SINGAPORE: United Overseas Bank (UOB) maintained earnings guidance for 2024 after posting on Thursday (Aug 1) a 1 per cent year-on-year rise in second quarter net profit that slightly missed expectations. “Global growth continues to be weighed down by geopolitical tensions and higher interest rates. However, we expect ASEAN toContinue Reading
One solution would be to empower banks to mediate and resolve more of these situations directly through legislation.
For instance, in the UK, if the recipient disputes the claim or does not respond to the sender’s bank, the receiving bank will freeze an amount equal to the mistaken payment until the matter is resolved.
Singapore banks could be granted authority to temporarily freeze recipient funds, investigate the claim by checking sender and recipient transaction histories and contacting both parties, and then reverse the transaction if an honest mistake seems likely.
If such a process is implemented in Singapore, safeguards and limits would be critical. Senders should have to attest to the mistake and face penalties for false claims.
Dollar and time limits on bank reversals would be needed to prevent abuse and protect recipients’ access to their money. Large, suspicious transfers would still require police involvement. But most incidents involve modest sums inadvertently sent to the wrong person, where a faster resolution by the bank could suffice.
An alternative is to expand the Small Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction to include unjust enrichment claims for mistaken payments, which was suggested by MP Murali Pillai (PAP-Bukit Batok) in a 2022 parliamentary question.
This would allow mistaken transfers of sums not exceeding S$20,000 to be reclaimed through a streamlined, user-friendly process. No lawyers needed, minimal fees and a quick resolution.
Empowering the Small Claims Tribunal to handle these cases could ensure that the right to recover mistaken payments is not just a legal theory, but a practical reality for all in Singapore. It could provide a cost-effective and quicker method to recover misdirected funds.
Ben Chester Cheong is Law Lecturer and inaugural START Scholar at the Singapore University of Social Sciences, and Lawyer at RHTLaw Asia LLP.
This week is offering quite the split screen to investors hoping China would step up efforts to raise its capital markets game.
On one screen, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) pledged to improve market operations, strengthen comprehensive research capabilities, deepen response mechanisms to manage market risks and hone regulations for trading.
On the other, signals that Beijing is increasing opacity surrounding the flow of capital. Specifically, how much capital international funds deploy into and out of Asia’s most volatile major stock market.
After August 18, analysts won’t be able to track net capital movements at the end of a trading day. The fact this follows a move in May to end intraday data flows with Hong Kong markets suggests this is no aberration.
And it generates more questions than answers about the state of Xi Jinping’s vision for making China a more attractive investment destination for the biggest of the globe’s big money.
Of course, there’s a third screen on which investors are keeping an eye. This one features a fresh round of stimulus.
On Tuesday, the Politburo, a Communist Party’s top decision-making body, signaled renewed efforts to reach this year’s 5% growth target focused on consumers.
Chinese leaders said the priority is increasing household income “through multiple channels” and increasing the “ability and willingness” of low- and middle-income groups to spend.
Yet the Politburo had less to say about financial upgrades at a moment when regulators are obscuring basic intelligence on capital flows.
True, exchanges still plan to provide data on turnover and trading volume in equities and exchange-traded funds through links with markets in Hong Kong.
But as regulatory signals go, making it harder to discern top-line levels of enthusiasm and pessimism about mainland shares isn’t likely to bolster confidence in Asia’s biggest economy.
Restoring trust on the part of global investors was a major goal of this month’s Third Plenum extravaganza. Though normally a five-yearly event, President Xi didn’t convene one in 2018.
Since the recently concluded Third Plenum was the first since 2013, expectations for bold reforms were – and still are – sky-high. Xi’s Communist Party pledged to “unswervingly encourage” the private sector in a bid to accelerate “high-quality development,” “Chinese-style modernization” and “innovative vitality.”
There’s still scope for China’s 24-member Politburo to bolster investors’ trust by detailing plans to make bigger alterations to the nation’s export- and investment-led growth model.
Suffice to say, though, announcing plans for reduced transparency the same month overseas money managers sold at least US$4.1 billion of Chinese shares might not go down well. Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets lost an epic $6.3 trillion from their peak in 2021 to January this year.
Xi’s team also faces confidence deficits on the economic front. The nation’s 4.7% economic growth rate in the second quarter amid weak consumer demand and housing prices disappointed many.
