final. And like with any sloppy isolation, fortunes will be made not by those who react physically, but by those who anticipate where assets, impact, and opportunities may flow when the ancient household is split.

The discerning investment will be guided by a mastery of the fresh rather than a return to the old.

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In Trump we do not trust – Asia Times

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We must then add a monetary problems, one capable of making the others little, much worse, to a political crisis and an economic crisis. President Donald Trump abruptly retreated from his tariff policy to the worst version, a retreat that any ordinary leader would have found humiliating. This was because he and his Wall Street supporters realized that by midweek US economic markets were on the verge of disaster, a disaster that could rival or even surpass the 2007-08 crash.

Trump was persuaded to move back a few feet from the rock’s border to which he had taken America and the world, but that threat has been for the time being. However, the mountain is still standing and is still standing. Trump’s business war has caused a loss of faith in US government bill, but that is where the biggest danger lies.

The lira sovereign debt crisis of 2010 appears to be much more recent. US Treasury securities have been viewed as the safest of all economic assets, just like German government bonds were back then by the most reliable of governments. Interest has turned to the now shattered believe as a result.

    to America’s$ 36 trillion common loan, which is four times as large as Japan’s loan and is 12 times as large as Italy’s.

  • to how a good recession would affect that debt,
  • to the resulting increase in interest expenses, and
  • to whether the Trump presidency might use the US dollar and public debt as negotiations leverage.

Additionally, the fact that Trump has already declared a total siege against imports from China by imposing a 135 percent price may increase the chances that China may dump its US Treasuries in answer, even if it would suffer a significant reduction in doing so. China is one of the largest foreign holders of US Treasuries. The$ 759 billion of US Treasuries it held at the end of 2024 represent an obvious weapon since Beijing has stated it is willing to fight the trade war” to the end.”

Trade taxes are bad enough, but this economic collapse poses a serious threat to consumers. Businesses are incredibly dependent on the endurance and great belief of the counterparties with whom business is conducted, many of whom have looked powerful because of their holdings of US Treasuries. When healthy assets begin to appear illegal, all financial institution risk factors start to change, and one’s financing costs start to rise.

A similar trend may be occurring in America today, just as the decline of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in 2008 led to a number of other crises. The US Federal Reserve Board can still be relied upon to help the financial structure by purchasing Treasuries, just as the European Central Bank did by promising to get German bill after 2010; however, the country’s chaotic state makes it impossible to rely on the US Treasury and White House in the same way.

Several fundamental information about Trump must be kept in mind. He has filed for bankruptcy four days to mistake on his debt as a business. He is a globe expert at using energy for self-advancement and knowing everything about international trade and finance.

Sad to say, he is capable of deciding that forcing a renewal of its debts would be wise for America and of overriding experts who might have been averse to do so.

This leaves America and the rest of the world dealing with three difficult realities: one about trade, one about confidence and uncertainty, and one about how the countries ‘ current relationships are becoming at least as significant as their interactions with the world’s most powerful nation, the United States.

Trump’s tax surrender has essentially changed the label for his trade policy from “disastrous” to “hugely damaging.” The imports tax of 10 %, which will now be applied to virtually all nations but China, is also three times as high as it was when he took office, and the additional tariffs he has placed on steel, aluminum, and cars also indicate that the general barrier he is putting in place is higher than America has been for a century.

The doubt that the plan is creating is also devastating. No big business, whether domestic or international, can easily plan long-term investments in the United States with the understanding that Trump might have major changes at any time.

Just weeks after declaring that the 90-day “pause” did not reduce tariffs on Chinese goods, he abruptly announced that all exports of phones and other electronic items would gain from the delay, before confirming that this digital deduction would only be for a short period of time. 80 % of Apple’s smartphones are built in China. Nobody is aware of their position.

The deterioration of the rule of law through attacks on courts and big law firms also raises the risk of conducting business in America. Trump may believe that his trade legislation will encourage hordes of businesses to set up factories inside his tax walls, but the doubt and lack of trust are actually causing a lot of people to leave.

The rest of the world is becoming distant from America, who was once a powerful ally and significant business for everyone, both politically and economically. An separation is not always permanent, as in a relationship, but it fundamentally alters behavior and leaves behind long-term harm.

Second fact: This alienation must be resolved by developing new associations with others. Countries must look for ways to establish and maintain international organizations without the influence of America.

Because trade blocs like the European Union, Mercosur in Latin America, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Asia now exist and you bargain collectively, that is fairly simple. China won’t get a full participant of those groups, but discussions with it will be simpler than they currently are with Trump’s United States, because typical interests will be simpler to get.

Because the US dollar will be the world’s major reserve currency and the importance of British banks may be difficult and costly to tremble off, the task is more difficult and takes longer. Making sure our personal financial institutions are strong enough to survive a problems is what must be the first task. Countries will need to consider ways to reduce their dependence on the US dollars and reduce their risk of being exposed to American economic bullying over the long term.

Prior to the US’s restrictions, countries like China, Russia, and Iran felt threatened about this. We are certainly in a completely new world.

Bill Emmott, who was previously The Economist’s editor-in-chief, is already president of the&nbsp, Japan Society of the UK, the&nbsp, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the&nbsp, International Trade Institute.

This post, which was previously published in La Stampa in Italy on April 12, has been republished with kind agreement.

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What a real anti-China trade strategy would look like – Asia Times

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Trump’s recent trade strategy will stifle China’s position as the world’s dominant nation, denigrate American technology and power, and alienate US allies and partners.

I also think it’s unlikely that this is willful, there’s an old notion that you should “never feature to hate that which is properly explained by stupidity”. The decision to roll out their tax plan in a careless, last-minute, on-again-off-again manner and the fact that Congress has not chosen to withdraw the government’s tax authority suggest that idiocy is at play here.

But in any situation, there are certainly some people within the Trump presidency and the MAGA movement who would like Trump to produce a business plan that helps to incorporate Chinese power.

According to CEA Chair Stephen Miran, who writes ,” China has chosen to triple down on its protectionist, export-led model to safe residual income, much to the consternation of the rest of the world.” And Treasury Secretary&nbsp, Scott Bessent went yet further, suggesting that confinement of China should be the primary purpose of US trade plan:

Scott Bessent emerged from this year’s market turmoil as a potentially unexpected cause trade negotiator, presenting a possible situation for the upcoming months: US agreements with long-standing partners that put pressure on China.

” They’ve been fine military allies, no great financial friends”, the original hedge fund manager said Wednesday of some of these US friends. In the end, the Trump administration should probably come to an agreement with them. ” Then we can approach China as a group”, he said.

Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and India, which Bessent claimed are the nations that are close to China, are the nations he said he’s looking at. They are countries with which the US could work to isolate China, something that’s been called a “grand encirclement” strategy.

