Leon Perera, a former Workers ‘ Party ( WP ) member of parliament in Singapore, will be relocating to the US after taking a new job, sparking rumors that he might run for the Progress Singapore Party ( PSP) in the upcoming general election. The 54-year-old announced his resignation asContinue Reading
Since the late 2010s, China has shown a growing sensitivity to the negative effects of its distant-water fishing ( DWF ) growth, as well as the reputational damage that some international environmental advocates have caused.
DWF describes nations that seafood outside their own borders and expand their range of activities to the financial exclusive areas or high seas of other nations.
Was China’s hyperbolic DWF development always a direct result of Beijing’s great strategy to create what’s known as a “blue economy” and became a maritime power? What are China’s major obstacles to halting this progress, exactly?
In an article published in Marine Policy, I want to examine the pivotal part of Chinese regions in driving this growth and change the state-centric view on China’s rapidly expanding DWF.
Not all of China’s southern counties are extremely interested in expanding their DWF sector. Between 2010 and 2020, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian and the China National Agricultural Development Group Co. Ltd. played a significant role in boosting China’s DWF pursuits, as measured by the number of vessels, power and fish get.
These institutions collectively owned 84 percent of China’s DWF vessels as of 2020, and they combined foresaw a complete power of 86.6 % of the total horsepower for all other Chinese DWF vessels. Additionally, their catch made up 87 percent of the total fat and 86.8 % of the total value of China’s DWF find.
Fujian was the state where the highest returns on investment in catch fish were found in Fujian. It didn’t have the most powerful DWF fleet ( Zhejiang did ) or the largest DWF fleet ( Shandong did ). However, it was only next to Shandong in terms of capture value per vessel and full DWF catch volume, which was both second.
Fujian was not immediately selected as a captain province for the development of the marine economy in 2010, but it soon established what is known as a leading small group, led by the provincial governor, to renew.
In 2011, this endeavor was successful, giving Fujian more managerial and budgetary authority to grow its marine economy. To improve coordination and conformity across administrative levels, sub-provincial leading little groups were also established.
When Fujian’s sea business development gained national significance, it rapidly expanded its DWF industry. The municipal authorities urged attempts to” float to the Western Ocean for the next time” in the year 2013. Regional businesses seized this chance to gain help from their provincial counterparts.
Starting in 2014, the provincial government promoted targeted plan incentives across the company’s value chain: vehicle construction, access to angling grounds, business operations and human resources. The development of the Maritime Silk Road was further aided by Fujian’s participation in the developing of the Maritime Silk Road in 2015.
These steps led to a production-focused, extraction-driven DWF progress in Fujian. From 2012 to 2015, the number of Fujian’s DWF arteries and get rose by 78 per cent and 50 per cent, substantially exceeding national goals of 15.5 per share and 18 per cent.
Since 2016, amid heightened international scrutiny, Beijing started to recentralize and tighten control over China’s DWF fleet. However, this work was slow to come down to the local level. The province’s DWF growth was aided by the Fujian incentive measures, which remained in place until 2018.
Beijing began putting forth concrete centralized policies to halt DWF growth toward the end of the decade. These included a blacklist for vessels and captains involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated ( IUU) fishing, a compliance ranking for DWF companies and revisions to China’s DWF regulations.
Fujian appeared to follow Beijing’s plan to slow down fleet growth, but it made a different move to make it easier to establish a national DWF base on its coast. This type of terraqueous infrastructure seeks to reorganize spaces that connect land and sea. The objective is to shorten the time it takes to sell DWF catch as commodities and increase its commercial value.
Beijing’s delegation of some administrative and fiscal authority to local governments is crucial to boosting the provinces ‘ economic performance. However, local governments may be motivated by economic interests to pursue policies that lead to exaggerated growth and have unintended foreign policy effects on China.
Fujian’s incentive policies suggest a firm commitment to a DWF growth model focused on enhancing capacities, maximizing outputs and boosting production. These policies don’t take into account potential environmental repercussions beyond its borders.