As economist Louise Loo at Oxford Economics observes, “discretionary retail spending fell at the sharpest sequential pace since the April 2022 Shanghai lockdowns.”
Hence the Politburo’s renewed focus on demand-boosting stimulus. To economist Zhang Zhiwei at Pinpoint Asset Management, it’s a sign Xi’s inner circle “recognizes that domestic demand is weak and plans to prepare some policy measures in the pipeline to address the problem.”
This backdrop explains why the People’s Bank of China surprised global markets with an interest rate cut on July 25. It trimmed the one-year policy loan rate by 20 basis points to 2.3%, the biggest move since April 2020. That came just days after the PBOC lowered a key short-term rate.
Robin Xing, economist at Goldman Sachs, is struck by the “reactive nature of easing” by PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng. Kathleen Brooks, research director at XTB, called it a “sign that the Chinese authorities are concerned about the state of the Chinese economy, which is more worrying for stock markets and for investors.”
All the more reason to use the recent Third Plenum as an opportunity to accelerate moves to increase the quality of growth, not just the quantity.
The weeks since the meeting have left unclear the status of Xi’s pledges to get bad assets off property developers’ balance sheets to avoid defaults. The same goes for creating social safety nets to prod households to save less and spend more, the fate of internet platforms uncertain about the regulatory outlook and moves to build more vibrant capital markets.
Though Xi has been promising to prioritize capital market development since 2013, the effort seemed to get a big lift last November. That was when Xi met with a who’s-who of top chieftains in San Francisco on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit – including Apple CEO Tim Cook, Tesla chief Elon Musk and Blackstone’s Steve Schwarzman.
Other top executives on hand to rub elbows with the man leading an economy with which the US does roughly $600 billion of trade annually: Marc Benioff of Salesforce; Stan Deal of Boeing; Raj Subramaniam of FedEx; Ryan McInerney of Visa; Ray Dalio of Bridgewater Associates; Albert Bourla of Pfizer; Merit Janow of Mastercard; and Larry Fink of BlackRock.
There, Xi raised expectations for his inner circle, led by Premier Li Qiang, to strengthen capital markets in foundational ways. Since then, though, progress on the ground in China hasn’t matched the lofty rhetoric.
The speed with which capital has continued to flee China suggests that Xi’s efforts to communicate that Beijing is at the top of its myriad challenges are not getting through to investors. That includes efforts to stabilize a cratering property market and overall weak demand.
There’s confusion in international circles, too, about Xi’s commitment to giving the private sector and market forces “decisive” roles in Beijing decision-making. That 2012-2013 pledge was first called into question in 2015 when Xi’s government intervened aggressively to stabilize Shanghai stocks.
Questions only increased after Xi began cracking down hard on mainland tech platforms in late 2020, starting with Jack Ma’s Alibaba Group. The inquisition rapidly widened to Baidu, Didi Global, JD.com, Tencent and other top internet companies. It even had Wall Street banks debating whether China might have become “uninvestable.”
Now seems the time to get under the economy’s hood as rarely before. One law of economic gravity that Xi’s team has tried to beat these last 10 years is the idea that a developing nation must build credible and trusted markets before trillions of dollars of outside capital arrive.
In China’s case, this means increasing transparency, making local government officials more accountable, prodding companies to raise their governance games, crafting reliable surveillance mechanisms like credit rating companies and strengthening the financial architecture before the world shows up.
Too often during Xi’s first two terms as leader, China has tried to flip the script, believing it can build a world-class financial system after waves of foreign capital arrive. Whether fair or not, the Xi era’s efforts to communicate that a financial Big Bang is afoot continue to get lost in translation in boardrooms from New York to London to Tokyo.
The sense that Xi’s China tends to over-promise and under-deliver financial upgrade-wise set in back in summer of 2015, back when Shanghai shares plunged by one-third in three weeks. Beijing’s response was to treat the symptoms of the market rout, not the underlying causes.
Since then, Xi stepped up the pace of winning Chinese stocks places in top global indices – from MSCI for stocks to FTSE-Russell for bonds. Yet increases in access to yuan-denominated assets often outpace reforms needed to prepare China Inc for the global prime time.
