Mun River overflows, flooding farms, low-lying areas in Phimai

Agricultural areas and other low-lying areas in Phimai district, Nakhon Ratchasima, are inundated after the Mun River burst its banks on Saturday morning. (Photo: Prasit Tangprasert)
Agricultural locations and different low-lying areas in Phimai area, Nakhon Ratchasima, are inundated after the Mun River burst its institutions on Saturday night. ( Photo: Prasit Tangprasert )

NAKHON RATCHASIMA: &nbsp, The Mun River burst its institutions on Saturday night, sending a large volume of water to storm rice fields and low-lying places in Phimai area.

In a number of areas, especially downstream of Phimai Dam, the river’s water levels were higher.

The Thung Samrit water operation and maintenance project’s six pipe gates were closed, preventing water from entering the Mun River and protecting monetary areas from flooding, because the dam’s holding capacity was increased by 3. 6 million cubic meters.

However, the Mun River’s water release caused major flooding in some rice grounds and low-lying areas in the tambons Nai Muang and Tha Luang.

Farmers expressed concern that if the floodwaters do n’t recede soon, their paddy plants, which are currently in the grain-yielding stage, could suffer significant damage. They pleaded with condition authorities to immediately assist them.

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35 people arrested for suspected involvement in government official impersonation scams

According to police, the connection between the following scammer and the victim could eventually be moved to messaging services like WhatsApp. &nbsp,

” In some cases, the scammers properly hand out bogus official documents or warrants to support their deception.

SPF said that the scammers would accuse the target of being involved in criminal activity, such as money laundering, and request that the victim exchange funds to” safe accounts” designated by the government to support investigations.

The survivors would only become aware that they had been defrauded when the “officials” became inaccessible or when they requested verification of their circumstances ‘ status with the police or businesses.

The Police take a very critical position regarding these crimes and will not hesitate to take legal action against those who may be involved in fraud, according to SPF.

Those who use their bank balances or Singpass credentials to evade detention may be sentenced to at least six months in prison, according to the Sentencing Advisory Panel‘s recommendations.

According to the police,” The judges also have the discretion to increase sentences if aggravating factors, such as the presence of vulnerable victims,” are present.

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How Xi’s crackdown turned China’s finance high-flyers into ‘rats’

Getty Images Businessman against Chinese flag in double exposure.Getty Images

” Then I think about it, I certainly chose the wrong market”.

Xiao Chen*, who works in a private equity firm in China’s economic hub, Shanghai, says he is having a hard time.

For his first year in the job, he says he was paid almost 750, 000 yuan ($ 106, 200, £81, 200 ). He was certain he would quickly reach the million-yuan level.

He is now making half of what he did when he was younger. His earn was frozen next year, and an annual extra, which had been a major part of his earnings, vanished.

The “glow” of the business has worn off, he says. It had previously made him “feel fancy”. Today, he is just a “finance rat”, as he and his contemporaries are derisively called online.

China’s once-thriving sector, which encouraged ambition, is now slow. The government’s leader, Xi Jinping, has become afraid of personal success and the difficulties of widening injustice.

Reprisals on billionaires and firms, from real estate to technology to funding, have been accompanied by socialist-style communications on enduring pain and trying for China’s success. Even famous people have been instructed to post more photos electronically.

People are told that loyalty to the Communist Party and their country then outweighs personal ambition, which has altered Chinese community in the last few decades.

Mr. Chen’s luxurious lifestyle has undoubtedly experienced the pinch from this U-turn. He exchanged a cheaper vacation in South East Asia for a vacation in Europe. And he says he “would n’t even think about” buying again from luxury brands like” Burberry or Louis Vuitton”.

But at least ordinary workers like him are less likely to find themselves in trouble with the law. Dozens of finance officials and banking bosses have been detained, including the former chairman of the Bank of China.

The market is under strain. Give reductions in banks and investment companies are a hot topic on Chinese social media, despite the few companies that have formally acknowledged it.

Millions of views have been posted on content about falling incomes recently. Additionally, hashtags like” changing careers from fund” and “quitting financing” have received more than two million views on the well-known social media platform Xiaohongshu.

Some finance professionals have seen their money decline since the start of the epidemic, but some people view one popular social media post as a turning point.

In July 2022, a Xiaohongshu person sparked anger after boasting about her 29-year-old father’s 82, 500-yuan monthly spend at leading financial services business, China International Capital Corporation.

People were shocked by the significant wage gap between what a fund contractor was receiving and their own money. The average monthly salary in the country’s richest area, Shanghai, was just over 12, 000 renminbi.

It sparked a discussion about incomes in the field that had been started by another net users who made money earlier that year.

These posts were made shortly after Xi demanded” common wealth,” a plan to close the growing wealth gap.

China’s financing ministry issued new regulations in August 2022 that required businesses to “optimise the domestic income distribution and medically design the wage system.”

