Some Asian businesspeople have praised the Vietnamese Communist Party’s statement of Resolution 68 as a significant step toward ensuring good competition, ensuring good competition, and codifying lawful precepts.
Crucially, those constitutional changes include a ban on voluntary law enforcement, a preference for legal remedies over criminal penalties, and the presumption of innocence. All of these are essential to the operation of a current market supported by the rule of law.
But beneath that business enthusiasm lies a crucial question: Is this a headless, pretended-to-be-real liberation for all secret business, or is it merely a headless, Marxist Party-connected, and wealthy?
Resolution 68, which was announced earlier this month, did not emerge in a womb. The” Views on Promoting Development and Growth of the Private Economy” were released by the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in July 2023.
That statement was made at a gentle time when China’s financial engines were slipping under the weight. After massive reprisals on large, privately held tech firms like Alibaba, firm confidence had deteriorated.
The Taiwanese government changed its position, highlighting the significance of the private sector to the region’s push for development, after acknowledging that a stifling regulatory burden and social uncertainty were stifling private-sector dynamism.
China’s record from 2023 aimed to rekindle confidence and stability, but it also signaled that the Communist Party was attempting to maintain a strong hold on the market.
By 2025, Vietnam’s monetary flood had also changed. Nguyen Phu Trong’s dying in 2024 and To Lam To Party’s arrival marked a significant shift in Vietnam’s management structure and outlook.
However, Vietnam’s private sector expanded rapidly but faced long-standing challenges, including limited resources, legal uncertainty, and fragile business confidence, partly as a result of the government’s crackdown on supposedly corrupt politicians and businesses.
Foreign literature
Resolution 68 draws heavily from China’s handbook, praises the importance of the private sector, and offers a more business-friendly culture. However, Vietnam’s version goes yet further, promising a stronger legitimate weapon than China’s.
Article 11 of China’s 2023 report makes explicit recommendations for preventing inside corruption and makes acts like misappropriation and bribery illegal. Additionally, it highlights efforts to improve Party operations in private companies and confirms the premise that all companies must operate in accordance with Party principles.
In addition, Vietnam’s Resolution 68 urges private firms to uphold business ethics, morality, and social responsibility. However, in Vietnam, corruption is seen as a two-way road, and it is imperative that people officials stop extorting and destroying private companies.
In this double messaging, the state is both an enforcer and a partner, aiming to promote both a private-led growth and a regulatory framework. The main issue between the two guidelines, however, is how they handle legal challenges.
China’s record promises to stop unnecessary interference with business during legal proceedings. It emphasizes “protecting the property rights and interests of private companies and businesses in accordance with the law” and vows to stop overreach through broad property freezes or arbitrary protection.
However, it falls short of removing the possibility of legal trial. Owing process and proportionality are important, but legal liability persists when determined.
The Vietnami Resolution 68 is more ambitious. Part 2.3 states:
- Civil, financial, and managerial measures should be used to address both civil and economic violations.
- Legal actions should be totally avoided where the law permits both legal and non-criminal management.
- Remediation should be prioritized and seriously weighed in lawful decisions, even when prosecution is required.
- It is against the law to engage in voluntary business injury.
- And the idea of ignorance is vehemently promoted.
This is not a gentle shifting. Vietnam’s record not only tries to minimize legitimate disturbance, but it also makes criminal sanctions a last resort even in situations where legal results are uncertain.
Transformation for whom?
These principles appear to be in line with international standards for consistency and proportion. A good legal method emphasizes civil rights and the protection of the presumption of innocence.
However, Vietnam’s political-business climate muddies the lakes. In an atmosphere also fueled by wealthy record and favoritism, these legal protections may still offer concern and better protection to effective state or state-linked conglomerates. Even if these reforms lead to a more level playing field for small and medium enterprises.
The new constitutional shield may eventually remain out of reach for many businesses unless you are one of the key players with political connections.
Moreover, overprotecting big businesses presents systemic risks. Protecting these businesses from total legal scrutiny creates moral hazard, or worse. If these megacorporations fail, the condition could be forced to participate in cheap bailouts, destabilizing the entire economic system in a” also big to fail” scenario.
Vietnam, one of the top” China 1″ destinations for global manufacturers, is already attracting international investors ‘ attention for its commitment to stability and predictability.
Resolution 68’s pro-business claims may lessen worries for home businesses, but international investors, especially those who are conscious of China’s decades-long trend, may remain closely monitoring how it’s carried out. Even if the outlook for short-term mood improves, any overt defence of aristocracy interests may undermine confidence in Vietnam’s long-term legal standing.
By any standard, Resolution 68 is a brave decision. It promises to reduce bureaucracy, guard home rights, and modify the legal system in ways that are more suitable for contemporary Vietnam.
However, Vietnam’s solid pro-business stance raises an obvious question: Is this the start of real legitimate reform or is it just a cunning way to protect the connected while appearing present and pro-business to the outside world?
Vietnam’s entrepreneurs and foreign observers should tread carefully when predicting whether this most recent wave of reforms actually level the playing field or just strengthen the system’s existing ones and hierarchies.
Leo Tran writes about global strategy, trade, and international affairs. His writing has appeared in The Diplomat, Kyiv Post, and Modern Diplomacy. He also writes for Vietnam Decoded.