Beijing overreaching for exiled HK dissidents
The Hong Kong government has extended its efforts to suppress political dissent overseas, issuing arrest warrants for eight exiled pro-democracy figures and offering bounties of HK$1 million (US$128,000) each.
The targeted pro-democracy figures, who now live in Australia, the US and UK, were selected from a longer list of wanted dissidents. There is a curated feel to their profiles – three ex-legislators, three activists, a unionist and a lawyer – that suggests the list is symbolic, as well as pragmatic.
It is reminiscent of the infamous “Umbrella Nine” trial that capped years of prosecutions after Hong Kong’s 2014 “Umbrella Movement” protests. Three academics, three politicians and three activists were tried and convicted together to send a message to “troublesome” sectors of civil society.
The mugshots of those issued with arrest warrants this week depict not gun-slinging outlaws, but amiable-looking intellectual types.
Their “very serious crimes”, according to police, consist mostly of calling for sanctions to turn the tide of political repression in Hong Kong. In the terms of the controversial national security law under which the warrants were issued, this is considered “subversion of state power”, an offence punishable by up to life imprisonment.
How extradition with Hong Kong works
Hong Kong is nominally a self-governing region of China under the “one country, two systems” model agreed to when the UK handed the territory back in 1997.
However, the national security law was drafted in Beijing and applied to Hong Kong after the tumultuous, protracted protests that gripped the city in 2019. These were prompted, ironically, by fears the region’s autonomy was breaking down.
A curious feature of the national security law is its purported extraterritorial effect. It claims jurisdiction over any person of any nationality who has committed any of its offences anywhere in the world.
Whether the Hong Kong government can realistically bring these people to trial is another matter entirely.
The international law of extradition (technically, in Hong Kong’s case, the surrender of fugitive offenders, as only states engage in extradition) includes certain safeguards. The act must be a sufficiently serious crime in both places, and it must not be a political offence.
The warrants in question fail both of these tests, notwithstanding the Hong Kong government’s hyperbolic claims about national security.
Moreover, extradition is guided by bilateral agreements between jurisdictions. Numerous Western countries, including the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong when the national security law was imposed, foreseeing the politicization of criminal justice.
The pro-democracy figures targeted this week knew which way the wind was blowing when they left Hong Kong. They will probably never return there, a sad fact to which they may already be reconciled.
However, they may also need to reconsider their travel to jurisdictions which do maintain extradition agreements with Hong Kong or China.
The risk goes beyond formal arrest and extradition. The bounties on offer may encourage vigilantism, and sympathetic governments may turn a blind eye to or even facilitate extra-legal rendition of the eight exiled activists.
This is illustrated by the 2015 case of the five Hong Kong booksellers who disappeared from various locations, including Thailand, and later showed up in China where they “confessed” to crimes in the state media.
The existence of overseas dissidents has long rankled Beijing – as the lifetime of spats with the Dalai Lama illustrates – but in recent years it has shown increased determination to monitor and influence the overseas Chinese diaspora.
The government has even set up secret “overseas police offices” in Europe, North America and elsewhere, as bases for information-gathering and harassment.
Hong Kong brought to heel
In the past, China and Hong Kong could be regarded as distinct political entities, but over the last decade, the “firewall” between the mainland and the region has gradually collapsed. Hong Kong’s government and political system have been stripped of democratic elements, and its national security and law enforcement apparatus are now dictated by the mainland.
Compared with its mainland counterpart, the Hong Kong government goes to greater pains to paper over its actions with a veneer of law and legal process.
However, this tactic is increasingly transparent as it ramps up its pursuit of authoritarian goals. The cooption of Hong Kong’s once-celebrated legal institutions undermines their already-damaged legitimacy.
Hong Kong’s civil society has been brought to heel via a suite of repressive reforms spanning the legal, political, education and media sectors. These new warrants are the latest sign that China will never stop trying to muzzle its critics, so long as they are willing to speak out.
Ultimately, these warrants may be futile overreach – for the sake of their targets, we can only hope that is so – but the intention behind them remains condemnable.
