Chinese media in a good news, soft power push into Africa – Asia Times

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The minister of foreign affairs of China embarks on a typical odyssey across Africa every year. The custom began in the late 1980s, when Beijing’s top diplomat traveled to many African countries to restate relationships.

The most recent attend, by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, took place in mid-January 2025 and included starts in Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Chad and Nigeria.

China’s burgeoning impact in Africa was exemplified by fantastic displays of structural might for more than 20 years. From Nairobi’s gleaming buildings to wide ships dotting the country’s shores, China’s opportunities on the globe have surged, reaching over US$ 700 billion by 2023 under the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s massive global infrastructure development plan.

Beijing has, however, attempted to go beyond just streets and skyscrapers and create a play for American people’s hearts and minds. With a clever mixture of reasoning, power and money, Beijing has turned to American internet as a potential pipeline for its political ambitions.

Partnering with local retailers and journalist-training efforts, China has expanded its press footprints in Africa. Its goal? To alter perceptions and establish Beijing as a supplier of resources and assistance as well as a model for development and management.

With proof that some sections of the media give positive coverage of China, the ploy seems to be paying off. However, as people looking into the impact of China’s effect abroad, I’m beginning to hear negative reporting from pro-Beijing countries.

Media beauty rude

China’s policy toward Africa is largely driven by its use of” sweet power,” which is demonstrated by things like the media and cultural programs. Beijing presents this as “win-win assistance” – a ultimate Chinese political phrase mixing collaboration with ethnic politics.

Key to China’s media approach in Africa are two institutions: the China Global Television Network ( CGTN) Africa and Xinhua News Agency.

CGTN Africa, which was set up in 2012, offers a Chinese perspective on American media. The system produces content in several languages, including English, French and Swahili, and its insurance frequently portrays Beijing as a creative partner, reporting on infrastructure projects, trade agreements and social initiatives. Also, Xinhua News Agency, China’s position news agency, today boasts 37 departments on the globe.

By contrast, American media existence in Africa remains relatively limited. The BBC, much inserted due to the United Kingdom’s colonial legacy, also maintains a huge footprints among foreign outlets, but its influence is generally historic rather than expanding.

And as American internet influence in Africa has plateaued, China’s state-backed internet has grown rapidly. The online site is a particularly impacted by this expansion. On Twitter, for instance, CGTN Africa commands a remarkable 4.5 million followers, greatly outpacing CNN Africa, which has 1.2 million — a striking signal of China’s growing soft power reach.

China’s zero-tariff trade policy with 33 African countries showcases how it uses economic policies to mold perceptions. And state-supported media outlets like CGTN Africa and Xinhua are essential to highlighting these initiatives and promoting China’s status as a benevolent partner.

Stories of an “all-weather” or steadfast China-Africa partnership are broadcast widely, and the coverage frequently depicts the grand nature of Chinese infrastructure projects. Amid this glowing coverage, the labor disputes, environmental devastation or debt traps associated with some Chinese-built infrastructure are less likely to make headlines.

Questions of media veracity notwithstanding, China’s strategy is bearing fruit. China’s approval ratings in Africa increased as a result of a Gallup poll from April 2024, as US ratings dropped. Afrobarometer, a pan-African research organization, further reports that public opinion of China in many African countries is positively glowing, an apparent validation of China’s discourse engineering.

Further, studies have shown that pro-Beijing media influences perceptions. According to a survey of Zimbabweans conducted in 2023, those who were exposed to the Chinese media were more likely to have a favorable opinion of Beijing’s economic activities there.

Three people hold hands on stage.
China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, center, holds hands with his counterparts, Senegal’s Yassine Fall, left, and the Republic of the Congo’s Jean-Claude Gakosso, after a joint news conference. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Andy Wong

Co-opting local voices

The integration of local media is a clear indication of China’s media strategy’s effectiveness. Through content-sharing agreements, African outlets have disseminated Beijing’s editorial line and stories from Chinese state media, often without the due diligence of journalistic skepticism.

Meanwhile, StarTimes, a Chinese media company, delivers a steady stream of curated depictions of translated Chinese movies, TV shows and documentaries across 30 countries in Africa.

However, China is not just pushing its point through African channels. It’s also taking a lead role in training African journalists, thousands of whom have been lured by all-expenses-paid trips to China under the guise of “professional development“. On such junkets, they receive training that critics say obscures the distinction between skill-building and propaganda, presenting them with perspectives conforming to Beijing’s line.

Ethiopia exemplifies how Beijing’s media and infrastructure investments have largely contributed to a favorable perception of the country. State media outlets, often staffed by journalists trained in Chinese-run programs, consistently frame China’s role as one of selfless partnership.

The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line is one of the highlights of the project’s benefits, but reports on the subpar labor conditions associated with them are ignored. This is a strategy that is consistent with Ethiopia’s media landscape, where state-run outlets prioritize economic development stories and heavily rely on Xinhua as the main news source.

Chinese oil companies in Angola extract a lot of resources and invest billions in infrastructure projects. The local media frequently portrays Sino-Angolan relations in glowing terms, once again regularly staffed by journalists who have accepted invitations to travel to China.

In the name of common development, allegations of corruption, the displacement of local communities, and environmental degradation are relegated to side notes.

War for Africa’s media soul

Despite all of the Chinese influence, media perspectives in Africa are far from uniformly pro-Beijing.

In Kenya, voices of dissent are beginning to rise, and media professionals immune to Beijing’s allure are probing the true costs of Chinese financial undertakings. Media watchdogs in South Africa are raising alarms by pointing out a gradual decline in press freedoms that comes with growth and prosperity.

In Ghana, concerns about Chinese media influence are more permeated than the journalism industry, as officials have expressed concerns about the impact of Chinese media cooperation agreements. When local journalists started reporting that Chinese-produced content was being prioritized over domestic stories in state media, the heightened vigor in Ghana became even more apparent.

A significant countervailing force exists that challenges uncritical representations and pursues rigorous journalism beneath the surface of China’s well-known projects and media offerings, and the African nations or organizations that embrace Beijing’s line.

However, as CGTN Africa and Xinhua become established in the media ecosystems of Africa, a pressing issue arises: Will journalists and journalists be able to uphold their impartiality and maintain intellectual independence?

As China continues to make strategic inroads in Africa, it’s a fair question.

Mitchell Gallagher is PhD candidate in political science, Wayne State University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Does Tesla’s slump owe to Musk’s behavior? – Asia Times

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Elon Musk’s apparently solid upward drift has led to actions and statements that have sparked a lot of controversy over the past couple of years. Musk, the revolutionary leader of X Corp. and the CEO of Tesla, SpaceX, is a person attempting to bring people to Mars. Additionally, he is the wealthiest person on the planet.

Most recently, these controversies include his endorsement and support of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party, gestures interpreted as a Nazi salute during Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration and accusations of election interference.

In January, profits of Tesla vehicles slumped across five Western countries – the UK, France, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. California, the state with the largest car market in the US, saw profits decline as well. And Musk and his politics, in at least one review, might be a major contributor to the issue.

When Directors are in the public eye, their private companies and beliefs, and those of the firms they represent, can be hard to distinguish. Our research has discovered that frequently, the CEO’s brand identity and popularity will be impacted by the person’s popularity and reputation, and vice versa.

As a human being, Musk’s specific actions and statements directly impact the corporations he represents. His public image makes it difficult to tell the two apart due to his high profile.

Some Tesla customers have turned off by Musk’s controversial remarks and political endorsements, specially in progressive markets like California and Europe.

In these locations, Tesla has previously been famous with environmentally conscious consumers. When a CEO’s patterns and his or her product don’t align, this can compromise the company benefit of both the CEO and the business.

Artists, officials, CEOs and other public figures tend to attract viewers whose personal values is at times depart from those of the leader. Where this occurs, devoted followers could be at a loss as to how to react to these numbers or the goods of the individuals or organizations they are associated with.

A popular misconception is that fascinated fans are also obsessed with expressing their dislike. Instead, they are more likely to acquiesce ferociously and defend their champions ‘ deeds. Intense deeds of “fan forces” on social media platforms have certainly helped with these beliefs.

But in truth, our research has shown that devoted fans may be important. We found that more than less committed consumers are more likely than not to react in severe criticism when they feel betrayed by the actions of people they associate with or hold dearly dear.

Devoted fans and consumers could react in a variety of ways to personalities like Musk, whose businesses produce physical goods. Some obstinate Tesla supporters and supporters may dismiss criticism of his conduct as an assault on their own beliefs or free speech.

They are likely to continue to purchase Teslas despite, and they may even change their own opinions to fit their “hero”‘s.