A performance evaluation report on Fujian’s special subsidy fund for marine economic development praises the shift in Fujianese fishermen from offshore fishing close to its coast to distant-water fishing.
It says there are” social” and “environmental” benefits that include supplying more DWF professionals and easing offshore over-fishing. The report doesn’t mention potential concerns about overcapacity or the ensuing environmental and foreign policy issues.
Measures taken by Beijing during the 13th Five-Year Planning Period in 2017 marked a first step toward recentralizing control and oversight over such provincial activism. Beijing faces a challenging task when monitoring DWF because its environmental effects are not directly borne by Chinese citizens and occur outside of China.
China’s 2023 White Paper on DWF reaffirms efforts to improve information-gathering and monitoring on DWF fleet capacities and operations. These include expanding the national fisheries observer program and creating an inclusive DWF data collection framework.
Beijing says the West is” strongly suppressing and restricting” China’s DWF, but the white paper supports dialogue with international non-governmental organizations regarding sustainable fisheries management and measures against IUU fishing. In other words, it acknowledges the importance of global bottom-up monitoring in resolving Beijing’s perennial issue with obtaining information on DWF.
Since China replaced the DWF fuel subsidy with the international compliance capacity enhancement subsidy in 2021, improving information-gathering and verification regarding any violations of both domestic and international regulations by Chinese DWF vessels has become important.
This new subsidy is in part related to DWF enterprise compliance scores. Each year, these scores are released by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. Any of the 14 DWF-regulated violations leads to lower scores, which in turn reduces the subsidy amount for offending enterprises.
Therefore, prompt and trustworthy information on IUU breaches is necessary to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Beijing should encourage and support its efforts to monitor and maintain the transparency and monitoring efforts of fisheries NGOs, as well as to maintain their ongoing collaboration with regional and international fisheries organizations.
Hang Zhou is a graduate student at Université Laval and an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science.
The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
In a remark that was republished by Asia Times on January 27, Noah Smith asserts that “reshoring US economy is achievable and happening.” His argument is based on flagrant misrepresentation of the facts.
Some of his mistakes depend on cherry-picking the day range – for example, a table that shows cell production up 20 % since 2018. But US battery production is down 20 % from 2014, if one looks at a long-term chart ( below ). That’s certainly a success story. Nevermind that the Federal Reserve index’s peak for manufacturing output in 2007 was 106, which is now only 99.
When the Biden Administration made the announcement about its CHIPS Act subsidies, which Smith describes as a significant advance for British manufacturing, there were shortages of labor and materials when building device processing plants began. An unheard-against production increase resulted in a 37 % increase in the Producer Price Index for new plant construction in a single year. At the same time, the number of vacant construction positions nearly doubled.
Smith is relieved that the US’s solar panels manufacturing capacity reached 27, 000 megawatts in 2024, which indicates that the US is” just way behind China.” How far behind? Smith doesn’t state. I may: China may make 890, 000 megawatts of solar panels – 33 times the US number.
The mistake in Smith’s panegyric to US business is how heavily America depends on imported capital goods, which are used to make other goods.
At only$ 400 billion annually, US imports of capital goods exceed private orders by almost three days. Both figures are deflated to January 2000 using the government’s price index for cover commodities exports and private investment products, both. Both set exclude trucks. Whatever the US is producing, it produces it generally with imported investment products.
Of course, the US imports a lot of electronics, whose prices have fallen by half since 2000, and it exports machinery, whose price has doubled ( the US exports about half as much capital goods as it imports ). It’s hard to get an apples-to-apples evaluation of local cover products purchases and cover products imports. But the developments however are striking: US cover goods exports jumped after Covid, rising by 60 % from 2020 through 2024.
Yes, Taiwan’s TSMC, which built a grow in Arizona, which is staffed primarily by workers and technicians from Taiwan, was able to create more computer chips inland because TSMC couldn’t get enough qualified workers in the country. That’s the kind of achievement that makes failure seemed interesting by comparison.
The reality is that America’s dependency on foreign countries is rapidly increasing. In the last ten years, the entire business output has remained essentially unchanged, while capital goods imports have almost doubled. It will require more to re-shore American industries than to publish economy blogs with hot weather.
The complicated problem is being worked out while efforts are being made.
Insurance companies have been required to offer customers the option to purchase heath insurance items with a co-payment have since September of last year.
According to Bank Negara Malaysia, prices for items with co-payment features range from 19 % to 68 % lower than those for items without these features.
Researchers have argued for greater accountability in the calculation of insurance premiums as well as for the establishment of an independent body to oversee the private medical industry.
An independent committee to review charges and price increases in personal care was suggested by Azrul of the Galen Center.  ,
He suggested that the payment may have authority related to Malaysia’s Competition Commission and get over takaful and health insurance legislation from Bank Negara Malaysia.
Sim Tze Tzin, a member of the Bayan Baru legislator, has stated to CNA that the Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee may be hearing testimony next month. Various stakeholders will be asked to comment on the story’s side.  ,
” It is ( an ) entire ecosystem and on the receiving end are the patients and policyholders”, he said.  , While carriers and private institutions are profit-driven, their income should not be “excessive”.
In 2023, carriers Prudential, Fantastic Eastern, and AIA made net income of RM963 million, RM1.123 billion, and RM1.41 billion respectively.
When asked about carriers ‘ profits, MarkO’Dell, the CEO of the Life Insurance Association of Malaysia, claimed the profits came from the business’s another branches.  ,
” A business could very easily be making 500 million dinars a year,” the statement read. But they’re losing wealth on their health organization. And therefore, he told CNA, you are asking the owners to give or receive subsidies from the profits of different lines of business by not raising the premium.
Sim noted in a presentation to parliamentarians last year that one aspect that needs to be looked into is the disparity in charges between those who file claims with insurance and those who pay out-of-pocket.
Mr. Chin pointed out that all of the current crop of people were acquired by various managers.
” In terms of building a team, you need to bolster that trust in each other… it’s the trust that is missing ( and ) a lack of familiarity with each other”, he said.
Amorim also now doesn’t have the types of players appropriate for his favored 3-4-3 formation.
But unfortunately, for enthusiasts like Mr Chin, nothing did sever their relationship to Manchester United.
” I grew up supporting them and there’s that connection to the team today”, he said. ” It doesn’t change my help”.
Jersey profits in Singapore support this increase.
At big sports merchandise retailer Weston Corp, that ‘s , been a” little decline” in the number of Manchester United kits sold this season , – but it remains the most popular team in terms of sales.
We sell more United kits than any other team, according to Weston producer Ami Chopra, who spoke to CNA.
” Supporters are quite loyal. When they support the pub, they support the club”.
Mr James Walton, Deloitte’s activities business team leader for Asia Pacific and Southeast Asia, noted that Manchester United’s possible problems with , revenue and sustainability rules could also have an effect on its fans.
These Premier League rules prohibit irresponsible spending and prevent wealthy donors from giving large sums of money to clubs. They also place restrictions on how much money a club can drop over the course of three seasons.
Last year, United wrote to buff parties warning that the team was at risk of breaching , the laws.
Fans who want the group to be built around the two skills may be offended by its willingness to sell two of its brightest fresh stars, 20-year-old wing Alejandro Garnacho and 19-year-old playmaker Kobbie Mainoo, said Mr. Walton, Mr.
And attracting younger generations to the United fans may be a problem if performances keep falling.
” The challenge for sports team is that your older supporters usually stay loyal through the thick and thin, but perhaps the younger followers will be the ones you won’t get,” he said.
They may rather seem to just more powerful teams like Liverpool and Manchester City because they are just starting out and finding a group to support them, according to Mr. Walton.
” But ultimately, Man United is one of the two or three largest brands of football clubs in the world, and will always have a large support”.
