In October 2023, the European Parliament approved the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) with 578 votes in favor, 24 against, and 19 nays.  ,
The European Commission will look into possible cases of economic force under this legislation and report its findings to the congress. If the legislature is satisfied that force has taken place but is unable to end it diplomatically, it may get restitution from the insulting party or put in place countermeasures.
At the 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit, where member states unveiled the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion ( CPEC ), this was also on the agenda. This mechanism will make it easier to share information and issue first warnings, allowing for the implementation of proactive measures to combat , financial coercion, and threats.
While American policymakers have been thinking about this issue and countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and other nations have officially objected to economic coercion, the issue has received less attention in Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asian nations have been less frequently the goals of coercive actions than nations like Australia and South Korea, which can be explained by their hedging tactics and dislike of political increase. However, this does not imply that they need to lower their troops.
Chinese borders officials immediately decided to  in September 2023, halt imports and n&bp, and turn up six tonnes of Taiwanese lobsters, forcing vendors to market their produce for a fourth of the going rate. China is the largest destination andnbsp for crab exports in Vietnam.  ,
Profits have resumed, but this incident might get a reaction to Vietnam’s mid-September upgrade andnbsp of its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the United States. Similar politically motivated restrictions have been imposed in the past on Philippine , bananas&inbph, and Vietnamese&ndbhpH, lychees & bbch.
Given their susceptibility to economic pressure, especially from Beijing, complacency from South Asian states may be inappropriate. China is the largest trading partner of all Association of South East Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) members, with the exception of Laos and Brunei. It is also the biggest investment partner and nbsp of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunéi, Cambodia, and the Philippines.  ,
Additionally, research has discovered a negative correlation between the per capita success of the target state and the effectiveness of Taiwanese coercion, supporting the idea that poorer nations are more susceptible to economic pressure.
Some Southeast Asian nations are also likely to experience stronger political ramifications from Chinese financial strain. China frequently focuses on districts that are crucial to the local politics of the intended states in order to impose social costs on their leaders.  ,
Due to Chinese sanctions and company leaders ‘ outcry against their president’s sea activity in the South China Sea, this strategy was only partially successful there.
Southeast Asian nations ought to take proactive measures to safeguard their markets. ASEAN nations should n’t rely on the G7’s goodwill, despite the fact that its CPEC is intended to safeguard both its members and smaller economies.  ,
When China outlawed the trade of American goods like coal, barley, and wine, Washington’s support was merely rhetorical. The sanctions truly had an impact on the United States because it increased its own exports of those commodities by$ 4.6 billion.
By adopting a “defensive” monetary policy, relatively weaker states can also defend themselves against financial force. For instance, steps like building up foreign exchange reserves and expanding local capital markets may stop capital flight. It is also best practice for institutions to recognize monetary coercion, support, and affected industries when they are badly targeted.
The most effective measures to prevent economic coercion will remain international because South Asian states may compete with China’s economic weight. ASEAN is unlikely to be able to replicate an organization like the ACI or an nbsp.  ,
Its prescriptive nature runs counter to ASEAN’s standard style, which places a strong emphasis on consensus, non-interference, and state sovereignty. Additionally, there is still disagreement among Southeast Asian nations regarding China, and they have found it difficult to come to an understanding on policies that could hurt Beijing.
Just when parties are willing to collectively phone out and listen to financial force and discuss the costs of retribution that result from a combined response is an arrangement like the ACI effective. However, it is doubtful that ASEAN nations will jeopardize their ties with China and endanger their own markets.
In the absence of a particular anti-coercion measure, ASEAN would gain from advancing programs that guarantee the economies of its members remain empty. Says can divert their trade and investment relationships to reduce costs if they are the targets of economic force when free business operates as intended.
This occurred when Australia found new areas for its exports, selling sanctioned  fuel to Taiwan, South Korea, and India in order to protect itself from Chinese trade restrictions.
ASEAN can assist in mobilizing support for initiatives that strengthen the resilience and interconnectedness of their markets. Policy formulation in this context may aid in fostering consensus because Asian states have historically found it simpler to agree on financial issues than strategic ones.
The long-term growth of ASEAN may be aided by advocating for a free and fair dealing program, which will also improve says ‘ financial and national security.
Max Broad is a New Colombo Plan Scholar and Research Intern at the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia.
This andnbsp, article, and was initially published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with a Creative Commons license.