China says Mongolia main source of severe sandstorms this year
SINGAPORE: Mongolia was the main source of northern China’s worst sandstorms in five years from January to April, and may have contributed as much as 70 per cent of the dust floating over capital Beijing, China’s environment ministry said on Monday (May 29). Northern China is routinely hit by heavyContinue Reading
Rare albino giant panda spotted again at Chinaâs Wolong natural reserve
A rare albino giant panda – believed to be the only one of its kind – has been spotted again in the wild in southwestern China. Camera footage of the all-white animal was released by the Wolong National Nature Reserve in Sichuan province, state broadcaster CCTV reported on Saturday (MayContinue Reading
Singapore Airlines, Garuda Indonesia plan joint venture to boost passenger capacity
Singapore Airlines and Garuda Indonesia plan to enter into a joint venture to increase passenger capacity between the two countries, the flag carriers said on Monday (May 29), as post-COVID tourism in Southeast Asia ramps up. The proposed joint venture would allow the carriers to potentially synchronise schedules, improving passengers’Continue Reading
China prepares to send first civilian into space
JIUQUAN, Gansu: China will send its first civilian astronaut into space as part of a crewed mission to the Tiangong space station on Tuesday (May 30) as it pursues its ambitious plans for a manned lunar landing by 2030. The world’s second-largest economy has invested billions of dollars in itsContinue Reading
Higher risk of haze in southern ASEAN region between June and October 2023
SINGAPORE: Weather and climate authorities on Monday (May 29) flagged a higher risk of haze in the southern ASEAN region between June and October this year amid expectations of a more intense and prolonged dry season.
The ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) made this announcement as it issued Alert Level 1, indicating the start of the dry season associated with the Southwest Monsoon in the southern ASEAN region.
“Persistent drier weather has been observed over most parts of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and southern Thailand in recent days, as the monsoon rain band moves north of the equator.
“With a high likelihood of El Nino conditions developing in the coming months, the dry season is expected to be more intense and prolonged compared to recent years, and extend into October 2023,” it said.
Hotspot activities in the southern ASEAN region are presently still subdued, with 14 and 13 hotspots detected in the southern ASEAN region on May 27 and May 28 respectively, said ASMC.
A few localised smoke plumes were detected in parts of the region on some days in May, but no transboundary smoke haze occurrence has been observed so far.
Malaysia detains Chinese ship linked to suspected illegal salvage of British WWII wrecks
A ship registered in Fuzhou, China and carrying 32 crew failed to present anchoring permits during a routine inspection in waters off Malaysia’s southern Johor state on Sunday, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) said. Authorities found scrap metal and cannon shells on the ship upon further checks. The shellsContinue Reading
CNA Explains: Why did the Singapore dollar hit an all-time high against the Malaysian ringgit?
The currency had surged by 1.8 per cent on the day of Mr Anwar’s appointment on Nov 24 – the largest single-day gain since March 2016.
He noted that predictably, the ringgit has not seen similar gains since.
“In November, the ringgit strengthened primarily due to the semblance of political stability post-election. However, it has since depreciated due to external factors such as the (US Federal Reserve’s) highly aggressive interest rate hikes, the US banking crisis and geopolitical uncertainties,” said Mr Afiq Asyraf.
Mr Hafidzi Razali, a senior analyst with strategic advisory firm Bower Group Asia, added the weaker ringgit recently can be attributed to China’s ongoing economic recovery.
“Given that China is one of Malaysia’s largest trading partners, China’s economic recovery is important for the value of (the ringgit),” said Mr Hafidzi.
He noted that Malaysia’s exports had contracted 1.8 per cent year on year in the first quarter of 2023, and that this could largely be attributed to the decline in exports to China.
Domestically, Mr Hafidzi posited that Malaysia’s relatively weaker investment opportunities and impending structural reforms have held back the ringgit’s value.
“Private investment opportunities remain relatively limited; compared to developed economies such as the US and Singapore,” said Mr Hafidzi.
“The market is still anticipating whether impending structural reforms will be implemented (by the Malaysia government); particularly on large subsidy bills, low tax base and the ability to attract value-added foreign direct investments,” he added.
WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR THE SGD TO MYR RATE?
Analysts whom CNA spoke to added that the value of the Singapore dollar to the Malaysian ringgit could spike to new highs in the near term especially if the US dollar continues to appreciate.
However, some have stressed that the Singapore dollar to Malaysian ringgit value would stabilise given that the US government has agreed to raise the debt ceiling and that Congress would vote on the deal on Wednesday.
After the agreement was announced on Saturday, US President Joe Biden said that the deal was “good news for the American people, because it prevents what could have been a catastrophic default and would have led to an economic recession, retirement accounts devastated, and millions of jobs lost”.
The tentative agreement to suspend the US$31.4 trillion debt ceiling must now get through the Republican-controlled House of Representatives and Democratic-led Senate before June 5 to avoid a crippling first-ever default.
Pita would face cabinet dissolution petition
Move Forward leader Pita Limjaroenrat will face a challenge over his qualifications and a request for the dissolution of his cabinet if he becomes prime minister, serial petitioner Ruangkrai Leekitwattana said on Monday.
Mr Ruangkrai said at the office of the Election Commission that if Mr Pita becomes prime minister he would file a petition signed by at least one-in-ten House representatives asking the court to consider the qualifications and eligibility of Mr Pita and his cabinet.
Mr Ruangkrai is a member of the Palang Pracharath Party, which still leads the caretaker government. PPRP came fourth in the May 14 general election. Mr Pita’s Move Forward Party won the most seats and has first option to form a coalition government.