President Donald Trump will matter a number of senior orders for US security, including the development of an Iron Dome system “like the one used by Israel to divert approaching missiles,” according to recently approved Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
The old Mutually Assured Destroy ( MAD ) doctrine will no longer be effective in preventing a first strike, and the US could be the target of a devastating and fatal nuclear ballistic missile attack as hypersonic threats start to grow.
The US does not have an all-encompassing air defense system for the continental United States. Additionally, it lacks a system in place to stop the development of hypersonic nuclear missiles and delivery systems, including hypersonic glide cars.
On the East Coast, nowhere near the US border, nowhere near the US’s facility, or anywhere along the Caribbean Sea, the country has almost no full-time heat protection.
What Trump calls Iron Dome and what Israel calls it is important to identify.
Iron Dome ( Kippat Barzel ) refers to the air defense system created to withstand short-range missiles launched into Israeli territory from Gaza.
Iron Dome, in Trump’s use, refers to an integrated air defense system that may defend the United States from missile attacks.
Now Israel has an incorporated air defense system that includes Iron Dome,  , Iron Beam,  , David’s Rope,  , Arrow 2 , and , Arrow 3 , plus , much collection scanners. Israel’s program includes a ability to capture projectile missiles in the exoatmosphere and, perhaps, beyond. In collaboration with the US, Israel is likewise developing a new Bow technique, called Arrow 4. ( Israel air defenses have also been , integrated with US radars. )
Major US defense companies Raytheon ( now RTX Corporation ), Boeing, and Lockheed all contribute to Israel’s air defense programs under US funding.
RTX even markets , Sky Hunter, a variation of the , Tamir interceptor , used in Iron Dome.
RTX is building a new facility in Camden, Arkansas to , produce Sky Hunter , for the US Marines. The Marine Corps requested$ 11 million for the system to help with the transition from quick prototyping to swift fielding, according to the FY-25 finances request. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, an Jewish company that makes Iron Dome, owns a portion of the new service.
The partnership between the US Missile Defense Agency ( MDA ) and the Israel Missile Defense Organization ( IMDO ) is at the top level of US-Israel air defense cooperation. The IMDO is part of the Israeli Directorate of Defense Research and Development ( DDR&, D), at Israel’s Ministry of Defense. The MDA is a research, creation, and consolidation organization that works on ballistic missile security devices for the United States and its allies.
The US is one of the least prepared allies to combat army ballistic missiles and other challenges, including robots. The lack of protection was intended, as those opposed to President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI) claimed that creating a missile shield was neither technically feasible nor politically acceptable.
The difficulty of putting fighter systems in space was the subject of the specialized debates in the mid-1980s.
( One of the Reagan proposals was called , Brilliant Pebbles, an idea pioneered by Lowell Wood and Edward Teller at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. )
The plan discussion claimed that SDI would stifle the Wild philosophy. The term” Middle East Assured Destruction” is derived from the idea that neither the US nor its allies would use nuclear weapons because the results of their use would be the party’s own destruction.
Arms control agreements were created with the goal of preventing any breakthrough that would allow the US or the USSR ( or its successor, Russia ) a way to establish a credible first-strike capability assuring that the nuclear assets of the other side would be destroyed before they could be used for retaliation.
While some claimed Wild to be a good way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, people, including Reagan, saw MAD as a common murder agreement. A key issue was that one country, China, did not participate in hands control partnerships and continued to grow its nuclear attack skills. Another was the increase of more nuclear actors, most notably North Korea and Iran, who were both interested in joining them.
The US put in place a ground-based fighter air defense system based in Greely, Alaska, and the Vandenberg Space Force center in California. The US Earth Based Midcourse Defense System includes GBI. A renewed work is now underway to update the fighter remove vehicles and install a$ 17 billion “next-generation fighter” for GBI. That multibillion dollars system has been plagued by various issues. An “interim option” of 20 submarines is planned for 2026.
It is claimed that GBI was primarily focused on a rogue state risk ( North Korea ) and no China, despite the existence of only a select few ships, 44, associated with it.
GBI employs a hit-to-kill capture system, which means that a non-explosive eliminate vehicle’s dynamic force causes an approaching ballistic missile warhead to be destroyed by the dynamic force of a non-explosive kill vehicle. It has been a source of issues and has been confined to dealing with maneuvering nuclear warheads. It is known as an EKV for exoatmospheric kill vehicle. A plan to redesign the kill vehicle, called RKV,  , was dropped , after the plan was judged unworkable. Beyond the kill vehicle, a huge issue, radars associated with GBI also have had problems, particularly a radar known as , Sea Based X Band. X-band radars operate in the 8 to 12 GHz microwave band.
The Defense Department appears to have plans to install a GBI system on the East Coast. At least four locations are under consideration, but the most likely is , Fort Drum in New York , near Lake Ontario. Congress has mandated an East Coast system to be in place by 2030 – although, without a workable system and funding, the 2030 date is optimistic.
The US also has forward-deployed THAAD (terminal high-altitude air defense ) systems, in Korea, UAE, Israel, Romania and Guam. THAAD is mainly an area defense system, and it has been used once, successfully, intercepting a Houthi-launched ballistic missile. That THAAD unit was running out of Israel. THAAD has a range of 150 to 200 kilometers ( 93 to 124 miles ).
In addition, the US has AEGIS air defense systems on board US Arleigh Burke-class destroyers ( DDG-51 ) and Ticonderoga cruisers ( CG-47 ). AEGIS is thought to be successful in preventing ballistic missiles. There are around 56 AEGIS-equipped ships, although the US Navy is , retiring some Ticonderoga-class cruisers.
The US also has three AEGIS-Ashore ( land based ) systems, one each in Guam, Poland and Romania. AEGIS-Ashore was also planned for Japan, but the Japanese government , canceled the program, allegedly because of local opposition to interceptor sites near them. Japanese , Kong ō class , ships do have the AEGIS system, but there are only four ships. Two new Kongo-class ships , are planned , over the next few years. Additionally, Japan and the US are developing an interceptor designed to deflect threats from hypersonic aircraft.
AEGIS has been used to thwart Houthi missiles in the Red Sea. A key problem has been intercepting Houthi-fired anti-ship ballistic missiles. AEGIS has assisted in helping track threats and destroy Houthi missiles, and AEGIS has been hurriedly upgraded to account for the anti-ship missile threat. As of January, US ships have fired 120 , SM-2 missiles, 80 , SM-6 missiles, 160 rounds from destroyers and cruisers ‘ , five-inch main guns as well as a combined 20 , Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles , ( ESSM) and , SM-3 missiles. SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 are AEGIS missiles. In one instance, the USS Gravely had to rely on its Phalanx CIWS rapid fire short range gun to detonate a Houthi missile that the AEGIS system’s radar had detected.
AEGIS is crucial for US missile defense in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf as well as in the Pacific and Atlantic.
The current jumble of US ballistic missile defenses is not necessarily a suitable model to fulfill President Trump’s desire to build an Iron Dome for the country.
An American Iron Dome requires some crucial elements from the US. Among these components are highly advanced radars, hit-to-kill technology, sophisticated secure communications, space based sensors, and experience it can draw on from its deployments in the Middle East and Israeli know-how and experience dealing with enemy swarm tactics.
Russian and Chinese pursuing hypersonic platforms, including those of Russians like Avangard and Chinese threats, are likely to follow. China already has” the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal” according to the , US Defense Intelligence Agency. The use of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile by Russia in Ukraine, which is a hybrid hypersonic glide vehicle with multiple kinetic warheads, demonstrates that conventionally armed missile defenses will also be challenged by nuclear weapons.
An Iron Dome for the United States, therefore, needs to account for both conventional and nuclear threats, for hypersonic weapons, and for serious problems of detecting and destroying the threats efficiently and effectively.
This implies that the US should look once more at Brilliant Pebbles and other space-based intercept capabilities for long range ballistic missile threats. A space-based approach is more likely to derail hypersonic glidecraft before they are launched by ballistic missiles.
