Only after the Israeli army and government’s conflict is over will an investigation into what went wrong, despite the already-known early notice provided by the war in Gaza.
The higher downs consistently communicated with the soldiers on the frontier who had witnessed Hamas’s military exercises and its bulldozers marching toward the border in a “no-man’s land,” as well as with residents of nearby villages who had heard the sounds of underwater digging.
That office ignored the warnings and why is it unknown as of this writing. It appears that they not arrived at Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s office if they did not reach government officials.
Since that October function, grave errors have plagued Boeing in the US, where the CEO only resigned.
These situations brought to my mind Chiles James ‘ book , Inviting Catastrophe, which I read more than two decades ago. It records a variety of catastrophic situations and provides a summary of their effects or remedies.
Because the majority of the book examines how to better handle complex technical risks rather than overcome human errors, I’ll just refer to the case studies in the book that are related to the events listed above. The answers the book addresses are amazing. If they were known and implemented, chances are that some new tragedies could have been averted.
These are two circumstances, one related to the state and the other to the defense.  ,
Welcome aboard
The US airmail service was losing pilots and aircraft at alarming rates when warning devices for bad weather did n’t exist yet. Despite the pilots ‘ concerns about the bad weather, the pilots finally persuaded their higher echelons that postal service professionals at the airport were giving orders to travel.
The aircraft requested that the bosses be required to get on table for any launch they had ordered during bad weather, in order for a quick solution. Chiles grimly observes a drop in the level of accidents. These days, in related circumstances, the pilots ‘ association would probably go to Washington and request laws and regulations as well as R&, D funding focused on inventing much poor- weather- detecting instruments.
From the beginning of a project to the launch, Admiral Hyman Rickover, a son of Jewish immigrants who came to the US at the age of six and later became the father of the US Navy’s nuclear submarine program, was determined to prevent reactor accidents.
Top representatives of important maintenance contracting firms were also required to be aboard during the test dives, according to Rickover, along with one of his close assistants. Having one’s life at stake focused the mind – that was Rickover’s observation and among his principles. There were , no reactor accidents , throughout Rickover’s management.
Instead of debating and shuffleing strategy papers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the principle could have been applied to the Israeli and Israeli Defense Forces ( IDF) through a rule mandating that rotating senior officers and members of the government stay in locations close to the Gaza border.
Should Boeing  have mandated that CEOs of suppliers and maintenance companies be involved when making technical adjustments or when handing over technical staff?
What if the US government had passed a similar law requiring the secretary of homeland security and his top assistants to live and work at the border on a rotating basis, standing, day and night, with the National Guard observing first-hand what is happening?
Would a border’s effective protection have been made possible by a solution that’s currently reminiscent of Swiss cheese?
It’s simple to repeatedly appeal for more accountability from politicians and the government. Unfortunately, it is well documented in all areas of life that nothing happens unless there is a disaster. We could, modifying a popular aphorism, say that “disaster is the mother of innovation” in rules and organizations.  ,
Reuven Brenner is , the author , of, among other books,  , Betting on Ideas: Wars, Inventions, Inflation , and , The Force of Finance.