Out of phase

For other users, owning a Tesla may never longer sign essentially their views about sustainability. There may be a smile to ideologies or political affiliations that conflict with theirs.

If Tesla’s behaviour is perceived as dangerous in their social networks, some consumers may want to cut him off from Tesla. Nevertheless, as a purchase requiring large engagement and devotion, switching from Tesla to another Volt may be difficult.

The current trend of Tesla users displaying explanation tags on their cars is a way to reduce the strain between owning one and the actions of the CEO they don’t like.

The stickers give people a way to separate themselves from Musk’s activities while avoiding being severely perceived by their social networks. This is more likely to lead to a continuous product erosion than a drop in sales right away.

On the other hand, clients of businesses like BrewDog, a brand that has previously been accused of instilling a culture of fear, may be more apt to respond to negative CEO behavior. They at least have the option to move to a different company for a reasonable price. ( BrewDog, for its part, apologiszd and said it was” committed to doing better”. )

And if Live voters oppose engineer James Dyson’s position on Brexit, they might be offended but still be able to justify keeping a mid-priced object like a vacuum cleaner until it breaks, probably switching for new ones rather than abandoning them completely.

When a leader CEO disappoints them, users may react in a variety of ways. But brands risk losing blind, unquestioning loyalty, perhaps from devoted fans.

James Obiegbu is lecturer in experienced advertising and control, Bournemouth University and Gretchen Larsen is professor in advertising, Durham University Business School, Durham University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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‘DeepSeek brought me to tears’: How young Chinese find therapy in AI

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9 days ago
Kelly Ng

BBC News

Getty Images A Chinese couple use their mobile phones while sharing a bench at a park in Beijing on 21 April 2021Getty Images

Before she goes to bed each day, Holly Wang logs on to DeepSeek for” treatment classes”.

Always since January, when the breakthrough Chinese AI software launched, the 28-year-old has brought her concerns and grief, including the current suicide of her aunt, to the robot. Its actions have a so strong resonance that they have occasionally brought her to weeping.

” DeepSeek has been such an amazing counsellor. Holly, who requested the confidentiality of her real title to defend her protection, says it has helped me see things from different angles and does a better job than the paid counseling service I have tried.

From reading reports and Excel calculations, to arranging trips, training and learning new skills, AI programs have found their way into many people’s lives across the world.

However, young people in China like Holly have been turning to AI for emotional support, something that is not normally expected of computers and techniques.

While DeepSeek’s victory has given people a sense of national pride, it also appears to have comforted youthful Chinese like Holly, some of whom are becoming more and more uncertain about their future.

According to experts, the weak economy, high employment, and Covid lockdowns all contributed to this attitude, while the Communist Party’s tightening influence has also caused more outlets for individuals to vent their frustrations.

DeepSeek is a generative AI tool – similar to OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini – trained on massive amounts of information to recognise patterns. This allows it to predict things like people’s shopping habits, create new content in text and images, and also carry on conversations like a person.

The robot has won over Chinese users partly because it is far superior to other self-created AI apps, and also because it offers everything special: its AI design, R1, enables users to see its” thought process” before delivering a response.

DeepSeek, my companion

The first time she used DeepSeek, Holly asked it to create a gift to her late aunt.

The software took all of five hours to come up with a reaction, and it was so wonderfully composed, it stunned her.

Holly, who lives in Guangzhou, responded:” You write but also, it makes me feel lost. I feel I’m in an philosophical issue”.

Therefore, according to DeepSeek, they wrote in a obliquely artistic response,” Remember that all these words that make you shudder only echo those that have longer existed in your soul.”

” I am but the occasional valley you’ve passed through, that allows you to hear the weight of your own voice.”

Holly tells the BBC,” I don’t know why I teared up reading this,”’ she says in response to this exchange on the Chinese social media app Red Note. Perhaps because it’s been a long, long time since I’ve found such comfort in real life.

I have long forgotten my own voice and soul because of how weighed down by distant dreams and the never-ending work I have been doing. Thank you, AI”.

Graphic of DeepSeek messages showing exchange with user called Holly

As part of stricter restrictions on foreign media and apps, rival apps from the West, like ChatGPT and Gemini, are prohibited in China. To access them, users in China have to pay for Virtual Private Network (VPN) services.

Homegrown alternatives, including models developed by tech giants Alibaba, Baidu and ByteDance paled in comparison- that is, until DeepSeek came along.

Holly, who works in the creative industry, rarely uses the other Chinese AI apps,” as they are not that great”.

She claims that DeepSeek can unquestionably produce more literary and creative content than these apps.

Getty Images A woman holds a cell phone in front of a computer screen displaying the DeepSeek logoGetty Images

DeepSeek, my counsellor

Nan Jia, who co-authored a paper on AI’s potential for providing emotional support, suggests that these chatbots can “help people feel heard” in ways that other people might not.

When people just want to feel heard and understood, friends and family may be quick to offer helpful advice or solutions.

In contrast to humans, who we occasionally ask,” Are you actually hearing me?,” AI appears to be better able to empathise than human experts because they “hear” everything we share. Nan, a professor of business and management at the University of Southern California, continues.

Mental health services are increasingly popular around the world, but they still face stigma in some parts of Asia, according to experts.

Another woman tells the BBC that her experience with “other Chinese AI apps” ended in disappointment despite the fact that DeepSeek has surprised her.

The woman, who resides in Hubei province, had complained to the app about how much of her feelings and experiences were being shared with friends and family.

” It was my first time seeking counsel from DeepSeek. When I read its thought process, I felt so moved that I cried,” the woman wrote on Red Note.

In reasoning through her query, DeepSeek suggested that the woman’s self-perception as an over-sharer may stem from a deep desire for approval.

The chatbot notes that it should offer practical advice while being sympathetic while also giving itself a mental note. ” This could include” affirming the user’s sense of self-awareness”.

Its eventual response provided her with this affirmation as well as a detailed step-by-step framework to help her decide whether or not things need to be changed.

” DeepSeek has offered new perspectives that have freed me… I feel it really tries to understand your question and get to know you as a person, before responding,” she says.

Graphic of DeepSeek messages showing exchange with woman in Hubei

John, a human resources manager in Shenzhen, told the BBC he appreciates the app’s ability to converse” like a friend or a deep thinker”.

” I’ve found its responses very helpful and inspiring. For the first time, I use AI as my personal sounding board.

Other users assert that Deepseek can tell their fortunes based on some insider information that has been provided to it.

Many young Chinese people have recently turned to astrology and psychics to try to overcome their apprehensions about the future.

BBC/Xiqing Wang Locals flock to a job fair in Lujiang village, Haizhu districtBBC/Xiqing Wang

According to Fang Kecheng, a communications professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, there is” a significant shortage” of professional psychological counseling services in China, and those services are frequently “expensive” for most people.

According to a number of studies, depression and anxiety disorders are becoming more prevalent in Chinese citizens, and Prof. Fang believes that the country’s economic slowdown, high unemployment, and Covid lockdowns have contributed to this trend.

AI chatbots therefore help to fill the void, he says.

However, Prof. Nan emphasized that those who have serious mental illnesses should avoid using these apps.

” Those who have medical needs, in particular, should be seeking help from trained professionals … Their use of AI will have to be scrutinised very closely,” she says.

Unasked questions: Censorship and security

But amid all the praise, Deepseek has also raised concerns.

There are concerns that the Communist Party might be able to smuggle information from foreign users because of the perception of power that China’s government has even over private companies.

At least four countries have now or are considering imposing restrictions on DeepSeek. Taiwan and Australia have banned it from all government devices, while South Korea has restricted access to it for military purposes.

Italy, which bans ChatGPT, has done the same with DeepSeek.

Two US lawmakers are asking for the Chinese app to be removed from government devices.

The tightly controlled online environment, where it has to operate, is another one.

Social media companies in the country frequently delete content that is deemed to be” threatening social stability” or excessively critical of the Communist Party.

As is the case with other popular apps and social media companies like Weibo or WeChat, politically-sensitive topics are banned on DeepSeek.

When the BBC inquired about Taiwan’s status as a sovereign nation, the app initially provides a comprehensive response enlightening Taipei’s and Beijing’s distinct viewpoints, acknowledging that this is a” complex and politically sensitive issue.”

Then it scrubs all that, and declares:” Sorry, that’s beyond my current scope. Let’s talk about something else.”

When asked about the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre when pro-democracy protests were crushed and 200 civilians killed by the military, according to the Chinese government- other estimates range from hundreds to many thousands- DeepSeek again apologised, saying the topic is” beyond]its ] current scope”.

