Donald Trump has aggressively pursued a radical overhaul of US foreign legislation since taking office in January 2025.
In early March, the State Department terminated international aid courses supporting political opposition and regime change in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, deeming them little more in the US “national attention”. After releasing 553 prisoners, Trump even overturned the Biden administration’s decision to renounce the country’s sanctions against Cuba.
The Inter-American Foundation, which had long advocated for economic and community-led growth in Latin America, wasdissolved by the government’s executive order in February.
The African Development Foundation is also slated to be eliminated under the executive order, while AFRICOM, the US military demand for Africa, could become following.
Trump’s drastic reductions also apply to organizations like the US Institute of Peace ( USIP), the US Agency for Global Media, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and US support for political prisoners around the world.
Trump’s crackdown on the foreign legislation establishment is well underway in the face of a divided criticism, a essentially loyal GOP, and key supporters in power.
In place of the US-led international order, he is embracing a harsh, America First, transactional approach to international politics centered on defense risks, economic force through tariffs and sanctions, and greater emigration policies—stripped of the common lip service to individual rights.
A more intense assault on unauthorised immigration has always been one of Trump’s top priorities. In March, a federal prosecutor “expressed doubts toward those challenging the national policy,” according to a New York Times article. His administration began moving illegal immigrants to Guantanamo Bay in the first few weeks of his name.
Then, alleged Cuban crew members are being sent to El Salvador under a confinement agreement with Trump supporter El Salvador President Nayib Bukele, while Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras have also agreed to accept third-party citizens, under the pressure of taxes being imposed and other financial measures.
Trump wants to have more control over international proper infrastructure. In a US$ 9 billion package in March, a consortium led by US company Blackrock highlighted the importance of the private business in achieving his objectives.
Foreign state-run advertising criticized the Hong Kong-based owner, and labeled the shift as “economic force”. Trump has made more and more hints at potential defense activity as Chinese companies are being removed from the Panama Canal. Trump’s idea of sending personal defense companies to Venezuela to overthrow President Nicolas Maduro came up in his first term, a practice that might come up again.
Conflicts with NATO supporters have played out publicly, undermining the transatlantic alliance that has been a vital part of the US-led global order, with Trump wielding taxes and even risks of conquest to force partners.
Trump also uses US assistance as a means of highlighting how dependent partners are on one another, such as halting intelligence-sharing and military assistance to Ukraine, one of the various pressure tactics used to entice Kyiv into talks with Russia.
Elon Musk then made a brief fessnote about ending Starlink services in Ukraine, which are essential for the country’s military communications, before backtracking. This pattern of signaling intent is common among Trump allies—before the March 14 executive order was issued to force Voice of America to shut down, Musk publicly called for its closure in February.
Trump must break away from the ingrained civil service and foreign policy bureaucracy, which he struggled with during his first term, to continue with his overhaul. Through leaks, delays, and policy adjustments, career officials, including some Republicans like John McCain, fought against his agenda.
Their efforts were complemented by the GOP’s disdain for the civil service, which has shifted increasingly left in recent decades. Before Biden rescinding the executive order in January 2021, Trump issued Schedule F, an executive order that reclassified some career positions as political appointments, making them easier to dismiss.
It’s not easy to break up a decades-old political system. Since World War II, Washington has built a vast ecosystem of NGOs, think tanks and development agencies that shape US foreign policy and diplomacy.
President George W. Bush leaned heavily on hard power with the start of the Global War on Terrorism even as his administration introduced initiatives like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ( PEPFAR ), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the President’s Malaria Initiative ( PMI ) to maintain international goodwill while engaging in unpopular wars.
These programs were all repurposed by various administrations, given lucrative contracts, and had close ties to policymakers, along with organizations like the Peace Corps, the US Trade and Development Agency, and others mentioned above. Over time, a revolving door of agencies, contractors and policymakers has reinforced and expanded this system, consolidating funding and influence.
The United States has always been the primary beneficiary of America’s foreign assistance programs, according to USAID’s website, which has since openly stated that almost 80 % of USAID contracts and grants have been awarded to US companies.
Of the$ 48 billion in official development assistance ( ODA ), 21 % went to governments, 20 % to nonprofit organizations, 34 % to multilateral organizations, and 25 % to other countries.