The US needs to strengthen its ability to neutralize incoming threats at the theater level, whether on land or sea, for intermediate and short range threats. For this reason, it might be possible to use AEGIS and other systems to connect improved space-based sensors to improved land-based radars and create hypersonic interceptors.
Additionally, the US needs to increase its efforts on air defense integration and the use of artificial intelligence to combat increasingly sophisticated tactics, including various decoy types and maneuvering warheads. If properly developed, AI might be able to distinguish between a conventional threat and a nuclear threat.
A US Iron Dome is a daunting task, but it is necessary before a rivalry realizes it is simple to accomplish. That’s the chance of staying with MAD, which is why Hegseth and Trump are moving quickly to construct a US Iron Dome.
Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and a special correspondent for Asia Times. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
India’s foreign ministry announced on Monday ( Jan 27 ) that the two countries have agreed to resume direct air service after almost five years, indicating a thaw in relations between the neighbors following a deadly military clash in 2020 on their disputed Himalayan border. Following a conference between India’sContinue Reading
Lahore:  , Pakistan’s imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan and his family Bushra Bibi appealed against their views for graft on Monday, his attorney said. Khan, 72, has been held in custody since August 2023 charged in approximately 200 circumstances that he says are politically motivated. In the most recentContinue Reading
Foreign artificial intelligence business DeepSeek has shook world markets and challenged long-held beliefs about the usefulness of tariffs as a means of economic dominance.  ,
A cost-effective AI model that runs on less-advanced chips, highlighted by its breakthrough, which poses a significant challenge for the United States: tariffs and other financial restrictions may no longer suffice to encircle and outpace China’s scientific rivals.
Revelations about DeepSeek’s low-cost success in the high-cost AI space , rocked , global technology stocks on Monday, with Nvidia’s shares down 9 % in premarket trading and Dutch high-end chip equipment maker , ASML down , as much as 11 %, according to breaking news reports.
Bloomberg reported the hitherto largely unheard-of startup ‘s , AI assistant has  , rocketed , to the top of the app download charts since it was released last week with capabilities widely , seen as competitive with the likes of , OpenAI, Google and , Meta’s AI offerings. That, in turn, has called into question America’s supposed big lead over China in the AI culture.
Meanwhile, President Trump’s current threat to impose taxes as high as 60 % on imports underscores Washington’s rely on financial restrictions to sustain its global technical standing. Tariffs have been a key component of US efforts for years to stop China’s increase and maintain its position of dominance in important technology and other sectors.  ,
However, DeepSeek’s success shows how rivals can develop around these measures, probably rendering them outdated. This success is a sign of a wider pattern. While the US has previously led in cutting-edge systems, China’s rapid development in AI and electronics is altering the balance of power.  ,
By restricting China’s access to advanced cards, Washington probably aimed to slow its modern development. Alternatively, it has spurred Beijing to triple down on self-reliance, accelerating inventions that could release America’s hold on global supply chains.
DeepSeek’s milestone AI design is more than just a modern leap, it’s a tactical victory for China. It demonstrates how development can circumvent restrictions imposed by taxes and other financial tools.
This change raises important questions about the US economic strategy’s coming. Tariffs could turn into relics of a bygone time if rivals could circumvent restrictions with more powerful alternatives.
Traditional uses for tariffs include imposing costs on rival companies, ensuring trade priorities, and safeguarding home industries. But, DeepSeek’s success casts question on whether these measures can also achieve their planned outcomes in an age of swift innovation.  ,
China’s advancement was slowed by the US’s policy of restricting access to crucial tools like advanced semiconductors. Alternatively, it has good accelerated Beijing’s modern push, demonstrating the unintended consequences of an depending on disciplinary measures.
If more companies adopt DeepSeek’s strategy, the need for high-end US cards was drop, more eroding America’s liquidity in international markets. These outcomes now have a ripple effect.