Brendan Clift is Lecturer, The University of Melbourne
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Shanghai Cooperation Organizationâs facade of unity
This week, India virtually hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, which brought together the most powerful nations across the Asian landmass and beyond. Among those in attendance were no less than Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The latest SCO Council of Heads of State meeting was particularly crucial since it formalized the full membership of yet another major Asian power, Iran. In his opening remarks, Modi congratulated the SCO’s latest member while also signaling that Russian ally Belarus could soon also join the power grouping.
Member states also discussed other pressing issues including infrastructure connectivity challenges, cross-border security, insurgency and terrorism, and the increasingly volatile situation in Afghanistan, which shares a border with multiple SCO members.
Putin, the embattled Russian leader who just saw down a mutiny some have characterized as a coup attempt, used the occasion to project strength and expressed hope for greater strategic cooperation with like-minded Asian powers.
Under India’s rotational watch, the SCO was adamant that its expanding ranks do not necessarily signal a budding new military alliance. Yet all key members are committed to facilitating a more multipolar international order.
Despite their shared strategic interests, however, the latest SCO summit also revealed growing tensions among the world’s two largest nations, namely India and China.
Although India has refused to align with the West in the name of non-alignment, Modi implicitly criticized China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and robust defense ties with Pakistan, India’s archrival.
Reeling from its own festering border disputes with Beijing in the Himalayas, the South Asian powerhouse is also expanding defense cooperation with China’s rivals in the South China Sea, most notably the Philippines, a US treaty ally.
For his part, Putin put on a brave face amid a Wagner Group mutiny, a grinding war in Ukraine and economic recession at home.
Striking a defiant note, the Russian leader claimed that his country is stronger than ever, as it “counters all these external sanctions, pressures and provocations and continues to develop as never before.”
“I would like to thank my colleagues from the SCO countries who expressed support for the actions of the Russian leadership to protect the constitutional order and the life and security of citizens,” Putin told his SCO colleagues in a televised address from the Kremlin, referring to expressions of diplomatic support by neighboring states at the height of Russia’s political crisis last month.
SCO members such as India and China have been crucial to Russia’s economic resilience in the face of Western sanctions.
Russo-Chinese trade has exploded on a year-on-year basis. In the first five months of this year, bilateral trade totaled more than US$93.8 billion, making a 40.7% increase on an annual basis. Meanwhile, India has rapidly become Russia’s largest oil customer, just as Western economies have punitively scaled back their Russian energy imports.
Russia hopes that the inclusion of Iran, another major strategic partner that is also battling Western sanctions, would further enhance its pivot to Asia by facilitating the creation of a pan-regional trade and infrastructure development regime, with Central Asian SCO members as the geographic linchpin.
Putin was also visibly pleased by the vocal support of his most powerful SCO ally. China, the organization’s founding member, called for a new global order beyond the dictates of the West. Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping firmly stood by his Russian ally and, accordingly, accused the West of a “narrow-minded” and zero-sum approach to 21st century geopolitics.
“We should truly respect each other’s core interests and major concerns, and firmly support each other’s endeavor for development and rejuvenation. We should keep in mind the overall and long-term interests of our region, and make our foreign policies independently,” Xi told his SCO colleagues.
“We must be highly vigilant against external attempts to foment a new Cold War or camp-based confrontation in our region. We must resolutely reject any interference in our internal affairs and the instigation of ‘color revolutions’ by any country under whatever pretext,” he added, underscoring the need for solidarity among Eastern powers in face of supposed Western aggression.
Although committed to a more multipolar international order, India has a radically divergent strategic calculus than its Russian and Chinese SCO counterparts. For starters, the South Asian powerhouse, which is also a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) along with the US, Australia and Japan, does not face any Western sanctions.
By and large, the West has relented in the face of India’s insistence on continuing its robust trade and defense ties with Russia. If anything, the West is focused on providing carrots rather than sticks in its dealings with India.
During his recent visit to the White House, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed onto a series of defense deals, which are explicitly designed to reduce his country’s historical dependence on Moscow.
