Asia (Page 17)

​The New York Times reports that US officials are planning to propose an “armistice ” for Ukraine, allegedly similar to how the Korean War ended in 1953. Nevertheless, an Armistice Partnership like the Asian one does not coincide with Russia’s targets and perhaps can’t be achieved if limited to a ceasefire.

The 1953 agreement was reached after hard discussions that involved the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, the former Soviet Union and United Nations troops. Its key rules were:

1. ​suspending opened conflicts;
2. withdrawing all military forces and products from a 4,000-meter-wide area, establishing the Demilitarized Area as a cushion between the troops;
3. ​ ​ both sides ​w​ill not enter the air, ground or sea areas under control of the other;
4. ​a​n design for the release and resettlement of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and
5. ​a​ Military Armistice Commission ( MAC ) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to ensure adherence to the truce terms.

T​he Asian ceasefire is then 72 years older. For the most part, it has prevented opened conflict involving North and South Korea.

​The demilitarized area, or DMZ, in Korea is around 160 km long and 2. 5 yards broad. Running through the DMZ is a Military Demarcation Line ( MDL ) which is where the opposing forces were when an armistice was reached.

The DMZ does not expand to the Yellow Sea which was not included in the ceasefire. The DMZ itself does not follow the 38th parallel northeast which was the limit agreed by the US and the USSR at the end of World War II, although sections of the DMZ follow the 38 horizontal.

Other than the Yellow Sea issue ( including a number of islands that are heavily militarized ), the DMZ is reasonably close to a final border should North and South Korea ever normalize their relations and sign a peace treaty.

The North Koreans have hinted, from time to time, that they are seeking a peace agreement ( and especially US recognition and US security assurances ), while the issue in South Korea is far more divisive and uncertain, fearing that normalization could undermine stability in South Korea and lead to a deal where US and allied forces would be withdrawn.

The Ukraine problem is regional, military and political. Russia annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions in September 2022 and Crimea in 2014. While the edges of Crimea are usually well recognized, the edges of the four regions are not so obvious.

Based on the official Ukrainian Oblast names, Russia does not completely handle any of these lands and battle is going on as the Russian army appears to be aiming at occupying as many place as possible before negotiations start. Assuming that a deal may be made on territories, there are a number of concerns that are more complicated.

Among them are the rights of citizens on both sides of any boundary line, deal between Ukraine and Russia, whether important utilities can be restored and utilized such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power advanced, water supply to Crimea from Ukraine, the status of ports and port and storage facilities on the Black Sea, the status of military ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, the location of long-range weapons and the presence of NATO forces on Ukraine’s soil.

More problems include the position of Ukraine’s military forces, Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO, types of security offers, oil and gas transport and associated sanctions on Russia.

An armistice would need to cover the presence of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk area ( Russia has liberated about 50 % of the Kursk incursion, but it could take months before the Ukrainians are finally pushed out if the war continues ).

When the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, United Nations Forces were stationed in South Korea, and Chinese “volunteers ” were in the North. Ukraine is different: officially there are no NATO forces ( strictly defined ) in Ukraine, although the Russian army is in Ukraine.

Numerous reports say that a number of NATO countries ( UK, France and even Germany ) are preparing to send troops to Ukraine when an Armistice is agreed and to offer Ukraine security guarantees. One concern is that an Armistice tracking pressure and an Armistice military rollout that would provide security guarantees to Ukraine are not the same thing.

Under the original Minsk agreements ( 2014, 2015 ) the OSCE ( Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ) was supposed to monitor the Minsk agreements. OSCE sent spectators, hardly an army. OSCE therefore had 57 people including Russia and Ukraine. Essentially the bargain was to finish conflicts and to give freedom to Luhansk and Donetsk ( although both may be lands inside Ukraine ). The package was not implemented.

Russia’s battle objectives, as we understand them, include not only acknowledgment of the conquered areas but the disarmament of Ukraine and an arrangement that Ukraine will not become a NATO part. Whether this includes security guarantees with major NATO countries is not clear. It is hard to see how an Armistice Agreement could be concluded without addressing these issues.

The US view is that Russia is hurting enough economically and its losses in the Ukraine war serious enough to incentivize the Russians to accept an Armistice, that would include some sort of buffer zone, essentially freezing the conflict and conceding some Ukrainian territory on a de facto, but not de jure basis. In this context, such a deal on these broad terms would be similar to the 1953 Korean Armistice.

Obviously, the Russian outlook does not align with the one under development in Washington. Russia is not looking for an armistice but for a comprehensive deal with the US and NATO.

A temporary Armistice Agreement (essentially a ceasefire in place ) might be possible if it was linked to agreed political steps, but it seems unlikely to be accepted as any long-term solution. Biden administration informants have hinted at a 10-year or even 20-year pause, but that idea does not have much traction for Russia as it would allow Ukraine to rebuild its army and its weapon stockpile.

President Trump has some cards to play. He could send more aid to Ukraine to prolong the conflict but it is doubtful this is Trump’s aim. He can offer sanctions relief to the Russians, even some accommodation with NATO.