Despite reaching nearly$ 80 billion in 2023 under the Biden administration, ODA still accounted for just 1.17 % of the federal budget. Trump’s efforts to undermine ODA may include reducing its spending as well as dismantling the foundational institutions that have for decades been the foundation of American foreign policy.
His purge of the civil service is much more aggressive now that he is in his second term. After labeling institutions like USIP and the Inter-American Foundation as politicized and aligned with Democratic priorities, Trump has made it harder for Democrats to justify billions of dollars for projects abroad—especially given longstanding concerns over ODA’s efficiency.
The acting deputy inspector general cited poor oversight, weak risk management, and human capital issues as examples of USAID’s” chronic, systemic weaknesses” in 2015, citing poor oversight and weak risk management.
The Carnegie Endowment discovered that both the State Department and USAID were overstretched and had little evidence of their effectiveness by the year Trump began to draw more attention to the issue. Aid often went to corrupt governments, was too small to make an impact, and failed to give Washington meaningful leverage.
USIP, which was originally developed in 1984 for conflict resolution, has received more negative reviews from its critics as a means of nation-building. Similar to this, AFRICOM, which was founded in 2007 to advance US national security interests in Africa, has focused on counterterrorism with mixed success. Aid recipients also face restrictions, often required to purchase goods and services from donor countries like the United States.
Other ODA activities, such as global media outreach, have lost their strategic edge as rival powers have undermined their effectiveness, as do more traditional approaches promoted by Democrats and seasoned foreign policy experts.
In response to competition from alternative international networks like Al Jazeera, RT, and China’s state-run media, US-backed media outlets like Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty have seen their influence diminish.
These competitors have reshaped the global information sphere, while decentralized information and social media platforms have proven more effective at reaching audiences.
In addition, China’s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) has demonstrated the viability of direct investment in developing infrastructure, offering countries tangible advantages in exchange for concessions like port access for Chinese ships. In contrast, Israel and Russia have shown how to advance foreign policy objectives unilateral military force.
Trump views America’s lingering military and economic dominance as key tools for reasserting US power in a changing global order. His more aggressive military stance and mercantilist economic philosophy prioritize coercion over multilateralism, looking for immediate and tangible benefits in the national interest.
Trump’s strategy emphasizes swift tariffs, threats, and direct pressure to drive markets and cause immediate reactions, an approach that is unpalatable given the ingrained culture of the current foreign policy bureaucracy, unlike previous administrations that invested in steady economic and diplomatic maneuvering.
If successful in reshaping American foreign policy, Trump will force a departure from Washington’s historical promotion of free trade. Bill Clinton, Bush, and Barack Obama, former presidents, all lowered tariffs. Biden eased some with the EU, but he raised China.
Trump’s proposed tariff increases and trade wars have far-reaching effects, implying that the US may no longer be a reliable consumer market, that the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency is in doubt, and that it will also raise concerns about protecting international sea lanes.
Promoting American democracy was never a top priority until recently, but it is now a rhetorical one. While the US has long backed autocrats, Trump’s acceptance of strongman rule extends to adversaries.
His recent use of the term “dictator” for Russian President Vladimir Putin while avoiding such language for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demonstrates a deliberate loosening of ideological restraints.
Additionally, the US has long opposed international law, with its refusal to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Criminal Court. Yet, it has traditionally played a central role in upholding basic global legal frameworks, with Europe often supporting its efforts.
Washington’s acceptance of border changes by Russia and Israel, which it is now shunning, reflects a growing respect for force, whether from allies or adversaries. China, Iran, and other countries are taking note, and they may soon begin to use economic and political pressure to lessen the autonomy of smaller nations.
Trump’s ongoing dismantling of the foreign policy establishment does not indicate an American retreat from global affairs but rather a radical overhaul. Washington is moving away from the post-World War II and post-Cold War neoliberal order it established and is characterized by multilateralism in favor of a more confrontational, transactional system based on unilateral strength.
The deterioration of institutions is yet another indication of the “unipolar moment” of America and a return to a more erratic and unpredictable era of global affairs.
John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D. C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to a number of foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas, was published in December 2022.
This article was produced by Economy for All, an Independent Media Institute initiative, and is now republished with permission.