A Chinese prison helped fuel the deadly fentanyl crisis in the US – Asia Times

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This article was originally published by ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom.

Reporting Highlights

  • Pipeline: A Chinese prison is part of the pipeline that delivers fentanyl to the US, ProPublica found in a review of US and Chinese documents and interviews with investigators.
  • Fallout: Opioid overdoses have killed more Americans than the number of US deaths in several wars combined.
  • Permissive: Veteran federal agents told ProPublica that China has failed to cooperate and even interfered with drug investigations; China insists it has cracked down.

China’s vast security apparatus shrouds itself in shadows, but the outside world has caught periodic glimpses of it behind the faded gray walls of Shijiazhuang prison in the northern province of Hebei.

Chinese media reports have shown inmates hunched over sewing machines in a garment workshop in the sprawling facility. Business leaders and Chinese Communist Party dignitaries have praised the penitentiary for exemplifying President Xi Jinping’s views on the rule of law.

But the prison has an alarming secret, US congressional investigators disclosed last year. They revealed evidence showing that it is a Chinese government outpost in the trafficking pipeline that inundates the United States with fentanyl.

For at least eight years, the prison owned a chemical company called Yafeng, the hub of a group of Chinese firms and websites that sold fentanyl products to Americans, according to the US congressional investigation, as well as Chinese government and corporate records obtained by ProPublica.

The company’s English-language websites brazenly offered US customers dangerous drugs that are illegal in both nations. Promising to smuggle illicit chemicals past US and Mexican border defenses, Yafeng boasted to American clients that “100% of our shipments will clear customs.”

Although China tightly restricts the domestic manufacturing, sale and use of fentanyl products, the nation has been the world’s leading producer of fentanyl that enters the United States and remains the leading producer of chemical precursors with which Mexican cartels make the drug.

Overdoses on synthetic opioid drugs, most of them fentanyl related, have killed over 450,000 Americans during the past decade — more than the US deaths in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.

The involvement of a state-run prison is just one sign of the Chinese government’s role in fomenting the US fentanyl crisis, US investigators say. Chinese leaders have insistently denied such allegations. But US national security officials said the Yafeng case shows how China allows its chemical industry to engage openly in sales to overseas customers while blocking online domestic access and enforcing stern laws against drug dealing inside the country.

Beijing also encourages the manufacture and export of fentanyl products, including drugs outlawed in China, with generous financial incentives, according to a bipartisan inquiry last year by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

“So the Chinese government pays you to send drugs to America but executes you for selling them in China,” Matt Cronin, a former federal prosecutor who led the House inquiry, said in an interview. “It’s impossible that the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t know what’s going on and can’t do anything about it.”

China’s antidrug cooperation has been persistently poor, US officials said. In 2019, Xi imposed controls that cut the export of fentanyl, but Chinese sellers shifted to shipping precursors to Mexico, where the cartels expanded their production.

“We couldn’t get the Chinese on the phone to talk about fighting child pornography, let alone fentanyl,” said Jacob Braun, who served as a senior official at the Department of Homeland Security during the Biden administration. “There was zero cooperation.”

China also remains the base of global organized crime groups that launder billions for fentanyl traffickers in the US, Mexico and Canada. ProPublica has previously reported that this underground banking system depends on Chinese elite who move fortunes abroad by acquiring drug cash from Chinese criminal brokers for Mexican cartels. Chinese banks and businesses also help hide the origin of illicit proceeds.

The regime in Beijing therefore has considerable control over key nodes in the fentanyl chain: raw materials, production, sales and money laundering.

US leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, have accused China of using fentanyl to weaken the United States. Some veteran agents agree.

Ray Donovan, who retired in 2023 as the Drug Enforcement Administration’s chief of operations, said he believes that a “deliberate strategy” by the Chinese state has caused the trafficking onslaught “to grow in size and scope.”

“They have said for years that they are cracking down,” Donovan said in an interview. “But we haven’t seen meaningful action.”

Still, current and former US officials told ProPublica that the national security community has not found conclusive evidence of a planned, high-level campaign against Americans by the Chinese government. That is partly because for years the US treated fentanyl as a law enforcement matter rather than a national security threat, making it hard to gather intelligence about the extent and nature of the regime’s role.

“If this was Chinese intelligence doing something, we have a focus on that as counterintelligence,” said Alan Kohler, who retired from the FBI in 2023 after serving as director of the counterintelligence division. “If it was drug cartels, we have a criminal focus on that. But this area of crime and state converging falls between the seams in and among agencies.”

Nonetheless, the current and former officials said rampant fentanyl trafficking could not continue without at least the passive complicity of the world’s most powerful police state.

“I haven’t seen smoking-gun evidence that it’s a policy or strategy of the government at a high level,” Kohler said. “You could argue that their decision not to do anything about it, even after the results are clear, is tacit support.”

In a written statement, the spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington described as “totally groundless” any allegation that the regime has fomented the crisis.

“The fentanyl issue is the US’s own problem,” said the spokesperson, Liu Pengyu. “China has given support to the US’s response to the fentanyl issue in the spirit of humanity.” At the United States’ request, he said, China in 2019 restricted “fentanyl-related substances as a class,” becoming the first country to do so, and has cooperated with the US on counternarcotics.

“The remarkable progress is there for all to see.”

The Trump administration has made the fight against fentanyl a priority and in February imposed a 25% tariff on Chinese imports to pressure Beijing for results. The approach could put a dent in the drug trade, but it’s too early to tell, officials said.

“The Chinese system responds to a negative incentive,” said former FBI agent Holden Triplett, who served as legal attache in Beijing and director of counterintelligence on the National Security Council. “China may be willing to endure more pain than we can give. But it is our only chance.”

To respond effectively, the US needs a clearer picture of the Chinese fentanyl underworld, Triplett and others say. The activities of the Shijiazhuang prison are a compelling case study, but not the only one.

To examine the role of the Chinese state in the drug trade, ProPublica interviewed more than three dozen current and former national security officials for the US and other countries, some of whom provided exclusive inside accounts. The reporting also drew on last year’s House investigation, digging into significant findings that have received little public attention, plus court files, government documents, academic studies, private inquiries and public records in the US, China and Mexico.

Prison business

In 2010, the Hebei Prison Administration Bureau combined three detention facilities to create a high-security prison in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei province. The region is a base of China’s chemical industry, which is the largest in the world. It is also weakly regulated and freewheeling, according to US national security officials, private studies and other sources. Companies peddle everything from innocuous fertilizers to deadly opioids.

Liu Jianhua, a veteran Chinese Communist Party official with a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Illinois Chicago, became director of the prison in 2014. By then, fentanyl was cutting a swath across America. Overdose deaths soared due to the ease with which US users and dealers could acquire fentanyl products by mail from China.

China’s high-tech surveillance apparatus aggressively polices the online activities of its citizens. Yet sales of fentanyl to foreigners have thrived on popular, easily accessible websites, said Frank Montoya Jr., a former FBI agent with years of China-related experience who served as a top U.S. counterintelligence official.

“You don’t have to go on the dark web,” Montoya said. “It is out in the open.”

Yafeng Biological Technology Co. Ltd., also known as Hebei Shijiazhuang Yafeng Chemical Plant, became a typical player on this frontier, the congressional inquiry found. (As part of its reporting, ProPublica mapped links between the prison, the company and the US drug market with the help of two entities that specialize in China open-source research: Sayari, a company that provides risk management and supply-chain analysis and that supported the House inquiry, and C4ADS, a nonprofit that investigates illicit global networks.)

Yafeng’s websites and Chinese corporate records describe the firm as a chemical manufacturer. It has ties through other websites, phone numbers and email addresses to at least nine companies that advertised illicit drugs, causing investigators to conclude that Yafeng was a network hub, according to the report and interviews. It’s common for interconnected Chinese fentanyl producers and brokers to obscure details about their enterprises and change names and platforms to elude detection, US officials said.

In some ways, Yafeng presented itself to foreign buyers as a respectable company. The English-language websites featured peppy phrases like “team spirit” and “promoting the well-being of community.” The China-based sales representatives gave themselves Western names: Diana, Monica, Jessica. A map of markets showed shipping routes from China to the United States, Mexico, Canada and other countries.

Yet the sales pitches left little doubt that the firm knew its activities were illegal. Yafeng websites utilized familiar terms assuring US and Mexican drug users and traffickers of the company’s skill at smuggling illegal narcotics overseas, according to the House report and US investigators.