This is actually a very achievable goal. Every day that Trump’s tariff chaos makes the US look like a chaotic clown car makes it a less realistic goal, but as of right now, I still think that it would be possible for the US to radically pivot its trade and industrial policies in order to create a coalition of nations that could economically balance, compete with and even isolate China. And it’s not difficult to imagine how that approach would work.

But first, we should think about why we would &nbsp, want&nbsp, to economically pressure China and what we might hope to accomplish. In the end, in a perfect world, nations would simply trade with one another and become wealthy rather than engage in conflict. And China has plenty of good stuff to offer the world —&nbsp, cool cars, cheap solar panels and batteries, and lots more. Why should we trade with China in a hostile manner?

The reason is geopolitics. Even singing praises for the benefits of trade don’t address the fact that sometimes powerful leaders want to rule or even attack other countries for whatever reason. The world is an ungoverned place, and the balance of power is the only thing that keeps the peace.

China is currently the world’s top producer and exporter. Its current leaders also think of the US and many of its allies as either rivals or outright enemies. They appear determined to conquer Taiwan, sever parts of India, Japan, and the Philippines, and frequently rely on Chinese influence to rule smaller nations. It makes sense to want to weaken China’s ability to do all this, while strengthening the other nations ‘ capacities to resist it.

Therefore, the following should likely be among the objectives of China’s trade policy:

  1. Preventing China from gaining an overwhelming&nbsp, military advantage&nbsp, over other nations
  2. reducing China’s ability to impose economic pressure on other countries
  3. Reducing&nbsp, supply chain vulnerability&nbsp, in nations threatened by China, so that any future conflict with China wouldn’t crash those countries ‘ economies.

That doesn’t mean that China’s trade policy should prioritize prosperity and cool cars; rather, it should instead prioritize adding these other geopolitical objectives.

In any case, when I talk about economically” containing” China, that’s what I’m talking about. So, here’s a list of things we would do if we wanted to accomplish that goal seriously. Obviously, this list is very, very far away from anything the Trump administration is doing or contemplating. However, this is what I believe it would require.

Zero trade barriers with any nations other than China

Manufacturers need scale  to lower costs and maintain their competitiveness. One reason China’s manufacturers are so formidable — and why American manufacturers were so formidable relative to their rivals 80 years ago — is that they have access to a huge&nbsp, domestic market.

Chinese automakers like BYD can increase sales and lower costs to levels that no foreign competitor can match because they can sell untold numbers of cars to their billion customers. BYD is currently building a single factory that ‘s&nbsp, bigger than the city of San Francisco.

Another important factor that Chinese manufacturers are so successful is domestic supply chains. Practically everything that goes into a Chinese EV, particularly the battery, the metal, and the chips, is produced in-country. Instead of having to struggle to import it from abroad, it is now very quick and simple for Chinese manufacturers to source everything they need.

It’s inherently very hard for American manufacturers can match those two advantages. Our consumption is higher in dollars, but we have much fewer people, so our companies can’t ship as many units domestically. The US is much smaller than China. Chinese people buy&nbsp, about double the number&nbsp, of cars every year that Americans do.

Of course, America’s allies, including Japan and Korea, are also at a greater risk of having this issue. Smaller countries compensate by finding highly specialized niches to be competitive in. Due to its size, China can more easily create a fully self-sufficient manufacturing ecosystem ( which it has, in fact, spent the last 20 years trying to do ) and this places their supply chains and defense-industrial bases at a disadvantage.

The only possible way for China’s rivals to match it in size is to gang up. And in this situation, “gang up” refers to creating a free trade zone where both parties can trade freely.

If the US had zero trade barriers with Europe, Japan, Korea, India and the countries of Southeast Asia, those countries wouldn’t become exactly like one huge “domestic” market. There would still be language barriers, geographic differences, exchange rate fluctuations, and national regulatory differences that might unintentionally stifle trade.

But it would go a long way toward allowing American manufacturers — and European, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and Southeast Asian manufacturers — to attain the sort of economies of scale and supply-chain networks that China enjoys within its borders.

In essence, you would have to start imagining” Non-China” as a single, vast economic force in order to balance China. If this sounds familiar, well, it should.

Two trade agreements, such as the TPP and TPP with Asia and TTIP and TTIP with Europe, would have greatly contributed to the development of this kind of common market among non-Chinese manufacturing countries. Both were killed by Trump. This is the first thing you would do, in any case, if you wanted to economically balance China and lessen your dependence on it.

Tariffs on Chinese intermediate goods, and data collection on supply chains

Next, supply chain vulnerabilities among non-Chinese countries would be something you’d need to address. The ideal would be to make sure that non-China has the ability to make everything it needs to make, so that A) non-China can be self-sufficient in case of a major war, and B) China can’t dominate the nations of non-China by exerting pressure on key supply chain vulnerabilities ( like&nbsp, it’s doing right now&nbsp, with rare earths ).

One thing you need here is targeted protectionism. The idea is to prevent China from being able to put non-China manufacturers out of business with a sudden flood of subsidized exports. Imagine, for instance, that China decided to savagely dominate the chip industries in the United States, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan by launching a sizable wave of subventioned computer chips. The only way to prevent this strategy from working is protectionism.

Therefore, you need the ability to impose specific trade restrictions very quickly in industries that China is attempting to conquer. Note that this is very different from Trump’s tariff policy — it ‘s&nbsp, far more targeted&nbsp, in terms of industries, it’s only on China, and it has nothing to do with trade deficits or other macro imbalances. It’s more similar to the tariffs that Biden imposed on some Chinese goods.

But there’s a problem here, which is that standard tariffs don’t hit&nbsp, intermediate goods. Our tariffs assume that this phone is “made in Vietnam” if China manufactures a phone, disassembles it, then ships the pieces to Vietnam where Vietnamese workers piece it back together and sell it to America.

If laptops made in Mexico and sold in America contain Chinese chips, those chips aren’t subject to the tariff rate on Chinese goods — they’re only subject to the tariff rate on&nbsp, Mexican&nbsp, goods. In <a href="https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf”>his 2024 note, Stephen Miran makes this clear. 1

The answer to this is to apply tariffs to the nations where the value was added, not the country where something was finally assembled. Doing this would allow us to put tariffs on Chinese intermediate goods like computer chips and batteries, in addition to final goods like phones and cars.

Of course, this method of applying tariffs would require much more sophisticated data collection. We’d need to figure out where the components in each imported good originated. A small army of bureaucrats would be necessary for this, among other things.

Industrial policy for strategic industries

We would need to do more than just plugging new holes in the ecosystem to give Non-China a self-sufficient, robust manufacturing one. We’d have to&nbsp, fix the existing holes&nbsp, as well. For instance, China already produces the majority of the world’s batteries and processes the majority of the world’s rare earths. Those are vulnerabilities that need to be dealt with.

