Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s interventionist position, and the United States ‘ imposition of tariffs, as financially foolish.
If the democratic motto was again that” under completely business everyone wins”, it is now logical to think that, under protectionism, people will lose. It would also suggest the close of globalization, which had come at a great financial cost for the US.
In just the past few weeks, the US-Canada tax crisis has escalated significantly. The Ontario government responded to Trump’s threats with a 25 % tariff on electricity serving the states of Minnesota, New York and Michigan, prompting Trump to announce that he would raise tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminium to 50 %.
Soon after, Ontario authorities suspended the energy level climb, and Trump has now also walked up his hostile price hike.
Similar activities are taking place on the other side of the Atlantic as also, as the European Commission has responded to US tax risks on steel imports with its own package of actions targeting a range of American products.
Trump’s tale tilt has caused tumult, and seems to work contrary to US company objectives. But, a critical look at the benefits of free business – and the US ‘ unique position in relation to it – may help us understand the rise of protectionist conversation, and the US ‘ trade war with China.
Free business serves US objectives
Economic history shows that, when the US ‘ technological development outstripped its competitors, it was able to change completely trade into an instrument that protected its personal interests. At this point it, along with its allies, began to promote free trade as vital to the development of less advanced economies.
This resulted in globalization, which was what made it possible to manufacture goods in China at lower costs, thus keeping US wages and inflation in check and increasing the profits of US companies. As long as this remained the case, free trade with China served the interests of US companies and was therefore justifiable.
However, in recent years, China has shifted its economic strategy toward producing and exporting high-tech, value-added products ( as South Korea and Taiwan have also done ). Chinese-produced mobile phones, electric cars and artificial intelligence ( AI ) have subsequently conquered the US market.
The longer this shift goes on, the more useful and legitimate tariffs and protectionism become as a way to shield the economic interests of US businesses.
How far will the US go?
Protectionist rhetoric and trade wars were already trumpeted by the first Trump administration.
However, the KOF globalisation index– which measures the global connectivity, integration and interdependence of countries – showed the same value in 2021 as it did in 2017.
While the growth experienced since 1970 ground to a halt, the index’s indicators disprove any claim that globalization receded during Trump’s first term in office.
This second term may well be different because, according to some experts, the president has learned to bypass political counterweights, to surround himself with like-minded people, and to free himself from partisan ties in order to implement his own agenda.
Others, however, question the very existence of his own agenda beyond the interests of big business, because it is precisely this alignment of interests that allows him to:
- Impose tariffs on developed countries, and on products competing for the same markets.
- Make political use of tariffs to threaten other countries and secure access to vital resources for the technology race ( mainly due to the US ‘ position of being the world’s largest buyer and military power ).
- Launch a new arms race that will boost the profits of US industry.
- Use a nationalist and anti-globalization narrative to justify the growing precariousness of the US working class. He aims to unite US citizens behind the flag, dilute their class consciousness, and offer up new scapegoats in the form of immigrants.
In reality, Trump’s agenda is unlikely to be compatible with any meaningful de-globalization process. Reversing globalization would be contrary to the interests of US capital, which needs to expand – into both new territories and sectors – to ensure its own survival.
In light of all this, why would US multinationals want to stop making huge profits in other countries? What could lead them to give up producing in territories with lower production costs, cheaper labor and a guaranteed supply of raw materials?
The dollar’s ‘ exorbitant privilege ‘
According to IMF data, in the third quarter of 2024 the US dollar still accounted for more than 57 % of total international reserves, and more than 80 % of international trade financing.
When a country’s domestic currency acts as a reserve asset or is the currency in which most international payments are made, the financing of persistent current account deficits does not carry major risks of either devaluation or currency crisis. Every year since 1982, with the sole exception of 1991, the US current account balance has been negative.
These conditions for financing its debt – which Valéry Giscardd’Estaing, Charles de Gaulle’s Minister of Economy, defined in 1964 as an “exorbitant privilege” – improve even in times of crisis. The dollar’s status as a safe haven asset ( much like gold ) means that international demand for it actually increases in times of uncertainty.
So why would the US be in favour of shifting its trade balance, thereby renouncing the privilege of issuing the international reserve currency?
The great trilemma
In his 2012 book The Globalisation Paradox, Turkish economist Dani Rodrik puts forward his theory of the” trilemma”. This theory states that democracy and national sovereignty are fundamentally incompatible with globalization.
Only those who accept the existence of this trilemma, and understand the tensions that arise from it, can then begin to pick apart one of its components. This is where Trump seems to have the upper hand.
He is playing a game of illusions, one where he publicly pretends to dynamite globalization while, behind the scenes, he stealthily dismantles the pillars of democracy.
Juan Carlos Palacios Cívico is profesor Agregado en el área de Política Económica y Desarrollo, Universitat de Barcelona
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.