In recent years, the Chinese government has made its desire to leave China in response to growing Sino-American economic rivalries.
The Shinzo Abe administration has already provided grants worth 70 billion renminbi ( US$ 445. million ) to Chinese companies in order to move their output from China to Southeast Asia or back to Japan as of 2020.
The Chinese government could conduct more in-depth examination of trade in sympathetic goods with China on national security grounds, frequently in cooperation with US and European authorities, thanks to changes to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act that year.  ,
However, it has been proven by numerous assessments that the two nations ‘ long and extensive trading relationship poses a significant barrier to dispersion. In fact, the supply chains that Japan’s and China’s latest economic partnership are characterized by are intricately intertwined.
As Japan’s largest trading partner, China buying more than 21 % of Japan’s export while providing more than 24 % of the products that support the Chinese economy bite on. These figures must be cut in order for Japan to truly detach itself from China.  ,
Articles show Chinese production is decoupling from China, if slowly and cautiously, according to several factors. The most pronounced is a worry of being barred from the attractive US market as China enacts more stringent tech and trade sanctions and begins to censor China’s transshipment and different roundabout efforts to evade the disciplinary measures.
A kills of big Chinese companies are eager to establish new production facilities in the US, while only 27 % of Japanese businesses with business relationships to China expressed a desire to grow those relationships. Toyota and Panasonic are two examples of US companies that have received grants for their further growth in the US.  ,
The difficulty of Japan Inc.’s ability to compete in China is also making their move toward the Chinese business more difficult. Japanese car sales in China dropped to an unprecedented 17 % next year as a result of a rapid shift toward EVs produced by Chinese companies like BYD.
Toyota and Nissan have collaborated with local Chinese companies to succeed while Mitsubishi has to cut back on its manufacturing in China. Japanese carmakers ‘ losing battle with Chinese EV manufacturers is suggestive of Chinese home electronics manufacturers that were once common in Chinese stores and were being overtaken by companies like Haier, Xiaomi, and Hisense.
Opponents of Japan’s decoupling from China also benefit from the wider restructuring of the two nations ‘ various trading partners. The slowing expansion in China, combined with concern for wider US and EU punishment, is altering global supply chains in ways that could lower Japan’s deal with the Middle Kingdom.
News from TSMC’s opening of new semiconductor factories in Japan, India, Mexico, and ASEAN’s attempts to entice companies away from China and a slow but steady flow of reshoring by US companies all point to a prospect where Japan must less rely on “made in China” products.
However, these evaluations, which are based on the patterns in producers and made goods, ignore a significant portion of the factor that will ultimately decide whether Japan’s large decoupling from China will succeed or fail.
The same cannot be said of the numerous Chinese companies that operate restaurants, stores, companies, and clinics that are based in China, although Chinese manufacturers that produce in China for Chinese markets may possibly still sell to China when factories are moved abroad.
Considering that manufacturers only account for about 40 % of the roughly 12, 000 Japanese companies that are currently active in China, ignoring this enormous presence of the Japanese service sector paints an incomplete picture of decoupling trends and potential outcomes.
Indeed, a casual look shows that Japanese service providers are deepening, not uprooting, their presence in China amid all the talk of decoupling. For instance, Japanese chain of convenience stores have steadily increased their presence in China since 2019, with Lawson almost tripling its number of locations over the same time period.
Meanwhile, fast- fashion giant Uniqlo’s presence in China grew from 711 stores in 2019 to 925 in 2023. Restaurant chain Saizeriya grew from 120 stores in 2016 to 387 over the same period. Aeon, the owner of a shopping mall, opened its first branch in 2010 and now has 22 locations in China.
These businesses ‘ growing presence in China has not been seen on a comparable scale in any other nation. The” China- only” success of the Japanese service industry is glaring from any perspective.
Among Lawson’s 7, 344 foreign outlets, 6, 288 are in China, representing 86 %. The equivalents for Uniqlo, Saizeriya and Aeon are respectively 57 % (925 out of 1, 634), 81 % ( 387 out of 478 ), and 59 % ( 22 out of 37 ).
Decoupling is a difficult task because Japan’s rapidly shrinking population makes it more urgent for these companies to expand abroad.
Japan Inc. will need to pay more attention to businesses in the services sector, not just its manufacturers, as it looks at ways to lessen its economic reliance on China.
The Japanese government should invest the same effort in helping Japanese service providers navigate a transition that could disproportionately harm their interests while implementing policies to reduce the volume of goods traded with China.