The Nasdaq 100 has experienced strong falls, Western tech stocks are slipping, and market sentiment is a sign of growing unease over Silicon Valley’s ability to maintain its position as the leader in the Artificial supply chain.
Trump’s proposed 60 % tax danger highlights Washington’s battle to adapt its guidelines to a world that is increasingly defined by technical aplomb.
Although these steps may have the potential to strengthen the US, they also run the risk of isolating it from a rapidly expanding global business. Competitors like China are proving adept at finding ways to overpower financial and other considerations, leaving Washington’s techniques looking obsolete and responsive.
DeepSeek’s fall is a wake-up contact for US politicians. Tariffs may have once been a useful tool for shaping international business dynamics, but they are extremely unfit for the challenges of a world driven by development. If the US wants to maintain leadership in important industries, it must reevaluate its financial strategies.
More convincing approaches are encouraging domestic innovation, funding research and development, and encouraging international collaboration than doubling down on disciplinary measures.
The emphasis should move from imposing restrictions on rivals to fostering domestic growth and development. Without these modifications, the US runs the risk of losing ground in the world’s battle for modern supremacy.
DeepSeek’s victory is not just a step for China—it’s a reminder for America. If Washington continues to move on tariffs as its main tool of financial control, it will consider itself extremely sidelined in a world where development, not restriction, drives power, wealth and growth.
It has become popular among Western analysts to speculate about the economic “miracle “‘s demise.
Slowing development, a worried real estate sector, and demographic shifts are frequently used as indicators of the situation. This tale has been further fueled by conflicts with the US, particularly during the previous two services.
Yet the photo is far more complex. Washington has so far avoided the broadest taxes and actions that his campaign speech suggested were a done deal under the administration of President Donald Trump.
However, three times before his commencement, Trump remarked:” I anticipate that we will solve many issues along, starting straight away. We talked about business balance, Fentanyl, TikTok, and several different topics. President Xi and I will do everything in our power to improve peace and security around the world.
These remarks suggest an implicit acknowledgement that China’s market is evolving, no collapsing – and that the United States, despite its speech, understands Beijing’s structural swings.
China’s first success was really driven by export-led production and state-owned weighty industry. Now, more than 65 of the 69 Taiwanese companies on the Fortune Global 500 are state-owned.
In recent years, Beijing has pushed for SOE mergers to boost “national warriors”, particularly in strategic areas. At a glance, such deeds might strengthen the tale of status dominance.
Yet the earth is evidently shifting. In the late 1990s, state-owned enterprises ( SOEs ) accounted for more than half of China’s industrial output. Nowadays, they produce almost 30 %. Private companies have become the website of productivity gains and job creation in the economy.
More than 60 % of GDP and more than 50 % of tax revenue are now made up by private companies. Consumption, long overshadowed by investment and exports, has risen in importance – from 35 % of GDP a decade ago to nearly 55 % by 2023.
By enabling greater access to medical facilities and improved funding options, innovative policies support private players. The goal is simple: maintain proper state control while utilizing the private sector’s vitality.
An example of this private-sector vitality is DeepSeek, founded by hedge fund manager Liang Wenfeng. A groundbreaking AI system developed on a relatively small budget, the company recently unveiled its R1 large language model ( LLM).
DeepSeek’s path challenges the notion that Chinese businesses rely only on state-driven technology. Instead, its story highlights the ability of the private sector to overcome local obstacles and physical limitations.
DeepSeek made novel teaching methods and “pure reasoning capabilities” without any controlled data, while rejecting the usual model of enormous resource investment seen in America. This is a step taken in the direction of an impressive path that deviates quickly from European norms.
DeepSeek developed unique marketing techniques to completely apply less strong GPUs, a miracle that has surprised US researchers because of hardware restrictions imposed by sanctions.
Using only 2, 048 Nvidia H800 GPUs and US$ 5.6 million, it trained a unit with 671 billion guidelines – close to efforts by British giants like as OpenAI and Google, which usually spend multiples of that number.