We need to start making things that we currently don’t make ( or that we make very little of ) in order to accomplish that. The best way to do that is industrial policy. Maybe given the right long-term incentives, those industries would reappear in non-China on their own, but giving them a helping hand fixes the problem much more quickly.

And industrial policy occasionally can contribute to non-China’s stability. For example, if Taiwan gets invaded or bombed by China or struck by a massive earthquake, the world’s chip supply could be seriously damaged because most of the factories of TSMC — the world’s dominant chipmaker — are in Taiwan. Therefore, it makes sense to press or persuade TSMC to relocate some of its factories to safer locations, such as the US, Japan, and elsewhere.

This was the cornerstone of Biden’s approach to industrial policy, with the CHIPS Act for chips and the Inflation Reduction Act for batteries and renewable energy tech. But this was only the start of a study, with only two sectors left.

Other industrial policies should be added for other sectors — drones, electric motors, machine tools, robots, telecom, and of course rare earths and mineral processing. They should be included in the mix, but they don’t have to be as extravagant and expensive as the CHIPS Act and IRA.

Of course, it’s not known whether Biden’s approach to industrial policy — which is similar to China’s, though smaller in scale — is the best one. Balaji Srinivasan offers an alternative strategy based on government-organized industry consortiums like SEMATECH in the 1990s in an interesting post. This is similar to how Japan did many of its industrial policies during its boom years.

In any case, industrial policy should be reinstated if the US and the rest of the non-China world want to compete with China.

Smart pro-investment policies here at home

China has structured its government policies around building lots of factories, which is another important reason why it is such a manufacturing superpower. That pro-investment policy has introduced macroeconomic distortions, but it has also allowed Chinese manufacturers to iterate quickly, to expand the ecosystem of suppliers, to scale up, and generally to do all the other things that make manufacturing work.

I don’t want to see the US allowing widespread pollution of its rivers or forcing millions of people to emigrate from their land in order to build factories in a bid to compete with China. But over the past half century, the US, even more than other rich countries, has thrown up a vast thicket of procedural barriers that block the building of new factories. Many of these barriers would be easily eliminated, which would greatly improve the ability to once again compete in American manufacturing.

To its credit, the Trump administration has actually been making some moves in this direction. For instance, Trump has acted in executive orders, eliminating a number of regulations governing the implementation of NEPA, one of the biggest procedural obstacles to development in the US. Experts on the negative effects of NEPA are optimistic that this change will significantly lessen NIMBYs ‘ ability to block factories, housing, and other development projects.

And while the US shouldn’t be trying to invest as much of its GDP as China does, raising it from its current low level should also be top of the priority list. Two policies, suggested by JD Vance and&nbsp, widely believed&nbsp, to be&nbsp, effective, are 100 % bonus depreciation and full expensing of R&amp, D spending.

Under the Office of Strategic Capital, the Trump administration is also testing out government loans for manufacturers. That’s a good idea, though of course, it’ll be subject to some amount of waste and corruption.

Much more can be accomplished. Private banks could be encouraged to make loans to manufacturers looking to scale up. Export promotion and the promotion of greenfield FDI in manufacturing are also thought to be promising concepts.

In any case, this is all aspirational on my part. The Trump administration has a total focus on its damaging and unproductive tariff policy. What’s more, zero tariffs on non-China countries, expansions of state capacity, and expanding on the legacy of Biden’s industrial policies definitely don’t seem like the sort of things this administration would be interested in.

This is essentially how you would go about making the world economy a fortress against Chinese power, if you wanted to, or did.

Notes

1 Miran does make a pretty substantial mistake, though. He stated:

” Freeman, Baldwin and Theodorakoplous ( 2023 ) find that, while just over 60 % of manufacturing intermediates imported into the U. S. came directly from China, incorporating the value-added of manufacturing intermediates that originated in China but were imported from other trade partners brought that number above 90 %.

These figures are far off. You can see Freeman, Baldwin, and Theodorakoplous ‘ estimates in Figure 2.3 in&nbsp, their paper:

This is the “look-through” exposure, or “estimation of the total value-added of manufacturing intermediaries that are Chinese. China is ultimately responsible for 3.5 % of all U. S. intermediate goods, which is about 20 % of the value of imported inputs. not 99 %. Miran is just way, way off base with his numbers here.

This article was originally published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack, and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Huawei armed and ready for Trump’s second assault – Asia Times

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Huawei, a tech giant, is more ready than it was for Donald Trump’s subsequent assault on China.

More than punishment, the major risk to the bank’s sales and profits then appears to be the possibility of a tariff-induced crisis. Over 70 % of Huawei’s sales are currently made in China.

Huawei’s complete sales are almost at their pre-sanctions maximum, which is supported by a switch to local procurement. Its profits in the US are small, leaving virtually no immediate exposure to Trump’s taxes.

A sizable R&amp, D budget has allowed the business to stay at the top of the telecom equipment market while facilitating diversification into artificial intelligence ( AI), cloud computing, autonomous driving, and semiconductors. The balance sheet is noise.

Recall that, in May 2019, Trump banned US telecom carriers from using Huawei equipment and the Bureau of Industry and Security ( BIS ) of the US Department of Commerce put the company on its Entity List, preventing it from buying components and other products containing US technology without the department’s approval.

These regulations were put in place over the course of two years to prevent the company from receiving advanced semiconductors, especially those produced by Taiwan’s TSMC, the nation’s leading high-end device manufacturer.

Huawei even was unable to access Google’s Android programs, including Google and Google Maps, as well. This caused Huawei’s 5G mobile phone company to decline, resulting in a 29 % overall decline in sales in 2021 and sharp declines in its income before property sales.

After selling its Honor budget brand to protect it from US sanctions, Huawei’s share of the global cellphone market decreased from 18 % in 2019 to about 2 % in 2023.

But the base was that. Sales increased marginally in 2022, rose by nearly 10 % in 2023 and jumped 22 % in 2024, with sales of cellphones and other consumer products up 38 %. If non-core business profits are taken into account, gains also increased in 2023.

Solutions: Huawei data, Asia Times table.

The geographical breakdown of Huawei’s revenue shows its rising dependency on the local Chinese market.

In 2019, the business was added to the Americas Entity List, and 59 % of its sales were made in China, 24 % in EMEA ( Europe, Middle East, and Africa ), 8.2 % in Asia-Pacific, 6.1 % in the Americas, and 2.7 % in other markets.

China had a breakdown of 71.4 %, followed by EMEA of 17.2 %, Asia-Pacific of 5 %, the Americas ( now primarily Latin America of 4.2 % ), and other regions of 2.2 % in 2024. Russia accounted for 15 %-20 % of EMEA sales.

Home sales increased by 30 % as a result of technological technology and the Chinese economy’s digitalization.

Progress across all of the company’s business segments was driven by strong demand for new design smartphones, telecoms network products, cloud computing, data storage, electric power, and related cars with self-driving functions.

