Asia (Page 563)

With double-digit prices pinching wallets, declining foreign exchange reserves, and declining economic growth, Bangladesh’s economy is in for a storm. The state is frantically looking for international funding to weather the problems.

Enter China into the attention of the storm. With a proper US$ 5 billion soft product, Beijing has positioned itself as Bangladesh’s possible economic savior. Beijing’s support comes just after Dhaka received a$ 1.4 billion tranche of a$ 4.7 billion IMF loan package.

But China’s present has a political spin. China has a chance to counteract India’s influence in the Bay of Bengal area as the two regional giant compete for power of the Teesta River project as a result of Bangladesh’s financial vulnerability.

The Teesta River, even spelled Tista River, is important for both Bangladesh and India for water and electricity. According to India’s unwillingness to discuss the water’s water downstream, it has also caused years of diplomatic tension.

Now, Beijing’s$ 5 billion loan is seemingly tied to making China the lead on completing the Teesta management and restoration project, provisionally estimated at$ 1 billion.

If China is really given the site’s direction, Dhaka and Delhi will undoubtedly find themselves in a new commotion. That’s in part because Vinay Mohan Kwatra, the Indian foreign secretary, recently offered American funding for growth projects along the river.

India’s Teesta present was taken with a grain of salt in Dhaka. Before Kwatra’s explore, a big American newspapers, The Hindu, expressed worry about China’s proposed Teesta growth project in Bangladesh.

India’s fear stems from the site’s area near the Siliguri Corridor, a carefully important strip of land connecting India’s north to the island. Nicknamed the” Chicken’s Neck”, this hall holds huge geopolitical importance.

India fears that China’s role in the Teesta project may serve as a covert attempt to woo this delicate area.

The Teesta River is Bangladesh’s essence. As the country’s fourth largest river and the main source of water for its northern parts, it’s important for water, supporting thousands of people and a significant portion of agricultural output.

India’s water diplomacy, however, has n’t been very diplomatic from Dhaka’s perspective. According to experts in Bangladesh, upstream reservoirs built by India have restricted waters flowing, significantly and negatively affecting downstream Bangladesh.

During clean seasons, Bangladesh receives just a fraction of the 1, 200- 1, 500 square feet per second of liquid it needs and much less compared to the perceived perfect 5, 000 cusecs, with levels dropping yet below 200- 300 cusecs at times.

Bangladesh and China collaborated to create a multipurpose barrage, dredge, and embank portions of the river to create a single, manageable channel with much higher water levels in 2022.

For the$ 88 million project, Bangladesh sought$ 725 million from China to ensure better water preservation on the Teesta River. China has already completed a survey and is waiting for Bangladesh’s response to its previous project proposal.

Chinese envoy to Dhaka Yao Wen last year predicted that his nation would wait until the election’s outcome ( which took place on January 7 this year and reinstated the Awami League-led government ) to continue discussions on the development project.

China requested that Bangladesh review its loan application and submit a new implementation plan after the election if the government still deemed the project essential, which Dhaka agreed in principle. &nbsp,

Munshi Faiz Ahmed, a former Bangladesh ambassador to China, has criticized Bangladesh’s approach to the Chinese proposal.

When Bangladesh could have adopted a more neutral stance, Ahmed believes it readily accepted China’s offer. This, he says, suggests Bangladesh is favoring China in implementing the Teesta project.

China is already Bangladesh’s largest economic partner. Beijing has already committed a sizable$ 17.5 billion in grants and loans to the nation as part of its Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ).

Some people take note of how this commitment contrasts starkly with the Covid-19 pandemic’s global trend. A report from the William and Mary Global Research Institute reveals that China continued to support Bangladesh while many countries reduced their foreign aid, providing a consistent$ 2.3 billion annually.

The Awami League government was able to quickly complete important infrastructure projects like the Padma Bridge, a significant elevated expressway, and several new power plants thanks to the influx of funds.

” China’s generosity is n’t purely altruistic”, Ahmed said, suggesting that Beijing’s largesse is part of a strategic soft power play in the Bay of Bengal region vis- à- vis India.

” By fostering economic ties and supporting Bangladesh’s development goals, China aims to build goodwill and secure a stronger foothold in the region”, he said.

The retired diplomat argued that Bangladesh’s economic dependence could give China more influence in the ongoing conflict over regional influence.

In his well-known podcast, Taj Hashmi, an expert on history and security studies, stated that Bangladesh desperately needs Chinese assistance and investment to avoid a financial crisis. He claimed that Dhaka cannot afford to provoke Beijing by allowing India to instead implement the Teesta project.

” If China denies Bangladesh’s request for a$ 5 billion soft loan and decides to scale back its investments, it will be a disastrous blow for Dhaka”, he said.

In the current situation, former Bangladeshi foreign secretary Md Touhid Hossain says Bangladesh has little choice but to take into account China’s involvement in the Teesta Project.