The following season, the country’s major problem watchdog criticised the ideas of “finance elites” and the “only cash matters” process, making funding a clearer target for the country’s continued anti-corruption campaign.

Getty Images Shanghai skyline.Getty Images

The changes came in a sweeping but discreet way, according to Alex*, a manager at a state-controlled bank in China’s capital, Beijing.

Even if there is an official document, you would not see the order put into writing; it’s certainly not for people on our level to see it. But everyone knows there is a cap on it ]salaries ] now. Simply put, we are unsure of the cap’s size.

According to Alex, employers are also having a hard time adjusting to the rapid pace of the crackdown:” Many banks ‘ orders could change unexpectedly quickly.”

By June or July, they would realize that the payment of salaries has exceeded the requirement, according to them. They would issue the annual guidance in February. Then they would develop methods to establish performance goals that would take people’s pay.”

Mr. Chen claims that his workload has decreased significantly as fewer companies have started trading shares on the stock market. Domestic businesses have also become cautious in China as a result of the crackdowns and weak consumption, and foreign investment has decreased.

In the past, his work frequently involved new initiatives that would generate revenue for his business. His days are currently primarily filled with chores, such as organizing the data from his earlier projects.

” The team’s morale is very low, and most discussions with the bosses are negative,” the team said. In three to five years, people are discussing what to do.

Although there have been some layoffs, it’s difficult to say whether people are leaving the industry in large numbers. Jobs are also scarce in China now, so even a lower-paying finance job is still worth keeping.

But the frustration is evident. Switching jobs and changing seats were compared by a user on Xiaohongshu, but he warned that if you stand up, your seat might be gone.

Mr. Chen claims that Chinese society in general is at odds with the authorities and that it’s also true that finance workers are at odds with the authorities.

” We are no longer wanted, even on a blind date.” Once they learned that you worked in finance, you would be advised not to leave.

The finance workers ‘ names have been changed to protect their identities.

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Victims file fraud complaints against iCon Group

Cheap online classes were used as a pretext to entice candidates who were later asked for more and more income.

A woman tells reporters about her investment with a firm running an online business as she joins about 20 others to file a fraud complaint against The iCon Group with consumer protection police on Thursday in Bangkok. (Photo supplied/Wassayos Ngamkham)
A person tells investigators about her investment in a company that runs an online business as she joins about 20 people to file a fraud problem with Bangkok’s consumer protection officers on Thursday. ( Photo supplied/Wassayos Ngamkham )

A lawyer has expressed confidence that some stars serving as its professionals will be prosecuted for operating a pyramid scheme as The image Group, a well-known online business producer, has become the target of fraud problems.

More than 20 people on Thursday filed complaints with Consumer Protection Police Division ( CPPD ) investigators. They were accompanied by Raphatsit Phattarasirichaisin, a attorney and deputy president of a base fighting to regain social fairness.

One of the victims reported to reporters that she first saw The image Group’s website business course for 50 to 100 people with tuition costs of only 98 to 99 baht per student.

She was curious and applied. Business mentors told the individuals that while they could help investors make extra money, they had to spend 2,500 baht each to receive the goods after she had spent three days at the course. The coaches promised that the company may offer marketing strategies to promote the products.

Celebrities often showed up at occurrences promoting the agency’s company, said the girl. She met three stars and noted that they were called “bosses”, never product participants. To go each occasion, participants had to give 1, 500 baht.

The girl claimed that at first, she did not have enough money to invest in the company. One instructor advised her to get in touch with lenders to request extended lines of credit so she can invest more money and make hefty profits. She then poured all of the funds and saving she had borrowed from her credit accounts into the business.

She eventually learned that the funds she invested was not intended to be used to purchase goods to sell. Otherwise, she was ordered to pay for social media ads to inspire people to use to become dealers or customers. She may be charged for their hiring.

Finally, the girl grew cautious, as she and another had not been taught how to promote products but instead had been persuaded to attract people to invest.

She claimed that she had already incurred significant debt and that the goods she received from the company was no longer be sold.

Another target claimed that because he had invested more than 200 000 ringgit in borrowed funds, he had considered suicide.

According to Mr. Raphatsit, the 20 accusers constituted one in 500 people who were connected to the business.

He demanded that the police look into whether the company’s business model constituted a pyramid scheme or a form of common forgery.

Some victims had filed problems with police previously but there was no-follow-up, said the lawyer. Some people had contacted people they believed could have some effect in negotiating with image.

After the talks, the company returned 50 % of the money they had invested, but they had to sign paperwork that they would not report problems with police, said the lawyer.

The Office of the Consumer Protection Board had come to the conclusion that the company’s business model was not in violation of the law, according to Mr. Raphatsit.