“If Mr Pita overcomes hurdles and becomes the prime minister, I will proceed with a petition for the disbandment of his whole cabinet,” Mr Ruangkrai said.
On Monday Mr Ruangkrai was at the office of the Election Commission to testify in his complaint about Mr Pita’s qualifications. The complaint was based on Mr Pita’s alleged holding of 42,000 shares in iTV Plc, a registered but now defunct media company. The constitution prohibits shareholders of media organisations sitting in the House of Representatives.
Mr Ruangkrai said Mr Pita had run in the 2019 general election as a candidate of the since-disbanded Future Forward Party and the EC would need to ask the Constitutional Court to disqualify Mr Pita retroactively.
If Mr Pita were to be retroactively disqualified, there would be problems with the allowances paid to Mr Pita and his assistant MPs, Mr Ruangkrai said. He had asked the EC to do the retroactive investigation.
Disqualification would also affect Mr Pita’s approval of Move Forward candidates in the May 14 general election this year, and his status as his party’s prime ministerial candidate, Mr Ruangkrai said.
Ruangkrai Leekitwattana
Interest rate for CPF Special and MediSave Account up to 4.01% in Q3; first increase since 2008
The SMA interest rate will be 4.01 per cent per annum from Jul 1 to Sep 30. The OA interest rate will remain unchanged at 2.5 per cent for the same period as the pegged OA rate remains below the floor rate. Meanwhile, the concessionary interest rate for HDB housingContinue Reading
Parsing Chinaâs ambiguous Ukraine war mediation
After a year of diplomatic inactivity towards the war in Ukraine, the Chinese government has made demonstrable attempts to look like a peacemaker. But while these moves indicate a change in its behavior, there is little reason to anticipate that China’s efforts will end the war.
China’s 12-point “peace plan” and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s direct phone call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, 2023, though met with skepticism and criticism in the West, led the international community to believe that China might be able to move the needle far enough to bring the Ukraine war closer to a solution or at least some sort of peace process.
But neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready to negotiate and make concessions. While the conflict is mutually detrimental, there is no clear battlefield stalemate or strategic impasse that would necessitate immediate negotiations. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is exhausted enough to engage in negotiations, with both sides digging in for a long haul.
Beijing’s relative success in brokering a Saudi-Iran agreement should not be extrapolated to the Ukraine war. In the Saudi–Iran case, a pre-established dialogue framework helped China’s late involvement. Iraq and Oman had done much of the substantive work before Beijing stepped in.
Most importantly, given the power vacuum in the region, both Iran and Saudi Arabia were willing to reach an agreement with each other.
This does not apply to the case of Ukraine, where the irreconcilability of Kiev’s and Moscow’s demands and the lack of a strong “give peace a chance” camp in Europe make protracted war the most likely scenario. If China’s mediation attempts are driven by the desire to boost its status, there is a risk for Beijing that a failure to achieve a successful outcome will damage its credibility.
The conflict between Moscow and Kiev has become an acute manifestation of global great power rivalry, an epicenter of the struggle for influence between Russia and the West rooted in long-term systemic trends.
The Russia–West stand-off in the post-Soviet space surfaced long before the Ukraine war. Soon after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated that Moscow had demarcated a “traditional sphere of Russian interests”, to which then-US vice president Joe Biden rebutted, “we will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence.”
Russia and the West ruled out any possibility of a positive-sum scenario involving Ukraine. This means that China must mediate not a Russia-Ukraine territorial dispute but a full-blown zero-sum confrontation between Russia and the West — a daunting task.
China’s own precarious position in great power politics and its deteriorating relations with the United States, aggravated by Beijing’s commitment to winning back Taiwan, make Beijing an unlikely candidate to solve tensions between Russia and the West. The crux of the problem is that Russia is China’s only great power ally, and China will rely on Russia in the event of a confrontation with the United States.
Unlike the United States and its allies, China does not want Russia to suffer a devastating defeat in Ukraine. Such a scenario would mean a triumph for the United States’ international order and global influence.
This would deal a blow not only to China’s aspirations for a new global order with “Chinese characteristics” and “dreams” but also to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy, especially from the standpoint of unification with Taiwan. If Russia falls in its confrontation with the West, China will become the West’s next target.
In contrast, a protracted war or some form of Russian victory will erode the US-led international order, exposing its flaws and opening new avenues for China’s global rise. China will tread the tightrope of Ukraine geopolitics very carefully, coming up with unfulfillable “peace initiatives” that combine a Russia-friendly stance with a desire to protect its own interests.
Given these considerations and China’s overall knowledge of the conflict, China’s plans to mediate the conflict are questionable. China’s activities regarding Ukraine seem to be dictated by Beijing’s broader foreign policy goals.
By becoming involved in the global “Ukraine project”, Beijing can consolidate a coalition of like-minded developing countries with ambivalent stances on the Ukraine war, such as Brazil and South Africa.
China can not only strengthen its influence in the developing world but also circumvent the uncompromisingly binary “barbaric and authoritarian Russia versus civilized and democratic West” structural environment.
In doing so, Beijing can expand the room for foreign policy maneuvering, simultaneously undermining the unity and global standing of the West.
Still, China’s “peace initiatives” should not be dismissed entirely despite their limited potential to end the Ukraine war.
While they may not bring about peace talks, they can facilitate ‘talks about talks’ and talks about avoiding vertical escalation when the use of tactical nuclear weapons is no longer a distant risk but an imminent threat. Given the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, these possible outcomes make China’s recent moves a worthy endeavor.
Alexander Korolev is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.