The company touted its use of “hidden food bags,” a method in which drugs are concealed in shipments labeled as food products. Ads promised “strong safety delivery to Mexico, USA” with “packaging made to measure” to “guarantee” that illicit chemicals would elude border inspections, documents show.

Chinese traffickers often discuss lawbreaking in such brazen terms with foreign customers, seemingly unconcerned about China’s omnipresent surveillance system, court files and interviews show.

Another firm, Hubei Amarvel Biotech, explicitly explained to US and Mexican clients online — complete with photos — its methods for “100% stealth shipping” of drugs disguised as nuts, dog food and motor oil, court documents say. After undercover DEA agents lured two Amarvel executives to Fiji and arrested them, a New York jury convicted them in February on charges of importation of fentanyl precursors and money laundering. (One defendant, Yiyi Chen, has filed a motion requesting an acquittal or retrial.)

At the time of the arrests, the Chinese government issued a statement condemning the US prosecution as “a typical example of arbitrary detention and unilateral sanctions.”

Similarly, Yafeng websites displayed photos of narcotics in plastic baggies to peddle a long list of chemicals, including fentanyl precursors and U-47700, a powerful fentanyl analogue outlawed in both the US and China that has no medical use, the House report says.

One victim of U-47700 was Garrett Holman of Lynchburg, Virginia. Holman had fallen in with youths who discovered how easy it was to buy synthetic drugs online. In late 2016, Holman overdosed on U-47700, street name “pinky,” that arrived by mail from southern China. His father, Don, performed CPR before paramedics rushed Holman to the hospital. Although he survived, another overdose killed him just days before his 21st birthday in February 2017.

“My son’s opioid exposure was less than two months,” Don Holman told a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee the next year. “At 20 years old, I do not believe my son deserved to die for his initial bad choices.”

The father handed over evidence, including the envelope in which the drugs arrived, to federal agents, who traced about 20 shipments back to the same sender in China, he said in an interview. Don Holman blames the fentanyl crisis on the American appetite for opioids as well as the Chinese government. He has spent eight years telling anyone he can, from drug czars to fellow parents, about the experience that shattered his family.

“I’ve had to hit parents right between the eyes, like: ‘Hey, your child is not going to be here if you don’t do something,” he said. “You need to wake up.’”

No link to Yafeng surfaced in that case. The firm’s sales of U-47700 and other illicit drugs occurred during a period when its sole owner and controlling shareholder was the Shijiazhuang prison, according to the House inquiry, Sayari and C4ADS.

One of Yafeng’s street addresses was that of the prison, ProPublica determined through satellite photos and public records. Another Yafeng address next door also houses the offices of a clothing firm owned by the provincial prison administration. A third Yafeng address a few blocks away is a former municipal police station, records and photos show.

The director of the prison, Liu Jianhua, left his post after becoming the target of a corruption inquiry in 2021, according to Chinese media reports. It’s unknown how that investigation was resolved or if his fall had anything to do with the drug activity. Liu could not be reached for comment. The prison administration did not respond to requests for comment.

Yafeng stopped doing business under that name at some point between 2018 and 2022, records show. Yet the Yafeng group continued to function through at least one of its affiliated websites, protonitazene.com, the congressional report said. As of last year, the site was still advertising “hot sale to Mexico” of drugs including nitazenes, which are 25 times more powerful than fentanyl.

Government incentives

Yafeng is not the only company with connections to the Chinese state and fentanyl.

Gaosheng Biotechnology in Shanghai is “wholly state-owned,” congressional investigators found. The company sold fentanyl precursors and other narcotics — some illegal in China — on 98 websites to US, Mexican and European customers, the report says. Senior provincial development officials visited Gaosheng and praised its benefits for the regional economy. Gaosheng did not respond to requests for comment.

The Chinese government owned a stake in Zhejiang Netsun, a private firm that had a Chinese Communist Party member serving on its board of directors as a deputy general manager, the congressional report says. Netsun carried out over 400 sales of illegal narcotics, the report says, and served as a billing or technical contact for over 100 similar companies — including Yafeng. Netsun did not respond to requests for comment.

And the Shanghai government gave monetary awards and export credits to Shanghai Ruizheng Chemical Technology Co., a “notorious seller of fentanyl products, which it advertises widely and openly on Chinese websites like Alibaba,” the report says. Chinese officials invited company reps to roundtable discussions about technology and business. Shanghai Ruizheng did not respond to requests for comment.

Chinese government officials who interact with the trafficking underworld are often prominent in provincial governments, where corruption is widespread, said a former senior DEA official, Donald Im, who led investigations focused on China. Not only can they make money through kickbacks or investments, but they benefit politically, rising in the Communist Party hierarchy if their local chemical industries prosper.

“Key government officials know about the fentanyl trade and they let it happen,” Im said.

China’s central government also plays a vital role by providing systemic financial incentives that fuel fentanyl trafficking to the Americas, US officials say. The House inquiry discovered a national Value-Added Tax rebate program that has spurred exports of at least 17 illegal narcotics with no legitimate purpose. They include a fentanyl product that is “up to 6,000 times stronger than morphine,” the House report says.

This state subsidy program has pumped billions of dollars into the export of fentanyl products, including ones outlawed in China, according to the report and US officials. The tax rebate is 13%, the highest available rate. To qualify, companies have to document the names and quantities of chemicals and other details of transactions, the report says.

The existence of this paper trail refutes a frequent claim by Chinese leaders: that weak regulation of the chemical sector makes it impossible to identify and punish suspects.

Chinese officials did not respond to specific questions about the government financial incentives or the state-connected companies involved in drug trafficking. But the embassy spokesperson said China has targeted online sellers with a “national internet cleanup campaign.”

During that crackdown, Liu Pengyu said, Chinese authorities have cleaned “14 online platforms, canceled over 330 company accounts, shut down over 1,000 online shops, removed over 152,000 online advertisements, and closed 10 botnet websites.” He said Chinese law enforcement has determined that many illegal ads appear on foreign online platforms.

Wall of resistance

In May 2018, Cronin — then a federal prosecutor based in Cleveland — went to Beijing in pursuit of one of the biggest targets in the grim history of the fentanyl crisis: the Zheng drug trafficking organization, an international empire accused of trafficking in 37 US states.

Cronin and his team of agents hoped to persuade Chinese authorities to prosecute Guanghua and Fujing Zheng, a father and son who were the top suspects. They ran into a wall of resistance.

In an interview, Cronin recalled walking into a cavernous room in China’s Ministry of Public Security where a row of senior officials and uniformed police waited at a long table. A curtain-sized Chinese flag covered a wall.

Cronin took a breath, opened a stack of binders he had lugged from Cleveland and presented his case. The prosecutor laid out evidence connecting the Zhengs, who were chemical company executives based in Shanghai, to two overdoses in Ohio. The US distribution hub was a warehouse near Boston run by a Chinese chemist, Bin Wang. Later, Wang said he simultaneously worked for the Chinese government “tracking chemicals produced in China” and traveled home monthly from Boston “to consult with Chinese officials,” a memo by his lawyer said.

The response of the Chinese counterdrug chiefs was a brush-off, Cronin recalled in the interview. Essentially, he said, they told him: “You are right that the Zhengs are exporting these drugs that are killing Americans. But unfortunately, technically what they are doing is not a violation of Chinese law.”

Cronin pulled out another binder. He went over evidence and an expert analysis showing that the Zhengs had committed Chinese felonies, including money laundering, manufacturing of counterfeit drugs and mislabeling of packages.

Tensions rose when the Chinese officials responded that, unfortunately, the police unit that handled such offenses was not available; they rebuffed Cronin’s offer to delay his return flight in order to meet with that unit, he said.

After the US Justice Department charged the Zhengs that August with a drug trafficking conspiracy resulting in death, a Chinese newspaper reported that a Chinese senior counterdrug official criticized the case. The US “failed to provide China any evidence to prove Zheng violated Chinese law,” the official said.

Later, the US Treasury Department sanctioned the Zhengs and designated the son as a drug kingpin. US investigators told ProPublica they concluded that the Zhengs operated with the blessing of the Chinese government, citing the defendants’ sheer volume of business, high-profile online activity and open communications on WeChat, the Chinese messaging platform that authorities heavily monitor.

Ohio courts granted millions of dollars in civil damages to the family of Thomas Rauh, a 37-year-old who died of an overdose in Akron in 2015. The family never received any money, however.

Rauh’s father, James, who traveled and did business in China in his youth, has become an antidrug activist. He said the US government must do more to crack down on China’s role and counter public stigma that still blames addicts.