But there must be a more rigorous investigation, said the lawyer. ( Story continues below )

Lawyer Decha Kittiwitthayanan says some celebrities involved in the alleged online business scam will be prosecuted. (Photo supplied/Wassayos Ngamkham)

Lawyer Decha Kittiwitthayanan, who is helping the forgery accusers, says some stars involved in the reported online fraud may be prosecuted. ( Photo supplied/Wassayos Ngamkham )

Celebrity attorney Decha Kittiwitthayanan likewise visited 10 admitted pyramid scheme victims on Thursday to file a complaint with the symbol Group.

He claimed that there was a good possibility that some famous people involved in the online industry may be charged. He declined to give them a brand.

The virtual organization in issue focuses on health products and features well-known professionals and artists such as Yuranunt” Sam” Pamornmontri, Kan Kantathavorn and Pechaya” Min” Wattanamontree.

The company, according to Thankhun Jitt-itsara, who likewise accompanied the sufferers, provided inaccurate information about its online business and inflated advertisements that swayed investors.

The company originally persuaded people to invest 97 ringgit per head for its purchase program in order to draw victims. For those who wanted to become dealers and form a sales staff with a guarantee of more income, the investment amounts steadily increased to 250, 000 ringgit per head, according to Mr. Thankhun.

Eventually, the company persuaded investors to make buy advertisements to attract more customers. On average, each man had at least 500, 000 ringgit in loss, he said. Thus far, about 500 people have sought legal aid from Mr Decha, said Mr Thankhun.

After news outlet Kanchai” Noom” Kamnerdploy made an admission to a scandal surrounding a well-known direct sales business that allegedly used prominent Thai celebrities as presenters to create a community and persuade customers to pursue investment opportunities, the case has sparked a social media stir.

Some people allegedly did n’t get the things that were promised or advertised.

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No China stimulus? Time to buy – Asia Times

It’s a wonderful time

Clouds falls, you feel like

It’s a wonderful time

Don’t let it get ahead

– U2

Do not get Taiwanese companies because you think a big fiscal stimulus is coming. Get Chinese shares because a big fiscal signal is not needed.

The bull situation for Chinese stocks is not that stimulus may save the economy. The bull event for Chinese stocks is that homeowners are sitting on US$ 20 trillion in payments with nowhere to go.

The managed destruction of the property market is ongoing. Authorities have curtailed money management products and their inherent guarantees.

Money controls prevent easy access to foreign goods. And the coming storm of high-tech technology companies in clean power, semiconductors, aviation, robotics and biotech will have a lively equity market to get off the ground.          

China ’s economic transformation will be ill-served by flood-the-zone stimulus which – if we recall – is what got us the real estate bubble and subsequent “three red lines ” credit limits in the first place. What China ’s economic transition needs is better execution of “establish the new before abolishing the old. ”

What if we generate of China ’s new stimulus methods? The grab bag of goodies – reserve requirement ratio ( RRR ) cut, lowered interest/mortgage rates, special local bond sales, cash for clunker programs– are all bullets pointing in the same direction. But the power falls well short of a bazooka.

Trillions of renminbi ( RMB) in fiscal stimulus have been dangled but apparently withheld given the non-meeting held by the National Development and Reform Commission ( NDRC ) after the holidays. What has been offered will help China achieve 5 % gross domestic product ( GDP ) growth this year, hardly a lofty goal.

The only interesting policy is the People’s Bank of China ’s ( PBOC ) unexpected support for equity markets through 1 ) a collateral replacement scheme to increase risk assets at institutional investors and 2 ) a program to encourage bank lending for share buybacks.

While some ascribe this to an effort to drink consumer confidence, the likelier inspiration is an effort by the PBoC to redeploy some of China ’s$ 20 trillion in family bank deposits.

China ’s roaring property market in the past couple of weeks has given the box of laws a vote of confidence. Note that private marketplaces are behaving far more sensibly than global markets.

China ’s markets took one year off from October 1-7for National Day breaks – enough time for global markets to roll wild and unrestrained thoughts about fiscal stimulus of RMB2 trillion, RMB4 trillion, RMB6 trillion and RMB10 trillion.

The following pain in Chinese stocks traded in Hong Kong and through global ETFs occurred in Shanghai and Shenzhen after industry reopened.

Properly attributing local business confidence is of course unthinkable. Low prices from beaten down shares provide a healthy surface.

The NDRC non-meeting may include lanced the cook of huge trigger expectations. The business has good determined that China is severe about utilizing capital markets. What it needs to figure out then is that China ’s financial woes are not as grave as made out to be.

How well has President Xi Jinping managed China ’s market? Much of the company hit is predicting Japan-style stagnation, if no inevitable decline. That, of course, has been the situation for years.

According to one famous China-based economist’s 2015 forecast, President Xi’s financial performance may have earned him God Emperor standing in the mythology of China ’s socialist officials:

My assumption is that, under President Xi’s name, 2013-2023, common growth rates are unlikely to reach 3-4 %. That’s not my prediction, that ’s the upper limit of my prediction… I think that if President Xi is able to pull off average growth rates of 3-4 % during his 10 years in office, he will have accomplished something that we should really be astonished. It would be truly impressive, almost on par with what Deng Xiaoping did in the 1980’s …

In President Xi’s first two conditions, China ’s economy grew at a 6. 2 % compound average growth rate ( CAGR ), nearly double the upper limit of said predictions. China substantially outgrew all major markets except India. Somehow, our analyst was hardly twice as dismayed.

Perhaps it was President Xi’s personal problem, extending his time in office past the usual two five-year words. Alternatively of graduating with double starred first accolades from our scholar, Xi has only extended his experiments trying to earn an extraordinary triple or even a double starred second.

Graphic: Asia Times

Han Feizi’s assessment of President Xi’s economic performance is considerably less generous. Economic growth of 6. 2 % CAGR in Xi’s first two terms is not at all astonishing; it was, in fact, modestly below expectations ( Covid 2000 to 2022, what can you do? ).

Han Feizi did not and does not share our Beijing economist’s bleak assessment of the economy that Xi inherited and thus cannot grant bonus points for outperformance:

[President Xi] inherited a much more difficult economy than we think. There’s a huge amount of debt. There’s a huge amount of unrecognized bad debt.                

While China did take on a lot of debt and take it on quickly, Han Feizi fundamentally disagrees that the amount of debt and the quality of the debt is all that problematic.

It has been his correspondent’s contention that the size of China ’s economy is significantly understated compared to OECD national accounts ( see here ).

China ’s debt-to-GDP ratio is, thus, closer to ~125-200 % instead of the often quoted ~300 %. Moreover, this debt largely financed housing and infrastructure – long-lived assets with relatively low maintenance capital – able to generate value for decades.

China still has 15-20 % of the population to urbanize. Given urbanization of 1 % of the population per year, overbuilt housing should naturally resolve itself by kicking the can down the road.

As such, China ’s debt is nowhere near capacity. Xi inherited an economy headed in the wrong direction, not an economy out of runway. With property investment hobbled by redline credit limits in 2020, China nonetheless continued to grow 5 % by redirecting lending to advanced manufacturing.

A sentiment that Han Feizi might share with our Beijing economist is that Xi’s record is incomplete. No marks can be given until he sees things through. Things being another transformation of China ’s economy and society, which Han Feizi has written about before ( see here ):

China wants America’s Silicon Valley but regulated, Japan’s car companies but electrified, Germany ’s Mittelstand but scalable and Korea’s Chaebols but without political capture. It wants to lead the world in science and technology but without cram schools. A thriving economy but with common prosperity. Industry without air pollution. Digital lifestyles without gaming addiction. Material plenty without hedonism. Modernity without its ills. This is, of course, a wish-list and unrealistically ambitious. But these mad scientists sure as hell are going to try. They’ve developed a taste for it.

Various pieces of this transformation have started to take shape. The anti-corruption campaign under Xi’s tenure has been unyielding and dare we say transformative. China ’s once low-trust and loutish public of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras is now unrecognizable, able to sustain high-trust business models like shared bikes and take-only-what-you-paid-for vending machines ( see here ).

The professional environment for China ’s young grads is surely far less treacherous than the get-rich-quick-at-any-cost mentality of the go-go days.

Output from the “new three” industries – solar, batteries and EVs – are surging, although capacity appears to be growing even faster. Deflation across multiple sectors has set off alarm bells. Although not ideal, China ’s deflation is fundamentally different from Japan’s in its lost decades.

Simplistically, deflation caused by decreasing consumption ( demand curve shifting in ) is bad; deflation caused by increasing production ( supply curve shifting out ) is good.

Unlike Japan, which suffered two recessions in the 1990s, demand in China is still growing, if weaker than optimal. Japan’s deflation started when Tokyo was the most expensive city in the world with cantaloupes selling for$ 100 each. This is not the same deflation China is currently dealing with.

China ’s real disposable household income grew 6. 1 % in 2023. In recent years, regulators have crimped the income of previously high-flying professionals in finance, tech and real estate. Upper-tier income growth has stalled while lower-tier income growth has been robust.

Economist Simon Kuznets ’s prediction that inequality would rise in the early stages of economic development before peaking and falling as wealth increases is playing out perfectly in China while it confounds expectations in more capitalist economies.      

Graphic: Asia Times

And, of course, Han Feizi does not believe China ’s economy is egregiously unbalanced ( perhaps not even unbalanced at all ) and thus has no need for massive consumption stimulus.

This is the key reason Han Feizi was not “astonished ” by China ’s ability to maintain growth over 6 % in Xi’s first two terms. There is no need for consumption to outgrow investment to signal economic health ( see here ) and thus no need for massive consumption stimulus.