Whether China can win back investors’ trust is an open question. As Chinese stocks are reminding us – the Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 300 Index is down more than 13% this year – there are certain laws of gravity that still apply to economies transitioning from state-driven and export-led growth to services, innovation and domestic consumption.
Trouble is, China’s bond market – totaling more than $23 trillion overall – is underpinned by a developing economy with limited liquidity and hedging tools, a giant and opaque state sector, and a rudimentary credit-rating system that can obscure risk and misallocate capital.
For all China’s promises, this makes it more of a buyer-beware market than many investors expected.
This gets at other split screens. On one, China’s inclusion in major benchmarks is luring bond giants like BlackRock. On screen No. 2: the crisis of confidence surrounding developers like China Evergrande Group offer a stark reminder of the mainland’s opacity and excesses.
The prevalence of local government financing vehicles – roughly $13 trillion of such off-balance sheet LGFVs – can be a major turnoff for foreign bond funds.
Not only are they difficult to analyze but their fingerprints also touch the operations of everything from commercial banks’ wealth management units to mutual funds to hedge funds to insurers to the gamut of securities companies.
Hence the need for deeper bond markets. And, of course, for regulators in Beijing to avoid steps that spook global markets anew. Among recent missteps by Xi’s party: last year’s crackdown on foreign consultancy firms on which global investors and multinational firms rely for information and analysis.
The move, supposedly part of a nationwide anti-espionage campaign, reduced the appetite for investment from some overseas firms. When US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s team visits Beijing these days, the consultancy policy is among the examples of “non-market” practices and “coercive actions” against American firms that US officials highlight.
Deeper debt markets would help sort out the cart-before-the-horse problem that afflicts China’s economy. During the Xi era and before it, China too often believed that pulling in more foreign capital was a reform all its own. It’s been slower to strengthen China’s financial system ahead of those waves of overseas capital.
And pulling down new curtains of opacity won’t help to reverse recent capital outflows and flagging investor confidence.
Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
Japan’s central bank has raised the cost of borrowing for only the second in 17 years as it tries to normalise monetary policy in the world’s fourth largest economy.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) increased its key interest rate to “around 0.25%” from the previous range of 0% to 0.1%.
It also outlined a plan to unwind its massive bond buying programme as it eases back from a decade of stimulus measures.
The move comes hours before the US Federal Reserve is set to announce its latest interest rate decision, while an announcement is also expected from the Bank of England on Thursday.
“The rate hike was widely expected after domestic media reported the decision ahead of time Tuesday night,” said Stefan Angrick, a senior economist at Moody’s Analytics.
“But the move sits uncomfortably with a poor run of economic data and lack of demand-driven inflation.”
In March, the BoJ raised borrowing costs for the first time since 2007.
In 2016, it cut its main interest rate below zero in an attempt to stimulate the country’s stagnating economy.
The hike meant that there were no longer any countries in the world left with negative interest rates.
When negative rates are in force people have to pay to deposit money in a bank. They have been used by several countries as a way of encouraging people to spend their money rather than putting it in a bank.
During the pandemic, central banks around the world slashed interest rates as they attempted to counteract the negative impact of border closures and lockdowns.
At the time some countries, including Switzerland and Denmark, as well as the European Central Bank, introduced negative interest rates.
Since then central banks around the world, like the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, have raised interest rates to curb soaring prices.
A ‘TRANSIENT’ COMMUNITY NOT OF LOCALS To what extent then does Geylang’s lingering stigma affect residential property developments in the area? For residential units located on even-numbered lorongs, which are commonly associated with vice activities, it can often take up to six months before a willing buyer is found, saidContinue Reading
United Overseas Bank (UOB) is making several senior leadership changes. From September 1, Susan Hwee, head of group technology and operations (GTO) will assume the role of head of group retail, taking over from Eddie Khoo.
Khoo (pictured left) is retiring from his role, but will still take on the position of senior adviser to United Overseas Bank (UOB) Vietnam.
To replace Hwee (pictured middle), UOB has promoted Singapore-based Lawrence Goh (pictured right) is promoted head of GTO and will commence the role on the same day as September 1, according to a UOB press release.
UOB is a leading bank in Asia, headquartered in Singapore with subsidiaries in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. The global bank has 500 offices in 19 countries throughout Asia Pacific, Europe and North America.
Hwee has more than 35 years of experience in the technology and banking industry. Having joined UOB in 2001, Hwee leads the bank’s global strategy for technology, operations and information security in her present role as head of GTO.
