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Analysis suggests that Russia may be in the early stages of a new offensive in Ukraine. On the ground, Moscow’s forces have intensified their attacks along major sections of the frontline. They have made small territorial gains over the past few weeks, taking new territory or reclaiming territory liberated by Kiev’s forces during last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops have switched to “active defense”, according to the commander of the country’s ground forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi.

Does this imply that Ukrainian efforts to resist and ultimately defeat Russia’s aggression are in serious peril should the offensive begin? This will depend on an assessment of both Russian and Ukrainian capabilities and political will. Regarding the latter, neither side shows any signs of backing down.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was unequivocal at a forum with local government leaders on January 16 that he was unwilling to enter into any negotiations with Ukraine. Instead, he predicted “a very serious blow” to Ukrainian statehood as a result of the war.

Putin’s Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week, left little doubt about his determination to continue fighting for the complete liberation of all of Ukraine’s currently Russian-occupied territories.

Men and materiel

But do Russia and Ukraine have the military capabilities to match their leaders’ rhetoric?

This is an issue of both equipment and manpower. As is obvious from the repeated and increasingly successful Russian airstrikes against a wide range of targets across Ukraine, including Kiev and the country’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, Russia has the arms and ammunition to continue its air campaign while Ukraine still lacks adequate air defense capabilities.

Similarly, Ukrainian ground efforts are hampered by increasingly serious ammunition shortages. Summarising several press reports, the non-profit policy organization the Institute for the Study of War reported on January 8, 2024, that Ukrainian troops “are struggling to completely compensate for artillery ammunition shortages” while their use of small drones for combat purposes was hampered by “insufficient electronic warfare capabilities.”

When it comes to manpower, both sides are struggling. In his year-end press conference, Putin ruled out any further mobilization. And, according to Vadym Skibitskyi, the deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Moscow can rely on a steady stream of some 30,000 volunteers a month.

As a consequence, however, the question facing the Kremlin is how the Russian economy will deal with manpower shortages as workers are diverted to the frontlines.

The planned mobilization of around 500,000 additional troops in Ukraine is also likely to be difficult and divisive for very similar reasons.

Russia has benefited enormously from Iranian and North Korean military supplies. As is obvious from the recent visit of the North Korean foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, to Moscow, these links are likely to grow and further boost Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.

Ukraine is, in many ways, even more dependent on foreign aid to sustain its defense against Russia’s aggression – yet this aid has become much more precarious.

With no clear pathway to unlocking further US military aid and uncertainty over future EU financial commitments, Ukraine has become dependent on a small number of donors, including Germany and the UK.

Ukraine’s predicament is exacerbated by the fact that its own defense sector is not yet fully on a war footing, which is partly why it has struggled to manufacture sufficient ammunition for its troops in the field.

Even if this were to change soon, including with the help of Western investment, Ukraine’s lack of strategic depth would remain an impediment. Russian drones and missiles have the reach to target military production facilities anywhere in Ukraine. Ukraine, for now, lacks the air defense systems to effectively counter such attacks.

Security guarantees

This leaves the question of deterrence as potentially the last obstacle in the path of a Russian counteroffensive that could deliver Putin’s threatened serious blow to Ukraine’s statehood.

First raised in a G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine in July 2023, bilateral agreements between Ukraine and several of its Western allies to strengthen defense and security cooperation are now beginning to take more concrete shape.

The UK-Ukraine agreement on security cooperation was signed on January 12, 2024. French President Emmanuel Macron has announced that a similar deal between France and Ukraine will be finalized in February.

The UK-Ukraine agreement provides for “comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.” It pledges “prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, any military escalation and/or a new aggression by the Russian Federation.” It also promises “support for Ukraine’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.”

Considered side-by-side, enthusiasm in the West for supporting a Ukrainian victory on the battlefield and for NATO membership is, at best, lukewarm.

However, if this is a model for similar deals in the future, if the US and other key NATO members reach similar agreements with Ukraine, and if these – as yet untested – commitments are followed through and don’t suffer the fate of the Budapest Memorandum (a 1994 document that Ukraine agreed to remove all of its nuclear weapons in return for recognition from Russia and others of its statehood) whose security assurances proved useless, this would indicate a clear Western determination to prevent a major Russian counteroffensive resulting in yet another illegal Russian land grab.

These are many and significant “ifs” and NATO’s goal of preventing Ukraine’s defeat is far more modest than Zelensky’s war aims. Yet, precisely because they are more modest, and therefore more credible, they could prevent a much more dangerous broader escalation between Russia and West without condemning Ukraine to a permanent defeat.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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In a striking display of advanced military capabilities, North Korea and Iran have made significant strides in their ballistic missile programs, posing new challenges to global security dynamics.