China ’s regulators and anti-corruption investigators have ransacked the nation’s banks and brokerages and detained high-profile bankers, attempting to put a leash on an industry with a natural tendency to run amok. The PBoC’s support for equity markets may signal confidence in the clean-up work recently performed.

So yes, buy Chinese stocks. Valuations are still cheap, and$ 20 trillion of savings has nowhere to go. Equity markets are being prepared for China ’s high-tech future.

Growth is more sustainable in a high-trust and more equal society. No there will not be a massive consumer stimulus. But that is precisely why you should buy, not sell, China.

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The World Bank isn’t buying China’s stimulus talk – Asia Times

To anyone who hopes 2025 will be a less terrible season for China’s economy, the World Bank has some bad news for you.

The international lender anticipates that Asia’s largest economy’s growth will decline also further next year, creating new headwinds for the region. This is in spite of Beijing’s current moves to boost economic growth in response to negative pressures and an initial global investor response that was at least initially passionate.

” Just signaled fiscal support may raise short-term progress, but longer-term development will depend on deeper structural measures”, the World Bank said on October 8. For three years, it said,” China’s expansion has spilled over advantageously to its companions, but the size of that motivation is today diminishing”.

The World Bank might be misinterpreting China’s efforts to resurrect its financial situation. It&nbsp, cut borrowing costs, slashed businesses ‘ supply need numbers, reduced loan rates and unveiled market-support resources to put a floor under share costs. In Beijing, stronger macroeconomic stimulus measures are also being considered.

If the world’s house crisis is allowed to enhance, furthering negative forces, some economists worry about a lighter course. The uncertainty issue is demonstrated by the extreme volatility in Chinese shares over the past ten days.

When the World Bank mentions the need for “deeper architectural changes,” plunging house prices are at the top of their record. Yet&nbsp, Chinese leader Xi Jinping appears to think period is on Beijing’s part in repairing the critical business. It might not be, as Japan has demonstrated over the years, &nbsp, some economists say.

China’s existing real estate troubles and Japan’s negative loan problems of the 1990s are n’t essentially analogous. The important resemblance is a critical driver of economic growth stalling out indefinitely, triggering bad knock-on implications in different industries.

In China’s situation, this likewise means municipal governments around the country. Provincial leaders have relied on area sales and tax revenues from sizable construction projects for many years.

” China’s boom-and-bust housing market is largely driven by local governments ‘ heavy reliance on expanding the real estate business to provide a major source of income”, said Tianlei Huang, an analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington-based think tank.

Since 2022, Huang added,” the decline in the housing market has hurt native state funds and exposed a&nbsp, prone system&nbsp, in need of reform”.

It’s a portrait of what ails China. And still, Xi’s Communist Party continues to treat the signs of financial issues, not the underlying problems themselves. The longer they fester, the stronger the resulting headwinds.

Rather than the 4.8 % the World Bank sees China’s economy growing this year, it sees the nation expanding at just 4.3 % in 2025. Both readings are below Beijing’s current 5 % target.

Of course, for an economy at China’s level of development, 4.3 % is effectively recession territory. And if Xi’s team does n’t act boldly and expeditiously to revive growth, that figure could prove too optimistic.

One wildcard is the&nbsp, November 5&nbsp, US election. The upcoming trade wars would disproportionately hit China if Donald Trump were to win.

During his first presidency from 2027 to 2021, Trump imposed harsh tariffs on China. Xi’s government has n’t seen anything yet if Trump comes back to power. Trump has already predicted a generalized global levy on all imports into the US and a 60 % tax on all Chinese goods.

” With higher US tariffs, a number of highly open economies in the Asia-Pacific are at risk of GDP falling below their baselines”, said Deborah Tan, an analyst at Moody’s Ratings. Along with China, they include Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.

According to Tan,” these are primarily economies with high participation in global value chains and high exposure to US and Chinese intermediate goods supply and final goods demand.”

Vietnam, for example, has a high export share of gross domestic product ( GDP ) with strong linkages with&nbsp, Chinese manufacturing&nbsp, supply chains. ” Our simulation shows that within Vietnam, the high-tech goods sector will take the largest hit to output”, Tan said. ” China, similarly, the high-tech goods sector takes the largest hit to output followed by the low-tech goods sector”.

As this threat percolates, Xi’s team in Beijing risks losing even more trust among global investors.

One thing is to discredit them on the stimulus front. The slower pace of fixing the housing sector, strengthening local government balance sheets, and establishing social safety nets so that households save less and spend more are the bigger issues.

However, these measures “do not replace the more thorough structural reforms that are required to promote longer-term growth,” according to World Bank economist Aaditya Mattoo. The majority of the measures and bond proceeds will carry over into the following fiscal year given the lead time for implementation of the policy.

Mattoo notes that “even then, consumers may be reluctant to splurge because a one-time transfer would not boost longer-term incomes or address concerns about aging, illness and unemployment”.