Inside China, sales rise was highest in Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia.

Selling decreased in all of the nations where revenue of Huawei’s 5G telecoms equipment have been restricted or prohibited, including India, Germany, the UK, Canada, and Australia.

Solutions: Huawei data, Asia Times table.

Restoring and diversifying

Huawei rebuilt its smartphone business by turning to Taiwanese semiconductor factory SMIC and developing its own Harmony running program.

HarmonyOS, which runs on a variety of devices, including smartphones, devices, tablet computers, TVs, electric cars, and IoT ( Internet of Things ) equipment, is currently second in China, trailing only Android and Apple’s iOS.

Huawei’s Mate 60 cellphone, which was released in August 2023, demonstrated that US sanctions are more of an opportunity for Chinese development than an unachievable barrier.

Based on a 7nm computer fabricated by SMIC without using ASML’s EUV printing, which cannot be sold in China, it was not supposed to be achievable. Gina Raimondo, a former secretary of commerce, described it as “incredibly disturbing.”

Huawei won the battle of the Chinese smartphone business in 2024, surpassing Apple’s iPhone and its local rivals, to regain control of the market, which saw its market share reach 18 % in the fourth quarter. But Huawei’s worldwide market share is still only about 6 %.

After the BIS ordered Oracle to stop providing Huawei with application updates and technical support, it was also forced to develop its own ERP ( Enterprise Resource Planning ) program.

It took more than three times before the enhanced edition without legacy issues that it now uses to support its own international businesses and also provides to Chinese state-owned companies like PetroChina and China Mobile as well as BYD, Xiaomi, and another privately held Chinese companies.

In 2024, Huawei’s efficiency by solution department was as follows:

Sales increased by 4.9 % to 42.9 % of the overall, mainly for ICT infrastructure. Basic stations, antennas, another mobile telecommunication system hardware and software, optical fiber and other fixed-line network equipment, enterprise switches and routers, 5G solutions for mining, seaports, and other particular industrial applications, as well as AI predicted maintenance.

Government spending and widespread use in industrial, logistics and social infrastructure applications support demand for 5G networking equipment in China. These factors, in addition to a comparatively uninteresting 5G consumer base in Europe and America, have increased Huawei’s share of the global market for radio access network products from 31 % in 2023 to an estimated 35 % in 2024.

China also has a strong investment in 6G, which should allow Huawei to continue receiving orders. It is also the world leader in the deployment of 5. 5G (5G-Advanced ) telecom services. South Korea, Japan, Finland, the EU and the US are also working on 6G, but China has the most supportive government and largest potential market.

China Mobile technology officer Liu Guangyi said in an interview with China Global Television Network ( CGTN) at the Global 6G Conference in Nanjing on April 10 that:”…

” When we first created 5G about a decade ago, we didn’t anticipate the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence. The focus then was mainly on improving communication speed and efficiency. However, by doing so, we ignored the potential for incorporating additional capabilities.

Think about intelligent hardware, connected vehicles, and robotics. 6G networks can help make these technologies more lightweight, compact, and low-cost, making mass adoption more feasible and accelerating the intelligent transformation of society.”

Consumer goods: Sales increased by 38.3 %, making up 39.3 % of the total. Smartphones and HarmonyOS, laptop and tablet computers, smartwatches and fitness trackers, and smart home appliances are some of the products offered.

Market research organization Counterpoint reports 36 % growth in Huawei’s smartphone shipments in 2024, with a higher average selling price boosting the value of sales.

Sales of cloud computing increased by 8.5 %, or 4.5 % of the total in 2024. Large language models for manufacturing, logistics, and finance, AI model training and security, database services, and software-as-a-service, including video conferencing in competition with Zoom and Microsoft Teams, are among the products offered.

Huawei was the second largest provider of cloud services in China last year, with a market share estimated at 22 % versus 34 % for Alibaba and 18 % for Tencent, according the market research organizations and industry sources. With a market share of about 5 %, Huawei came in fifth overall.

Digital power: Sales were up 24.4 % to account for 8 % of the total in 2024. Inverters, battery storage, AI efficiency optimization, and power grid integration for solar energy, data center power supplies and cooling systems, motor/powertrain design for electric vehicles, mobile telecom base station power supplies, lithium-ion batteries for telecom, renewable energy and microgrids, and cloud-computing energy management systems are some of the products.

Huawei creates prefabricated modular data centers that are housed in dust, water, extreme temperatures, and shock-proof metal containers the size of shipping containers for remote and harsh environments. Dozens of these modular data centers have been deployed in Saudi Arabia.

Automotive products: Sales increased by 5.7 times to account for 7.1 % of the total in 2024. Products include integrated motor/inverter systems and HarmonyOS for vehicles, as well as the Pangu AI model for urban and highway driving.

These are provided to several Chinese automakers. According to market research firms and industry sources, Huawei’s share of China’s market for autonomous vehicle technology is between 25 % and 30 %.

Other goods: In 2024, sales increased by 70.0 % to 5.8 % total. Medical devices, industrial sensors, 5G modems for use with robots and drones, augmented reality glasses and displays, and other products that do not fit conveniently into other segments.

Solutions: Huawei data, Asia Times table.

Huawei’s R&amp, D budget has increased from 15 % to 20 % of its sales since 2021, up from 15 % to 15 % in the prior two years.

The company spent a lot of money on advanced semiconductor technology, the HarmonyOS NEXT mobile operating system, 6G, and quantum computing, but the figure for 2024 as a whole increased to 20.8 %, but in Q4 it increased to 25 %.

In addition, it recorded expenses related to the replacement of imported components with Chinese alternatives and the cancellation of contracts in Europe due to sanctions, wrote down 4G inventory, and cut prices to compete with Apple, Alibaba and Tencent.

In the end, net profit fell to zero in the fourth quarter of the year as a result. However, the financial decks were cleared for what appears to be a challenging 2025 and the full-year results were in line with management’s expectations.

Follow this writer on&nbsp, X: @ScottFo83517667

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China holds more trade war cards than Trump thinks – Asia Times

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There was one notable exceptions to Donald Trump’s pivotal decision to impose eye-watering levies on trading partners around the world.

While the rest of the world may be given a 90-day relief on more responsibilities beyond the new 10 % taxes on all US business associates, China would think the squash even more. Trump increased the Chinese goods price to 12 % on April 9, 2025.

According to Trump, the decision was motivated by Beijing’s “lack of regard for international markets.” But the US senator may well have been smarting from Beijing’s apparent determination to fight US tariffs head-on.

Beijing took a different tack than some nations, choosing to favor negotiation and dialogue over Trump’s now-delayed mutual tariff increases. It immediately and steadfastly reacted.

On April 11, China dismissed Trump’s moves as a” joke” and raised its own tariff against the US to 125 %. Trump after raised his tariffs on China to 145 % in reprisal before granting an exemption for some devices.