India’s divergent outlook was clearly on display during the SCO summit. On one hand, Modi implicitly criticized China’s BRI, refusing to back the infrastructure development initiative embraced by all other SCO members.
“Strong connectivity is crucial for the progress of any region. Better connectivity not only enhances mutual trade but also fosters mutual trust,” said the Indian leader while not mentioning either the BRI or China explicitly.
“However, in these efforts, it is essential to uphold the basic principles of the SCO charter, particularly respecting the sovereignty and regional integrity of the member states,” he added, effectively echoing “debt trap” accusations against China’s signature infrastructure initiative.
If anything, the Indian leader also took a jab at China’s warm ties with neighboring Pakistan. During the SCO meeting, where both the Chinese and Pakistani leaders were in attendance, Modi warned against the “use [of] cross-border terrorism as an instrument” of foreign policy, referring to allegations that Pakistani intelligence elements have been involved in violent operations inside India.
Growing geopolitical differences stretch way beyond India’s own backyard. New Delhi is now actively backing China’s rivals in Southeast Asia. Earlier this year, the South Asian power officially kicked off negotiations for the sale of BrahMos supersonic missiles to Vietnam, which has long been at loggerheads with China in the South China Sea.
Just days ahead of the SCO summit, India also held high-stakes bilateral strategic dialogue with the Philippines, another major claimant state in the Beijing-claimed waters.
Following its acquisition of the BrahMos missle system last year, Manila is intent on further expanding military cooperation with the South Asian powerhouse. Anticipating booming ties, India is set to dispatch its first-ever defense attaché to Manila.
During the 5th India-Philippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation meeting in New Delhi last week, co-chaired by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines Enrique Manalo, India reiterated its support for the Manila-initiated arbitral tribunal award at The Hague in 2016, which rejected Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea as incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
In a joint statement, India and the Philippines underscored the “need for peaceful settlement of disputes and for adherence to international law, especially the UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea in this regard.”
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian
Parks chief: No policy to reclaim Thai âambassador elephantsâ
Repatriation of Sak Surin was a special case agreed on by Thai and Sri Lankan governments
The government has no policy to reclaim Thai “ambassador elephants” in Sri Lanka, says Atthapol Charoenchansa, acting chief of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP).
Mr Attapol was responding on Thursday to reports by local media in Sri Lanka that the Sri Lankan government would sue Thailand if it wanted to bring back two male elephants — Pratu Pha and Srinarong — that were sent as goodwill gifts in 2001.
Earlier, the ailing Thai elephant Sak Surin was flown from Sri Lanka to Chiang Mai on Sunday after living there for 22 years. The 30-year-old jumbo is now under the care of the Elephant Conservation Centre in Lampang province.
Sak Surin is one of three Thai elephants gifted to Sri Lanka in 2001 as a goodwill ambassador for the country. He changed hands many times before ending up at Aluthgama Kande Viharaya in the south of Sri Lanka, where he carried holy relics during annual Buddhist parades.
Mr Attapol said Thailand had not “reclaimed” Sak Surin, stressing that the repatriation of the ailing jumbo was made under a diplomatic agreement. Both countries agreed to have the animal receive medical treatment in Thailand.
He also insisted there was no rift between the two countries over the repatriation of the elephant.
Natural Resources and Environment Minister Varawut Silpa-archa has given clear guidelines that Thailand would coordinate with veterinary faculties at universities in Sri Lanka to help take care of Thai ambassador elephants, said Mr Attapol.
As for other Thai elephants living abroad, a survey must be conducted to see their living conditions as well as determine measures to take care of them, said the acting DNP chief.
On Friday, deputy DNP director-general Rungnapa Phatthanawiboon will hold a meeting of a sub-panel on elephants at the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to discuss the sending of goodwill ambassador elephants, said Mr Attapol. Conclusions will be forwarded to the National Committee on Elephants, he added.
Defence grills stepmother of 5-year-old girl allegedly murdered by father
He put it to the man’s wife that she was shown pushing the bookshelf to close up the naughty corner space, but she disagreed, saying she did not know why she did that.