In the interim, billionaire Ray Dalio sees this as Xi’s party’s “do what it takes” to change the gloomy narrative that may be evoking global investor sentiment. Draghi’s 2012 declaration as head of the European Central Bank is referenced here.

Last week “was a big week” ,&nbsp, said Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates. ” In fact, I think that it was such a big week that&nbsp, it could go down in the market-economic history books as comparable to the week Draghi said that he and the ECB would ‘ do whatever it takes,’ if China’s policymakers, in fact, do what it takes, which will require a lot more than what was announced”.

A long-time China bull, Dalio is increasingly vocal about his worries Beijing is sleepwalking into a&nbsp, Japan-like funk&nbsp, that history shows is challenging to exit. It’s taken Tokyo 25 years to begin exiting quantitative easing and its zero-interest-rate policies, and even that is proving challenging for the Bank of Japan.

To avoid it, one must devise a “beautiful deleveraging” strategy that balances printing enough yuan to support growth without causing inflation to rise too quickly while restructuring the entire economy. ” Doing these things starts to rekindle’ bottom fishing ‘ ]in stocks ] and ‘ animal spirits,'” he said. ” That is clearly happening right now,” he says.

Any new deleveraging efforts by Xi and Premier Li Qiang, Dalio said, will undoubtedly disorient and likely lead to more wealth destruction. That, it follows, will require considerable political courage, with Xi and Li having to decide where the costs and fallout of debt losses will be concentrated.

To Dalio, it all depends on “how well China’s domestic debt-money-economy challenges will be handled”.

At the same time, demographics are complicating the deleveraging process. The numerous moving parts that Xi and Li are struggling to manage are given a unique dimension by China’s aging population and shrinking working-age population. &nbsp,

” While last week saw some amazing actions and words that I’m certain will be followed by highly stimulative policies that will greatly boost asset prices,” Dalio said.” I think there are several important other things to keep an eye on to see how well China’s domestic debt-money issues will be handled,”

That’s not to say there are n’t some reform wins that Xi and Li can tout. As Sherry Zhao, analyst at&nbsp, Fitch Ratings, pointed out, refinancing risks for China’s local-government financing vehicles ( LGFVs ) have “reduced in the short term following government debt-relief measures and policy support, which will limit systemic risk”.

Provincial governments, Zhao said, continue to issue special refinancing bonds to swap “hidden debt”. The central government, meanwhile, has increased transfers to shoulder more infrastructure spending.

However, Zhao stressed,” we believe those support measures focus on the prevention of short-term&nbsp, systemic risk rather than a full-scale bailout. There continue to be longer-term risks associated with&nbsp, LGFVs ‘ debt burdens, and their resolution will hinge on China’s overall economic and fiscal strength”.

The Third Plenum meeting in July made it clear that local and regional governments may have more revenue flexibility to better accommodate their expenditure demands. ” The credit effects”, Zhao said,” will depend on how the changes are implemented, and on local governments ‘ willingness to use any additional revenue-raising powers given to them”.

The official Fitch view is that overall&nbsp, LGFV&nbsp, debt growth will be curbed as local governments tighten control of new debt, especially in regions that Beijing views as a priority for debt resolution.

The danger, however, is that these regions ‘ long-term debt default risk “remains and may even rise because of imbalances in economic and debt growth, as well as the potential inability of local governments to generate sustainable revenue for debt service.”

There are encouraging indications that China is currently developing a plan to stabilize the financial system and lessen risks.

Zheng Shanjie, the head of the National Development and Reform Commission, told reporters on October 8 that Beijing is developing” comprehensive policy measures to help stop the decline in the real estate market.” Shanjie said this in response to the National Development and Reform Commission’s announcement to stop housing sales and prices.

Zheng added that” we will take a number of potent and effective measures to try to boost the capital market in response to volatility and declines in the stock market.”

Even so, many economists and investors were disappointed that more short-term stimulus is n’t being deployed. ” Tuesday’s press briefing from China’s top economic planner … was supposed to be the big moment, the one where Beijing unleashed a&nbsp, stimulus bazooka“, said economist Stephen Innes at SPI Asset Management. ” Instead, it was more of a pop gun”.

Innes added that” Beijing’s reluctance to roll out a bigger package is seriously questioned about the viability of this rally” in stocks.

James Sullivan, head of Asia-Pacific equity research at JPMorgan, told CNBC that” the million-dollar question in China right now is, does the stimulus only flow into the supply side of the equation, or does it ultimately flow through into consumer demand? That’s not our expectation right now”.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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BoT board boss pick delay

Selection put on hold due to meddling concerns.

A commission that was set up to select a new chairman of the Board of Governor for the Bank of Thailand has postponed its choice until further notice due to concerns about potential political interference from many individuals, including former BoT government Tarisa Watanagase.