According to the release, Hwee is “instrumental in the development and innovation” of UOB’s digital platform, UOB TMRW, which uses artificial intelligence (AI) to push digital acquisition and customer engagement.
Hwee’s promotion will see her spearhead plans to strengthen the bank’s digital operations and product solutions while increasing customer engagement and connection to Asean opportunities, the release said. Hwee will also help integrate AI and push digital acquisition across UOB’s customer base.
Goh will succeed Hwee as head of GTO after more than three decades of IT experience spread across positions in corporate and consultancy roles. Goh began his professional life at a global advisory firm, having held positions of leadership in strategy and transformation, infrastructure consulting and security.
Goh currently manages the day-to-day operation and strategic planning of UOB’s infrastructure and platform services across the bank’s international network as chief operating officer for GTO and head of group infrastructure platform services.
Responsible for progressing UOB’s technology strategy, Goh has been “instrumental in shaping the bank’s technological investment and transformation”, according to the release, having established UOB’s first Test Centre of Excellence in 2018 to enhance the bank’s testing quality, automation and consistency.
The aim of Goh’s new role is to push innovation and technology integration to enhance operational efficiency and customer experience, the release said
Khoo is to become senior advisor to UOB Vietnam after retiring as head of group retail. Khoo joined UOB in 2005 and has been “pivotal in growing UOB’s group retail business to the strong regional franchise the bank has today”, the release said.
UOB Vietnam has been integrating Citigroup’s consumer banking businesses following its full integration of Citi’s consumer banking businesses into UOB Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, after UOB’s acquisition of several of Citigroup’s businessesin 2022.
Khoo intends to apply his experience to support UOB’s management team to drive the bank’s retail strategy in Vietnam, with UOB Vietnam “imperative” to strengthening the bank’s regional franchise.
“This management refresh is part of our ongoing efforts to strengthen UOB’s capabilities to serve our enlarged customer base across the region,” commented Ee Cheong Wee, deputy chairman and chief executive officer of UOB, in the release.
Wee added: “With rapid digitalisation in our key markets, Susan’s experience is crucial to drive digital engagement strategies and uplift customer experience. Lawrence, as a seasoned IT leader, will continue to drive innovation and lead our technology transformation in our new phase of growth. Eddie has made invaluable contributions to our retail banking business. In his new role, he will continue to support our team to realise the potential of our retail franchise in Vietnam.”
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BEIJING: According to state media reports on Sunday ( Jul 28 ), persistent heavy rain from Tropical Storm Gaemi caused flash floods in northeast China on the border with North Korea and caused railway disruptions and landslides in other areas of the nation. Two officers, including the deputy governor ofContinue Reading
Tokyo: According to officials and media reports from Friday ( Jul 26 ), record heavy rain forced the evacuation of thousands of people across parts of northern Japan as rivers burst their banks wreak havoc on bridges and cars. In Yamagata and Akita regions on the major area of Honshu,Continue Reading
Following NATO’s condemnation of Beijing’s support of the Soviet defense field on July 11, United States leaders, politicians, and non-profit businesses have called for sanctions on Hong Kong businesses and banks.  ,
During a conference with Wang Yi, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken plans to lodge a complaint about Russian supplies, with him in Laos. He claimed last week that Russia imports 90 % of its nanotechnology and 70 % of its system tools from China.  ,
Separately, Republican US Senator Marco Rubio proposed a change to the National Defense Authorization Act that would give the president the authority to impose sanctions on economic institutions that deal with illegally Russian supplies.  ,
Two US information media sources and an activist group have released their analyses over the past few weeks that look at the level of transshipments of products from the typical high priority list ( CHPL) to Russia.  ,
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, according to the New York Times, it has reportedly received about US$ 4 billion in limited chips. It claimed that a number of shell corporations in Hong Kong assisted in the shipment of many of these items to Moscow. According to the report, the number was derived from an analysis of Russian norms data since the middle of 2021.  ,
The paper said the cards were sent to Russia in almost 800, 000 supplies by more than 6, 000 businesses. The sixth floor of the Hong Kong company’s sixth floor, located at 135 Bonham Strand in Central, was visited by New York Times staff, who was reportedly involved in the transshipments, but they were unable to meet anyone.  ,  ,
Between August and December 2023, 206 Hong Kong companies, known as consignors, have shipped US$ 750 million of CHPL items to Russia, the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation ( CFHK Foundation ), a non-profit organization based in Washington, said in a report on July 22.