At the same time, the new administration knows how fragile Ukraine itself is, with its military losing one battle after another, short on manpower, encountering popular resistance to the enforced draft, and suffering high casualties.

It is hard to predict where any of this will go but President Trump has signaled his desire to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin, starting with a phone call in the days ahead. Trump will table the idea of an Armistice Agreement: the Russians will demand considerably more.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This  article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter  Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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This month, multiple media outlets reported on the US Navy’s evolving plans for the next-generation DDG( X ) destroyer, emphasizing its advanced capabilities and challenges. But while the US Navy bets on the DDG( X )’s futuristic concept to outpace China ’s naval surge with advanced tech, logistical and industrial hurdles loom large.

Notable design changes for the DDG( X ) include removing the traditional Mark 45 main gun, which implies integrating directed-energy weapons like lasers and microwaves and a new vertical launch system (VLS ) layout.

Designed to replace the aging Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the DDG( X ) will incorporate state-of-the-art weapons, radar systems and a powerful Integrated Power System ( IPS) to meet the high-energy demands of next-generation combat. But, steep costs, technical uncertainties and technological limitations present fierce obstacles to the program’s success.

The DDG( X ) will feature hypersonic and directed-energy weapons, the AN/SPY-6 radar, enhanced stealth and increased payload capacity. This technological step is critical for countering evolving challenges like robots, hypersonic weapons and advanced naval platforms. The ship’s IPS, adapted from the Zumwalt-class ships, promises unparalleled power generation essential for supporting its high-powered techniques.

However, these advancements come with a significant price tag: the DDG( X ) is estimated to cost US$ 4. 4 billion per fleet, far exceeding its forebears. Structure will begin in 2032, with a three-year overlap alongside continued Arleigh Burke-class production to maintain business continuity.

Directed-energy weaponry promise infinite magazine level, low-cost engagements and rapid strikes against different threats ranging from drones to fast weapons. Nevertheless, they require significant storage, power and heating. Also, atmospheric disturbances and collection restrictions pose challenges to light tool success.

The US Navy’s aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers and maxed-out Arleigh Burke-class destroyers cannot meet these demands, underscoring the importance of the DDG( X ) in the US Navy’s future surface fleet. Directed-energy weapons may also alleviate the US Navy’s rely on expensive fighter missiles, freeing area for anti-ship missiles essential for high-end conflicts, particularly against China.

China ’s marine development poses a major challenge to US sea dominance. According to the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power report, China now fields over 370 ships and submarines, including 140 major surface combatants, outpacing the US fleet numerically.

Moreover, China ’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy ( PLAN ) has achieved over 50 % of the US Navy’s vertical launch system (VLS ) capacity, with nearly 4,300 VLS cells on 84 principal surface combatants, compared to the US Navy’s 8,400 cells on 85 ships.

In an article for the International Institute of Strategic Studies ( IISS), Johannes Fischbach highlights that China ’s construction of high-end platforms, such as Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers, further narrows the VLS gap.

The Type 052D battleship has 64 Vocabulary, while the Model 055 ship has 112 VLS. In contrast, the Journey IIA and later Arleigh Burke-class warships have 96 Vocabulary, while the Ticonderoga-class ships have 122 VLS.

Despite that power gap, the PLAN’s quick shipbuilding—producing 3. 1 Model 052D ships every compared to the US’s 1. 6 Arleigh Burke destroyers—illustrates the size of China ’s business benefits.

The DDG( X ) is designed to address this disparity, offering greater operational range and reduced logistical needs, vital for countering the “tyranny of distance ” in Pacific operations.

US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro has emphasized the critical need for the Transferrable Reload At-Sea Method ( TRAM ), which enables at-sea VLS reloading. Properly tested in October 2024, The War Zone information Metro addresses a major logistical challenge by minimizing the moment warships spend out of action for disarming.

This ability is essential for sustaining a ahead existence during conflicts, especially with China, where rearming at distant foundations like Guam may become impractical and dangerous. By integrating TRAM with the DDG( X )’s design, the US Navy aims to bolster combat readiness and mitigate the presence gap created by extended resupply periods.

Despite its promise, the DDG( X ) program is hampered by systemic challenges hounding US shipbuilding. Post-Cold War expenditure cuts significantly reduced the number of naval architects and engineers, creating obstacles in both design and production.

Over 60 % of US Navy ship repairs are not completed on time, reflecting inadequate infrastructure and outdated practices. Also, US factories cannot match China ’s industrial production.

China ’s civil-military fusion strategy—which combines military and civilian shipbuilding facilities —has enabled unmatched efficiency and surge capacity. In comparison, the US’s scattered approach and selection of big ships over smaller, cost-effective vessels slow development efforts.

US politicians, including Representative John Moolenaar, warn that without striking policy changes and important investments, the US cannot hinder or succeed in a possible conflict with China, as quoted by the Associated Press.

Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi underscores the disparity, noting that China can produce 359 ships for every US ship made annually. He has emphasized the need to revitalize the US defense industrial base to maintain global stability.

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