The two markets are currently tangled up in a massive, high-intensity industry conflict. And China is showing no signs of backing over.

And I wouldn’t expect China to, as an analyst on US-China relationships. China now has much more leverage than the first US-China business war during Trump’s first word, when Beijing eagerly sought a deal with the US.

However, Beijing believes it can wreak at least as much harm on the US as evil opposite, while at the same time expanding its international location.

A modified mathematics for China

There is no denying that China’s export-focused companies, particularly those in coastal regions, are subject to severe tariff consequences for American consumers.

Man with a flag behind him.
Amid taxes, China’s President Xi Jinping sensations a traditional option. Photo via Getty Images: Carlos Barria

However, a number of actual financial factors have considerably altered Beijing’s math since Trump initially increased tariffs on China in 2018.

Critically, the importance of the US business to China’s export-driven market has declined considerably. US-bound export made up 19.8 % of China’s full imports in 2018, the first trade war started.

That percentage had dropped to 12.8 % in 2023. The tariffs perhaps more enable China to expand its “domestic need development” strategy, unleashing the spending power of its consumers and strengthening its local economy.

China entered the 2018 trade war during a period of robust economic growth, but the current situation is completely different. The Chinese economy is experiencing a persistent slowdown due to the slowness of the real estate markets, capital flight, and Western “decoupling.”

Perhaps counterintuitively, this prolonged downturn may have made the Chinese economy more resilient to shocks. Even prior to the impact of Trump’s tariffs, it has pushed businesses and policymakers to take into account the already harsh economic realities.

Trump’s tariffs on China may also give Beijing a useful external scapegoat, allowing it to spread the blame for US aggression and win over public opinion.

China also understands that the US cannot easily replace its dependency on Chinese goods, particularly through its supply chains. Although China’s direct US imports have decreased, many products now coming from third countries still rely on Chinese-made components or raw materials.

By 2022, China was almost four times as dependent on China as of the same time, compared to the same period in which China was almost four times as dependent.

There’s a related public opinion calculation: Rising tariffs are expected to drive up prices, something that could stir discontent among American consumers, particularly blue-collar voters. Beijing, in fact, thinks that Trump’s tariffs could cause the country’s otherwise robust economy to recede.

Two men sit side by side at a conference.
Donald Trump, the president of the United States, examines Chinese President Xi Jinping during the G20 Summit’s plenary session on July 7, 2017, in Hamburg, Germany. Photo: Mikhail Svetlov / Getty Images via The Conversation

Potent tools for reprisal

China also has a number of strategic tools to use retaliation against the US in addition to the altered economic environments. It dominates the global rare earth supply chain – critical to military and high-tech industries – supplying roughly 72 % of US rare earth imports, by some estimates.

On April 9, China added 12 American companies to its list of countries that are subject to export control on March 4. Many US high-tech companies or US defense contractors rely on rare earth elements in their products.

China also retains the ability to target key US agricultural export sectors such as poultry and soybeans – industries heavily dependent on Chinese demand and concentrated in Republican-leaning states.

About 5 % of US exports of poultry and soybeans are made up of China. Beijing revoked import authorizations for three significant U.S. soybean exporters on March 4.

And on the tech side, many US companies – such as Apple and Tesla – remain deeply tied to Chinese manufacturing. Tariffs threaten to significantly lower their profit margins, which Beijing believes can be used as a leverage against the Trump administration. Beijing is reportedly planning to retaliate by imposing regulations on US businesses operating in China.

Meanwhile, the fact that Elon Musk, a senior Trump insider who has clashed with US trade adviser Peter Navarro against tariffs, has major business interests in China is a particularly strong wedge that Beijing could yet exploit in an attempt to divide the Trump administration.

Two mini flags side by side.
Chinese and American flags fly at a booth in Shanghai during the first China International Import Expo on November 6, 2018. Photo: Johannes Eisele / AFP via Getty Images

A strategic opening for China?

Beijing believes it can withstand Trump’s significant tariffs on a bilateral basis, but it also believes that the US broadside against its own trading partners has given rise to a generational strategic opportunity to replace American hegemony.

This shift may have a significant impact on East Asia’s geopolitical landscape. Already on March 30 – after Trump had first raised tariffs on Beijing – China, Japan and South Korea hosted their first economic dialogue in five years and pledged to advance a trilateral free trade agreement.

Given how diligently the US worked under the Biden administration to combat regional influence from China, the move was especially remarkable. Trump’s actions, in Beijing’s opinion, give the US a chance to directly erode its influence in the Indo-Pacific.

A model dragon is seen through a shop window.
Could China’s dragon economy slay Trump’s tariffs? Wang Zhao / AFP via Getty Images/ The Conversation

Similar to how Trump’s severe tariffs on Southeast Asian nations, which were a significant strategic regional priority during the Biden administration, may aggravate those nations ‘ relationship with China.

Chinese state media announced on April 11 that President Xi Jinping will pay state visits to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia from April 14-18, aiming to deepen “all-round cooperation” with neighboring countries.

Notably, the Trump administration targeted all three Southeast Asian countries with their now-paused reciprocal tariffs, which included 49 % on Cambodian goods, 46 % on Vietnamese exports, and 24 % on Malaysian products.

Farther away from China lies an even more promising strategic opportunity. Trump’s tariff plan has already prompted China and European Union officials to consider strengthening their own, previously strained trade ties, which might sour the transatlantic alliance that had been trying to break up with China.

On April 8, the European Commission president spoke with China’s premier to discuss trade protectionionism in which both sides jointly condemned US trade protectionism and supported free and open trade.

Coincidentally, on April 9, the day China raised tariffs on US goods to 84 %, the EU also announced its first wave of retaliatory measures – imposing a 25 % tariff on selected US imports worth over 20 billion euros– but delayed implementation following Trump’s 90-day pause.

Officials from the EU and China are currently negotiating with each other over the current trade barriers and considering holding a full-fledged summit in China in July.

China also believes that Trump’s tariffs could potentially affect the US dollar’s reputation abroad. Widespread tariffs imposed on multiple countries have shaken investor confidence in the US economy, contributing to a decline in the dollar’s value.

The dollar and US Treasury bonds have traditionally been viewed as haven assets, but recent market turmoil has questioned that status. Soaring tariffs have also undermined investor confidence in both the US economy and US Treasurys, raising questions about the viability of the country’s economy and the sustainability of its debt.

While Trump’s tariffs will inevitably hurt parts of the Chinese economy, Beijing appears to have far more cards to play this time around. It has the means to seriously harm US interests, and Trump’s comprehensive tariff war offers China a rare and unexploited strategic opportunity.