These things include data receivers, system chips and controllers, digital storage and input/output models and various integrated circuits. Other things include dynamic converters, amplifiers, memory cards and diodes.  ,
They were made by 31 American companies, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Apple, Intel, Dell and Nvidia.
The CFHK Foundation said it used data collected by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies ( C4ADS ), another Washington-based non-profit organization.  ,
It recommended that the US use its secondary sanctions authority to designate Hong Kong and Chinese banks as primary money laundering concerns ( PMLC ) and to designate Hong Kong as a primary money laundering concern ( PMLC ).  ,
However, an unknown US Commerce Department official was cited as saying in a document on July 22 that the volume of CHPL products shipped through Hong Kong had decreased by 28 % between January and May.  ,
The official claimed that the government’s extreme law enforcement and product supplier wedding contributed to the decrease, but did not explain how it was calculated. However, the standard claimed that Hong Kong is still a haven for Russians to escape international sanctions.
For the same time, transshipments of CHPL things through mainland China, excluding Hong Kong, fell 19 %. The US Commerce Department stated that it wanted to restrict access to the data because it could not get it in its entirety.  ,
All these new figures were made after NATO leaders called China a “decisive facilitator” of Russia’s war against Ukraine in a mutual declaration on July 11. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on July 19 that the US is preparing to impose fresh sanctions against Chinese companies that provided dual-use goods to Russia’s Ukrainian military.  ,
Rubio updated the National Defense Authorization Act on July 11th.
He proposed that the US President have the power to impose sanctions on any” covered financial institution” that uses China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System ( CIPS), Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages ( SPFS ) or Iran’s System for Electronic Payment Messaging ( SEPAM ) to clear, verify, settle or conduct transactions with any other” covered financial institution”.
A” covered financial institution” means one located in or organized under the laws of one of the countries of concern, which include China ( including Hong Kong and Macau ), Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela.  ,
By the end of this year, the US Congress is anticipated to make a choice regarding NDAA modifications for 2025.  ,
Rubio had introduced the Crippling Deranged Russian Belligerence and Chinese Presence in Putin’s Schemes Act in March 2022. There have n’t been any updates on it.
As of last fortnight, CIPS has 148 clear members, including Citibank, and 1, 396 indirect individuals around the world.  ,  ,
According to a report released on June 18 by C4ADS,” War Machine– The Networks Supplying &, Sustaining the Russian Precision Machine Tool Arsenal,” China, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are among the nations in concern with the supply of computer numeric control ( CNC ) machine tools for Russia.
According to the report, Russia has historically obtained foreign-produced CNC machine tools ( FPCMTs ) from nations whose governments now support Kyiv.  ,
Wang Wenbin, a former Chinese ambassador to Cambodia and a former official of the Chinese foreign ministry, claimed on April 23 that the US is dishonest and reckless because it continues to make excuses about regular business and economic relations between China and Russia while providing significant assistance to Ukraine.  ,
Some experts claimed that the new US sanctions will only raise foreign exchange transaction costs to finance Russian purchases relating to the war, but they wo n’t stop them.  ,
They claimed that while large Chinese banks have stopped financing industry with Russia to evade US sanctions, smaller banks may continue because they do not have multi-dollar businesses. They said different states such as Kazakhstan and Armenia, rather of Hong Kong, can even handle Russian supplies.  ,  ,
Read: US warns Chinese institutions over Russian supplies
Observe Jeff Pao on X:  , @jeffpao3
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission ( ASIC ) is looking into ANZ in light of serious allegations that the bank manipulated the market when it facilitated a$ 14 billion ( US$ 9.2 billion ) sale of government bonds in April of last year.
ASIC has today officially stated that it believes ANZ acted unlawfully. ASIC chair Joe Longo told the Australian Financial Review on Tuesday,” We are talking about you.
The CEO of ANZ has the right to define how he would describe it, but it is clear that it is an research, which means we must by definition believe there is a violation of the law.
Earlier this month, ANZ launched its own domestic investigation into alleged misconduct in its industry sector. ANZ says it is treating the claims” with the highest severity” and has engaged additional constitutional lawyers to help with its studies.
