Asia (Page 998)

The ASEAN Solidarity Exercise in Natuna 2023 (ASEX-01N), hosted by Indonesia in September 2023, was the first joint military exercise exclusive to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The exercise was called a major accomplishment as ASEAN member states considered to be “pro-Beijing” such as Cambodia attended.

This is not the first intra-ASEAN military drill held against a backdrop of tensions in the South China Sea. The ASEAN Multinational Naval Exercise (AMNEX) took place in Thailand in 2017, shortly after the South China Sea arbitration ruling. The second AMNEX was held in the Philippines in May 2023 amid renewed tensions between the Philippines and China.

AMNEX 2023 saw seven of 10 ASEAN member states contribute naval vessels — the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar sent observers. Despite the exercise being held facing the South China Sea, no sensitivities over the disputes emerged that could hamstring the event.

Unlike AMNEX, which involves only ASEAN navies, ASEX-01N engaged armies, air forces and navies. Announcing plans for ASEX-01N in June 2023, commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Admiral Yudo Margono said he hoped the exercise, planned to take place in the North Natuna Sea, would strengthen ASEAN’s centrality and preserve regional stability.

Margono’s Cambodian counterpart, General Vong Pisen, later contradicted him — stating that the exercise was proposed by Indonesia when they were the ASEAN chair, but that Phnom Penh and several other ASEAN members did not respond. Cambodian defense authorities further claimed that all nine other ASEAN members had yet to respond to Margono’s announcement.

The core issue was the exercise location, as it involved the North Natuna Sea. This area includes Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, which overlaps with Beijing’s “nine-dash line” claim. Cambodia and Myanmar were absent in the initial planning conference, likely to avoid provoking China.

Given the wariness of ASEAN member states, Indonesia shifted the location of ASEX-01N from the North Natuna Sea to areas that “include Batam and the waters of South Natuna”, with priority given to “areas that are prone to [natural] disasters” — especially the Lampa Strait and Sabang Mawang Island.

ASEX-01N involved five warships — two from Indonesia and one each from Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia also contributed air assets, while the remaining ASEAN countries and prospective new member Timor-Leste sent observers.

The Philippines and Vietnam did not send assets. This could be due to Manila’s limited capacity, given its earlier participation in training exercises with foreign partners, and the need to maintain assets in the South China Sea amid tensions with China.

Vietnam did not provide a reason for the absence of participating assets, though Hanoi may be balancing its South China Sea interests with maintaining ties with Beijing.

Indonesia emphasized the non-combat nature of the exercise, which included humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, and maritime security.

Margono avoided mentioning the South China Sea disputes during the ASEX-01N opening ceremony, instead stressing intra-ASEAN unity. But he later remarked that “those who carry out any exploration or activities in that area must not violate state territory.”

When asked if ASEAN was sending a stronger message against Beijing’s South China Sea claims, he replied, “we have had a firm stance”, adding that ASEAN has agreed to hold military exercises annually and future iterations will be expanded to full war drills involving the armies, navies and air forces of member states.

While ASEX-01N’s turnout was modest compared to AMNEX 2023, Margono’s remarks signal the potential for institutionalized and greater intramural participation. But the controversies leading up to the drill suggest it is difficult for an ASEAN member to use the exercise to push for its interests in the South China Sea.

The exercise is likely to be confined to non-traditional threat scenarios typically seen in pre-existing ASEAN-centric exercises. If Margono’s vision of future full war drills is to be realized, it is likely to include just a handful of ASEAN militaries, since members with closer ties to Beijing would refrain from meaningful participation.

There is also an often overlooked practical aspect. Upscaling joint training exercises requires resource and manpower commitments, which could strain ASEAN militaries’ limited capacities — especially in the context of economic and security challenges at home. ASEAN militaries have to be judicious in the exercises they choose to commit troops and assets to.

ASEX-01N symbolizes ASEAN’s commitment to strengthening the bloc’s centrality and represents a bold effort to promote tri-service joint military training beyond existing interactions.

To increase its prospects of institutionalization and expansion, future iterations of the exercise must contend with the expectations of individual ASEAN member states — meaning that future exercises will remain fraught with uncertainty.

Collin Koh is Senior Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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After Hamas’s deadly attacks on October 7, a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) appeared inevitable. Benjamin Netanyahu’s government apparently had little choice, given that the attack shocked Israel to its very core.

The IDF failed to prevent or plan for the attack, while the government’s hubristic view that Israel could tacitly support Hamas’s rule in Gaza, thereby dividing the Palestinians while indefinitely containing their aspirations for statehood, proved fundamentally flawed.