Auburn University’s PhD candidate in political science is Linggong Kong.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

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Indonesia arrests judges who cleared palm oil companies of graft charges

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Following the arrest of a local prosecutor’s chief judge on corruption charges in the same problem, Indonesian government arrested three judges on Monday ( Apr 14), according to an official.

The three businesses- Wilmar Group, Musim Mas Group, and Permata Hijau Group, all of which are located in North Sumatra, were cleared next quarter of claims of wrongdoing in obtaining trade mandates in 2022.

The three judges who rendered the decision were detained on Sunday evening, according to a lawyer for the Attorney General’s Office, Harli Siregar, who contacted Reuters via language on Monday.

Prosecutors detained South Jakarta district judge chief judge Muhammad Arif Nuryanta on Saturday. According to Siregar, who claimed in a statement that he was paid 60 billion dirhams ( US$ 3.57 million ) to arrange for a favorable conviction by two attorneys for the companies, US$ 1.07 million was reportedly given to the three other judges.

According to Siregar, the reward was placed in place so that courts could decide whether it was a crime. Additionally, two attorneys and a court clerk were detained.

The three magistrates ‘ attorneys and News was not immediately be reached for comment.

Siregar claimed that the Attorney General’s Office had filed an appeal in response to the judge’s March conviction of the businesses.

The Wilmar Group, Musim Mas Group, and Permata Hijau Group did not respond to a request for comment right away.

When the ruling was made public, Nuryanta served as the court’s assistant key. He did not directly hear the case.

In an effort to stop the rising prices of regional cooking oil, Indonesia, which accounts for about 60 % of the global palm oil offer, implemented significant trade measures in 2022, including a three-week restrictions on supplies.

Lawyers were seeking charges and payments of up to 11 trillion rupees when the first fraud charges were brought against the businesses.

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Experts urge caution in tariff talks

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US President Donald Trump holds a chart next to US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick as Trump delivers remarks on tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC, US, April 2, 2025. (Reuters photo)
US President Donald Trump makes notes on taxes in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC, on April 2, 2025, holding a table next to US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick. ( Reuters image )

Experts advise the government to act cautiously rather than retaliate against the United States ‘ reciprocal tax steps.

Thailand, one of the nations currently lining up to deal with the US for a potential price reduction, is one of the many nations that has been hit by a 36 % reciprocal tariff.

No particular place in the dialogue process has been revealed as of yet, despite the government’s claim that Washington has responded to Bangkok’s demand for negotiations.

An impartial political and economic researcher named Somjai Phagaphasvivat called on the government to come up with a tactical and measured response.

According to him, the federal appears to be putting its weight on its own violent business plan, and he claimed that this is a wait-and-see strategy.

President Donald Trump’s announcement of a 90-day wait in higher tariffs on several nations, including Thailand, is a sign that the US may be reevaluating the effects of its business measures, he said.

A nation you choose four strategic responses to tariff increases: plan and work quickly, as Vietnam and Cambodia have done, fight instantly, as China has, make and wait for clarity, and wait for the US to feel the effects of its own measures.

But, whether import taxes may be reduced or raised yet further remains to be seen. Thailand may find itself at a disadvantage, the researcher said, if the expensive tariffs are gradually implemented.

” The US imposes various tax prices on various nations. Our exports may suffer significantly if our companies have now negotiated lower taxes while we have not,” he said.

Prudence, no retaliation

When asked whether Mr. Somjai’s response to the US’s trade policy signaled the start of a full-fledged international trade war, he responded with caution.

He claimed that the condition has not reached the height of a world trade war, a repeat of the 1929 Great Depression, or a serious global economic downturn that is being discussed.

It took two years to resolve the problems, which involved a 90 % decline in stock markets at the time.

It was followed by World War II and the formation of the International Trade Organization in 1944, which later evolved into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) to regulate international trade.

He claimed that the US is engaging in a traditional” chicken game” where nations with low liquidity are more likely to succumb to US industry stress. However, it’s unlikely that major players like China and the European Union ( EU) will give in.

China, which is currently at a 125 % rate, will respond with higher taxes, he said, sending a clear message that if the conflict persists, both sides will suffer.

The US leader is also putting more home pressure on himself. In only three days, US markets lost US$ 9.5 trillion, or roughly quarter of GDP. Mr. Trump won’t fall off the cliff, which may prompt negotiations, according to Mr. Somjai.

Beijing imposed tariff increases on US imports last Friday to 125 %.

Asean is a lightly bound system and is unlikely to challenge the US, according to Mr. Somjai, who questioned whether Asean would work together and discuss with the US as a whole, especially when Mr. Trump threatened to escalate sanctions against nations that would criticize him.

Following a movie conference meeting of financial officials, Asean, which is the fifth-largest economy in the world, expressed profound concern over the US’s decision to introduce punitive taxes.

Cambodia is subject to a 49 % duty and Singapore is subject to a 10 % tax in Southeast Asia.

Asean should use this chance to strengthen assistance, not to issue the US, but to be prepared to deal with international changes brought on by the US’s fresh price policy, according to Mr. Somjai.

To Thai exporters, Mr. Somjai said there is no need to fret yet because the economy is expanding at a slower rate, with growth potential slipping from 3 % to 1 % this year.

” As long as the economy turns bad, it isn’t also a full-blown problems.” In the worst case situation, there would be a battle between the US and the EU. A full-fledged international trade conflict is still unavoidable at this point, he said.

Mr. Somjai argued that Thailand may be prepared to deal with an economic slowdown regardless of how the US trade policy develops.

He also noted that nations who are closely aligned with the US are likely to follow other strategies, such as extending free trade agreements to lessen their rely on the American market.

Thailand’s trade surplus with the US was thought to be worth more than$ 40 billion last year.

Punitive steps, according to Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira, are not the best course of action because Thailand is a small nation and could suffer from a GDP drop of at least one percentage point.

Somjai:

Somjai:” Don’t issue the US.”

Opportunities exist in a turmoil.

The Thailand Development Research Institute’s senior research fellow Nonarit Bisonyabut cited the position as a chance to promote development.

He claimed that the US’ worries about taxes are not totally unfounded. He advised Thailand to examine the justification for the distinguished tax rates it had in place and whether they had acted in a certain way.

Some were intended to safeguard important sectors for national growth. However, he said,” we must ask whether they are only generating revenue for significant capital groups.”

Additionally, Mr. Nonarit urged a review of “zero-dollar imports” and to consider whether or not these permissions should be discontinued. Exports of zero-dollar goods refer to business practices that the exporting nation finds to be having little or no monetary benefit.

He argued that the government should consider alternatives to the US’s present actions because the mutual tariff is only the first step in addressing trade imbalances.

The US is also trying to persuade businesses to return their products to the US to address the nation’s debt problems.

” There will be more goes to come,” she said. We merely saw an appetiser, he said.

Mr. Nonarit argued that the Trump administration wants to alter the world trade order.