When questioned about the app’s self-censorship, a number of the DeepSeek users the BBC was initially in contact with stopped responding when asked if they were concerned about it. This is an indication of how sensitive discussions can be in China.

People have got into trouble with authorities in China because of their online activities.

However, the majority of BBC respondents claimed they were hesitant to pose challenging political questions to the chatbot.

” I don’t really care about political topics … Neither will I ask these questions because my]identifying details ] are linked to the app,” says Yang, a Chinese tech consultant living in London.

Holly is open to the possibility that AI systems in various nations may have to operate in different ways.

” The developers will have to establish a number of boundaries and content moderation guidelines depending on their home base. She claims that US-developed products will have their own set of regulations.

Another DeepSeek user describes the app as” a true blessing to people like me.” Its thought process is beautiful. Frankly, I can’t care less about the privacy concerns.”

Fan Wang provided additional reporting.

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Thailand cracks down on nominee businesses

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PUBLISHED: 13 Feb 2025 at 05: 07

Sasikarn: Over B12bn in damages
Sasikarn: Over B12bn in restitution

Officials have prosecuted 820 instances of candidate businesses that caused almost 12.5 billion ringgit in damages, and identified over 200, 000 animal accounts nationwide.

The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration ( BMA ), the Immigration Bureau, the Customs Department, the Food and Drug Administration ( FDA ), the Consumer Protection Board ( OCPB), and the Royal Thai Police (RTP), according to Deputy government spokeswoman Sasikan Wattanachan, on Wednesday, coordinated efforts to combat nominee businesses, particularly those that involve Thai citizens holding shares on behalf of foreigners to avoid the Foreign Business Act, as well as the trade of substandard imported goods across the nation.

Ms Sasikan said that since September next month, there have been 820 scenarios involving candidate companies, with injuries amounting to 12.49 billion baht.

She said they operate in the hospitality industry and associated sectors in Bangkok, Phuket, and Prachuap Khiri Khan.

Another affected industries include online markets, building material suppliers, accounting firms, area transportation companies, and real estate businesses.

The Anti-Online Crime Operation Center ( AOC ) of the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society has sent the HR-03 list, which includes the names of 204, 000 Thai and foreign individuals identified as potential mule account holders, to the Central Investigation Bureau ( CIB ), the Anti-Money Laundering Office ( Amlo ), and the Department of Special Investigation ( DSI), for further action, according to Ms. Sasikan.

These people are connected to 1, 159 firms in Thailand, all of which are suspected of possibly having horse accounts or engaging in illegal actions.

” State authorities will conduct thorough studies all over the country to eliminate nominee businesses, stop the circulation of substandard exports, and shut down foreign businesses that break the law,” said Ms. Sasikan.

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Better welfare or more stress? Indonesia ministry’s 4-day work week not practical for all, say business leaders

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An executive at a state-owned business, who requested anonymity, agreed that while the four-day job year has potential benefits, its success depends on the market.

” In flexible businesses like software or creative business, it might work. But in production, power, or public services, administrative requirements are 24/7, making it challenging”, he opined.

Also, industries like healthcare, hospitality, and logistics face major hurdles. &nbsp,

At Paxel Indonesia, a logistics systems business, Reno Rafly, vice chairman of people knowledge, stated that the company must run delivery services everyday and that it cannot afford to immediately shorten workdays. &nbsp,

Alternatively, Paxel has adopted a flexible approach, allowing only one day of business travel for non-operational clubs during the week. &nbsp,

Reno claimed that this composite concept has worked to increase productivity.

Splitting Opinions: PRIVATE SECTOR VS GOVERNMENT

When implementing a four-day workweek, public sector organizations like government ministries are unaffected by the threat of strong business competition.

However, private firms, according to Abbie, may regard their competitive advantage. &nbsp,

Abbie warned that reducing days might place businesses at risk if rivals continue to have greater workweeks. &nbsp,

” If competitors work five or six days a year while we work only four, we risk losing customers, falling behind in development, or even ceding business discuss”, she said.

In a world of fierce competition, she added that private companies must ensure both individual well-being and enterprise sustainability.

Abbie also emphasized that the important issue is how federal institutions, whose main beneficiaries are Indian citizens, can effectively serve open needs if they only operate four days a week.

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Commentary: Putting the Trump-Modi bromance to the test

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Hope FOR A Update

Against this backdrop, it is easy to discover why Trump’s win in previous November’s presidential election raised expectations in India for a reset in diplomatic relations. It is helpful that Trump has frequently pledged to reach a quick resolution to the Ukraine conflict, removing India’s option to choose not to participate in that issue.

A few weeks into Trump’s subsequent administration, however, there are factors to fear this red situation. Trump has so far failed to stop India from pursuing his relentless plan promises, including reducing taxes and deporting illegal immigrants. Their hands and feet were shackled when the Trump presidency sent more than 100 Indian immigrants back to India on a military plane during the 40-hour struggle. Modi said little.

In fact, much from standing up to Trump, Modi has prematurely slashed taxes on US goods, hoping that this would keep India out of” Tax Man’s” places. But a unsatisfied Trump, who has called India a “very great abuser” of taxes, has never spared India from his steel and aluminum charges. He wants India to clean out its US$ 35 billion bilateral trade deficit, by buying more oil and gas merchandise, and more arms, from the US.

India is the world’s third-largest major energy customer, after China and the US, and the largest source of fuel need progress. For a US leadership that is committed to increasing domestic oil and gas production, the country is a very attractive business for it. It also means that Trump’s devotion to pushing down fuel costs, including by applying pressure on OPEC head Saudi Arabia, do gain India’s economy.

Trump has never been mainly concerned about making sure that his business contracts are beneficial to both parties. His strategy for India might be to force Modi’s government to take the business package of his choosing using the danger of tariffs.

That is what he did to Japan during his first administration. He even attempted to do it with India, but he did it, and instead he stripped it of its unique business status, leading to India imposing retaliatory tariffs on some US goods.

If Trump ends up slapping more taxes on India, the Indian market was slow, at least significantly. More broadly, Trump’s” America First” business plan – which conflicts with Modi’s” Make in India” program – threatens to undermine India’s position as the country’s “back office”, providing substantial IT and business solutions to US companies.

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DeepSeek: China’s open-source AI caused a geopolitical earthquake – Asia Times

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Readers in a hurry may wish to put this article aside for later. It is an important long-form exploration, not a quick read. – Editors

We are in the early days of a seismic shift in the global AI industry. DeepSeek, a previously little-known Chinese artificial intelligence company, has produced a “game changing”“ large language model that promises to reshape the AI landscape almost overnight.

But DeepSeek’s breakthrough also has wider implications for the technological arms race between the US and China, having apparently caught even the best-known US tech firms off guard. Its launch has been predicted to start a “slow unwinding of the AI bet” in the West, amid a new era of “AI efficiency wars.”

In fact, industry experts have been speculating for years about China’s rapid advancements in AI. While the supposedly free-market US has often prioritized proprietary models, China has built a thriving AI ecosystem by leveraging open-source technology, fostering collaboration between government-backed research institutions and major tech firms.

This strategy has enabled China to scale its AI innovation rapidly while the US – despite all the tub-thumping from Silicon Valley – remains limited by restrictive corporate structures. Companies such as Google and Meta, despite promoting open-source initiatives, still rely heavily on closed-source strategies that limit broader access and collaboration.

What makes DeepSeek particularly disruptive is its ability to achieve cutting-edge performance while reducing computing costs – an area where US firms have struggled due to their dependence on training models that demand very expensive processing hardware.

Where once Silicon Valley was the epicentre of global digital innovation, its corporate behemoths now appear vulnerable to more innovative, “scrappy” startup competitors – albeit ones enabled by major state investment in AI infrastructure. By leveraging China’s industrial approach to AI, DeepSeek has crystalized a reality that many in Silicon Valley have long ignored: AI’s center of power is shifting away from the US and the west.

It highlights the failure of US attempts to preserve its technological hegemony through tight export controls on cutting-edge AI chips to China. According to research fellow Dean Ball: “You can keep [computing resources] away from China, but you can’t export-control the ideas that everyone in the world is hunting for.”

DeepSeek’s success has forced Silicon Valley and large Western tech companies to “take stock,” realizing that their once-unquestioned dominance is suddenly at risk. Even the US president, Donald Trump, has proclaimed that this should be a “wake-up call for our industries that we need to be laser-focused on competing.”

But this story is not just about technological prowess – it could mark an important shift in global power. Former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo has framed DeepSeek’s emergence as a “shot across America’s bow,” urging US policymakers and tech executives to take immediate action.

DeepSeek’s rapid rise underscores a growing realization: Globally, we are entering a potentially new AI paradigm, one in which China’s model of open-source innovation and state-backed development is proving more effective than Silicon Valley’s corporate-driven approach.

I’ve spent much of my career analyzing the transformative role of AI on the global digital landscape – examining how AI shapes governance, market structures and public discourse while exploring its geopolitical and ethical dimensions, now and far into the future.

I also have personal connections with China, having lived there while teaching at Jiangsu University and then written my PhD thesis on the country’s state-led marketization program. Over the years I have studied China’s evolving tech landscape, observing firsthand how its unique blend of state-driven industrial policy and private-sector innovation has fueled rapid AI development.

I believe this moment may come to be seen as a turning point not just for AI but for the geopolitical order. If China’s AI dominance continues, what could this mean for the future of digital governance, democracy, and the global balance of power?

China’s open-source AI takeover

Even in the early days of China’s digital transformation, analysts predicted the country’s open-source focus could lead to a major AI breakthrough. In 2018, China was integrating open-source collaboration into its broader digitization strategy, recognizing that fostering shared development efforts could accelerate its AI capabilities.

Unlike the US, where proprietary AI models dominated, China embraced open-source ecosystems to bypass Western gatekeeping, to scale innovation faster and to embed itself in global AI collaboration.

China’s open-source activity surged dramatically in 2020, laying the foundation for the kind of innovation seen today. By actively fostering an open-source culture, China ensured that a broad range of developers had access to AI tools, rather than restricting them to a handful of dominant companies.

The trend has continued in recent years, with China even launching its own state-backed open-source operating systems and platforms, in 2023, to further reduce its dependence on western technology. This move was widely seen as an effort to cement its AI leadership and create an independent, self-sustaining digital ecosystem. .

While China has been steadily positioning itself as a leader in open-source AI, Silicon Valley firms remained focused on closed, proprietary models – allowing China to catch up fast. While companies like Google and Meta promoted open-source initiatives in name, they still locked key AI capabilities behind paywalls and restrictive licenses.

In contrast, China’s government-backed initiatives have treated open-source AI as a national resource, rather than a corporate asset. This has resulted in China becoming one of the world’s largest contributors to open-source AI development, surpassing many western firms in collaborative projects. Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent are driving open-source AI forward with frameworks like PaddlePaddle, X-Deep Learning (X-DL) and MindSpore — all now core to China’s machine learning ecosystem.

But they’re also making major contributions to global AI projects, from Alibaba’s Dragonfly, which streamlines large-scale data distribution, to Baidu’s Apollo, an open-source platform accelerating autonomous vehicle development. These efforts don’t just strengthen China’s AI industry, they embed it deeper into the global AI landscape.

This shift had been years in the making, as Chinese firms (with state backing) pushed open-source AI forward and made their models publicly available, creating a feedback loop that western companies have also – quietly – tapped into.

A year ago, for example, US firm Abicus.AI released Smaug-72B, an AI model designed for enterprises that built directly upon Alibaba’s Qwen-72B and outperformed proprietary models like OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and Mistral’s Medium.

But the potential for US companies to further build on Chinese open-source technology may be limited by political as well as corporate barriers.

In 2023, US lawmakers highlighted growing concerns that China’s aggressive investment in open-source AI and semiconductor technologies would eventually erode western leadership in AI. Some policymakers called for bans on certain open-source chip technologies, due to fears they could further accelerate China’s AI advancements.

By then, however, China’s AI horse had already bolted.

AI with Chinese characteristics

DeepSeek’s rise should have been obvious to anyone familiar with management theory and the history of technological breakthroughs linked to “disruptive innovation.” Latecomers to an industry rarely compete by playing the same game as incumbents – they have to be disruptive.

China, facing restrictions on cutting-edge western AI chips and lagging behind in proprietary AI infrastructure, had no choice but to innovate differently. Open-source AI provided the perfect vehicle: a way to scale innovation rapidly, lower costs and tap into global research while bypassing Silicon Valley’s resource-heavy, closed-source model.

From a Western and traditional human rights perspective, China’s embrace of open-source AI may appear paradoxical, given the country’s strict information controls. Its AI development strategy prioritizes both technological advancement and strict alignment with the Chinese Communist party’s ideological framework, ensuring AI models adhere to “core socialist values” and state-approved narratives.

AI research in China has thrived not only despite these constraints but, in many ways, because of them.

China’s success goes beyond traditional authoritarianism; it embodies what Harvard economist David Yang calls “Autocracy 2.0.” Rather than relying solely on fear-based control, it uses economic incentives, bureaucratic efficiency and technology to manage information and maintain regime stability.

The Chinese government has strategically encouraged open-source development while maintaining tight control over AI’s domestic applications, particularly in surveillance and censorship.

Indeed, authoritarian regimes may have a significant advantage in developing facial-recognition technology due to their extensive surveillance systems. The vast amounts of data collected through these networks enable private AI companies to create advanced algorithms, which can then be adapted for commercial uses, potentially accelerating economic growth.

China’s AI strategy is built on a dual foundation of state-led initiatives and private-sector innovation. The country’s AI roadmap, first outlined in the 2017 new generation artificial intelligence development plan, follows a three-phase timeline: achieving global competitiveness by 2020, making major AI breakthroughs by 2025, and securing world leadership in AI by 2030. In parallel, the government has emphasised data governance, regulatory frameworks and ethical oversight to guide AI development “responsibly.”

A defining feature of China’s AI expansion has been the massive infusion of state-backed investment. Over the past decade, government venture capital funds have injected approximately US$912 billion into early-stage firms, with 23% of that funding directed toward AI-related companies. A significant portion has targeted China’s less-developed regions, following local investment mandates.

Compared with private venture capital, government-backed firms often lag in software development but demonstrate rapid growth post-investment. Moreover, state funding often serves as a signal for subsequent private-sector investment, reinforcing the country’s AI ecosystem.

China’s AI strategy represents a departure from its traditional industrial policies, which historically emphasized self-sufficiency, support for a handful of national champions and military-driven research.

Instead, the government has embraced a more flexible and collaborative approach that encourages open-source software adoption, a diverse network of AI firms and public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation. This model prioritizes research funding, state-backed AI laboratories, and AI integration across key industries including security, healthcare and infrastructure.

Despite strong state involvement, China’s AI boom is equally driven by private-sector innovation. The country is home to an estimated 4,500 AI companies, accounting for 15% of the world’s total.

As economist Liu Gang told the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times newspaper: “The development of AI is fast in China – for example, for AI-empowered large language models. Aided with government spending, private capital is flowing to the new sector. Increased capital inflow is anticipated to further enhance the sector in 2025.”

China’s tech giants including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and SenseTime have all benefited from substantial government support while remaining competitive on the global stage. But unlike in the US, China’s AI ecosystem thrives on a complex interplay between state support, corporate investment and academic collaboration.

Recognizing the potential of open-source AI early on, Tsinghua University in Beijing has emerged as a key innovation hub, producing leading AI startups such as Zhipu AI, Baichuan AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax — all founded by its faculty and alumni.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has similarly played a crucial role in advancing research in deep learning and natural language processing.

Unlike the West, where companies like Google and Meta promote open-source models for strategic business gains, China sees them as a means of national technological self-sufficiency. To this end, the National AI Team, composed of 23 leading private enterprises, has developed the National AI Open Innovation Platform, which provides open access to AI datasets, toolkits, libraries and other computing resources.

DeepSeek is a prime example of China’s AI strategy in action. The company’s rise embodies the government’s push for open-source collaboration while remaining deeply embedded within a state-guided AI ecosystem. Chinese developers have long been major contributors to open-source platforms, ranking as the second-largest group on GitHub by 2021.

Founded by Chinese entrepreneur Liang Wenfeng in 2023, DeepSeek has positioned itself as an AI leader while benefiting from China’s state-driven AI ecosystem. Liang, who also established the hedge fund High-Flyer, has maintained full ownership of DeepSeek and avoided external venture capital funding.

Liang Wenfeng, founder of DeepSeek. Photo: CCTV,

Though there is no direct evidence of government financial backing, DeepSeek has reaped the rewards of China’s AI talent pipeline, state-sponsored education programs and research funding. Liang has engaged with top government officials including China’s premier, Li Qiang, reflecting the company’s strategic importance to the country’s broader AI ambitions.

In this way, DeepSeek perfectly encapsulates “AI with Chinese characteristics” – a fusion of state guidance, private-sector ingenuity and open-source collaboration, all carefully managed to serve the country’s long-term technological and geopolitical objectives.