But nearly two-and-a-half weeks into the war, an Israel ground invasion is only starting to materialize. Instead, both sides have settled into an all-too-familiar pattern of tit-for-tat rocket and airstrike exchanges. Why, then, have Israel’s actions not matched its rhetoric?

Two intertwined factors – incorporating both Israel’s internal and external politics – explain this operational inertia.

The first is US-Israel relations. Biden administration officials initially refused to call for Israeli restraint and even backed a ground invasion. This differs from previous rounds of escalations, where US pressure was a critical factor in persuading Israel to agree to a ceasefire.

But the familiar dynamic soon returned. Biden warned Israel to respect the “laws of war” and protect Gaza’s civilians. The White House also overcame Israeli intransigence to allow aid to enter the territory. Now, since Hamas has released some hostages, the US is again pressing for time to bring more Israeli civilians home without a further escalation.

Israeli pundits are railing against a supposedly weak and gullible US for falling for Hamas’s delaying tactics. But the reality is closer to home. It is not Hamas, but internal dissent at the highest levels of Jerusalem’s political and military elite that has caused the US to temper Israel’s war plans.

Ground invasion and the day after

Since the conflict began, US officials have been pressuring Israel to answer two questions. First, what a ground invasion would look like. And second, how Israel would translate any military success into a comprehensive political plan for Gaza after it removes Hamas from power.

It is Israel’s inability to answer these questions that have driven the US to tentatively push for de-escalation. Israel’s political and military elite remain divided over what a ground invasion would look like and what the long-term political objectives should be.

Before October 7, Israel’s leadership was united in a belief that keeping Hamas in power was preferable to reoccupying Gaza, given that any intervention would create an unpalatable number of casualties and significant international censure.

Hamas’s ferocious attacks destroyed this consensus, but a new one has not replaced it. The IDF is pushing for a comprehensive ground invasion that would seize the entire territory by land, sea and air. Other security experts advocate that Israel tighten its blockade and occupy the less-populated areas in Gaza’s southern and middle regions.

In so doing, Israel could apparently avoid a prolonged urban conflict in the most densely populated parts of the territory but still force Hamas to eventually capitulate by making Gaza unliveable.

Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners also advocate this siege model but want to use it as a springboard to advance their political agenda, that is, complementing a military occupation with civilian settlement and eventual annexation of these sparsely populated parts of Gaza.

Netanyahu’s position

Netanyahu himself is racked by at best indecision and at worst the paranoia that has recently underlined his leadership. Israel’s longest-serving prime minister remains reluctant to abandon the pre-war status quo and would prefer short-term, surgical raids by special forces.

Complicating matters, both Netanyahu and the IDF elite are distracted by blame-shifting, with media leaks pointing the finger at each other for the October 7 attacks and Israel’s ongoing political and military paralysis.

It is therefore unsurprising that nobody in Israel can agree on the even thornier question of what comes next if the IDF does manage to end Hamas’s rule. Israel’s public representatives have even verged on boasting that no one currently cares to consider this question.

The entry of the relatively moderate Blue and White Party into Israel’s “emergency coalition” government has partly assuaged the US. Party leader, now defense minister Benny Gantz, has convened a committee charged with determining the future of Gaza after Hamas.

But this may be too little, too late. Israeli governmental committees are not known for their swift decision-making, while Netanyahu has consistently worked to monopolize power and minimize the policy-making inputs of Blue and White, the IDF elite and even his own defense minister.

It is this indecision, internecine bickering and – most of all – the lack of a long-term plan that most worries the Biden administration. And for good reason. My own research has illustrated that occupiers often fall into “the occupation trap.” They fail to engage in post-intervention planning and as a result, sink into an unwinnable quagmire with no achievable political goal.

The result is usually an ignominious withdrawal, coupled with a post-exit political future that looks remarkably like the pre-occupation status quo – contemporary Afghanistan represents a timely example.

The US has learned these lessons – Israel apparently has not. This is all the more surprising given that when Israel created a “security zone” in southern Lebanon in 1985, then defense minister, Shimon Peres, claimed that year would be the IDF’s last in the country. It was not.

Israel did not end its occupation until mid-2000, having failed to achieve any of its objectives and empowering Hamas’ allies – Hezbollah – to take credit for an Israeli “retreat”.

Israel, then, does not need to look as far afield as Iraq and Afghanistan to realize the strategic folly in failing to plan for a day after Hamas scenario.

Rob Geist Pinfold is Lecturer in Peace and Security, Durham University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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