China’s key spy bases in Cuba sign a new entry in Beijing’s global intelligence activity by targeting America’s southern seaboard.
According to satellite imagery and open-source information, the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) reported this month in a report claiming that China is likely operating multiple spy facilities in Cuba.
CSIS points out that these facilities, which are strategically located to control delicate communications and activities on the US’s southeast coast, which is home to many military installations and space launch facilities.
The document highlights four lively places in Cuba capable of conducting digital monitoring activities: Bejucal, El Salao, Wajay and Calabazar. The largest is near Bejucal, which is known for its Cold War story.
The El Salao site, which is currently under construction near Santiago de Cuba, will reportedly house a sizable circular antenna array ( CDAA ) for enhanced air and maritime domain awareness.
The presence of these services, according to the CSIS report, highlights China’s desire to expand its international intelligence-gathering capabilities and give Beijing a considerable window into the region.
It also provides an understanding of the political and corporate intentions behind China’s appearance in Cuba, including its support for one of the few remaining Communist Party-led governments in the world and its potential for gaining exposure to military installations.
Even with limited access to these SIGINT features, the CSIS report suggests, which would drastically improve China’s ability to monitor and connect with its storage assets and capture data from US spacecraft.
According to the report, China’s detective facilities in Cuba raise concerns for US policymakers and local partners because their concerns could be related to the US’s long-term corporate impact from China’s gradual expansion there.
Cuba’s strategic value is attributed to its place in the Caribbean, which allows it to control the flow of maritime traffic to the US without really imposing a blockade.
China’s growing reputation in Cuba may have an impact on the countries that recognize Taiwan as a protectorate. In the event of a US-China fight over Taiwan, Cuba becomes a useful tool in China’s arms.
In terms of defense, Robert Ellis claims in a 2023 post for the Colombian Army Center for Strategic Studies that China was good to send military personnel to Latin America to help special operations and cleverness collection.
Ellis adds that these employees could make plans to disrupt critical US services or routes like the Panama Canal, observe US military activities from the Caribbean, or even launch attacks against the country.
Ellis points out that China may employ special operations or intelligence to trigger preventative crises in the region, such as food crises or supply chain disruptions. He mentions how these forces may contribute to US partner countries ‘ economic or political unrest by leveraging their economically dependent partners to support their work.
He adds that China does approach anti-US colleagues in the region and outside Venezuela and Nicaragua for assistance. Ellis asserts that China has the potential to damage the US directly or indirectly, which is aided by the significant presence of Taiwanese companies in the area.
Beyond Cuba, China has deployed a dual- wire strategy to increase its impact in Latin America, featuring financial, social, information and digital elements.
Jessica Brandt claims in a Brookings Institution criticism that China has expanded its involvement with more than 20 nations in Latin America to increase its influence on the world’s political system in the future.
But, Brandt notes that China’s forceful monetary activities, which use tactics like as boycotts, import restrictions and export quotas, can foster dependence in Latin American countries and undermine great governance, potentially contributing to illegitimate migration.
Brandt goes on to say that China presents itself as aiding Latin American cultures in their fight against the US-led, dishonest republics.
She also claims that China’s data activities in Latin America support a myth that portrays democracy as illogical and dishonest while promoting the advantages of its autocratic system of governance. She mentions, for instance, that China has been willing to draw attention to US duplicity while promoting human rights while abusing immigrants.
According to Brandt, China has also provided security to at least nine Latin American nations, with the use of surveillance equipment that could impair individual freedom and lead to illegal immigration.
These innovations may challenge the Monroe Doctrine’s historic claim to be the US’s supremacy over Latin America. According to this theory, any foreign forces ‘ interference in the American political affairs could lead to hostility toward the US.
Daniel Vrablic makes the observation that the US’s dominance in Latin America may be ending in a June 2023 content. Vrablic notes that China has increased its business with the area, with more than US$ 700 billion anticipated by 2035, opening up a doorway for greater political and military control.
According to Vrablic, Russia has been increasingly trying to break US military ties with Latin American nations and to become a major distributor of weapons, with Iran even making an effort to lessen its influence there. He argues that the US does develop a strategy to hinder China and Russia, its around- peer adversaries, from making more inroads into Latin America.
He points out that these revisionist powers establish spheres of influence that defy the US-led rules-based international order. According to Vrablic, this has contributed to increased US security concerns, including the flow of illegal drugs through the US-Mexico border, organized crime organizations that bribe politicians and law enforcement, and a marked decline in Latin America and the US’s democracy.
According to Vrablic, Latin America is a place where the US does not benefit from its geographical isolation in comparison to its close-knit neighbors, making it necessary for the US to reevaluate its strategy by making fresh diplomatic and security arrangements.
In line with that, Anthony Constantini mentions that a” Monroe Doctrine Plus” should promote pragmatism rather than focusing on an ideological perspective in a February 2023 article for The National Interest ( TNI).
Constantini further asserts that Monroe Doctrine Plus should not conflict with existing alliances and avoid sacrificing US national interests in favor of existing ones. He points out that if the US breaks its commitments to Europe and East Asia, Europe may choose to remain neutral in a Taiwan conflict, Eurasia may fall under Sino-Russian rule, and the US may struggle to keep Chinese influence in Latin America.