For Beijing, modern self-reliance has long been an economic feature of strategic goal. At a recent conference of companies with Premier Li Qiang, China’s second-most powerful chief, the communication was blunt:” Focus efforts to break through key main systems”.
DeepSeek’s victory coincides with this perspective. The company’s “local-first” method, which places its employees with PhDs from Foreign universities, best exemplifies Beijing’s wider plan to cut down on foreign tech while cultivating local talent. It is a part of a larger effort to create a self-sustaining development ecosystem that can withstand forces from both the world and the world.
Yet now, China’s economic development is usually misconstrued as a shift away from production. In fact, it is a move up the value chain.
The region continues to utilize its great developing skills, built over years, to occupy high-tech sectors such as renewable energy, electric cars and AI. DeepSeek’s increase mirrors the broader path of corporations like Huawei and ByteDance, which have transformed from followers into global entrepreneurs.
At the same time, China leads the world in AI-related patents and boasts one of the largest pools of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. More than 40 % of GDP is made up of the country’s digital economy, led by e-commerce giants Alibaba and JD.com.
Newcomers like DeepSeek are pushing the limits by demonstrating that even global-scale AI can be produced on smaller budgets when combined with the right combination of technical expertise and business acumen.
One of the most critical, yet sometimes overlooked, aspects of China’s continued economic strength is its unrivaled industrial and production base. This ecosystem, painstakingly built over decades of export-led growth, is not simply about low-cost assembly.
It is a vast, integrated network of suppliers, logistics hubs, specialized clusters and infrastructure that supports a range of high-value industries.
This industrial backbone is more than just a piece of China’s past; it serves as a fundamental framework for the onset of its economic transformation. Companies developing large language models, EV batteries, or green technologies can tap into a powerful base of suppliers, technicians, and engineers, enabling them to iterate faster and scale more efficiently than competitors elsewhere.
China’s ability to move toward cutting-edge industries without giving up its manufacturing roots is supported by this synergy.
Against this backdrop, predictions of China’s imminent downfall appear short-sighted. The country’s current challenges, such as high youth unemployment and the real estate sector’s recalibration, are significant but not unique. When at comparable stages of development, major economies have experienced similar transitions.
When America’s GDP was roughly China’s current size, it grew at an average of 2.4 % annually. By contrast, China posted growth rates of 5.4 % in 2023, 5 % in 2024 and is projected to maintain 4%-5 % growth through 2025.
These figures, while lower than the double-digit expansions of the past, remain impressive for an economy of China’s scale. And with a GDP per capita of$ 12, 970 – significantly below the U. S. level of$ 83, 000 – China still has ample room for” catch-up” growth, especially as it invests more in education, innovation and domestic consumption.
Moreover, even incremental growth in a$ 17 trillion economy adds substantially to global GDP. Beijing appears committed to laying the groundwork for a more stable economic model, one that is more in tune with the burgeoning middle class of some 400 million people, by embracing structural reforms, encouraging private sector innovation, and unlocking household wealth.
Dismissing China’s economy as having “peaked” overlooks its ongoing metamorphosis. The growth of businesses like DeepSeek highlights the entrepreneurial spirit of China’s private sector in fostering innovation and overcoming constraints from outside.
The accomplishments of DeepSeek serve as a framework for a wider narrative of resilience, where challenges are neither insurmountable nor a sign of unavoidable decline.
A more nuanced perspective reveals China’s transition from an export-driven, investment-heavy model to one centered on domestic consumption and technological innovation. Its extensive manufacturing base is being upgraded and redeployed to support a high-tech future, far from being abandoned.
This evolution is a sign of China’s resilience, ingenuity, and capacity for reinvention, traits that continue to shape the opportunities for others in the global economy.
Marcus Loh is a director at Temus, a Singapore-based company that offers digital transformation services. He is responsible for Step IT Up’s business affairs, marketing, and strategic communications.
He was formerly the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore’s President, and he is currently a member of the SG Tech, the largest trade association for Singapore’s technology sector ,’s digital transformation chapter.