Decoding China’s ‘new normal’ Taiwan policy

Cina this week closed its largest ever army drills in the Taiwan Strait with a series of important statements, such as the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Authorities issuing its 3rd White Paper, the particular title of which uncovers the “new normal” of its Taiwan policy.

The title of this 3rd White Paper upon Taiwan reads: “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification within the New Era. ” The paper includes content quite distinct in tone plus tenor from the two earlier White Papers on Taiwan.

In a nutshell, the White Papers claims that reunification is not just the Communist Party of China’s “historic mission” but is also “indispensable for the understanding of China’s revitalization. ” It promises the party has adopted, under Chief executive Xi Jinping’s management, “new and revolutionary measures in relation to Taiwan. ” This “new starting point for reunification” is referred to as the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy.

Clearly, regarding all civilizational says, especially those with imperial impulses and system-shaping capabilities, understanding the significance of semantics can be significant in interpreting their likely trajectories, with implications everywhere. And given this diagnosis, the “new normal” of China-Taiwan connections has become the subject of media commentaries.

Shifting saliences

To begin with, the title of the White Papers issued this week – the first one under President Xi Jinping – marks a significant change in stance through the earlier two, that have been titled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (February 2000) and “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” (August 1993).  

That change will be the inclusion of “New Era” in the name, which is defined simply by Xi as isolating China from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strengthens and bide your time” thesis.   Especially right now, in the run-up towards the 20th Party Congress, where Xi is going to be seeking an unparalleled third term in office, this radicalization has been there for those to see.

Second, the title of the paper also involves an interesting twist associated with words, from “reunification of China” to “China’s reunification, ” which alludes to an assertion toward an even more China-driven reunification. This particular reminds of a comparable earlier twist from Chairman Mao Zedong’s “liberation” of Taiwan to Deng’s “integration of Taiwan, ” saying the same thing while using the different semantics.

The third distinction much more operative and much too “in the face” to be missed also by cursory Tiongkok watchers. Here, compared to the White Papers of August 1993 and February 2k , it has expunged their earlier commitment that “any issue can be negotiated” as long as Taiwan accepts that there is only one China and pursue separatist policies. This again reinforces Beijing’s growing certainty in effecting this reunification on its own terms.

Fourth, unlike the earlier 2, this third White Paper showcases relatively stronger allusion towards use of military power in effecting reunification. It elucidates how in the “new era, ” “with significant growth in its political, economic, ethnic, technological, and military strength, there is no possibility that China will allow Taiwan to be divided again. ”

This assertion, of course , is described in terms of military breakthroughs of Taiwan and other foreign powers trying to split China, implying United States and its friends and allies.

Fifth, the release of the White Paper recently was accompanied by other statements to state China’s non-renunciation of use of its military.   This element was, for example , elucidated on Wednesday in a formal declaration issued by the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

Announcing the successful completion of military drills within Taiwan Strait, it said, “But we are going to not renounce the usage of force, and hold the option of taking just about all necessary measures. This really is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities. ” 

All this is now being called the “ new normal ” of China’s Taiwan policy plus China-US ties, exactly where extensive military drills are expected to become more regular to effect blockage of ocean routes and the airspace of Taiwan, therefore circumventing its growing economic partnerships and further reducing the number of nations that continue to acknowledge Taipei as a sovereign nation-state.

This ratcheting up in cross-Strait relations, however , has implications way above China-US-Taiwan triangular connections.

Strategic implications

The fact that Chinese state media confirming on military exercises has been seen as alluding to transgressions over the Taiwan Strait’s median line becoming a “ regular ” exercise has already had a visible effect on regional supply ranges, with companies evaluating short-term and extensive costs and techniques.

At least, these military exercises have demonstrated Beijing’s capacity to inflict an enormous yet uncontested disruption to regional trade runs as and when it selects.   In the midst of post-pandemic resilience initiatives, these disruptions are bound to trigger panic.