ANZ has also been accused of increasing the value of its bond buying by billions of dollars in order to get “lucrative” government mandates that come from large-scale trading.
Tie markets? State demands? You’d be forgiven for feeling a little lost.
On its encounter, the alleged crime might seem very mystical and professional. However, the Australian Financial Review has suggested that the dispute might turn into” the biggest incident” in ANZ’s 182-year story.
To be clear, these are claims amid an ongoing research by Australia’s business regulation. However, it’s crucial to comprehend exactly what the lender has been accused of doing here and how what transpires in the relationship sector has the power to affect everyone.
You need a thorough understanding of a transaction that sounds a little dry-sounding and quite routine in order to understand the allegations made against ANZ.
The state of Australia frequently takes out loans. It does this by selling so-called “bonds” to shareholders.
An investor purchases a bond, which was once a piece of paper but is now electronic, and in exchange receives (usually fixed ) interest payments known as” coupons,” one each month or year.
At the issuance of the tie, get it after three years, ten years, 20 years or more, the trader gets her or his money again.
You do n’t need to know everything about how bonds function. Bonds are only available on the open market, meaning that their value is shift, and that investors can buy them to other investors.
The investors ‘ returns are a result of both ( a ) receiving those coupons and ( b ) the difference between the amount they spend on the bond and the final principal amount when the bonds are due.
The price of the friendship will drop if standard interest rates rise above the bond’s coupon rate. Because the bond simply would n’t pay enough in comparison to what they want from an investment with that much risk.
Likewise, if standard interest rates fall, the relationship price is likely to walk.
An Australian Office of Financial Management ( AOFM), a branch of the Commonwealth Treasury, issues new government bonds. In order to conduct significant relationship sales, AOFM normally appoints a bank or banks to oversee the process and communicate with investors.
The state contracted ANZ to maintain a sizable A$ 14 billion bond sales in April 2023. ANZ was given access to sensitive information, including information about when the giving do take place.
ANZ was required to purchase bonds from investors who wanted to trade them for new bonds as part of the position. The value of those securities may depend on the gain that investors want from government bonds. Remember that a bond’s value drops if it receives an unrequited gain in excess of what is needed. So, if the expected return increases, the cost ANZ has to spend decreases.
You might have heard the notion: purchase low and sell high. Also, ANZ reportedly sought to do just that.
It is claimed that ANZ allegedly tried to raise bond yields by investing in what is known as the “futures industry,” a market that essentially allows traders to place bets on upcoming interest rate movements.
These wagers even affect the reference rate that determines the cost of new ties. Because the government uses the futures level to determine the profit the business needs for its debt and determine the bond issuer’s coupon rate.
If that prospects price climbs, then so too does the discount price on the government’s new relationship issues. This increases the government’s overall interest costs.
ANZ is accused of manipulating future yields to get it to buy bonds from investors for a lower rate.
ANZ supposedly then reversed its future trades, allowing the price of the securities it held to rise and the general interest rate to fall, earning a profit.
If the claims are accurate, ANZ did have engaged in both insider trading and market manipulation. This would be outlawed.
According to the Australian Financial Review, trading information details to unexpected price moves on and around April 19 of last year.
Up until the relationship was issued on April 19, the data shows that bond prices had risen (yields had risen ), then produces had dropped, leading to a rise in bond rates.
But it’s important to notice this diagram says nothing about cause. Charges may have decreased for reasons related to ANZ.
ANZ has also been accused of overstating its investing success to the state, to secure rewarding friendship control options.
Based on their trading of government bonds and their skills, the state chooses managers. It is claimed that ANZ falsely reported how much buying it did.
According to the Australian Financial Review, ANZ told the government it had “facilitated”$ 137.6 billion in bond trades to the year ended June 2023, when it had really only facilitated$ 83.2 billion – a discrepancy of$ 54.4 billion.
Although it may seem far removed from daily life, what happens on the bond market has the ability to have an impact on everyone.
If found to be true, ANZ’s reported deception was reportedly had cost citizens as much as A$ 80 million. That number reflects how much more interest the government may be required to pay if it issued bonds with higher interest rates than they needed to.
Mark Humphery-Jenner is associate professor of funding, UNSW Sydney
This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.