“I don’t think the US government wants to take the responsibility for confronting this,” he said.

A decade of frustration has compelled James Rauh to call for a drastic solution. He wants the US to designate fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction in response to what he sees as an intentional Chinese campaign.

“It’s asymmetric warfare,” he said.

Wang pleaded guilty and served prison time. The Zhengs, however, remain free in China and have never responded to the allegations in court. During a brief encounter with a “60 Minutes” journalist in Shanghai in 2019, Guanghua Zheng denied he was still selling fentanyl in the United States and said the Chinese government “has nothing to do with it.”

The Zheng case is typical, said Im, the former senior DEA official. Thousands of DEA leads relayed to Chinese counterparts over the years have been “met with silence,” he said. In other cases, Chinese officials have asked for more details about the targets of US investigations — and then warned suspects linked to the Communist Party, Im said.

Most US national security officials interviewed for this story described similar experiences, citing a few exceptions, such as a joint US-Chinese operation in Hebei province in 2019.

A former DEA agent, William Kinghorn, recalled the dispiriting aftermath of an investigation he oversaw centered on Chuen Fat Yip, whose firms allegedly distributed more than $280 million worth of drugs. Yip has denied wrongdoing and denounced US criminal charges and sanctions. He is on the DEA’s 10 most wanted fugitives list and remains free in China, US officials said.

“We obtained information that the Chinese authorities did ban or shut down the companies” the DEA targeted in the case, Kinghorn said in an interview. “We learned that afterward these same people [linked to Yip] were now owning or managing similar companies. Even though they had been banned, they basically just changed the name of the company.”

A sense of impunity persists in the chemical industry, according to a 2023 inquiry by Elliptic, a UK analytics firm. It reported that many of the 90 Chinese companies contacted by its undercover researchers were “willing to supply fentanyl itself, despite this being banned in China since 2019.”

The final year of the Biden administration brought signs of modest progress in China, including new regulations, shutdowns of firms, and arrests of a suspected money launderer and four senior chemical company employees charged by US prosecutors.

Citing those cases from 2024, spokesperson Liu Pengyu said China has “collaborated closely” with the US, adding, “Multiple major cases are making great progress.”

Meanwhile, US overdose deaths fell by 33% compared with the previous year, according to the annual threat assessment by the US intelligence community released March 25. The drop may be tied to the increased availability of naloxone, a drug for treating overdoses, the report said.

The threat assessment report warned that “China likely will struggle to sufficiently constrain” companies and criminal groups involved in the US fentanyl trade, “absent greater law enforcement actions.”

Cronin, the former federal prosecutor, went on to become chief investigative counsel for the House Select Committee. He led last year’s inquiry into China’s role in the fentanyl crisis. The committee’s review of seven Chinese company websites found over 31,000 instances of firms offering illegal chemicals during a period of about three months in early 2024.

Undercover communications with the firms “revealed an eagerness to engage in clearly illicit drug sales,” the report says, “with no fear of reprisal.”

Kirsten Berg contributed research. Sign up for The Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox.

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Cash handout faces legal hurdle

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B35 billion fund transfer is improper, according to the pair.

Eligible recipients queue to withdraw their money from a Government Savings Bank branch at the start of the first phase of the 10,000-baht cash handout, on Oct 1 last year.
On October 1st, last year, a group of eligible consumers waited to withdraw their money from a Government Savings Bank tree at the start of the second phase of the 10,000-baht money flyer.

The government is facing a fresh legal challenge after a complaint was sent to the NACC to request that it look into a 35-billion-baht total used to pay for its 10, 000-baht cash handout.

The latest government officials, former Srettha Thavisin administration officials, as well as the legislators and MPs who supported the budget costs for the 2025 fiscal year are among those who are implicated in the case.

The petition was signed by Jade Donavanik, a previous democratic writing commission director, Somchai Swangkarn, a former legislator, and Charnchai Issarasenarak, a former Democrat MP.

They charged these government officials, Members, and senators with breaking both Part 144 of the law and Area 88 of the Anti-Corruption Act, which is the network’s fundamental laws.

Mr. Charnchai and Mr. Jade have requested that the NACC conduct an investigation into the situation, and if the investigation finds sufficient grounds, it may refer the situation to the Constitutional Court for decision-making.

The House approved the 3.75-trillion-baht resources costs for the 2025 fiscal year, according to Mr. Charnchai, in its first reading of the bill on June 21, next year.

A 35 billion baht resources will be used to pay debts to state-run banks under Part 28 of the Financial and Fiscal Discipline Act, according to the government led by the then-prime secretary, Mr. Srettha, before the next studying. To finance the 10,000-baht cash handout scheme, it was diverted to a central fund.

Despite the constitution forbidding such actions, the House committee that was looking at the budget consented.

The decision, according to the former MP, had an impact on several state-run banks, including the Government Savings Bank ( 2.68 billion baht ), Government Housing Bank ( 592 million baht ), and the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives ( 2.68 billion baht ).

These budgetary adjustments were originally intended to make up for the loss of revenue generated by the implementation of government initiatives like a farmer’s debt suspension program and a crop price guarantee project.

Under Section 28 of the Financial and Fiscal Discipline Act, Section 144 of the Constitution prohibits the slashing of budget allocations used to fulfill legal obligations, particularly those set aside for bank debt payments.

Additionally, Mr. Charnchai reported that an additional 1.25 billion baht was diverted from the central fund to a fund for former parliamentarians, which was in violation of Section 144 ( 2 ) of the constitution, which forbids MPs or senators from devoting budget allocations for personal benefits.

In its second and third readings, he claimed that the bill received a total of 309 MPs, 175 senators, and 72 committee members who were watching the 2025 budget bill closely. Therefore, Mr. Charnchai said, each of them is connected to the allegation.

According to Mr. Jade, the NACC’s investigation is anticipated to last no longer than two months. The NACC can submit the case to the Constitutional Court if it finds enough evidence in the evidence to support its case, which is expected to take 15 days to consider the case before rendering a decision.

According to observers, the Paetongtarn administration could be involved in the case because the Srettha government’s 10-millibaht cash handout is still being implemented.

The government approved a third phase of the digital wallet program in March, which will give 10, 000 baht to 2.7 million people between the ages of 16 and 20 as part of its economic stimulus package.

As the system designed to make this happen, Ms. Paetongtarn previously stated that digital wallets would be used to distribute and spend this portion of the 10,000-baht giveaway.

Welfare cardholders, those with disabilities, and those over the age of 60 were covered by the first two phases of the program, which included payments made using PromptPay.

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Thailand, Australia target global crime

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Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop Bhuridej, CIB Commissioner, exchanges mementoes with AFP Commissioner Reece Kershaw. (Photo: Wassayos Ngamkham)
Pol Lt. Gen. Jirabhop Bhuridej, CIB Commissioner, and AFP Commissioner Reece Kershaw exchange memories. Wassayos Ngamkham is the photographer.

Thai and Asian authorities have launched a joint operation to demolish transnational criminal systems in a significant step toward preventing international murder. The collaboration aims to address complex crimes that transcend borders, from cocaine to child abuse and cryptocurrency-based money fraud.

Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop Bhuridej, Commissioner of the Royal Thai Police’s Central Investigation Bureau ( CIB ), led a delegation to Australia earlier this month for discussions with its law enforcement counterpart, the Australian Federal Police ( AFP).

According to Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop,” the nature of international crime nowadays demands real-time cleverness, cross-border cooperation, and scientific integration.” ” We are no longer focusing on isolated businesses. Our goal is to create a co-operative system that is flawless.

Both sides came to terms with the necessity of creating shared task forces and information-sharing procedures during the visit. Thailand’s officers displayed their skills in industry operations and local knowledge, especially in the Greater Mekong Subregion, while the AFP introduced tools and systems developed for international crime surveillance.

He claimed that the Australians liked how quickly we operated. Our officers are trained to manage challenging terrain and access challenging locations, which are frequently the hub of these legal networks.

Digital Trails, Drug Routes

One of the main points of discussion was drug smuggling. Thailand, a long-standing transport nation, is a key player in the transition from Myanmar’s Shan State’s manufacturing hubs to Australia’s high-value markets.

” Crystal meth, or “ya glacier,” continues to be the main drug coming into Australia from Southeast Asia,” remarked Pol Lt. Gen. Jirabhop. It’s inexpensive to produce, high-quality, and low, which makes it very beneficial for organized crime organizations.