The lawyer pointed out that the woman was shown resting her hand on the bookshelf while her husband was beating the girl up.
“My instructions are that during that period of time, you were complaining to (the accused) about (the deceased’s) behaviour. Do you agree or disagree?” asked Mr Cheong.
“I cannot remember,” answered the woman.
“At that point in time, did you think about comforting (the deceased)?” asked the lawyer.
“I cannot remember anything on that day. What I did, or what I said, or what I think,” said the woman.
“Because you walked away, you actually did not feel sorry for (the deceased) at all,” asserted the lawyer.
“My answer is still – I don’t know. I cannot remember how I feel,” replied the woman.
The lawyer then played footage where the accused reached behind him to get a cane that was resting on the bookshelf. After this, he strikes his daughter repeatedly with it.
Mr Cheong asserted that woman had walked in and out of the video frame because she was trying to pass the cane to her husband, but left when she saw that he already had it.
The woman again said she could not remember why she went in and out.
Mr Cheong then played another video clip which showed the accused pushing his daughter and son in a pram down a corridor towards his flat.
The two children were shown to be subdued, staring at their stepmother, who was filming the video and silently following instructions to sit down or stand up.
In the background, cooing sounds could be heard and the accused’s legs could be seen as he lay on a mattress. He shared that mattress with his wife and her two baby daughters.
THE WAY SHE ADDRESSED THE KIDS
In the video, the man’s wife can be heard talking to the man’s children.
She referred to the girl as “Eh” or “A”, and to the boy as “guy”.
“Why did you not call (the deceased) by her name?” asked Mr Cheong.
“On that particular day, I don’t know why. But I did call sometimes by her name,” answered the woman.
“So sometimes you call her by her name, most of the time you just refer to her as ‘eh’?” asked the lawyer.
“No. Sometimes I just … didn’t even talk to her,” answered the woman.
The woman had been shown in video footage calling her stepson “jantan”.
“The Malay word ‘jantan’ is actually a disrespectful way of referring to a male person, do you agree or disagree?” asked Mr Cheong.
“No,” replied the woman.
The lawyer also showed the woman a video of the girl playing with her milk bottle and suggested to the woman that she had taken this video to send to the accused, because she wanted him to come home and punish the girl.
The woman disagreed.
She also disagreed with the lawyer’s suggestion that she was jealous of her husband’s two kids.
The trial continues, with the first tranche set to end this Friday and resume again in September.
If convicted of murder under Section 300(c), the man can be sentenced to death, or to life imprisonment with caning.
CNA Explains: The challenges school bus operators face and why they need parents to pay more
LACK OF DEMAND, HIGH COSTS
The costs of running a bus service are high, and providing school bus services rarely covers them, said the industry players.
It is the supplementary income from transporting workers and tourists that keeps the school bus business “viable”, said Mr Adrian Yeap, CEO of bus company Yeap Transport.
“No school bus operator can survive on just school bus fare in Singapore,” he told CNA’s podcast Heart of The Matter.
Previously, school bus operators had pupils in the morning session and the afternoon session to cater to, but things changed after the move to a single session in 2000.
“The price did not catch up,” said Mr Yeap.
For instance, if it costs S$100 a day to run the service today, what he may earn from three trips may be S$30, he said.
To earn the remaining money just to break even, he will have to drive more, he noted.
“How many more hours do you want the school bus driver who’s responsible for the very life of your children at the back to drive?” he asked.
“The poor bus driver has to drive many hours in order to make ends meet,” he added.
EXPECTATIONS OF LOW FEES
The industry is also limited by parents’ perceptions on how much school bus services are worth, bus owners said.
“A lot of the parents have a mindset that they are willing to pay this much,” said Mr Darry Lim, spokesman from the Singapore School Transport Association.
Parents of children in local primary schools currently typically pay between S$110 and S$180 per month for nine months, he told Heart of The Matter.
Will Bidenâs âMade in Americaâ policy work?
“A nation can be transformed.” With those stately words, US President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law in August 2022.
Despite the fractured state of US partisan politics, the Democratic Party guided the largest energy subsidy in US history into being with a new national ethos for greening the economy while tilting global competition in the United States’ favor.
The IRA is part of a broader policy agenda with the CHIPS and Science Act that provides US$280 billion in federal funding for research and the fabrication of logic and memory chips inside the United States.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act also funneled $700 billion into electrification, renewable energy and digital infrastructure and has already funded 20,000 projects since 2021.
Understandably, there is some consternation over the market-distorting effects of Washington offering Beijing-style direct subsidies for those willing to bet on the Democrats’ “Make it in America” agenda.
While governments with cash to spend – like members of the European Union – have pledged their own net-zero industrial plans and chips subsidies, Asian leaders, like Indonesian President Joko Widodo, have hinted at trade remedies to protect Asia’s budding electric vehicle (EV) industry against unfair market practices abroad.
US industrial policy is not just transformative for the United States, but also for Asia, and intentionally so. The United States will subsidize hydrogen investments twice over: first for its production and again when it is used by energy-intensive industries across Asia, such as steel, aluminum, chemicals and heavy manufacturing.
Such double-sided stimuli will change the parity of competition against China and with allies and net importers of energy like India, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Carbon levies, currently under consideration, will also hamper exports from countries like Malaysia or Indonesia.
These subsidies also have some broader macro effects on Asia. While Trump-era tariffs created little or no jobs at home, the 2017 US tax reforms incentivized US multinationals to repatriate trillions from East Asia back into the domestic economy.
The IRA will funnel these profits into investments rather than shareholder dividends. The United States is already the largest recipient of foreign investments – thanks to its position as the world’s most productive economy by some margin – and the IRA will divert more capital from East Asia into the United States.
But the Biden administration’s industrial policy trifecta is not just an innovation moonshot of the 1960s. There is also an ideological shift – which National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan describes as the “new Washington consensus” – from a productivity-driven economic policy towards a statecraft-led one that aims to secure a comfortable lead over any rival on emerging technologies.
If US sanctions are designed to stop China from ever landing on the Sea of Tranquillity, the subsidies are the flipside of the same coin.
But today’s geostrategic competition is also a challenge different from that of the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into global production networks with well-diversified fiscal revenue. The United States would never be able to outspend it.
Nor is China the only rival. The puzzlement over whether electric vehicles from US allies – but commercial rivals – like Japan or Germany qualified for IRA tax credits showed how distinguishing allies and adversaries is a second-order priority for US legislators.
Other subsidies favor 5G equipment from a private consortium led by US cloud companies and Chinese military contractors – such as ZTE, Inspur, Phytium and H3C – over trusted South Korean and Nordic manufacturers like Samsung, Ericsson and Nokia.
But perhaps the most conspicuous plans pertain to moving the manufacturing of high-end processors and dynamic random-access memory chips to the United States.
The market leader, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), estimates that the construction costs are likely to be at least four times higher than they would be in Taiwan due to skill shortages and administrative red tape. Its CEO, Morris Chang, candidly called the US effort to bring chipmaking home an “exercise in futility.”
Absent of commercial logic, such endeavors seem eerily similar to Beijing’s attempt at forced technology transfer, especially in light of US export controls towards South Korean and Taiwanese-owned microchip manufacturing plants in China.
Given such negative outlooks and global ramifications, it is an open question whether Biden’s gamble will pay off.
Many economists are negatively disposed to US industrial policy as markets inevitably make better informed and diversified bets on future technologies than government officials.
Postwar activist policies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were successful because they redirected scarce resources into sectors that held more long-term promise. They then ceased to be productive once the countries matured into dynamic market economies.
East Asian countries could shield their ministries from lawmakers and lobbyists representing special interests. Elsewhere, industrial policy is prone to failure in stakeholder systems like the United States or China, where lobbying has been elevated to performance art.
Auto bailouts, Cray supercomputers, solar panels and attempts to synthesize fuel from coal failed because the government supported unviable ideas or companies that were politically well-connected.
In contrast, innovations often labeled as successful – from the early breakthrough in semiconductor technology in the 1960s to Covid-19 vaccines – were not thanks to the White House betting on the right technology or company, but the results of broader support for scientific research.