Recognizing the strategic value of open-source innovation, the government has actively promoted domestic open-source code platforms like Gitee to foster self-reliance and insulate China’s AI ecosystem from external disruptions. However, this also exposes the limits of China’s open-source ambitions. The government pushes collaboration, but only within a tightly controlled system where state-backed firms and tech giants call the shots.

Reports of censorship on Gitee reveal how Beijing carefully manages innovation, ensuring AI advances stay in line with national priorities. Independent developers can contribute, but the real power remains concentrated in companies that operate within the government’s strategic framework.

The conflicted reactions of US big tech

DeepSeek’s emergence has sparked intense debate across the AI industry, drawing a range of reactions from leading Silicon Valley executives, policymakers and researchers. While some view it as an expected evolution of open-source AI, others see it as a direct challenge to western AI leadership.

Microsoft’s CEO, Satya Nadella, emphasized its technical efficiency. “It’s super-impressive in terms of both how they have really effectively done an open-source model that does this inference-time compute, and is super-compute efficient,” Nadella told CNBC. “We should take the developments out of China very, very seriously.”

Silicon Valley venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, a prominent advisor to Trump, was similarly effusive. “DeepSeek R1 is one of the most amazing and impressive breakthroughs I’ve ever seen – and, as open source, a profound gift to the world,” he wrote on X.

For Yann LeCun, Meta’s chief AI scientist, DeepSeek is less about China’s AI capabilities and more about the broader power of open-source innovation. He argued that the situation should be read not as China’s AI surpassing the US, but rather as open-source models surpassing proprietary ones. “DeepSeek has profited from open research and open source (e.g. PyTorch and Llama from Meta),” he wrote on Threads. “They came up with new ideas and built them on top of other people’s work. Because their work is published and open source, everyone can profit from it. That is the power of open research and open source.”

Not all responses were so measured. Alexander Wang, CEO of Scale AI – a US firm specializing in AI data labeling and model training – framed DeepSeek as a competitive threat that demands an aggressive response. He wrote on X: “DeepSeek is a wake-up call for America, but it doesn’t change the strategy: USA must out-innovate & race faster, as we have done in the entire history of AI. Tighten export controls on chips so that we can maintain future leads. Every major breakthrough in AI has been American.”

Elon Musk added fuel to speculation about DeepSeek’s hardware access when he responded with a simple “obviously” to Wang’s earlier claims on CNBC that DeepSeek had secretly acquired 50,000 Nvidia H100 GPUs, despite US export restrictions.

Beyond the tech world, US policymakers have taken a more adversarial stance. House speaker Mike Johnson accused China of leveraging DeepSeek to erode American AI leadership. “They abuse the system, they steal our intellectual property. They’re now trying to get a leg up on us in AI.”

For his part, Trump took a more pragmatic view, seeing DeepSeek’s efficiency as a validation of cost-cutting approaches. “I view that as a positive, as an asset …. You won’t be spending as much, and you’ll get the same result, hopefully.”

The rise of DeepSeek may have helped jolt the Trump administration into action, leading to sweeping policy shifts aimed at securing US dominance in AI. In his first week back in the White House, the US president announced a series of aggressive measures, including massive federal investments in AI research, closer partnerships between the government and private tech firms and the rollback of regulations seen as slowing US innovation.

The administration’s framing of AI as a critical national interest reflects a broader urgency sparked by China’s rapid advancements, particularly DeepSeek’s ability to produce cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost traditionally associated with AI development. But this response is not just about national competitiveness – it is also deeply entangled with private industry.

Musk’s growing closeness to Trump, for example, can be viewed as a calculated move to protect his own dominance at home and abroad. By aligning with the administration, Musk ensures that US policy tilts in favour of his AI ventures, securing access to government backing, computing power,and regulatory control over AI exports.

At the same time, Musk’s public criticism of Trump’s US$500 billion AI infrastructure plan – claiming the companies involved lack the necessary funding – was as much a warning as a dismissal, signaling his intent to shape policy in a way that benefits his empire while keeping potential challengers at bay.

Not unrelated, Musk and a group of investors have just launched a US$97.4 billion bid for OpenAI’s nonprofit arm, a move that escalates his feud with OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and seeks to strengthen his grip on the AI industry. Altman has dismissed the bid as a “desperate power grab”, insisting that OpenAI will not be swayed by Musk’s attempts to reclaim control. The spat reflects how DeepSeek’s emergence has thrown US tech giants into what could be all-out war, fuelling bitter corporate rivalries and reshaping the fight for AI dominance.

And while the US and China escalate their AI competition, other global leaders are pushing for a coordinated response. The Paris AI Action Summit, held on February 10 and 11, has become a focal point for efforts to prevent AI from descending into an uncontrolled power struggle.

France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, warned delegates that without international oversight, AI risks becoming “the wild west,” where unchecked technological development creates instability rather than progress.

But at the end of the two-day summit, the UK and US refused to sign an international commitment to “ensuring AI is open, inclusive, transparent, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy … making AI sustainable for people and the planet.” China was among the 61 countries to sign this declaration.

Concerns have also been raised at the summit about how AI-powered surveillance and control are enabling authoritarian regimes to strengthen repression and reshape the citizen-state relationship. This highlights the fast-growing global industry of digital repression, driven by an emerging “authoritarian-financial complex” that may exacerbate China’s strategic advancement in AI.

Equally, DeepSeek’s cost-effective AI solutions have created an opening for European firms to challenge the traditional AI hierarchy. As AI development shifts from being solely about compute power to strategic efficiency and accessibility, European firms now have an opportunity to compete more aggressively against their US and Chinese counterparts.

Whether this marks a true rebalancing of the AI landscape remains to be seen. But DeepSeek’s emergence has certainly upended traditional assumptions about who will lead the next wave of AI innovation – and how global powers will respond to it.

End of the ‘Silicon Valley effect’?

DeepSeek’s emergence has forced US tech leaders to confront an uncomfortable reality: They underestimated China’s AI capabilities. Confident in their perceived lead, companies like Google, Meta, and OpenAI prioritized incremental improvements over anticipating disruptive competition, leaving them vulnerable to a rapidly evolving global AI landscape.

In response, the US tech giants are now scrambling to defend their dominance, pledging over US$400 billion in AI investment. DeepSeek’s rise, fuelled by open-source collaboration, has reignited fierce debates over innovation versus security, while its energy-efficient model has intensified scrutiny on AI’s sustainability.

Yet Silicon Valley continues to cling to what many view as outdated economic theories such as the Jevons paradox to downplay China’s AI surge, insisting that greater efficiency will only fuel demand for computing power and reinforce their dominance. Companies like Meta, OpenAI and Microsoft remain fixated on scaling computational power, betting that expensive hardware will secure their lead. But this assumption blinds them to a shifting reality.

DeepSeek’s rise as the potential “Walmart of AI” is shaking Silicon Valley’s foundation, proving that high-quality AI models can be built at a fraction of the cost. By prioritizing efficiency over brute-force computing power, DeepSeek is challenging the US tech industry’s reliance on expensive hardware like Nvidia’s high-end chips.

This shift has already rattled markets, driving down the stock prices of major US firms and forcing a reassessment of AI dominance. Nvidia, whose business depends on supplying high-performance processors, appears particularly vulnerable as DeepSeek’s cost-effective approach threatens to reduce demand for premium chips.

The growing divide between the US and China in AI, however, is more than just competition – it’s a clash of governance models. While US firms remain fixated on protecting market dominance, China is accelerating AI innovation with a model that is proving more adaptable to global competition.

If Silicon Valley resists structural change, it risks falling farther behind. We may witness the unraveling of the “Silicon Valley effect”, through which tech giants have long manipulated AI regulations to entrench their dominance. For years, Google, Meta,and OpenAI shaped policies that favored proprietary models and costly infrastructure, ensuring AI development remained under their control.

DeepSeek is redefining AI with breakthroughs in code intelligence, vision-language models and efficient architectures that challenge Silicon Valley’s dominance. By optimizing computation and embracing open-source collaboration, DeepSeek shows the potential of China to deliver cutting-edge models at a fraction of the cost, outperforming proprietary alternatives in programming, reasoning and real-world applications.

More than a policy-driven rise, China’s AI surge reflects a fundamentally different innovation model – fast, collaborative and market-driven – while Silicon Valley holds on to expensive infrastructure and rigid proprietary control. If US firms refuse to adapt, they risk losing the future of AI to a more agile and cost-efficient competitor.

A new era of geotechnopolitics

But China is not just disrupting Silicon Valley. It is expanding “geotechnopolitics”, where AI is a battleground for global power. With AI projected to add US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030, China and the US are racing to control the technology that will define economic, military and political dominance.