Another medications, such as cocaine and MDMA, are still popular among those who are younger and in the heart of entertainment. Despite the knowledge shared by the AFP, medications are frequently kept hidden inside reasonable shipping pots filled with gadgets, household items, or car parts, a tactic used to obstruct border inspections.

Thailand and Australia are looking into preventing actions in response, including sharing information on known traffickers and trafficking routes and improved goods screening. The possible development of a joint databases that both countries can use to track supplies and suspects in real-time is a key growth.

The conflict goes way beyond traditional contraband, though. Today’s criminal organizations are becoming more tech-savvy, frequently laundering profits using electronic money and online wallets. He claimed that” criptocurrency is the new frontier for criminals.” They” industry anonymously, move money immediately, and escape conventional financial oversight,” they claim.

Thailand also faces legitimate and structural restrictions, despite the AFP’s advanced crypto-tracking technology. Digital property lack a clear position as admissible evidence in Thai law, putting a strain on efforts to freeze or acquire funds.

” Despite the difficulties, we are moving forward,” he said. To tighten controls on illicit money flows, we are working with partners like Interpol ( International Criminal Police Organization ), Aseanapol ( Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chiefs of Police ), and financial intelligence organizations like Amlo ( Anti-Money Laundering Office ) and Austrac ( Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre ).

Both nations are investing in the future of law enforcement through engineering, management training, and inter-agency cooperation, in addition to their functional work. Data management is a promising area of cooperation. The AFP, which has developed related methods for predicted surveillance and case integration, is of particular attention to the CIB’s Big Data Centre.

We had in-depth debate about Thailand’s Big Data Center and how it could work with the AFP’s Investigation Management System, according to Pol Lt Gen Jirabhop. There are many things that we can understand from one another, particularly in terms of system infrastructure and software in real-world situations.

The American Criminal Intelligence Commission, which manages the nation’s potent database that connects crime data from across Australia, received similar industrial synergies during discussions with them.

” We think this is a concept that is for replicating,” said Pol Lt. Gen. Jirabhop. ” Centralizing crime data prevents effort duplication because it allows companies to answer more quickly, identify patterns sooner, and prevent duplication.”

Leadership growth was also high on the plan. To discuss leadership training programs, Thai officials met with the Australian Institute of Police Management ( AIPM). Programs are being made to take Thai officers to AIPM for superior training, and to invite American trainers to Thailand to share their experience. He claimed that “effective policing depends on good leadership.” It’s about creating institutions that can adapt, innovate, and lead in a fast-changing world, not just about catching criminals.

The Joint Policing Cybercrime Coordination Centre ( JPC3 ), an Australian multi-agency hub that brings together police, cybercrime experts, banks, and tech companies in one location with shared databases and real-time coordination, is a standout example of innovation.

He claimed that it provides the kind of integrated approach we require. We want to use this model in Thailand to combat cybercrime and financial crime more effectively.

Security Partnership

Thailand and Australia’s shared commitment to public safety is emerging as a cornerstone of regional stability as transnational criminal threats become more sophisticated.

Both of our countries are clearly facing common threats, according to Pol Lt. Gen. Jirabhop. By uniting through joint operations, intelligence sharing, and institutional development, we convey to criminal networks that we are prepared, connected, and resolute.

Both parties are optimistic about the plans to formalize this cooperation through more structured frameworks and regular exchanges. As crime continues to become more global, so must the response. ” This is only the beginning,” Pol Lt. Gen. Jirabhop declared. A partnership for peace, safety, and justice across our nations is something we’re building that will endure.

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China, Japan, Korea sense Trump trade war weakness – Asia Times

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TOKYO – Asia is breathing somewhat easier as Donald Trump confronts the limits of his ability to self-immolate the US economy.

Amid historically free-falling markets and an Oval Office intervention by the CEOs of Walmart, Target and Home Depot, the US president is watering down a tariff policy, including a 145% levy on China, that’s already rocked the global economy.

It’s unclear whether the climbdown, where Trump said this week he would “substantially” pare back tariffs on China in a trade deal, is real or lasting. On Thursday, he blasted China anew on social media for canceling delivery of Boeing-made jets and its role in the continued flow of fentanyl into the US.

But as Trump flinches, it’s clear his inner circle is distressed by how catastrophically the tariff policy is going down with markets. Many are coming to the conclusion that the Trump White House’s standing will never be the same on Wall Street.

Asian leaders are right to smell blood in the water. In the short run, Japan and South Korea can take a beat as Trump World tries to rally fleeing global investors back around the dollar and US Treasuries.

For one thing, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and South Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo now understand just how badly Trump needs a win, any win, on the trade front. This gives two of North Asia’s biggest economies greater leverage in talks than they had just a week ago.

For another, Xi Jinping now knows that China’s decision to push back instead of bowing to Trump’s threats and demands is paying off spectacularly. So is President Xi’s free-trade charm offensive from East to West as Trump torches friend and foe alike with arbitrary tariffs and bullying rhetoric.

Asian leaders now have scope to take a breath and regroup as Trump’s tariffs — particularly his 145% tax on China — trigger what Wedbush Securities analyst Dan Ives calls an “Armageddon scenario” for the US.

Recent reports of dissension in Trump’s top ranks shed light on his apparent pivot on “Liberation Day” tariffs. They include clashes between anti-China trade advisor Peter Navarro and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent spilling out into the open on a near-daily basis.

Yet Trump “blinked” first in his trade war, says economist David Rosenberg, founder of Rosenberg Research. The same goes for Trump backing away from earlier threats to fire Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell for not lowering rates as recession risks flash red.

“The blinking that the president is busily doing on trade and Powell has unleashed a follow-through on the short-covering rally,” Rosenberg says.

Trump pivoting first contrasts markedly with what China is saying. As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun puts it: “China’s attitude towards the tariff war launched by the US is quite clear: We don’t want to fight, but we are not afraid of it. If we fight, we will fight to the end; if we talk, the door is wide open.”

To be sure, Beijing is reportedly considering suspending its 125% tariff on some US imports to limit economic fallout. Bloomberg reported today (April 25) that Beijing may remove additional levies on US-made medical equipment and some industrial chemicals like ethane, as well as waive tariffs on plane leases.

But the last month has shown what it looks like when an unstoppable force like Trump meets an immovable object like Xi’s China. But Trump just demonstrated that his pain threshold for tariffs is Wall Street-dependent.

It was headlines about the many trillions of dollars in stock losses, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon being unhappy and Goldman Sachs talking recession that had the self-proclaimed “Tariff Man” changing his tune.

The only thing falling faster than the US dollar is Trump’s economic approval rating at home. A new Reuters/Ipsos poll puts it at 37% while roughly 75% of American adults worry recession is imminent.

Confidence is likely to fall even more precipitously as American households see their retirement account statements and feel tariffs boosting prices across the board. Market volatility also forced Trump to throttle back on plans to fire Powell, at least for now.

If you’re happy “just because Trump said he isn’t going to fire Powell in an era in which the independence of central banks is going to be called into question by the demands of realpolitik, or because he said something nice about China and tariffs for the nth time as the world starts to divide along geopolitical lines, well clearly you enjoy fairy tales,” says Michael Every, global strategist at Rabobank.

At a business forum this week, veteran investment strategist Jim Paulsen said that “almost every corporate CEO is revising down their outlook. The commentary warnings of the corporate sector have escalated.”

Some titans of finance think many peers are being too dramatic about what damage Trump 2.0 might do in the long run. As C S Venkatakrishnan, CEO of Barclays, tells Bloomberg: “It’s 100 years of dollar strength, so much so that important commodities — gold, oil — are denominated in dollars. I think undoing that will take a long, long time.”

Yet Wedbush’s Ives speaks for many when he says Trump’s tariffs, and the chaos surrounding their implementation, “will go down as the worst US policy mistake” since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which amplified the Great Depression.

China’s Commerce Ministry has been making a similar point, calling the US tariff moves “a mistake on top of a mistake.”

Then, after the US president vowed to ratchet up tariffs again this week, Beijing once again vowed to hold the line.

It has since clashed with Trump by insisting no trade talks are underway, which the US leader has insisted are happening behind the scenes without naming who was involved.

At a forum in Washington sponsored by Semafor this week, Citadel CEO and founder Ken Griffin warned that a Trump reversal might be too little, too late. Before the tariffs, “no brand compared” to US Treasurys, the dollar or the creditworthiness of the biggest economy. That’s now been “eroded” in short order.