The US’s extreme legislation is unlikely to be abandoned anytime soon, and the more dangerous the situation becomes the sooner it surrenders. The US tax policy may have a negative impact on domestic demand, as high inflation would also be felt by American consumers.

People force is anticipated to rise in this situation for the reversal of the plan.

The US senator also faces legal challenges in the Supreme Court, he added, noting that there is a chance for policy change to occur without external force in six months to two years.

He argued that Thailand may lose more by trying to communicate and get offers, noting that Singapore’s strategy is also viewed as a strategy for asking the people to prepare for impacts.

” Some offers we make may be challenging to accept again. Often, we have to wait and see because Thailand is a small nation or doesn’t have little leverage to derive significant benefits from the discussions, he said.

Nonarit:

Nonarit:” More moves to occur.

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Proxy probe into collapsed Bangkok tower constructor 50% complete

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PUBLISHED: 13 Apr 2025 at 13: 06

Rescuers look for signs of life at the collapse site in Chatuchak district, Bangkok, on Sunday morning. (Screenshot from the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration's Facebook page)
On Sunday night, volunteers examine the decline site in Bangkok’s Chatuchak neighborhood for signs of life. ( Twitter website for the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration )

The State Audit Office tower’s suspected surrogate business with a Chinese company is almost at 50 % of its completion, despite the lack of visible lights under the dust of the high-rise construction.

The Department of Special Investigation’s official, Pol Maj Woranan Srilam, stated on Sunday that the research involved alleged shareholding by proxy at China Railway No. 10 Engineering Co ( Crec 10 ). He claimed that the department was looking into the monetary dealings of three alleged nominees.

The State Audit Office’s ( SAO ) new headquarters was constructed under the auspices of Crec 10’s creation of the ITD-Crec Joint Venture. Quickly collapsing on March 28 was the construction of the tower when a 7.7-magnitude disaster struck Myanmar.

The DSI is looking into Crec 10’s joint ventures and previous jobs, according to Pol Maj Woranan. About 10 more businesses have been registered to the same group of shareholders, according to the department’s findings.

The DSI is looking into whether the firm harmed international business and engaged in selling cooperation, and whether the 30-store SAO tower was constructed using subpar concrete.

Surawut Rangsai, the DS I’s deputy director-general, claimed that the agency had already discovered that two Chinese citizens had received money from allegedly proxy.

He added that from April 18 to May 15, the DSI would interview representatives of Crec 10, Italian-Thai Development Plc ( ITD), and other businesses that had entered the SAO tower project.

Rescuers continued to remove dirt at the decline site in Bangkok’s Chatuchak district on Sunday. Firefighters are also attempting to reach the place where there were blinking lamps beneath the dust, according to Chatuchak district chief Patkorn Sinsuk.

She claimed that there were no rescue attempts because big concrete blocks were still holding back volunteers.

As of Sunday, 37 people had died at the site of the collapse, and 57 some had vanished. Nine people came out of the hospital with wounds.

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Apple was on brink of crisis before tariff concession from Trump

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A tourist uses an Apple iPhone to take a selfie with Donald Trump impersonator Ed Weiskopf in front of the White House in Washington, D.C., US, April 9, 2025. (Reuters)
In front of the White House in Washington, D.C., United States, on April 9, 2025, a visitor poses for a selfie with Donald Trump’s imitation Ed Weiskopf. ( Reuters )

For the time being, at least, Apple Inc. has escaped its biggest issue since the pandemic.

Donald Trump’s 12 % tariffs on Chinese goods threatened to destroy its supply chain just as significantly as the Covid growls did five years ago. The US president gave Apple a significant victory on Friday night, allowing some well-known consumer devices to be excluded. That includes Air Tags, Apple Watches, tablets, Macs, and handsets. &nbsp,

Another benefit: Those products now do not have to pay the 10 % tariff on imports from other nations. &nbsp,

The change is beneficial for Apple and the Asian electronics sector, which also rely heavily on China for manufacturing. However, a new, lower so-called regional tariff may also apply to products that contain semiconductors.

This is a significant reduction for Apple, according to Evercore ISI analyst Amit Daryanani in a statement released on Saturday. ” The levies would have caused material value inflation,” the statement goes.

Following a 11 % defeat this month, he anticipates the stock to rise on Monday.

Before the most recent provision, the phone manufacturer had a strategy: change its supply chain to produce more US-bound iPhones in India, which would have been much less expensive. That, according to Apple professionals, would be a quick fix to halt the astronomical China price and fend off costly price increases in the near future. &nbsp,

Manufacturing from India alone could have met a sizable portion of British require given that the facility’s plans to produce more than 30 million iPhones per year are on pace to meet that demand. About 220 to 230 million handsets are sold every by Apple these days, with about a third going to the US.

Such a change would be challenging to implement without a hitch, especially since the company is now close to producing the iPhone 17, which will be primarily made in China. Concerns had grown about the effect on the fall launch of new iPhones with Apple’s operations, financing, and marketing departments, and this sparked a sense of dread.

In a matter of months, the business would have needed to complete the monumental task of moving more iPhone 17 manufacturing to India or another country. It most likely would have had to raise rates, which is still a possibility, and fought with manufacturers to improve profits. Additionally, Apple’s renowned selling team would have had to persuade customers that it was all worthwhile.

But the sense of uncertainty persists. Plans at the White House are likely to change once more, and Apple may need to make more drastic adjustments. Management is then breathing a sigh of relief, at least for the moment. &nbsp,

handsets made in China account for 87 % of the market.

Another issue: How did China react if it increased production from China at a fast rate? Apple is an exception among US-based businesses because it receives about 17 % of its revenue from abroad and runs lots of businesses there. An Apple spokesman declined to comment.

China has begun looking into US businesses for opposition, which Apple might encounter through its own customs procedure. It has also recently outlawed iPhones from its army of federal employees, among other US-designed devices. That came after US onslaught on Huawei Technologies Co., a champion of Chinese technology.

According to estimates from Morgan Stanley, about 87 % of the iPhones are produced in China, making it Apple’s biggest revenue-maker. In addition to 60 % of Macs, about four in five tablets are produced in the nation.

Up, those products account for roughly 75 % of Apple’s yearly income. The organization continues to manufacture nearly all of its AirPods and Apple Watches in Vietnam. In that nation, some iPads and Laptops are produced, and there are growing Mac creation in Thailand, Malaysia, and Thailand.

According to Morgan Stanley, the company generates approximately 38 % of its iPad profits in the US and about half of its revenue from Apple Watch, AirPods, and Mac.

It would be unlikely to cut Apple completely from China, which has been the company’s main manufacturing hub for years. Although Trump has pushed Apple to produce iPhones in the US, the lack of local executive and manufacturing expertise may make that nearly impossible in the long run.