This month, Military Watch Magazine reported that North Korea had launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) to replace the Hwasong-12, which entered service in 2017 and has the potential to strike targets across the Pacific including US military facilities on Guam.

Military Watch Magazine cites the North Korean state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) saying that the test “was aimed at verifying the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.”

The report says that the missile is estimated to have a range of over 4,000 kilometers and is developed as a direct successor to the Hwasong-12, an older liquid-fueled missile design expected to be replaced by the new type in 2025.

At the same time, The Warzone reported this month that Iran had used its new Kheiber Shekan medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) for the first time in Syria’s Idlib province, marking one of three attacks carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF) in three countries over the past two days.

The Warzone notes that the Kheiber Shekan MRBM strike was likely the longest ever by an Iranian ballistic missile. The report says the type is Iran’s most advanced solid-propellant missile, with a reported range of 1,450 kilometers and a separating warhead.

Solid-fuel missiles have several advantages over liquid-fuel designs. In particular, they do not need to be fueled before launch, are more accessible and safer to operate, and require less logistical support, which increases their survivability compared to liquid-fuel systems.

Liquid-fuel systems generate more thrust and power but require more complex technology and extra weight. Solid missile fuel burns quickly, produces a large amount of thrust over a short time and can be stored without degradation for long periods.

North Korea and Iran are known to have mutually supported each other’s missile programs, swapping critical technologies in a transactional partnership made stronger by US sanctions and pressure.

In a November 2023 article for 38 North, Samuel Ramani mentions that while North Korea and Iran’s materiel assistance to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated global headlines, North Korea-Iran cooperation has continued under the radar.

Ramani says that North Korean technology transfer to Iran dates back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and subsequently weakened as Iran sought commercial ties with South Korea after the 2015 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, he says those ties resurged after the 2018 US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement.

Asia Times reported in February 2021 that North Korea and Iran resumed cooperation in developing long-range missiles in 2020, citing a confidential UN report. The report stated that the continued collaboration included transferring critical parts, with parts shipments occurring that year.

Ramani notes that Iran’s Khorramshahr missile, first launched in 2017, resembles North Korea’s Musudan or Hwasong-10, which the latter tested in 2016.

He notes that while North Korea’s sale of R-27 rocket engines to Iran has yet to be confirmed, reports of Iran’s purchase of Hwasong-10 missiles go back to 2005. US intelligence has tracked Iran’s search for a high-performance North Korean propulsion system since 2010.

Jonathan Corrado mentions in a September 2023 article for War on the Rocks that Iran’s Shahab-3 missile could be based on North Korea’s Nodong missile and that Iran’s space launch vehicles bear similarity with North Korea’s Hwasong-14 missiles.

Given those examples, it is plausible that Iran may have developed its Kheibar Sheikan with North Korean assistance, despite Tehran’s insistence that the missile is an entirely indigenous weapon.

North Korea and Iran each have cause to advertise their progress in missile technology, ranging from weapons tests to threat signaling and showcasing their wares to potential buyers.

In a December 2023 study for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Daniel Salisbury and Darya Dolzikova note that North Korea has long exported ballistic missile technology, making up 40% of all ballistic missile sales to developing countries from 1987 and 2009 for a total of 500 systems.

Salisbury and Dolzikova note that newly developed North Korean systems are more attractive to potential customers while phasing out older systems creates a surplus of goods and expertise for export.

They say that North Korean surplus missile technology could be tempting to clients with a limited capability to absorb new technology, constrained budgets, or systems that are inoperable or need spare parts.

However, they also point out that North Korea may choose not to export its latest missile technology including hypersonic weapons. Still, they note that North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end systems as Iran has an extensive missile manufacturing capacity and export capability.

As for Iran, Lara Jakes and David Sanger note in The New York Times this month that the use of an advanced missile such as the Kheiber Shekan in Syria when a less-advanced missile could do the same damage shows that Iran is interested in testing its missile technology in combat while also sending a warning to the US and Israel.

North Korea and Iran’s advances in missile technology may become increasingly attractive to Russia, which is known to have used North Korean missiles and Iranian drones in the ongoing Ukraine war.

This month, Asia Times reported on Russia’s use of North Korean short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to strike Ukraine and its efforts to source Iranian missiles to replenish its depleted stockpiles.

Russia most likely used North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 SRBMs, analogous to the Russian Iskander-M and US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The KN-23 notably resembles the Iskander-M and may have been designed with Russian assistance.

Iran could sell ballistic missiles to Russia but it may be holding back for multiple reasons. These include a desire to keep critical technologies confidential, maintain a missile stockpile in case of a wider Middle East conflict as well as the doubtful military value of ballistic missiles to break the stalemate in Ukraine.

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