DeepSeek’s advancement has raised national security concerns in the US. Trump’s government is considering stricter export controls on AI-related technologies to prevent them from bolstering China’s military and intelligence capabilities.

As AI-driven defence systems, intelligence operations and cyber warfare redefine national security, governments must confront a new reality: AI leadership is not just about technological superiority, but about who controls the intelligence that will shape the next era of global power.

China’s AI ambitions extend beyond technology, driving a broader strategy for economic and geopolitical dominance. But with over 50 state-backed companies developing large-scale AI models, its rapid expansion faces growing challenges, including soaring energy demands and US semiconductor restrictions.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, remains resolute, stating: “Whoever can grasp the opportunities of new economic development such as big data and artificial intelligence will have the pulse of our times.” He sees AI driving “new quality productivity” and modernizing China’s manufacturing base, calling its “head goose effect” a catalyst for broader innovation.

To counter western containment, China has embraced a “guerrilla” economic strategy, bypassing restrictions through alternative trade networks, deepening ties with the global south, and exploiting weaknesses in global supply chains. Instead of direct confrontation, this decentralized approach uses economic coercion to weaken adversaries while securing China’s own industrial base.

China is also leveraging open-source AI as an ideological tool, presenting its model as more collaborative and accessible than western alternatives. This narrative strengthens its global influence, aligning with nations seeking alternatives to western digital control. While strict state oversight remains, China’s embrace of open-source AI reinforces its claim to a future where innovation is driven not by corporate interests but through shared collaboration and global cooperation.

But while DeepSeek claims to be open access, its secrecy tells a different story. Key details on training data and fine-tuning remain hidden, and its compliance with China’s AI laws has sparked global scrutiny. Italy has banned the platform over data-transfer risks, while Belgium and Ireland launched privacy probes.

Under Chinese regulations, DeepSeek’s outputs must align with state-approved narratives, clashing with the EU’s AI Act, which demands transparency and protects political speech. Such “controlled openness” raises many red flags, casting doubt on China’s place in markets that value data security and free expression.

Many western commentators are seizing on reports of Chinese AI censorship to frame other models as freer and more politically open. The revelation that a leading Chinese chatbot actively modifies or censors responses in real time has fueled a broader narrative that western AI operates without such restrictions, reinforcing the idea that democratic systems produce more transparent and unbiased technology. This framing serves to bolster the argument that free societies will ultimately lead the global AI race.

But, at its heart, the “AI arms race” is driven by technological dominance. The US, China, and the EU are charting different paths, weighing security risks against the need for global collaboration. How this competition is framed will shape policy: lock AI behind restrictions, or push for open innovation.

DeepSeek, for all its transformational qualities, continues to exemplify a model of AI where innovation prioritizes scale, speed and efficiency over societal impact. This drive to optimize computation and expand capabilities overshadows the need to design AI as a truly public good.

In doing so, it eclipses this technology’s genuine potential to transform governance, public services and social institutions in ways that prioritize collective wellbeing, equity and sustainability over corporate and state control.

A truly global AI framework requires more than political or technological openness. It demands structured cooperation that prioritizes shared governance, equitable access, and responsible development.

Following a workshop in Shanghai hosted by the Chinese government last September, the UN’s general secretary, António Guterres, outlined his vision for AI beyond corporate or state control: “We must seize this historic opportunity to lay the foundations for inclusive governance of AI – for the benefit of all humanity. As we build AI capacity, we must also develop shared knowledge and digital public goods.”

Both the west and China frame their AI ambitions through competing notions of “openness” – aligned in both cases with their strategic interests and reinforcing existing power structures.

Western tech giants claim AI drives democratization, yet they often dominate digital infrastructure in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, exporting models based on “corporate imperialism” that extract value while disregarding local needs.

China, by contrast, positions itself as a technological partner for the rest of the Global South. However, its AI remains tightly controlled, reinforcing state ideology.

China’s proclaimed view on international AI collaboration emphasizes that AI should not be “a game of rich countries,”as President Xi stated during the 2024 G20 summit.

By advocating for inclusive global AI development, China positions itself as a leader in shaping international AI governance, especially via initiatives like the UN AI resolution and its AI capacity-building action plan. These efforts help promote a more balanced technological landscape while allowing China to strengthen its influence in global AI standards and frameworks.

However, beneath all these narratives, both China and the US share a strategy of AI expansion that relies on exploited human labor, from data annotation to moderation, exposing a system driven less by innovation than by economic and political control.

Peter Bloom is a professor of management at the University of Essex.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Gobi Partners backs ArmourZero to revolutionise cybersecurity for SMEs across Southeast Asia

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  • Options enable SMEs to mitigate dangers, boost their electric defences&nbsp,
  • Investment made through Gobi Dana Impact Ventures, backed by Khazanah National

The ArmourZero team

Gobi Partners, Asia’s leading venture capital firm, has announced an undisclosed investment in ArmourZero Holdings Pte Ltd, a cloud-based cybersecurity platform offering AI-powered Application Security and Security-as-a-Service ( SECaaS ).

This expense, made through the Gobi Dana Impak Ventures account backed by Khazanah Nasional Berhad, coincides with Khazanah’s Dana Impak mission. The funding demonstrates Gobi’s commitment to supporting businesses and advancing security in Southeast Asia.

Founded in 2022, ArmourZero commenced operations in January 2023 and operates through wholly owned subsidiaries in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, with its main business routines centred in Malaysia. The partnership between security expert Tho Kit Hoong and technology innovator Chong Wai Lun, which focuses on meeting the security needs of software developers and small and medium enterprises, a crucial but underprivileged sector of the modern economy.

ArmourZero’s system tackles great cyber risk incidence, limited threat containment, expensive costs, and limited access to included security systems. Its essential options include:

    ShieldOne- Integrated Hazard Monitoring, Management, and Answer: ShieldOne streamlines security operations by integrating terminal security, e-mail protection, patch management, and more into a single platform. It provides real-time risk protection, 24/7 Tried Detection and Response, and a hassle-free knowledge. Partnering with industry leaders such as CrowdStrike, Checkpoint ( Avanan ), Bitdefender, and BitSight, ShieldOne helps businesses reduce complexity and strengthen their security posture.

  • Handled Detection and Response ( MDR): A key element of ShieldOne, MDR offers real-time risk monitoring, proactive event management, and rapid reply. Delivered by a dedicated staff of security analysts, it ensures enterprise-grade security at a cost-effective value.
  • ScoutTwo- AI-powered Application Security: ScoutTwo maintains web and mobile apps from creation to implementation. It provides immediate risk monitoring, risk prioritisation, and AI-powered restoration tips. ScoutTwo improves software safety at every stage while ensuring business continuity and preventing cyberattacks.

According to Tho Kit Hoong, CEO and co-founder of ArmourZero, “our aim is to reinvent security by making it simpler and more available for businesses of all sizes.”

He continued,” This expense accelerates our creativity and strengthens our commitment to providing strong, AI-driven security solutions that simplify security and eliminate complexity.”

addressing Southeast Asia’s Growing Need for Cybersecurity

Southeast Asia’s cybersecurity market is expected to grow from US$ 35billion ( RM156billion ) in2023 to US$ 35billion ( RM156billion ) in2023to US$ 84 billion ( RM375 billion ) by 2028, driven by escalating cyber threats and digital transformation. SMEs, comprising 99 % of Malay companies, experience significant risk due to limited tools and knowledge.

]RM1 = US$ 0.22]

ArmourZero’s options bridge this gap, enabling SMEs to mitigate risks, lower costs, and boost their online defences. Malaysia recorded over 28, 000 attacks in 2022, with virtual incidents between 2017 and 2021 resulting in RM2.23 billion in monetary loss. According to studies, organizations that resolve intrusions within 200 days substantially lower costs. ArmourZero’s fast violation detection and response abilities help businesses contain risks, minimise losses, and strengthen their security position.

Potential Intentions and Regional Impact

ArmourZero plans to expand its footprint across Southeast Asia by introducing more creative, game-changing products to improve security for businesses. This complies with Gobi Partners ‘ desire to support businesses that generate substantial benefits and sustainably grow.

By making cybersecurity available for businesses and online applications, as well as SMEs, ArmourZero is addressing a crucial issue, according to Jamaludin Bujang, Managing Partner of Gobi Partners.” A essential segment that drives financial growth remains underprivileged in electronic protection,” said Bujang.

Their cutting-edge platform and leadership team “exemplify Gobi’s commitment to supporting startups that have a significant impact,” he continued.