Even a cursory look into these trade moves shows how, for that first half of this year , about half of the world’s container fleet plus nearly 90% from the largest vessels by tonnage passed through the particular Taiwan Strait hooking up East Asia to markets worldwide.

It is well understood that any kind of tension in the Taiwan Strait will indicate trade routes getting extended, increasing transit times and pushing up freight rates, with goods and services achieving consumers much later and at a much higher price.  

But may not such disruptions become equally counterproductive pertaining to China’s own whopping foreign trade, specifically its commerce from the eastern ports associated with Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo and Guangzhou, the four largest slots facing the Taiwan Strait?   The solution to this is obviously detrimental.  

China may be world’s largest trading country, but the world provides witnessed President Xi’s sustained willingness in order to sacrifice economics to get his politics; find for example his “zero Covid” strategy that will continues to shut down huge parts of the country, greatly slowing its economy.  

However , what brings relief will be the broad consensus about how China continues to be strongly circumscribed in the tactics. Unleashing a direct military strike seems as yet completely unaffordable among its plan choices.

So instead of an incessant amphibious assault, China is likely to select a strategy of verbose “warrior diplomacy” accompanied by intermittent unannounced and unacknowledged naval plus aerial blockades associated with Taiwan, and get this routine the “new normal” of its time-tested “gray-zone operations, ” which will make the American response indecisive.

When elephants fight …

Because the saying goes, when elephants fight it is the grass that suffers. All this “new normal” does not augur properly for Taipei.

For instance, at end of its current military drills, the particular People’s Liberation Army’s East Theater Command word said in a statement : “Theater forces can keep an eye on the changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, continue to execute training and preparing for combat, arrange regular combat readiness patrols in the direction of the Taiwan Strait, and resolutely defend nationwide sovereignty and territorial integrity. ” 

On Wednesday, this was corroborated simply by Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reporting that an overall of 17 Chinese fighter jets travelled across the median line of the Taiwan Strait.

China and taiwan claims that it is america that is trying to change the status quo by conditioning and upgrading its relations with Taiwan, which Beijing states as its territory. So , Chinese Vice-Foreign Ressortchef (umgangssprachlich) Mother Zhaoxu told China Central Television (CCTV) upon Tuesday, “China has no choice but to fight back and protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. ”

But while China persists in the view that will its relations with Taiwan are an inner matter and that this reserves the right to create the island under its control, by force if necessary, Taiwan rejects China’s claims, saying that only the island’s people can decide their future.

The United States, at the same time, continues to claim that trips to the island such as the recent one from the Speaker of its Home of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, are regimen and that China is with them as pretexts to ratchet up its force posture against Taipei.

Then there are internal disjunctions of Taiwan’s democracy, which have witnessed the particular cyclical nature of the Kuomintang (KMT or even Nationalist Party) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sharing power on a two-term schedule. This logic predictions the KMT, viewed as relatively much cozier with Beijing, coming back to power within 2024.

Some of this was shown in how, could China’s military exercises had ended, Toby Hsia, deputy leader of the KMT, travelled to China to get what his party said was a prearranged visit to meet the Taiwanese business community. Understandably, President Tsai Ing-wen , leader of the presently ruling DPP, known as this “disappointing to the people, ” although Hsia’s China check out involved no established meetings or even a visit to Beijing.  

China’s neighbors in the mean time are taking notice of this power posturing, even though their responses remain disjointed.

Whereas newly selected South Korean Leader Yoon Suk-yeol was the only regional innovator to give Pelosi the slip even when this individual was in same city, India is planning high-altitude joint military workouts with all the United States less one hundred kilometers from the tension-ridden  China-India ceasefire collection, and its timing in October will coincide with China’s twentieth Party Congress in Beijing.

All this does not augur well for local peace and safety.

Adhere to Swaran Singh on Twitter @SwaranSinghJNU .

______________________