Apparently, the state has indicated that it intends to send its individual candidate to replace Porametee Vimolsiri, whose term ends this month. Past Commerce Minister Kittiratt Na-Ranong has a strong chance of landing the position.

Past Pheu Thai Party deputy president and chief strategist for the market, Mr. Kittiratt. He even criticized the BoT’s attention rate plan and the company’s freedom while serving as an assistant to former prime minister Srettha Thavisin.

The seven-member collection panel convened on Tuesday afternoon to discuss whether Mr. Kittiratt would be chosen. But, it decided to postpone the choice pending more data gathering.

Its members are former financing permanent secretary Sathit Limphongpan, past business permanent director Boonyarit Kalayanamitr, former business permanent secretary Witoon Simachokedee, past Budget Bureau producer Worawit Champeerat, former director general of the Council of State Office Atchaporn Charuchinda, former SEC secretary-general Pakorn Malakul na Ayutthaya, and former secretary of the Office of the Insurance Commission Sutthipol Thaweechaikarn.

Mr Pakorn said the gathering was diverse, and the agency’s director was assigned to provide more info. Mr Atchaporn said more information is needed to vet the prospects ‘ skills, and the next meeting has not yet been scheduled.

Ms Vireka Suntapuntu, the panel’s director, said the information must be complete for the selection to be true, so the secretary has asked for more time to evaluate it.

On Tuesday, Mr. Worawit confirmed that Mr. Kittiratt was a candidate.

Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira reportedly shone a dim light on speculation that the government intends to assign a legislator for the position.

When the subject was brought up, he was speaking to reporters about potential conversations with BoT government Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput regarding economic policy and the government’s financial stimulus measures.

He responded:” Is it? BoT? Lawmaker”?

There was no social interference, according to deputy finance secretary Julapun Amornvivat, and the procedure was conducted in accordance with the law.

He said he had no information about Mr Kittiratt’s frequently speculated session.

In the meantime, Tarisa Watanagase, a former governor of the central bank, on Tuesday urged the council to choose the board president to exhibit moral courage.

She claimed in a social media post that the state was unsatisfied with the BoT’s decisions regarding interest rates and the 10,000-baht digital budget plan.

She warned that if the candidate with the government support was elected president, it would open the door to political meddling and had significant financial effects.

The selection panel must make a good conscience choice, which may prevent further financial issues, she said.

Ms. Tarisa argued that political interference in central banks, as seen in other nations, was proof that institutions lacking independence ca n’t always maintain long-term economic stability.

The law requires the collection council members to become retired senior representatives from financial institutions who have lived up to all expectations, according to Ms. Tarisa, in order to protect against political meddling.

She expressed hope that the committee would uphold the principles.

Meanwhile, Luangta Maha Bua’s supporters on Tuesday wrote to Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra to protest the government’s alleged interference in the BoT.

The monk’s disciples slammed the finance minister’s appointment of the committee to select the BoT’s board and chairman. They claimed that the panel did not include any former central bank governors, which suggests an intention to interfere with the organization’s operations.

Kittiratt:

Kittiratt Na-Ranong

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Myanmar talks tackle border river issues

The Mae Sai River heavily overflows in Chiang Rai province recently. (Photo: Wiang Phang Kham sub-district municipal office)
Lately, Chiang Rai province’s Mae Sai River overflows significantly. ( Photo: Wiang Phang Kham sub-district municipal office )

In order to cooperate more effectively with each other to solve the flood issues in the area, Thailand and Myanmar were scheduled to examine on Wednesday the possibility of destroying buildings that extend over the Mae Sai River.

A plan approved by the Thai government on Monday may be discussed at a conference of the Thai-Myanmar joint council on the Mae Sai and Nam Ruak rivers, according to Lt. Gen. Natthaphong Phraokaeo, the head of the Royal Thai Army’s Department of Border Affairs.

The Thai part states in the request that it believes the Mae Sai River really keep an average length of at least 30 meters to improve the flow of water and drastically reduce the risk of run-off overflowing the river banks, according to him.

He said a strong partnership is necessary to remove protruding structures from the river in order to accomplish this goal.

Lt. Gen Natthaphong stated,” The ultimate goal for 2025 is to prevent flooding that occurs as a result of Mae Sai overflowing.”

Lt. Gen. Natthaphong added that the Myanmar side had proposed that both sides remove structures that protruded into the Mae Sai and Nam Ruak rivers in 13 locations, with six on the Myanmar side and seven on the Thai side, in 2018.

He did point out that the proposal has not yet prompted any action.

Therefore, at Wednesday’s meeting, both sides aim to at least reach an agreement on concrete measures that will possibly help sustain their flood prevention efforts, curb the risk of an unexpected natural disaster, and mitigate its impact on both nations, he said.

A proposal for Thailand and Myanmar to develop a new joint operation plan for flood prevention in the long term, which should start with a new boundary survey and demarcation, he said, was also expected to be discussed at Wednesday’s joint committee meeting.

Thai authorities reportedly fought activity on the Myanmar side of the Mae Sai River on October 1 as thick muddy debris from flooding was being dumped into the river.

Myanmar authorities ordered the activity to be stopped after receiving an objection from the Thai-Myanmar Township Border Committee ( TBC ), and later explained that the event was being carried out by a private party who might not be familiar with the joint border rules and laws.

Additionally, Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter of opposition to its Myanmar counterpart regarding the unlawful dumping of mud into the river. The latter reaffirmed that the problem had already been resolved.

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Trump’s economic program would weaken the US – and Australia – Asia Times

It’s time to take Donald Trump seriously. Betting markets say it’s as likely as not he will be elected US president in four weeks.

And unlike in 2016 when his program wasn’t clearly defined, he has set out plainly what he intends to do. Which means it’s possible to model the consequences.

The three Trump promises with the greatest economic impact are

  • the deportation of millions of US residents
  • steep restrictions on imports, especially from China
  • presidential influence over interest rates.

The best way to model the consequences is with an established model of the kind used by the International Monetary Fund and central banks around the world rather than one set up for the purpose that could be seen as designed to favor or not favor Trump.

The Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics has just done that, noting that during Trump’s first term as president he “by and large” did what he said he would do.

It finds

ironically, despite his “make the foreigners pay” rhetoric, Trump’s package of policies does more damage to the US economy than to any other in the world.

No other country in the world would be hurt by Trump’s program as much as the US – not even China – although several US allies would suffer, including Australia, which would be the fourth-worst hit by the most extreme version of what Trump is proposing.

Mass deportations

Trump has repeatedly promised the “largest domestic deportation operation in American history,” targeting up to 20 million unauthorized immigrants, including about 8.3 million thought to be in the workforce.

He says his model is Operation Wetback – a 1956 Eisenhower administration program that used military-style tactics to deport 1.3 million Mexicans.

The institute says Eisenhower’s success makes it easy to believe Trump could remove 1.3 million immigrant workers. It has modeled two scenarios: removing 1.3 million and 8.3 million, both over two years in 2025 and 2026.

Both slash employment, including the employment of non-immigrants, both push up inflation, which eventually is brought under control, and both make the US a less attractive place to invest, which benefits much of the rest of the world.

The institute says the low and high scenarios differ “only by the degree of damage inflicted on people, households, firms and the overall economy”.

Huge tariff hikes

Trump wants to increase every tariff on goods imported to the US by 10 percentage points, including where there is at present no tariff. And he wants at least a 60% tariff on imports from China. The institute has modelled both, with and without retaliatory tariffs from China and the rest of the world.

It finds, unsurprisingly, that extra tariffs push up the price of US imports and the prices of US-produced goods that compete with imports. Many are used as inputs in manufacturing, which means US manufacturing suffers (which is probably not what Trump had in mind).

Fewer imports mean less demand for foreign exchange within the US, which means a higher US dollar which makes US exports less competitive. The US economy is weaker as a result, although China’s is weaker still and Australia’s is weakened as much as the US given its role in providing resources to China.

Tampering with the Fed

Trump has raised the prospect of more presidential influence over interest rates, saying he thinks he has “a better instinct than, in many cases” the board of US Federal Reserve. This could be achieved by requiring the president to be consulted on rate decisions or by appointing a compliant chair.

However it’s done, the institute’s “conservative” assumption based on what happens in developing countries with less central bank independence is that it will push inflation two percentage points higher.

The modeled result is capital flight. While the US economy is initially stronger than it would have been because of the Fed’s willingness to tolerate higher inflation, after a few years it is weaker and every other economy is stronger.

When all the measures are combined, under the extreme scenarios the US economy is 6.7% weaker than it would have been by 2035 and Australia’s is 0.2% weaker. Under the more modest scenarios, the US economy is 1.6% weaker and Australia’s is 0.06% weaker.

Why not examine Harris?

Despite a history of non-partisanship, the Peterson Institute is prepared for criticism. It points out that the economic model it used is regarded as the best in the world for scenario planning and is Australian, built by Warwick McKibbin of the Australian National University.

And it says it has modeled the Trump policies rather than the Harris policies because only Trump’s represent a departure from business as usual.

As the Institute’s president, Adam Posen, put it in Washington last month, the Harris campaign has said it will not impose across-the-board tariffs, will not engage in mass deportations and will not interfere with the independence of the US Federal Reserve.

The Trump campaign has indicated it will do all three.

It’s entirely possible that in office Trump wouldn’t do everything he proposed while campaigning, and it’s entirely possible that he would change course if what was doing damaged the US in the way the modeling suggests.

But there’s something to be said for taking people at their word, at least to get an idea of what we could be in store for after a knife-edge election.

Peter Martin is a visiting fellow at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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