He said,” I believe it will be wiser for Bangladesh to pursue the Teesta project with China’s assistance.”

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Xiaolong Zhu, a PhD student at Queensland University of Technology, made national information over the weekend, and not for a good reason.

Zhu is a member of China, and his card was turned down because he “directly or directly contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

The narrative begins in October 2019, when Zhu was given a fellowship to pursue a technology PhD. His exploration may concentrate on how drones can manage industrial settings without the aid of GPS.

However, Zhu was informed that the foreign minister had declared him a chance of the proliferation of WMDs, particularly missiles and rockets, in June 2020. Zhu’s previous training at Beihang University, a school that is closely connected with China’s defense and a pioneer in the development of nuclear missiles and secrecy aircraft, may contribute to that decision.

Zhu’s elegance is ongoing, and he has not been accused of any crime or found guilty of any crime. He has done nothing to indicate otherwise. Why is his tale like a big deal, then?

Zhu’s event is just the latest result of Australia’s uneven and random approach to “research security,” which is the second in which a researcher has been barred from the country on suspicion of links to weapons of mass destruction.

Australia’s strategy for protecting some types of research from dangers from national security is uneven and out of step with many of our allies’.

The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union and New Zealand all have national guidelines on research protection. Australia does no.

Rather, we have voluntary University Foreign Interference Taskforce rules, second written in 2019 and updated in 2021. These instructions were first published before Covid, the US-China” device warfare,” and the launch of AUKUS.

The Australian Research Council, one of Australia’s largest sponsors of college study, has only recently released a research security framework in the last six weeks. Our other major research funders, CSIRO and the National Health and Medical Research Council, do n’t appear to have anything similar.

In response to government budget cuts, the majority of American universities, if not all of them, are increasingly turning to international funding.

Blunt tools

The American government appears to be working on regulating research protection with blunt tools right now.

For example, the foreign minister can refuse or cancel a visa if a person poses a risk to security, fails the” good character” test or ( as in Zhu’s case ) is deemed to be potentially associated with weapons of mass destruction. The international minister has the authority to refuse or withdraw visas starting in April 2024 if a person poses” an unreasonable risk of an unnecessarily transferred important technology”

When universities are also facing potentially catastrophic restrictions on foreign student enrollment and where Australia’s largest exports are in foreign education, for controls can be extremely difficult.

American academic experts are also subject to export controls. If they share or publish military or “dual use” technology ( research that includes both military and civilian applications, such as radar ), they must obtain a permit.

Some countries have related controls, but the description of “dual use” technologies can be very personal. After publishing research that supposedly could have been used to create natural weapons, a French researcher was notoriously sent to court in 2012.

Additionally, Australian colleges are required to publicly disclose any agreements they have with a foreign government. A recent analysis of these plans revealed a number of possible high-risk ventures at our universities.

Disclosure does not seem to prevent the advancement of dubious research organizations. Perhaps a legislative investigation has determined that the public record is no longer fit for purpose.

There has n’t been a consistent effort to protect research security. A legislative investigation two years ago discovered ongoing and ongoing international disturbance at our institutions. To date, fewer than a third of the agency’s comments have been acted upon.

The Universities Accord’s final report, which Federal Education Minister Jason Clare described as” a blueprint for the next decade and beyond,” does n’t mention research security at all. It was released this year. In truth, it mentions regional security just three days in 408 sites.

Another issue is the perfect secrecy surrounding these kinds of situations. Had Zhu no appealed, we might never have heard about it.

Significant public statements about the event were both the state nor the university. And Zhu himself is unlikely to actually know what information the secretary considered to be outlawing him.

Instead, the government issued a variety of credentials to defend “lawful methods for preventing, detecting, and investigating vulnerabilities or denials of the law” and” personal options”.

Where to from these?

Australia might learn some classes from our friends. In Canada, any federal money involving a” sensitive systems” may be refused if it involves relationship with people on a list of certain institutions.

In New Zealand, large- risk analysis may be secured by the use of secured devices, protection clearances, and keeping all research data offline. If universities do n’t adhere to the disclosure requirements, they could be fined or even have their funding suspended in the US.

That said, our universities are unlikely to welcome more regulation. These regulations could violate academic freedom, which protects academics ‘ freedom to pursue contentious or contentious subjects.

Universities already complain they are one of the most “over- regulated” sectors in the country. Yet, according to universities, stifling global competition could “leave us worse off” and hinder our innovation.

But these objections should n’t be the end of the story. In 2021, ASIO head Mike Burgess said that” taking a sensible approach to national security risks should n’t stop]universities ] from getting on with their core roles”.

Three years on, even discussion of this” sensible approach” seems to have fallen by the wayside. It needs to start again– or any” Future Made in Australia” might stall before it even gets started.

Brendan Walker- Munro is Senior Lecturer ( Law ), Southern Cross University

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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