China to defuse its $13 trillion LGFV debt time bomb? – Asia Times

China to defuse its $13 trillion LGFV debt time bomb? - Asia Times

China’s leadership getting scheduled for later this month could be the catalyst for policymakers ‘ development of a defused US$ 13 trillion time bomb that threatens Asia’s largest economy.

Although China’s home crisis is in the news, debt issues plaguing local governments across the country also call for immediate action.

The recent boom in local government financing vehicles ( LGFVs ) raises questions. For bill, the vast majority of it the off- balance- strip form, now nearly rivals China’s annual&nbsp, gross domestic product ( GDP ).

It’s obvious why international investors are concerned about China’s monetary foundations given the definition drama surrounding the large property developers and the glut of LGFVs, especially in a time of extreme global uncertainty.

With US&nbsp, bond yields staying increased, Japan skirting crisis and Europe walking in position, the second quarter of 2024 is n’t simply fertile ground for China to produce an export boom.

The good news, however, is Xi Jinping’s Communist Party seems ready to tackle the ticking LGFV time bomb. According to local press reports, a long-awaited economic strategy session scheduled for July 15 to August 18 will aim to find a resolution to the enormous debt load.

At the upcoming Third Plenum, Xi’s inner circle is anticipated to permit local governments to retain more of the fiscal funds that currently go to Beijing at the upcoming election. The necessary tax reforms in China’s system could be a significant step in the direction of eradicating one of the most pressing threats to financial stability.

It could also be a vital step toward investing more in high- value manufacturing sectors while stimulating&nbsp, now languid domestic consumption. The issue is that mainlanders save more than they spend because of the lack of social safety nets.

Increased revenues would reduce local governments ‘ dependence on property and land sales to stay afloat and give them more opportunity to invest in innovation and productivity-boosting industries. Additionally, they would lessen debt issuances ‘ appeal.

It’s difficult to overstate how significant a pivot could be. Fixing China’s financial cracks is only one part of the process. The other is building economic muscle that puts China on a path toward growing&nbsp, better, not just&nbsp, faster.

Since the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis, Beijing has relied heavily on China’s 34 province- level administrative areas to fuel economic growth. Regional leaders in Beijing frequently caught attention even before that by reporting higher GDP figures than the national average.

This accounts for the nation’s infrastructure arms race. Now, the bill for all those ginormous skyscrapers, &nbsp, six- lane&nbsp, highways, international airports and hotels, white- elephant stadiums, sprawling shopping districts and amusement parks is coming due.

Local governments raced to outbuild and outgrow each other to get Beijing’s attention. Photo: Asia Times Files / iStock

“LGFVs played an essential role in funding&nbsp, China’s colossal infrastructure buildout, which has also helped drive up land prices in what was previously a virtuous growth cycle”, notes Henry Storey, an economist at the Lowy Institute think tank. Land revenue provided an ostensibly inexhaustible source of largesse for subsidies in the heady days before China’s real estate collapse.

This growth model was not without its drawbacks, Storey notes”. After decades of bingeing, he says, “LGFV debt comprises&nbsp, well over half of China’s GDP – a totally unsustainable dynamic when median return on assets has hovered around 1 %. Local governments currently invest about 19 % of their total fiscal resources in interest payments.

Over the next few weeks, Xi has a chance for a major reboot. Since taking the reins in 2012 and 2013, Xi pledged to recalibrate an economic model that he said had become “unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable”.

But “despite momentous economic change since, many of the government’s stated ambitions remain the same”, says economist Diana Choyleva at Enodo Economics.

For this “vision of high- quality development” to ultimately be achieved, it will depend on “whether Xi can fully implement” reforms, Choyleva says,

Without the structural changes required to create genuine consumer demand, Choyleva goes on to say that a successful implementation of these supply-side reforms wo n’t be sufficient to put the economy on a sustainable growth path. However, the majority of those are glaringly absent from the discussion.

The weeks to come may provide this missing link and mark one of the biggest adjustments to China’s financial system since the Xi era, if not the last couple of decades. &nbsp, It would also be a major down payment on Xi’s pledges to revamp China’s$ 61 trillion financial sector.