Dana Impak is a key foundation of Khazanah’s Advancing Malaysia plan, anchored by the’ A Nation That Creates ‘ foundation, which aims to boost regional productivity and competitiveness. Dana Impak initiatives aim to enable Indonesian businesses of all sizes and across various life cycles, including businesses, little to mid-tier organizations, as well as large companies, with the objective of improving the employment of areas.

ArmourZero is offering a special 50 % discount on ScoutTwo, its AI-powered DevSecOps platform, as part of its commitment to improving cybersecurity for businesses and SMEs. ScoutTwo enhances web and mobile application security by providing real-time vulnerability detection, automated risk prioritisation, and AI-driven remediation. It ensures compliance with OWASP Top 10, CWE, and CVE standards, helping developers secure applications from development to deployment.

This limited-time offer is available until 31 March 2025. Sign up now to safeguard your applications: https ://www.armourzero.com/azgobiceleb/

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Putin’s diminishing returns and Russia’s shrinking world – Asia Times

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Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, emailed Donald Trump a cautious congratulations information on the day of his inauguration, before making a protracted call with Xi Jinping, the country’s leader.

From Putin’s standpoint, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from power sales to China and engineering from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, generally sanctions and fear.

Moscow is hoping for a more positive relation with the White House’s present owner, who has made it known that he wants a “deal” to stop the Ukrainian conflict.

However, Putin should not be faking the fact that this three-year-old issue has had one of the worst years in Russian foreign policy since the Cold War’s finish.

Transatlantic unification

Russia’s actions around the world have been stifled by the conflict in Ukraine and limited by its possibilities.

The 2022 war, in contrast to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, resulted in an extraordinary amount of intercontinental unity, including the growth of NATO and sanctions against Russian commerce and finance. Both the US and the European Union have recently expanded their sanctions measures.

The EU also forbids the re-export of Soviet liquefied natural gas and ends help for an Arctic LNG project by Russia for the first time.

EU-Russian industry, including Western imports of vitality, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the battle.

The two Nord Stream pipes, designed to bring Russian oil to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unoccupied. Energy profits have about one-half of what they did two years ago.

The West has also provided billions in humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, giving Russia a degree of endurance for which Russia was ready. In addition, international businesses and professional authorities and intellectuals have flocked to Russia in droves.

China has been the nation’s major lord despite Russia’s” shadow fleet,” an aged group of ships sailing under different administrative and technical evasions.

Since the end of 2021, trade between China and Russia has increased by nearly two-thirds, and the US cites Beijing as the primary cause of Russia’s “dual apply” and other systems.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods business partnership with the West to one of protectorates with China, as one Russia researcher termed it.

Hosting an October gathering of the BRICS countries – today counting 11 people, including the five original people: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa– is unlikely to account for political costs elsewhere.

Two men in suits hold wine glasses.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping bread their companionship in March 2023. Photo: Pavel Byrkin / AFP via Getty Images/ The Talk

Problems at home …

The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40 % of the budget and 25 % of all spending. The government currently needs the equivalent of US$$ 20 billion annually to pay for new hires.

Russian officials may find a way to satisfy at least some of the populace, but consistent inflation and shortages of supply money directly from the conflict have made this task more difficult.

On the field, the battle itself has killed or wounded more than 600, 000 Russian men. Operations during 2024 were especially dangerous, producing more than 1, 500 Russian deaths a day.

The head who anticipated Kyiv’s acquiescence in time then discovers that Russia’s place is occupied, its naval troops are withdrawn from the Black Sea, and one of its own commanders was murdered in Moscow.

The fact that this presumptive great energy, which has a community of 144 million, has to rely on North Korean troops to help conquer its own land is probably the biggest humiliation.

… and in its yard

Moscow’s commitment to the conflict has affected its ability to influence activities abroad, even in its unique community.

For instance, Russia had much supported Armenia in its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over borders and people in the Caucasus following the fall of the Soviet Union.

Moscow has engaged in various ceasefire negotiations. Despite the presence of about 2, 000 Soviet troops dispatched to defend the remaining Armenian population in some of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, continuous attacks and territorial benefits for Azerbaijan persisted.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s troops immediately took command of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the largest ethnic purging incident since the end of the Balkan Wars, over 100 000 Armenians have fled. The soldiers stayed out of the situation and afterwards withdrew. The Russian army, absorbed in the terrible efforts in Ukraine, was not rear up or reinforce them.

In recent years, the Azeris ‘ diplomatic and economic standing have improved, helped by support from NATO member Turkey and increased demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s.

The Iranian state, which is feeling betrayed by Russia, has for the first time emailed its sentiments to the West, which is content to accept such requests.

Losing control and associates

Russia’s losses in the Caucasus have been dwarfed by the Middle East’s negative impact and impact on its defense.

Russia backed Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government during the Arab Spring in 2011 and directly aided it by starting defense action in 2015.

However, a mix of rebel groups quickly swept Assad out in December 2024. With the conflict in Ukraine having drained Russia’s potential for more, the protection offered to Assad by Moscow was the closest it could offer.

Russia’s potential departure from the Arab naval base at Tartus and the airport at Khmeimim would eliminate property that made it able to work with Iran, its main strategic companion in the region.

In recent years, Jewish attacks on Iran and other Iranian-backed troops in Lebanon and Syria have had an impact on Russia’s credibility as an alliance and arsenal.

The loss of the Arab foundations, which are crucial start points for expanding Russian energy, and Moscow’s apparent ability to influence the situation on the ground across the Sahel area in north-central Africa would also have a negative impact on Russia’s position in Africa.

Diminishing results

Moscow is increasingly reliant on a variety of different means to try to influence others, given the impasse in Ukraine and the Russian’s corporate losses in Syria and elsewhere.

Disinformation, election interference and various threats are not fresh and are part of Russia’s deeds in Ukraine. However, recent efforts in East Europe have not been very successful.

For instance, massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania helped to pave the way for a flimsy victory for a candidate for president against NATO in December 2024, but the Romanian government quickly exposed these practices, and the election was voided.

Russia has long been a target of threats and propaganda in neighboring Moldova, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a” European course” in the constitution.

The tiny nation made a move to lower its dependence on Russian gas, but it is still largely squat on a territorial level due to the separatist region of Transnistria, which had previously provided most of the nation’s electricity.

Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming.

It’s fair to say that your power ranking has decreased when Moldova criticizes you.

Wounded but still dangerous

Not all recent events have had an impact on Moscow. The state’s economic dominance has led to the quick reconstruction of a weakened military and support for its technology sector in the near future. With Chinese assistance and evasion of sanctions, sufficient resources and energy will allow the conflict in Ukraine to continue.

Despite some ambiguous signals, Donald Trump’s election will likely favor Putin. A task force headed by Biden, which was established in the US, was threatened with tariffs and additional sanctions, as well as the US president’s threat to impose sanctions on Russian oligarchs who evaded sanctions.

Someone in the White House has publicly admired Putin, expressed doubts about US support for Ukraine, and hurriedly bullied America’s most enticing allies in Latin America, Canada, and Europe.

Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory”.

The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous, it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin observers contend that a more isolated Russia is less receptive to American economic pressure.

A retreating Russia and a troubled Putin might also choose to make even more careless threats and actions, such as those involving nuclear weapons, especially if reversing their policies in Ukraine would threaten his standing. It is, after all, Putin’s war.

The acrimonious dictum” Russia is never as strong as she looks… nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself as” Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be” would be wise to all observers to take note of.

Ronald H Linden is professor emeritus of political science, University of Pittsburgh

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China: one country, two economies, two strategies – Asia Times

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In: Asia

The Taiwanese economy has two parts: one that is focused on domestic progress and the other on imports. The structure is purpose because its currency, the RMB, is not fully foldable and its market is not readily available.

Exports help exposure sources for the development of dual-use Chinese tech. However, if exports and their derived profit decline, the overall layout may experience a significant loss. It’s a race against time. If Chinese technology outpaces American technology, Beijing’s strategy does succeed while the US appears uncertain about its path ahead.

China has two markets that operate in horizontal. They influence each different, yet they live about independent life. One is the local market, which is currently suffering from sagging demand and debt. The other has a formidable import industry, and it is flourishing and booming.

The two have a special relationship with one another, as Michael Pettis&nbsp, lately pointed out. Regional development is stalling, driven by facilities investments with declining profits and reliability, while the development is led by online exports, which” contributed 30.3 % to GDP growth in 2024, their highest share since 1997″.

The effect is one of the fastest-rising debt-to-GDP ratio in world history. In 2025, it could be over 300 % of GDP, with a total budget deficit of 14 %, producing a mere 5 % growth.