“We put that brand at risk,” the billionaire hedge fund manager said. “It can be a lifetime to repair the damage that has been done.”

The financial dust cloud Trump leaves behind could play into Asia’s hands as trade negotiations are expected to heat up in coming weeks amid a 90-day pause on the imposition of his reciprocal tariffs on all global nations.  

China now knows, for example, that the bond market can rattle Trump. The recent surge in yields clearly unnerved Trump’s inner circle.

And it put on display the extent to which the US is just as vulnerable as it’s perceived to be strong. Beijing holds some US$760 billion of US Treasuries.

Chinese state media regularly discusses the idea of selling, or scaling back purchases, as a retaliation tool some market watchers believe Beijing quietly did soon after Trump’s reciprocal tariff announcement.

It’s all making Trump desperate to change the narrative with a big trade deal win. The first opportunity on that front is Japan.

Of course, Team Trump is trying to put on a brave face. Asked on Wednesday whether Trump had unilaterally offered to de-escalate trade tensions with China, Treasury head Bessent claimed “not at all.”

“As I’ve said many times, I don’t think either side believes that the current tariff levels are sustainable, so I would not be surprised if they went down in a mutual way,” Bessent said.

One possible takeaway from Bessent’s comments is that they “underscored that the United States is not aiming to decouple from China,” says Thomas Lee, head of research at Fundstrat Global Advisors.

Lee points to Trump’s press secretary claiming there are “ongoing trade discussions with 34 countries and referencing President Trump’s optimistic outlook regarding a potential deal with China.”

Yet the lack of progress with Japan could be a warning sign for the White House.

Last week, Navarro tried to suggest a bilateral Japan deal was imminent. It was his Exhibit A for the argument that Trump’s “90 deals in 90 days” pledge remains operational.

Yet Navarro was left holding only his ego when Tokyo reported that Economic Revitalization Minister Akazawa Ryosei was already back home with no deal in sight.

Seeing Trump caving this week, why wouldn’t Ishiba slow things down even further? This strategy worked well for former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2019. Back then, the late Abe signed a bilateral deal that Trump touted as “phenomenal.”  

But, in reality, Japan gave up less on agriculture than it had as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multilateral free trade pact that Trump scrapped. Autos were excluded and everything from pharmaceuticals to financial services was left to a future date.

The end result was negligible in altering US-Japan trade dynamics and “was a poignant reminder of how much President Trump gave away when he turned his back on the TPP,” observed economist Matthew Goodman, who at the time was at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

It’s also a timely reminder of how far Ishiba can get with some flattery and moving slowly. Presumably, Trump’s inner circle is aware that Japan outmaneuvered Trump 1.0, just as China is so far getting the better of Trump 2.0.

But Trump World also knows the illusion of pulling off the “art of the deal” with Japan could be packaged as a badly needed trade war win.

Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), after all, faces a tough national election in July. And with approval ratings around 26%, Ishiba can hardly appear to be getting fleeced by a Trump White House with no allies among major economies.

Any perception that Ishiba gave away too much to Trump could usher his LDP out of power a few months from now. Tokyo knows, too, that if they lather Trump with concessions, he’ll likely be back for more in short order.

South Korea’s negotiations could go a similar way. At the moment, Bessent is suggesting that US-Korea talks “may be moving faster than I thought, and we will be talking technical terms as early as next week.”

Perhaps. But just like China and Japan, South Korea has good reason to think its negotiating position is improving as Trump’s global standing and trade war credibility falls by the day.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Trump pushing India into high-stakes, high-risk China clash – Asia Times

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No president has felt the sting of US President Donald Trump’s tax war as strongly as India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite the fact that no other leader has. Caught in a high-stakes political connect, India is grappling with an philosophical problem: balancing its crucial economic ties with China against the beauty of the American business.

The Trump administration imposed a 26 % “reciprocal” tax on American goods on April 2, 2025, putting New Delhi in tense negotiations to gain access to the country’s largest export location, the US.

India’s response has betrayed a shocking respect, as evidenced by the rapid and significant trade work cuts on Harley-Davidson scooters and American-made whiskey liquor amid a large pledge&nbsp to lift down trade barriers. New Delhi has furthermore announced plans to buy more US strength and protection products in a bid to appease Trump.

The Trump administration has used a 90-day relief on the tariffs to pressure India into a more comprehensive National strategy to isolate China financially and carefully. US Vice President JD Vance made a notable four-day visit to Delhi on April 22 as part of this political unpleasant.

Ostensibly a family affair—Vance, with his Indian-origin wife and children, framed the trip as a nod to his Sasural ( “in-laws” ) and his kids ‘” Nana-Nani” ( maternal grandparents ) —the visit’s true purpose is to tighten the screws on India and secure its alignment against Beijing.

Trump uses the rod of tariffs to fudge Modi’s wishes in his second term, replacing the vegetable of American investment moving from China to India in his first.

Ajay Seth, the secretary of economic affairs, claimed this week that the” first order” hit from 26 % tariffs on India could reduce GDP by between 0.2 % and 0.5 %, which he said was” not a significant impact.” However, underscoring the urgency of the situation, New Delhi planned to transport both its chief trade communicator and finance secretary to Washington this week before the terrible Kashmir problems.

India’s plight is rooted in its divided financial fact. To produce ultimate products for trade, especially to the US, its business center, which is frequently just an “assembly line,” relies heavily on Chinese transitional goods, raw materials, funds equipment, technology, and investment.

In 2024-25, China accounted for over 14 % of India’s full international trade, while India’s goods contributed a simple 1.9 % to China’s international trade, highlighting a striking imbalance. India can import Chinese components, arrange them, and trade finished goods to the US now because a 35 % value addition there qualifies as enough for a “rules of origin” certificate.

Nevertheless, this type makes India susceptible to a proportion readjustment. Tilting toward the US challenges Chinese retribution that could drown its production ranges, leaning toward China threatens to renounce US market access.

India’s fundamental problem is this. Beijing may impose a bombardment of punitive measures, both explicit and implicit, that would deteriorate India’s economic trajectory, erode its security, and weaken its regional influence, much like it did in 2020 in a punitive response to the tensions in the Himalayas.

China’s most immediate tool would be business adjustment, exploiting India’s$ 100 billion deal gap in 2024-25. India’s exposure to Chinese and allied markets may be restricted by Beijing’s imposing steep tariffs or non-tariff obstacles, such as stringent quality checks, on American exports like agro products, textiles, and leather goods.

China might restrict exports of important inputs, including smartphone components, pharmaceutical precursors ( 70 % of India’s supply ), and industrial machinery, even more severely. In 2020, when India tightened attention on Chinese opportunities, Beijing retaliated by blocking engineers ‘ and technicians ‘ visits and technology shipments, a methodology it may rise to even more damaging effect immediately.

Such restrictions would stifle India’s tightly bound smartphone, pharmaceutical, and solar energy sectors, which are all closely linked to Chinese supply chains. China could further skew the trade balance, shrinking India’s export revenues, by selectively lowering imports of Indian goods.

With China constituting over a third of India’s foreign trade, these measures could precipitate a severe economic contraction, hobbling India’s industrial ambitions and global market competitiveness.

China has another means of squeezing India with financial leverage. Beijing could stifle trade financing for Indian businesses by tightening payment terms, putting off processing, or restricting credit flow through Chinese banks with$ 3.24 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and significant influence in global finance. After India’s 2020 ban on Chinese apps, Chinese investors curtailed funding to Indian startups, a precedent that could expand to broader sectors.

China might halt investments in recently approved joint ventures like Vivo, Suzhou Inovance, and ZNShine if India’s US alignment is further strained, undermining India’s plans for manufacturing growth and technology transfer.

By putting Indian projects prioritizing them, China may have a more subtle impact on India’s access to multilateral financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the New Development Bank. These financial chokeholds could starve India’s industrial and infrastructure initiatives, limiting its ability to scale up domestic production or diversify away from Chinese inputs.

China might target India’s nascent digital and defense sectors in the technological sphere. Chinese tech companies like Huawei and ZTE have a share of the power behind India’s 5G networks and smart city projects. Beijing could derail India’s digital infrastructure by restricting access or withholding technical support.

In a report from the Harvard Belfer Center for 2021, China’s dominance in semiconductors, 5G, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence was highlighted. India’s newly established semiconductor industry and defense manufacturing, which depend on Chinese inputs for advanced electronics, could be hampered by an embargo on semiconductors or high-tech components.