According to Sherry Zhao, an analyst at Fitch Ratings,” We believe local and regional governments will still face challenges in supporting LGFVs due to falling land concession revenue.” Because they have more state-owned assets and financial resources for long-term debt resolution, economically stronger regions are more likely to have higher resilience.

A more active capital market would lessen boom-bust cycles, which would be less volatile. Additionally, reforms would give municipalities more room to put policies into practice so that they can spread the fruits of economic growth.

Analysts concur that significant disruption is required. ” China’s economy is not cratering, but it is definitely running at well below potential, and the government seems reluctant to do what it takes to get it up to full speed again”, says Arthur Kroeber, an analyst at Gavekal Dragonomics.

As ever, it will all come down to implementation. Over the past 13 plus years, Xi has occasionally shown to be more adept at recommending bold reforms than putting them into practice. That may be about to change, though, in foundational ways.

Last week, the party’s 24- member Politburo noted that a “resolution on comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese modernization” will be circulated among the Beijing elite. By 2035, the nation should be transformed into a “high-level socialist market economy.”

According to Haibin Zhu, an economist at Morgan Chase &amp, Co., one reason for reform hope is that, unlike in the past when significant policy pivots were announced, the coming Third Plenum does not coincide with significant changes in top leaders.” This is not the case this time,” Zhu says.

Continuity, economists say, could improve the odds that reforms are implemented.

Xi Jinping, the leader of China, has a chance to fulfill his high-quality growth promise. Image: Asia Times Files / Getty

According to Robin Xing, an economist at Morgan Stanley,” The Plenum will likely support the economic framework that has taken shape in recent years: prioritizing chokepoints in supply chain self-sufficiency and tech innovation.”

Shuang Ding, an analyst at Standard Chartered, expects this month to be a key moment for Xi’s legacy as a reformer. We anticipate that the Plenum will reiterate the party’s support for the expansion of the private sector, a stronger state sector, and the crucial role that the market plays in resource allocation.

More importantly, Ding adds,” we think they’ll take steps to remove cross- region barriers, encourage innovation and green transition, and improve income distribution. Additionally, we anticipate that they will place greater value on security, addressing security risks in the financial and housing sectors, and strengthening supply chain resilience. Potential fiscal and tax reforms, which are crucial for long-term sustainability, will likely receive a lot of attention from the market.

Even though it might not significantly increase GDP in the short run, this latter push may be a game-changer for local governments. In fact, efforts to repair the local government’s finances would cause more economic turbulence in the near future.

According to Xing,” the focus on deleveraging the housing sector and LGFVs continues to put downward pressure on growth and deflation.”

LGFVs have found it much harder to issue bonds in recent months as regulators have made more effort to lessen risks in one of China’s most debated industries.

That “points to the continued regulatory tightening since the fourth quarter last year and we have n’t yet seen any signs of relaxation”, says Laura Li, an analyst at Standard &amp, Poor’s.

” This suggests that it’s increasingly difficult for low- quality, low- rated LGFVs, including those from affluent provinces such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang, to issue bonds in future”, Li added.

However, allowing local governments to keep more tax revenue could have a significant impact on incentives. As economist Jonathon Sine, author of the Cogitations newsletter, explains, Beijing in decades past wanted revenues routed through its own coffers for purposes of control, most importantly over subordinate levels of government and redistribution.

Once you realize that the central government is essentially responsible for the majority of the money, Sine explains. ” Indeed, once transfers are accounted for the oft- cited central- local fiscal gap disappears. Unfunded mandates did occur following the budget reform in 1994, but in a more nuanced way.

Locally generated income is frequently transported from the provinces to Beijing and back again. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP

However, he claims that the “problem was – and still is – in the nature of the intergovernmental transfer system.” ” Beijing bureaucrats apportion funds to the provinces, who are in charge of apportioning funds to prefectural cities, who are in charge of apportioning funds among county-level units, and who are in charge of apportioning funds among townships,” the phrase goes.

Sometimes, Sine notes,” the provinces send funds directly to the counties, by- passing the cities. Each level also requires its own funds. And each level may take months before passing on the funds it has received. By the time funds get from top to bottom, a year or more can pass”.

China could reduce the effectiveness of the world’s second-largest economy, destabilize distorted incentive structures, and help Xi deliver on his high-quality growth promises by putting an end to this M C Escher-like financial system.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek