Per Ukraine, Taiwan boosts maritime drone production – Asia Times

Taking a page from Ukraine’s naval warfare playbook, Taiwan aims to ramp up the production of unmanned surface vessels ( USVs ) to fend off a possible Chinese invasion. &nbsp,

In the event of a Taiwanese war, Taiwan may adopt Ukraine’s use of USVs as a basis for asymmetrical device war strategies.

SCMP notes that Ukraine’s equivalent success in the Black Sea, with USVs exacting a heavy burden on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, is an inspiration for Taiwan’s military managers. &nbsp,

In the event that the PLA Navy launches an amphibious assault on Taiwan, USVs would be one of Taiwan’s numerous symmetric arms. It notes that since Taiwan’s comparatively small and worn-out warships may take on much more sophisticated adversaries, these drones had mostly targeted incoming warships or those close to the island’s coastline.

In line with that, SCMP says that Taiwan’s USV economy has kicked into high gear, with the National Chung- Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST ) initiating a US$ 25 million, two- time “unmanned attack vehicle” development program, with the production of at least 200 vessels anticipated to begin in 2026. &nbsp,

As for the features, SCMP says that the USVs weigh less than four tons, estimate under 10 meters in length, have a half- meter review and are electronically stable from a distance of up to seventy kilometers. It states that the Taiwanese army would launch them in order to launch suicide attacks on PLA-N ships. &nbsp,

SCMP says that Taiwan’s private sector is involved in this effort. It mentions that last year, Thunder Tiger Corporation unveiled its&nbsp, Seawolf 400 unmanned submarine and Shark 400 USV prototypes, capable of carrying strikes with various payloads. &nbsp,

Taiwan could repel a Chinese invasion fleet by deploying hundreds or thousands of USVs from various piers and minor islands, according to Asia Times in February 2024.

Chinese warship defenses may be overpowered by USV swarms, and cargo and personnel transportation may be more vulnerable to USV attacks. &nbsp,

Another advantage for Taiwan lies in USV cost, with one USV estimated to cost about US$ 250, 000, per Ukrainian estimates. With that, Taiwan could purchase 1, 000 for 1 % of its annual defense expenditures of US$ 20 billion, with minimal fuel, maintenance, and training expenses. Mass production is relatively easy for Taiwan, given its technological prowess.

However, USVs alone cannot defeat an invasion fleet – they must be supplemented with naval mines, anti- ship missiles, and other weapons. By sheer numbers, USV swarms can overwhelm a target ship’s defensive systems, guaranteeing that at least some of the USVs that are attacking will attack their targets.

Some USV designs keep a low profile close to the surface of the water, enabling them to avoid detection by shipboard sensors and follow their target more closely.

Due to advancements in AI, USVs can now carry out sophisticated maneuvers and significantly lower the adversary’s morale by delaying their false sense of security, causing them to abandon their naval forces and misalign resources to fend off such attacks. &nbsp,

Despite USVs ‘ advantages, they may not be the wonder weapon they are touted to be, having several vulnerabilities and drawbacks.

Asia Times has noted that the harsh maritime environment can quickly degrade sensitive electronics, and as USV designs grow in sophistication, more points of possible failure are introduced. Also, as USVs become more autonomous, they become more tempting cyberattack targets.

Additionally, USVs still require an external communications link, which advanced jamming techniques can break. Cryptographic keys may be compromised if an adversary is able to capture an intact USV. &nbsp,

China could take steps to seize Taiwan’s strategic semiconductor industry without firing a shot while Taiwan can produce sophisticated AI chips for USVs. &nbsp,

Gabriel Collins and Andrew Erickson discuss a hypothetical 2027 scenario in which China’s relentless all-daily pressure campaign has caused significant political polarization in Taiwan and exposed unheard of vulnerabilities in the country’s economy to China’s control and influence in a September 2023 article.

Collins and Erickson point out that China may conduct live-fire drills throughout Taiwan to ensure that sensitive suppliers and customers of Taiwan’s top semiconductor companies are protected when they ship goods to and from their facilities and the power plants that support them.

They mention that China may require ships and aircraft traveling to Taiwan to land or land first at Chinese airports and ports for inspection. Additionally, they assert that China may order intercepts of ships and aircraft and force them to leave the area.

Collins and Erickson mention that as a result, ships and aircraft avoid Taiwan, the self- governing island’s fuel and food stocks run low, unemployment rises, and voices supporting the accommodation of China gain traction. Importantly, they note that in this hypothetical scenario, the US and its allies have refused to transit Chinese exclusion zones to uphold freedom of navigation.

According to Collins and Erickson, the presidents of China’s National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation ( SMIC ) could offer to purchase a 51 % controlling stake from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation ( TSMC), whose value has decreased from USD 700 billion to USD 300 billion. &nbsp,

China pledges to defend all incoming air and sea traffic from Taiwan, according to them, if TSMC and the Taiwanese government accept the offer. Alternatively, they note that should Taiwan refuse, China can continue unspecified “exercises” indefinitely. &nbsp,

Additionally, SCMP points out that Taiwan has been slow to adjust to USVs and that Taiwan may have already fallen behind some Third World nations in terms of quality and quantity.

Asia Times noted in January 2024&nbsp, that Taiwan’s naval modernization is torn between two contradicting objectives, split between a traditional naval force focusing on high- visibility, high- profile assets such as frigates, destroyers, and amphibious assault ships, and an asymmetric force posture. &nbsp,

Taiwan’s focus on acquiring high- visibility, high- profile assets stems from the self- governing island’s embattled history. The Kuomintang ( KMT ) emigrated to Taiwan in 1949 with the fantastical intention of retaking the country, and the organization has since maintained strong naval and air forces. &nbsp,

That idea was inconvenient at the beginning. China was unable to retake Taiwan back then, even though Taiwan was unable to retake the mainland. Given that reality, Taiwan’s strong naval and air forces were all about posturing.

However, the military balance has shifted in China’s favor, with Taiwan’s high- visibility and high- profile assets of questionable value in repelling a Chinese invasion. &nbsp,

Although high-level, high-profile assets are required to provide presence and counteract China’s “grey zone” intrusions, they do not address Taiwan’s pronounced military asymmetry. If China decides to forcefully pursue reunification, those assets are likely to last a long time. &nbsp,

Additionally, Taiwan’s investment in those prestigious assets may make it vulnerable in both these areas as it develops asymmetric warfare capabilities. Taiwan’s survival depends on its ability to resist a Chinese invasion with asymmetric means until the US and its allies can intervene, not on its actions in response to China’s provocative offensives or limited offensive strikes. &nbsp,