China could also complicate operations for its tech firms in India, halting solar panels or telecom equipment supplies. Such alterations would halt India’s advancement in technology and weaken its strategic abilities, particularly in defense systems that are crucial for battling regional threats.

An even greater existential risk is posed by China’s stranglehold on critical raw minerals ( CRMs) and rare earth elements ( REEs ). In 2023, India identified 30 critical minerals vital for electric vehicles ( EVs ), semiconductors, defense equipment, and renewable energy, including lithium, cobalt, gallium, titanium, graphite, silicon, bismuth, tellurium, and REEs like neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.

India is the fifth-largest store in the world with 6.9 million metric tons of REE reserves, but its processing and refining capacity is inestimable. It imports 60 % of its REE imports from China, and over 40 % of its six CRMs, including graphite ( 42.4 % ), lithium ( 82 % ), silicon ( 76 % ), titanium ( 50 % ), and lithium ( 85.6 % ), lithium ( 82 % ), and titanium ( 50.6 % ) ) and lithium ( 42.4 % ) of those products. Beijing controls 87 % of global REE processing, 58 % of lithium refining and 68 % of silicon refining.

India’s plans for 30 % EV penetration by 2030, its semiconductor manufacturing plans, and its defense production, which rely on REEs for missiles, radar, and guidance systems, could be devastated by a Chinese export ban. India’s smartphone sector, which relies heavily on Chinese components, and its pharmaceutical sector, which relies on China for 70 % of its precursors, would experience severe shortages.

While India seeks alternatives through the Mineral Security Partnership and Australian partnerships, decoupling from China’s dominance could take decades. Thus, India’s industrial and strategic goals would suffer a terrible blow if an embargo were to be implemented.

China might use its diplomatic position to isolate India from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and BRICS by portraying its US support as a betrayal of collective interests. In 2024, China’s foreign ministry condemned such alliances, and Beijing could rally SCO members like Pakistan and Russia to obstruct India’s initiatives.

China might strengthen ties with Brazil, South Africa, and other newly incorporated nations in BRICS , which would marginalize New Delhi. Regionally, Beijing could intensify Belt and Road Initiative projects in India’s neighbors—Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh—eroding India’s” Neighbourhood First” policy.

Chinese ambassador Chen Song emphasized BRI’s role in South Asia in 2023, signaling Beijing’s desire to encircle India. Such maneuvers would undermine India’s regional influence, isolate it diplomatically, and alienate it from its allies in the Global South, and make it appear as a Western proxy.

If India persists in antagonizing China, Beijing could escalate to hard measures. As seen in the 2020 Galwan clash, border tensions may rekindle with incursions in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh. China deployed 100 advanced rocket launchers along the Line of Actual Control in 2021, indicating its readiness to escalate.

Naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, leveraging ports like Gwadar, Hambantota and Chattogram, could challenge India’s maritime dominance. India’s telecom, energy, and banking sectors could be targeted by cyberattacks, such as the 2020 Mumbai power outage brought on by Chinese state-sponsored organizations, potentially suffocating its economy.

Proxy threats made by Pakistan or Myanmar, which are potentially armed by China, could put strain on India’s security apparatus on multiple fronts.

Soft power offers China a subtler tool to destabilize Modi’s domestic standing. A goodwill gesture was made in 2024 to allow Indian pilgrimages to begin at Tibet’s Kailash Mansarovar, a sacred site for Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists. These communities may react negatively to a new ban, putting strain on Modi’s political standing.

In Washington, India’s trade talks with the US this week will test Modi’s ability to navigate this minefield. Beijing clearly has the upper hand with its outsized role in India’s supply chains and minimal reliance on Indian trade.

Modi might have to balance the risks of defiance against the risks of dependence as a result of a mistake that could plunge India into economic turmoil, compromise its security, and weaken its reputation globally.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at&nbsp, @BhimBhurtel

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Trump tariff shockwaves already buffeting Asian shores – Asia Times

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TOKYO – The unexpected brake in South Korea’s export leaves little doubt about the degree to which Asia is in harm’s means amid Donald Trump’s tax anger.
 
In the first 20 weeks of April, South Korea’s outside shipping fell 5. 2 % year on year — the mirror image of the 5. 5 % rise for the entire month of March. US-bound imports plunged by 14. 3 % in the first 20 weeks of April.

It’s an first view of the credit damage to occur as the most protectionist US president in more than a century mountains Asia’s export-reliant markets. And it could be an sign of greater-than-feared problems to occur.
 
South Korea often acts as an early-warning method for international tone items. Its huge, empty market is on the front lines of high-tech trade sectors prone to zigs and zags in need patterns. And at the time, South Korea is signaling that the Trump 2. 0 age is about to do serious harm to economy from China to Indonesia. And the US, to.
 
There are also doubts that items are about to get even more chaotic as Trump aims his revenge-tour indignation at the US Federal Reserve, America’s most respected organization worldwide.
 
Trump 1. 0 definitely mixed it up with Fed Chair Jerome Powell. Shortly after Trump’s hand-picked Fed president took the helm in February 2018, Trump had buyer’s grief. He criticized Powell early and often, yet mulling ways to remove him.
 
This day, Trump means activity. Along with calling Powell a “loser ” and “Mr. Too Late, ” Trump is making clear that he might fire Powell at any moment. That a leader is only fire the Fed’s head for “cause” is n’t slowing Trump World over.
 
Does cratering world marketplaces give this White House wait? The S& P 500 fell another 2. 4 % on Monday, extending this year’s decline to 12. 3 %. And on the same day, The Wall Street Journal ’s newspaper website dubbed it “The Fire Jerome Powell Market Rout. ”
 
“Were Powell to be fired, the first reaction would be a huge shot of uncertainty into financial businesses, and the most dramatic jump to the return from US resources that it is possible to imagine, ” says Michael Brown, a senior research planner at buying services firm Pepperstone. “Lower, significantly lower, securities; Treasuries sold across the board; and, the money falling off a cliff. ”
 
The Fed’s much-vaunted freedom coming under threat “would notice investors across the globe selling every one US-based asset that they have, and also poses the truly terrifying prospect of upending the whole way in which the global financial system operates. If this were to happen, then the reserve status of the dollar, and the value of Treasuries, would be wiped out, probably forever in both cases. ”
 
Brown speaks for many, though, when he worries the damage “might already be done. ”
 
Krishna Guha, vice chairman of Evercore ISI, adds that “risk to Fed independence is negative for all major US asset classes and provides a partial foretaste of what might come if President Trump – who again tweeted his demand for preemptive Fed rate cuts – were to actually try to fire Powell. ”
 
Guha notes that “we still think, more likely than not, Trump will not actually try to fire Powell and will instead blame him for the tariff-led downturn ahead. But the risk is enough to move markets. ”
 
It’s hardly promising that “the price of gold registered another record high today, overcoming yet another periodic round of profit-taking by some tactical traders, ” observes Mohamed El-Erian, chief advisor at Allianz. “This, as it benefits from the tailwind of slow and steady diversification away from the dollar by some foreign central banks and others. ”
 
Given today’s “extremely rare ” combination of lower US bond prices, stocks and the dollar sliding simultaneously, as Guha puts it, the reaction to Powell’s firing could be greater than markets understand. These dynamics, he says, “indicate higher risk premia is being required to hold US assets. Trump moving to axe Powell “would manifest in a shift from recession to stagflation trades. ”
 
When 2025 began, few in Asia had the “Trump trade” being to sell America on their Bingo cards. But as this stark reality sets in, the best-laid plans of policymakers from Seoul to Beijing to Tokyo are being upended in real time.
 
Korean officials are as disoriented as any as international chaos collides with political uncertainty at home. Yoon Suk Yeol’s leaving the presidency on April 11, post-impeachment, merely signaled the beginning of a political power struggle in Asia’s fourth-biggest economy ahead of the June 3 election.
 
This vacuum could n’t be timed any worse. South Korea, notes Frederic Neumann, chief Asia economist at HSBC, faces “sputtering ” growth drivers both externally and internally, adding to the risk that Korean GDP “stalled ” in the first quarter. Already, Neumann says, Trump’s tariffs are “pulling down GDP growth and investment. ”
 
South Korea, Neumann says, “will continue to face headwinds for the remainder of the year from likely slowing growth in key economies, including the United States, Europe, and China. ”
 
Fitch Ratings analyst Heakyu Chang observes that the “cyclical and structural challenges faced by Korea’s competitive and evolving banking system include domestic political turmoil and a global trade war, which have hindered business investment and weakened consumption since the fourth quarter of 2024, as well as subdued economic growth, falling interest rates, high leverage and an aging population. ”
 
These are the pre-existing conditions Korea carried into Trump’s trade war.   Following a 10 % tax on imports of metals, Trump slapped a 25 % tariff on autos and another 10 % on all other shipments. Korea faces a 25 % reciprocal tariff once Trump’s 90-day cooling-off period ends.
 