In the coming decade, the United States will spend $100 billion annually on industrial support, a sum larger than the entire government expenditure of Singapore. While many programs will fail, a few projects may prolong US industrial pre-eminence, especially if the incentives are carefully designed to exploit Asia and Europe’s struggle with higher energy prices.
As Samuel Huntington said of the United States’ relative industrial decline against Japan back in 1988, “The United States is unlikely to decline so long as its public is periodically convinced that it is about to decline.”
Such aversion to defeatism – real or imagined – is indispensable in mobilizing the nation into something previously unthinkable, or even slightly un-American, like industrial policy.
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama is Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy and Senior Fellow of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
PUBG: India-Pakistan gaming love story ends in jail
The love story of a Pakistani woman and an Indian man who met through popular online game PUBG has been making headlines in India after the couple landed up in jail.
Seema Ghulam Haider, 27, met Sachin Meena, 22, through the virtual gaming platform a couple of years ago and recently travelled to India so that she could live with him.
She entered India illegally in May along with her four young children and they were staying with Mr Meena in Greater Noida – a city in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh – for over a month, police said.
On Tuesday, the couple was arrested. A court has remanded them in jail for 14 days. The woman’s children are with their mother. The couple have told reporters that they want to get married and live together. Police say they are carrying out a detailed investigation into the case.
The India-Pakistan love story has sparked conversations around the role the virtual world plays in fostering real-life relationships across geographical borders.
Sparks fly on PUBG
Ms Haider married Ghulam Haider, a resident of Pakistan’s Sindh province, in February 2014. The couple had four children – three daughters and a son – together.
Five years after their marriage, her husband moved to Saudi Arabia for work. Ms Haider began playing PUBG to keep herself occupied.
“I used to play PUBG for two to three hours a day and I got to know Sachin while playing the game,” she told BBC Hindi. The two exchanged phone numbers and began speaking regularly.
After their relationship had progressed over three years, Ms Haider decided to move to India to marry Mr Meena.
She has accused her husband of beating her and has told police that she had divorced him. Mr Haider has denied the domestic violence allegations and the divorce.
He has accused Ms Haider of selling their house in Pakistan and running away with their children and jewellery.
How the couple met
Police said that Ms Haider and Mr Meena first met in Nepal in March and stayed in a hotel for a couple of days before they returned to their respective countries.
In May, Ms Haider travelled to Nepal again on a tourist visa, this time with her four children. From there she took a bus to Delhi, senior police official in Greater Noida Saad Miya Khan told the BBC.
Police said she told them that she did not sell her husband’s house but a plot of land that belonged to her parents to gather money for the trip and got the idea of entering India via Nepal from a YouTube video.
Mr Meena, who lives in Rabupura town in Greater Noida and works in a grocery shop, rented a room to stay with Ms Haider and her children.
His landlord, Girish Kumar, told the BBC that he never suspected anything illegal as Mr Meena had provided necessary government documents while renting the house and that his parents too had come to visit the couple.
How they got caught
The couple reportedly met a local lawyer for advice about Ms Haider’s residency in India last week but the lawyer informed the police about them, Times of India newspaper reported.
“I was startled when I found that she and her children were carrying Pakistani passports,” the lawyer told the newspaper, and added that Ms Haider was making inquiries about the process of getting married in India.
The lawyer claimed that Ms Haider had said that her husband [Ghulam Haider] would physically assault her and that she had not met him in four years.
He also claimed that Ms Haider got up and left as soon as she was asked about her Indian visa and that one of his associates then followed her.
“When I learnt that they were living in Rabupura, I informed the police,” the lawyer said.
Along with the couple, the police have arrested Mr Meena’s father as well for sheltering Ms Haider without a visa.
The couple have appealed to the Indian government to help them get married.
Ms Haider’s husband, meanwhile, claims that his wife has been “seduced” through PUBG and wants her to be returned to Pakistan with their children.
Additional reporting by Riyaz Sohail and Shumaila Khan
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