The speed and efficiency of the facilities in China are unparalleled due to their size and range. Apple’s sales abroad in the world are even impacted by China production, which is important. The Cupertino, California-based business generates nearly 60 % of its income outside of the United States.

Lobbying from Apple and other tech firms have been pressing the White House for exemptions since a string of tariff announcements came out on April 2. &nbsp,

After a number of tit-for-tat reprisals between Washington and Beijing resulted in what amounts to 145 % duties on Chinese goods, the conversations became even more urgent in recent days.

After Trump put a stop to higher levies on other nations, the probable effect was even greater. That meant that Samsung Electronics Co, an Apple adversary that produces its devices outside of China, would have had an advantage.

Apple and other businesses have been telling the Trump administration that while they are willing to invest in the US, moving last council to the state would not be very beneficial. Instead, they have argued that the US ought to be concentrating on reviving higher-value tasks and stimulating investment in areas like semiconductor manufacturing.

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Punch drunk traders across Asia ready for another week of drama and also skipping sleep

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After a year in which Asian stocks posted both their biggest-ever decline and their largest one-day obtain since 2008, place investors are working weekends, skipping sleep, interfering with business trips, poring on social media, and focusing on short-term trades, aware that one man at the world’s furthest reaches may destroy markets again at any moment.

No wonder the region’s economic experts are hysterical. In addition to the uncertainty in stocks, Japanese government bonds posted their worst day ever on Tuesday, credit expands blew out the worst in a row since 2000, the Chinese yuan dropped to its weakest levels since 2007, and the Indonesian rupiah hit an all-time small. &nbsp,

The American penny dropped the most in a moment on Friday before the global financial crisis.

All those maneuvers shifted with regard to US President Donald Trump’s decisions regarding business and officials ‘ responses to those in Asia Pacific. And that’s why it’s proving to be so destructive to regional areas.

Forex traders will be the first to respond as markets reopen on Monday morning, regional time, after the dollar fell against almost all of the main counterparts.

This past year was “horribly tiring and emotionally draining because a new level of mad hits you,” according to Vishnu Varathan, head of economics and strategy at Mizuho Bank,” as soon as a set of parameters that’s put in front of you, as mad as that set is, a new level of mad hits you.” &nbsp,

The global financial crisis was” a lot more severe, much more urgent.” The main difference was that it was designed by us as a team rather than just one person’s desires. That’s how it’s different.

Even though last weekend’s events terrified investors, the market reaction was more extreme than many expected.

Nearly half the portfolio had been transferred into cash by Nick Ferres, chief investment officer of Vantage Point Asset Management in Singapore, which runs a global macro fund with an emphasis on Asia. &nbsp,

As markets began, he realized this wasn’t enough. We were defensive, he said, but” I wish I had done more.” In its three-decade history, MSCI’s Asia Pacific Index experienced the worst decline. &nbsp,

” I worked Sunday through Monday, working.” This week, Ferres reported that I have averaged three hours of sleep per night.

People” completely underestimated the scale and scope of change Trump was going to bring,” said Prashant Newnaha, a Singapore-based strategist at TD Securities, “until the headlines.” They weren’t prepared for it, which is important.

By Wednesday, Vantage Point’s Ferres had spotted a turbulence in the Asian trading market that would compel the administration to soften its grip on tariffs. When yields suddenly spiked on fears of an unwind to the basis trade, the market was in turmoil. &nbsp,

He was correct. Trump’s decision to halt some tariffs for 90 days caused Wall Street to rise and eased jitters in the bond market.

He claimed that” the stress in the bond market contributed to the pivot.” However, he still questioned whether a rebound would last long, and he instead chose to use the rally to divert more risk. The call was successful. The rally had reverted by Thursday in New York. He claimed that he put more risk into the rally than the other way around.

The more the episode drags on, the more your chances of seeing a decline in growth and profits are. It will result in a fundamental shock that is still being weighed against the market, according to Ferres.

The most enthralling aspect of Trump’s policy is the potential for quick turnarounds.

However, it’s odd because one person can flip the switch at any time, which is unusual for multi-strategy hedge fund GAO Capital in Singapore. &nbsp,

According to Trump,” the recession genie has been let out of the bottle so people are going to be more careful,” and traders may now opt to stay up at night and avoid Truth Social for hints on Trump’s next action. &nbsp,

After the rally, we witnessed profit-taking, with few people rushing in to take on new positions. We are still trading short-term and are acting reactively rather than fundamentally long-term.

All that volatility is also affecting regional business plans, aside from the markets. Indonesia’s markets fell on reopening following the weeklong Eid holiday, and Brian Tan, the head of non-China EM Asia economics research at Barclays Plc in Singapore, was in Jakarta for a business trip during the week.

After Trump announced the 90-day pause, he had to squeeze in time to deliver a note to clients early on Thursday morning. He then hopped into his car to juggling a few meetings.

Kok Hoong Wong, Maybank Securities ‘ head of institutional equities trading, said,” Everyone is still on edge.” It appeared as though the financial world was about to end on Wednesday morning, with stocks falling, stock futures falling, and the yen strengthening sharply. We experienced some panic buying at the open on Thursday morning, and by Friday it appeared that people had reacted to the rising sentiment.

” The awareness that Trump may not be the bottom has begun to percolate. Perhaps we will experience a longer-than-expected adjustment period following this trade tariff episode.

According to Louis Gave of Gavekal, a group that runs the Hong Kong-based asset-allocation consultancy Gavekal Research and some global funds, the volatility may have a positive effect.

In a note dated April 10, he wrote,” The past week has demonstrated that the ice investors are skating on is much thinner than most had believed.” &nbsp,

Trump had to significantly reduce his threat of a trade war to stop the crisis. This implies that the majority of tariffs are currently back in the box. Trump is now aware that if he reopens the box, he will run the risk of another equity and bond market collapse. In consequence, it appears likely that the box will remain closed.

Even so, for traders trying to figure out how and where to invest their money after the week’s wild swings, the risk of a rebound is almost as dangerous as that of a new selloff.

” We started covering shorts in a lot of names and closing some short positions during the falling market on Monday,” said Jun Bei Liu, lead portfolio manager at Ten Cap, a long-short equity fund with a focus on Australian equities in Sydney. &nbsp,

The fund increased the number of long positions it found to be less fortunate from a trade war, including those held by Australian companies like Fisher &amp, Paykel Healthcare Corp., Cochlear Ltd., and Pro Medicus Ltd.

However, it’s impossible to be complacent.

The market is “oversold on this pessimism,” she said, adding that even the slightest positive attitude is causing the market to move so quickly. Shorts are dangerous in this sector because some businesses are oversold and we have no idea how quickly they will recover.

–With the assistance of Cormac Mullen, Ruth Carson, Winnie Hsu, Abhishek Vishnoi, Prima Wirayani, and Winnie Hsu.

— ©2025 Bloomberg L. P.

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