That risk has Korean Finance Minister Choi Sang-mo and Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun in Washington this week to begin trade negotiations with Trump World.

The auto tariff is already hitting Korea hard. Last year, Trump’s economy accounted for nearly half of Korea’s US$ 71 billion of vehicle exports. “The overall export momentum is weak, with growth slowing in April due to deteriorating trade conditions after expanding slightly in March, ” Bank of Korea Governor Rhee Chang-yong told reporters last week.
 
Japan has its own headwinds to overcome, making life miserable for Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Bank of Japan Governor Kazuo Ueda.
 
The only thing falling faster than Ishiba’s approval rating — 27. 6 % at last check — are the odds that the BOJ will be raising interest rates in the months ahead. Just a week ago, many economists thought the BOJ would tighten again at its April 30-May 1.
 
But “the deteriorating outlook for the economy throws a wrench into its rate hike plans, ” says Stefan Angrick, Head of Japan at Moody’s Analytics.
 
One big problem for trade-reliant Japan is the haphazard way in which Trump is conducting his tariff policies. Torsten Sløk, chief economist at Apollo Global Management, says that the “tariffs have been implemented in a way that has not been effective, and there is now a 90 % chance of what can be called a voluntary trade reset recession. ”
 
The yen, meanwhile, is up nearly 11 % so far this year, threatening Japan’s export engine. “We believe dollar weakness will continue, ” says Win Thin, a managing director at Brown Brothers Harriman.
 
A big fear in Tokyo is that, along with trashing the Fed’s credibility, Trump might move to weaken the dollar. Japan, says Citigroup currency strategist Osamu Takashima, would be a top target if Trump World engineers a dollar devaluation.
 
“At this point, we do not see a ‘Mar-a-Lago Accord ’ as a concrete risk, ” Takashima notes. “However, countries such as Japan, which have sizable foreign currency reserves and whose currency is undervalued, would tend to be the target in this case. ”
 
Overall, Angrick says, “the BOJ’s path just got a lot trickier. The deteriorating outlook for the economy throws a wrench into its rate hike plans. We still think the bank will press ahead with a rate hike in June, unless the economy takes a sharper turn south. But the broader picture has flipped. After months of worrying that the BOJ might fall behind the curve on hikes, the bigger risk now is that it tightens into a downturn. Buckle up. ”
 
Then there’s China. Last week, President Xi Jinping’s government agreed to sit down with Trump’s trade negotiators with a few preconditions. So far, Team Xi has rebuffed Trump’s demands for a series of anticipatory concessions. China also goes in armed with a solid 5. 4 % year-on-year growth rate in the first quarter.
 
Team Xi has demonstrated it ’s willing to live with considerable pain to avoid giving away the store to Trump’s White House. China has considerable fiscal and monetary space to support Asia’s biggest economy, even with Trump hiking tariffs on all Chinese goods to 145 %.

Beijing is also proving to be a worthier sparring partner than Trump probably expected. Case in point: reports that Beijing is prodding trading partners not to cut bilateral trade deals with Washington or slap “secondary tariffs ” on imports coming from specific countries with close China ties.

China, meanwhile, has steadily redirected its trade away from the US to Southeast Asia, Global South nations and Europe.
 
But the “damage from the trade war will show up in the macro data next month, ” says Zhiwei Zhang, president and chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management, adding that the “high frequency indicators suggest exports have slowed sharply in the region. ”
 
That’s why economist Lisheng Wang at Goldman Sachs thinks the “urgency for more policy easing is on the rise and fiscal expansion will likely do most of the heavy lifting to stabilize growth, though this should be still insufficient to fully offset the severe external shocks. ”
 
There’s also a question about whether slowing growth among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations economies and the rest of the Global South might complicate China ’s export diversification strategy. Trump-generated shockwaves are coming for these economies, too. So are higher global interest rates as Trump meddles with the Fed and his tariffs provoke the so-called “bond vigilantes ” to act.
 
East Asia’s economic miracle was born of – and sustained by – exports to the West. Though China has made important strides in weaning itself off the US consumer, the transition won’t necessarily be smooth. Losing US export markets will change dynamics for everything from local consumption to tourism to the health of banks for Beijing and other governments across Asia.

“China’s economic policy challenges, including its efforts to counter deflationary pressure and control financial leverage, will be heightened by the intensifying trade war with the US, potentially influencing issuer credit ratings, ” says Fitch analyst Duncan Innes-Ker.

Innes-Ker notes that “we believe domestic demand is likely to become the key driver of China ’s growth again and domestic deflationary pressures may be exacerbated. This reinforces our belief the authorities will deploy sustained fiscal stimulus to support growth, weakening public finances. ”

With Korea flashing red, Japan slowing down and China ’s exports in unprecedented jeopardy, the Trump 2. 0 shockwaves are only just beginning in Asia.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Juspay establishes Asia Pacific hub in Singapore

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  • Now operating in over 50 locations across five countries
  • The SG company, with 6 workers, is expanding & supported by 50 authorities from Bangalore 

Juspay, a world leader in pay system solutions for enterprises and banks, has announced the opening of a new company in Singapore, marking a key step in its global growth and reinforcing its dedication to a growing customer base across Asia Pacific.

Currently operating in over 50 countries, Juspay has offices across five continents: Bangalore ( India ), San Francisco ( USA ), Dublin ( UK), São Paulo ( Brazil ), and now Singapore. The Singapore business, first staffed by six staff members, is set for development and benefits from the expertise of more than 50 pay specialists based at the Bangalore office.

Backed by top-tier investors including SoftBank, Accel, and VEF, Juspay provides organization merchants with a set of services such as one-click shopping, full-stack automation, 3DS identification, system tokenisation, peace, fraud solutions, and more. Their services also include end-to-end, white-label, new-age payment gates and real-time transaction system for banks.

Headquartered in Bangalore, ‘India’s Silicon Valley’, Juspay supports over 500 market-leading customers nationally, and claims to approach more than 200 million transactions routine with 99. 999 % reliability and an annual processed volume exceeding US$ 900 billion ( RM3. 9 trillion ).

Sheetal Lalwani, co-founder and COO of Juspay, commented:” Our growth into Singapore places us at the heart of the powerful Asia Pacific market, enabling us to work strongly with merchants to handle their special challenges. We aim to empower them with reliable, scalable, and high-performance payment infrastructure that has made us a trusted partner for leading enterprises worldwide. This expansion furthers our vision of making digital payments interoperable and accessible on a global scale. “

With nearly 1,200 payment experts across India, the US, the UK, Brazil, and Singapore, Juspay is strategically positioned to reshape the payment landscape in Asia Pacific.

Nakul Kothari, head of APAC & Middle East at Juspay, added:” This expansion comes at a pivotal moment as APAC’s digital payment landscape undergoes rapid transformation. We plan to grow our team in Singapore to address the challenges enterprises face in managing global payments, such as optimising transaction costs, improving authorisation rates, and enhancing payment experiences with local payment methods. “

Juspay’s growth in Asia Pacific is further strengthened by a strategic partnership with digital travel platform Agoda, which has implemented Juspay’s full-stack orchestration and reconciliation services across the region.

Jibran Bugvi, Head of Fintech & Business Initiatives at Agoda, commented:” Maintaining an efficient and reliable payment process is essential for Agoda, and Juspay plays a critical role in this. Their support for a wide range of local payment methods and consistent system reliability is invaluable to us. “

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PAP counters WP’s ‘policy win’ claim, says many ideas were previously raised by its MPs

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INTERRUPTING Trail Report

The PAP even made room for inconsistencies in the WP’s record history, particularly in enclosure policy, in its post.

Due to a soft resale market, the WP had called for a 2019 construction freeze on Build-to-Order ( BTO ) flats, suggesting a 9, 000 new flats cap. The party, however, urged the government to shorten the waiting period for BTO cottages in 2023.

The PAP argued that the waiting times for BTO flats would have been greater if we had accepted the WP’s advice during the COVID period, when construction had come to a halt, and that waiting times would have been “far&nbsp, the&nbsp, the&nbsp, shortfall, and…

” In some cases, had&nbsp, the&nbsp, government heeded&nbsp, WP ‘s&nbsp, proposals ,&nbsp, the&nbsp, consequences&nbsp, would have been severe,” it continued.