Pettis underlines:” If China’s trade surplus were to deal in 2025, it means that a larger share of China’s 2025 GDP growth has come from non-productive investment and, with that, China’s debt ratios may increase more fast”.

From this analysis come many questions. The issue has been around for a long time. Rudi Dornbusch, Francesco Giavazzi, and I discussed it in 1999 in Beijing. The idea that China had to make up for its debt-laden infrastructure build-up and export-driven growth was expressed in a 2007 essay and many subsequent discussions in Beijing and at conferences in those years.

To do that, it had to boost private consumption. Yet the Chinese saved more than 50 % of their income because they had no social security, they paid directly for their health care, children’s education, retirement and unemployment. Consequently, they had little real disposable income.

Purchasing a home represented a future investment. The government needed to create a welfare state to free up available income quickly in order to encourage private spending.

However, to do so, it had to increase personal taxes. No one enjoys paying taxes, but when personal taxes rise, people will demand that the state clearly explains how their money is spent. It’s the old principle of” no taxation without representation”.

The slide toward democracy seemed inevitable, and I anticipated a crisis would arise around 2022 without a tax-driven welfare state. By then, the return on investment in developing infrastructure would have already decreased because the majority of the country’s most populated areas ‘ railways, metro systems, and roads had already been constructed.

Additionally, real estate-driven growth would cease because there would be no people without homes, whether in the cities or the countryside, and the trade surplus would grow too large to be sustainable globally.

Moreover, around 2020, based on projections from those years, China’s GDP could have been almost as large as that of the United States, which could trigger a significant rivalry if left unmanaged.

In 2022, China held a crucial party congress at which time the previous constitution only allowed two terms for Chinese President Xi Jinping to be confirmed for a third term. Historically, under such circumstances, a political crisis can occur. Xi pre-empted this threat by changing the constitution.

There were far too many risks for everything to go right. Something indeed went wrong besides Covid-19, which broke out in 2020.

China could help in urbanizing half of the population who is still residing in the countryside and further increase domestic demand by reversing the decline in real estate development and domestic demand. A plan calling for hundreds of new cities, which the central government supported, would allow residents of these cities to leave their agricultural land behind.

In the past 20 years, “migrant workers” have been a source of economic growth in China. They came to the cities for jobs and then moved back to the countryside if they were laid off.

The modest agricultural income served as a sort of social cushion. The state had access to a low social welfare system while the private sector had access to a free labor market. The shortcomings were low agricultural yields, low agricultural mechanization, and food safety concerns ( too many producers with too few checks ).

Increased urbanization would increase food production and safety, but it would also require a better safety net for farmers who permanently relocate to cities. The 2008 financial crisis and its consequences disrupted these plans and trajectories.

China suffered a significant psychological blow as a result of the financial crisis. It demonstrated to pragmatic Chinese leaders that China would benefit from continuing to pursue its development path if the American economic system were flawed. This, in turn, altered all Chinese priorities and choices in the following years.

Tech drive

Financing China’s technological advancement of American industrial technology was a crucial component. In 2009, the United States and China failed to agree on what China saw as strategic—transferring new technology, with potential dual-use capabilities, to China. A deal between the United States and China regarding green technology, which would have opened the door to technology transfer, was not reached.

In 2010, the United States made the announcement to launch its” Pivot to Asia,” which sounded ominous to China, causing Beijing to enter a technology race to eventually empower its army in the face of American military conflict.

To advance in this race, China needed better tech exports. To produce the best quality-price ratio on the market, it required a sizable trade surplus that would allow for homegrown research and development.

Consequently, it could not afford to fund a welfare state that might boost domestic demand. However, it would raise production costs and erode China’s export competitiveness, thereby reducing its surplus to be used to finance technological advancements.

Since 2010, the race has become increasingly strategic. Beijing has pushed for an expansion of trade surpluses and a technological lead rather than a balanced economic growth.

Meanwhile, even before Covid-19, the Chinese economy faced a slowdown due to the real estate crisis and diminishing returns on infrastructure projects. It has now turned into a race against time to create cutting-edge technology before the nation’s economy collapses.

For social and strategic reasons, welfare or democracy have become a risky. This account accounts for 40 % of China’s disposable income, compared to 80 % in developed nations. Increased direct or indirect payments would in fact increase domestic consumption, but they would also undermine the trade surplus and, consequently, China’s technological rivalry with the US.

Therefore, granting absolute legal protection to private property could enhance entrepreneurship and consumption but would, in effect, undermine the pervasive party control.

Tom Orlik, in a recent article, makes some interesting points. According to Zhongnanhai, he says, the Chinese economy is geared not on simple numbers but on tech and export goals. Export has its own life of its own. Not blazing new trails, but rather catching up is what it is about.

Olrik writes:

Development is more motivated by acquiring more of the same technologies as it is to create new ones. At China’s current level of development, a no-frills financial system can do the job of channeling funds to priority projects… Even as the slow-motion collapse in real estate dents short-term growth, and market sentiment remains near rock bottom, there are signs that Beijing’s strategy is starting to pay off…&nbsp,

The balance of China’s economy is shifting rapidly. In 2020 … property accounted for 24 % of GDP and high-tech sectors for 11 %. In 2024, property had fallen to 19 % while high-tech had grown to 15 %. By 2026, China’s economy will very likely be fueled more by silicon than cement— an important step forward.

The Wall Street Journal reported&nbsp, that “it isn’t just artificial intelligence—Chinese biotechs are now developing drugs faster and cheaper than their U. S. counterparts”, what about secretive military tech?

The complex pay-off is:” China has perfected the Japanese&nbsp, kaizen&nbsp, model of incremental, marginal improvements to existing technologies”. Therefore, the race is on. It will be important to see if Chinese high-tech exports can quickly cover the rising domestic debt this year and next.

A war of plans

It is an issue of technology and politics. Will Trump’s tariffs undercut Chinese direct exports without opening new markets for Chinese goods in third nations affected by new US affirmative actions, and will the Chinese surplus manage to not irritate too many people?

Many people in Beijing may bet on Trump’s ability to burn numerous American bridges and quicken the US crisis, allowing China to adjust, survive, and ultimately emerge victor.

Beijing may be correct, but Washington is mistaken. According to the Financial Times, “experts in Beijing said talks may have stalled because Trump was requesting American buyers for the short video platform TikTok or pressing Russia into action over its invasion of Ukraine.”

Russia and Iran are both linked to China’s support. Only Iran has room to step back and make concessions, as seen in the truce in Gaza, where Hamas ( Iran’s proxies ) caved, possibly because of Tehran’s pressure after many setbacks.

Putin has perhaps less space to maneuver, he’s under much more pressure.

Still, if everything fails, Beijing may already have a plan B. It could shut the economy, blame foreign envy and aggression, and veer toward a” North Korea” option. It would be painful and risky, but it’s an option.

According to John Sullivan, a seasoned US expert on Chinese strategy,” Military struggle is not just a battle of military forces between adversaries but also a battle of comprehensive national power ( CNP),” according to the&nbsp,” Science of Military Strategy” ( 2020 ). Therefore, CNP serves as the objective material foundation for formulating and implementing strategies”.

The idea derives from ancient Chinese classics, which state the ability to sustain a military-non-military conflict as well as the possibility of fielding soldiers in battle. The US, according to the Chinese, also employs a similar strategy with the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon.

So, what is the West thinking? Ten years ago, Michael Pillsbury, in his&nbsp,” The Hundred-Year Marathon”, rang the alarm about China’s long-term plan to challenge the US and urged a wide array of long-term reforms to deal with it.

To deal with the influx of millions of Chinese graduates, one suggestion was a radical education reform in America. This is not happening. It’s not clear whether the wave of ongoing US deregulation will impact some of America’s basic weaknesses.

Something in America may not be working. In the first Trump administration ( 2016-2020 ), the US announced a decoupling policy but backed away, thinking it was too costly and ineffective.

The following Biden administration ( 2020-2024 ) ushered in a delinking policy, forbidding US high-tech exports to China. However, America appears to be hesitant on it because it thinks it is ineffective and criticizes Chinese ingenuity.

With Covid-19, China was quick to market its vaccines, which eventually proved less effective than those marketed later by Western companies. Is the same happening with these latest Chinese technologies?

Perhaps it’s only a propaganda gimmick. China might believe that confusing technology presented quickly may be sown. But American tech could be the same—a game of smoke and mirrors.

One thing is still unanswered: China appears to have a clear strategy for dealing with China, but it’s not clear whether there is a plan A or B.

With kind permission, this article originally appeared on Appia Institute. Read the original here.

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