SELECTION Tales

The ruling group added that the WP&nbsp claimed credit for policies&nbsp, which deviated from&nbsp, its&nbsp, first recommendations.

It made note of Sylvia Lim, WP head, who had urged the government to mandate institutions and businesses pay back  and to fully reimburse  fraud victims in 2023. Her request was turned down by Minister of State for Trade and Industry Alvin Tan, who argued that it would not be good or desired.

The Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre increased its prize control in 2024 to S$ 150, 000.

The PAP stated on Saturday that “unsurprisingly, the , WP , now , claims , Ms. Lim’s proposal , influenced the , increase , in , the adjudicated , honor limit , for ,

” Surely it knows that the particle is fundamentally different from what it is, having an independent dispute resolution mechanism, mechanism, and determining,” he says.

The PAP stated that it is “gratified” the WP thinks” so also of our contributions” and welcomes” all creative ideas, including&nbsp, from the Opposition.” &nbsp,

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Trump’s misguided and deluded tariff crusade – Asia Times

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The financial advisors of Donald Trump see tariffs as a magic cure for America’s problems, as well as a chance to revive manufacturing, stabilize the dollar as the reserve currency, and reduce exploding public debt.

However, this strategy is based on conflicting financial goals that defy logic and are a property of accounts. Reciprocal taxes, including a staggering 145 % on China, perhaps bring in money for the government, but they also run the risk of long-term stagnation and fractious alliances because they fail to target America’s fundamental economic imbalances.

Trade partners like the EU and India face a significant threat of global economic integration as a result of the tax policy, which could stifle decades of economic development and alleviation around the world.

1.) Bringing back manufacturing

Trump’s team claims that American manufacturing has been harmed by China’s money manipulation, technology theft, and affordable exports.

According to them, offshoring destroyed 50 million American employment, a figure that was exacerbated by the impact of automation at once. However, digital photography replaced analog jobs, e-readers replaced printing, and robotics redefined recently manual assembly procedures—a fact that Trump’s advisors can’t seem to deny.

Manufacturing made up 11 % of the US GDP in 2024, down from 20 % in the 1980s, a decline that was caused by US technological advancement, US failures to retrain its workforce, and changing global supply chains.

Taxes aim to entice factories again and promise to restore America’s “great again” by preventing imports from domestic producers.

2.) preserving the dollar’s position of power

The economy’s position as the world’s reserve currency is also given precedence in the policy. Through BRICS , China and Russia are looking into options, which has prompted Trump to rely on taxes as a barrier.

Trump pledged 100 % tariffs on all countries pursuing de-dollarization in his inaugural address in January 2025. This threat has now materialized, with 14 % tariffs on China and various other countries ‘ levels within 90 days.

These tactics aim to intimidate trading partners into continuing to deal with the dollar while preserving the US’s ability to use profitably. India is at a high risk because of tariffs, which could stymie its ability to access National markets and stymie its export-driven development, with$ 120 billion in US business and$ 437 billion in full global exports by 2024.

3.) reducing debts and funding tax breaks

Lastly, Trump’s administration intends to pay off the country’s$ 36.21 trillion public debt, which is projected to total$ 50 trillion by 2035, while allowing for tax breaks for the wealthy and those making under$ 150,000.

Price income, which is expected to be$ 300 billion annually, is expected to cover these expenses and help maintain the strength of US Treasury securities by keeping the money strong. This trifecta of industrial revival, dollar dominance, and debt management appears strong but falters under scrutiny because each objective undermines the other in a jumble of monetary contradictions.

Contrasts in economics

A review of shared exclusion is the pursuit of a strong dollar and a rebound in manufacturing. A solid dollar drives up the price of US products, pricing them out of trade industry. US exports of goods totaled$ 2 trillion in 2023, less than China’s$ 3 trillion, a gap that was made wider by America’s higher wages and currency strength.

The 1985 Plaza Accord, which devalued the dollar by 50 % against the Japanese yen, helped US exports by 20 % in three years, demonstrating that a weaker dollar is necessary for the revival of manufacturing.

However, devaluing the dollar today would weaken its reserve currency because global central banks, which have an estimated$ 7 trillion in reserves, might convert to euros, yuan, or yen, cutting down demand for US Treasury bonds.

The industry balance and foreign investment in US Treasury securities are in conflict. Because trade deficits, which total$ 400 billion for China in 2023, create dollar reserves, countries like China, Japan, and South Korea, which together hold trillions of dollars worth of US bonds, invest.

Great taxes reduce these deficits by stifling US exports, which results in lower bond purchases. Local use, not just foreign business strategies, contributes to the$ 918 billion trade deficit in the US in 2024.

Taxes could lead to US inflation, which is projected to rise to 3 % in 2025, causing Fed rate increases that could halt economic growth and send a struggling economy into recession. The Fed issued a price cut announcement in 2024, but a weaker money or lower provides did dissuade bond investors, making debt management even more challenging.

The tension between the dollar’s power, Fed rates, and friendship appeal adds yet another layer of vacuity. A strong dollar maintains bond desire, but price reductions lower yields, which frightens foreign investors.

If inflation rises, which will lead to price increases, lending becomes more expensive, creating a tighter governmental buffer for income cuts. These contradictions highlight the vulnerability of the policy: tariffs that aim to revive manufacturing could potentially sabotage other goals like debt financing. Hence, the policy runs the risk of delving into the very goals it aims to achieve.

No unusual villains, but structural flaws.

Trump’s team claims that the trade deficit is the result of a story by foreigners to lie on the US, including China, the EU, Mexico, and Canada, but that America’s fundamental squander is the real culprit. The US runs a$ 2 trillion fiscal deficit of 6 % of GDP in 2024 because it uses more than its means.

The economy’s supply position, which encourages this” spend-now, pay-later” culture, contributes to the current account deficit, as well as the business gap. Compared to China, American households save only 3 % of GDP, while government deficits, which have grown due to tax breaks and subsidies, increase the imbalance.

Both the Republican and Democratic parties bear the brunt of the blame, favoring rich lobby groups and adopting policies that favor profit increases. A Senate-amended budget resolution that authorized$ 5.3 trillion in tax cuts,$ 521 billion in spending increases on defense and immigration, at least$ 4.2 billion in spending cuts, and a$ 5 trillion debt limit increase was approved by the House of Representatives on April 10, 2025.

With international central banks holding$ 7 trillion in resources, the US can borrow cheaply because of the economy’s pleasure. However, this conceals the root cause of persistent US spending. With a$ 2 trillion deficit, taxes are a drop in the bucket when it comes to reducing taxes or reducing debts without changes to rights like Social Security or Medicare.

Trump avoids Washington’s governmental recklessness by demonizing trade partners, putting the country at risk of having trade war that had cost its supporters, including India, Vietnam, the EU, and Canada, trillions in exports and destroy global markets.

Traditional errors only highlight the absurdity. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised tariffs to less than 60 % ( as opposed to tobacco at 64.78 % ) and sugar at 77.2 %, exacerbated the Great Depression by halting global trade.

Trump’s tariffs, while less drastic, sound this protectionist urge while disregarding the interdependence of contemporary markets. No tariffs can fix the trade deficit, which is a mirror of private choices that include low savings, great consumption, and deficit spending.

A mistaken expedition

Trump’s tariff plan is a quixotic attempt at financial glorification that often leads to failure. Depreciation threatens the dollar’s supply status and relationship demand, while a strong dollar smothers manufacturing.

Taxes does increase profits, but they also increase prices, causing harm to customers and friends like the EU, Japan, and India, whose trade markets are impacted by disturbance. The trade deficit is a reflection of America’s governmental constipation, no foreign hatred, and cannot be resolved by stricter laws only.

Washington must be reining in order to advance, not engaging in trade war. For green growth, it is essential to address excessive spending, including tax cuts and tax reforms that allow the rich and middle classes to pay fair amounts of taxes.

Debating lobbying’s influence on fiscal policy may reduce deficits more efficiently than tariffs, streamlining entitlements, and lowering house discounts. The US has rekindle trust with trading partners worldwide rather than turn them away with protectionist nonsense.

Without these difficult choices, Trump’s vision of American glory will continue to be a hallucination, leaving the US economy weak, the dollar falling, and the rest of the world skeptical of US leadership.

Bhim Bhurtel is a member of the X network, @BhimBhurtel.

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