Kyiv has suddenly turned off Russia’s fuel source to Europe, ending a source of income that helped pay for Moscow’s war against Ukraine. The decades-old agreement, which made it possible for Gazprom’s natural gas to travel through Ukraine through Ukraine, expired on December 31 at midnight, thereby ending Russia’s final key fuel corridor.
The movement is mainly symbolic because Russia’s dependence on it has already drastically decreased since the invasion of Europe in February 2022. However, it doesn’t negate the significance of the selection or suggest that there won’t be any repercussions for the remaining Gazprom consumers in Europe.
Russia will continue to supply some oil via the Turkstream network across the Black Sea, primarily to Serbia and Hungary. In addition to the closing of the Yamal-Europe network through Belarus and the cancellation of Nordstream 2 in 2022, Gazprom has suffered another significant blow as a result of the loss of transit contacts through Ukraine.
Gazprom reported its first running damage in a year, reporting its first loss since 1999, and is now expected to lose another €5 to €6 billion. This will also help the business decrease its tax contributions to the Soviet budget.
Russia only recently provided around 41 % of the EU’s energy needs. It currently simply offers about 8 %.
It has found new users in Asia, primarily for fuel. Major portions of its oil infrastructure are currently inactive. And while it is fighting Ukraine, its gas export markets are being redirected to Asia, which is too slowly and expensive to maintain.
The EU has demonstrated a surprising ability to muster the political will and political will to bear the consequences after quickly kicking off Russian gas by finding new suppliers, especially of liquified natural gas ( LNG ) in the US and Norway.
Gas storage tank across Europe are now more than 90 % complete, and the EU has even increased its strength endurance. Charges have also fallen far below their 2022 inflationary peaks. There is no denying that Brussels will be able to control the consequences of Ukraine’s oil supply interruption.
This is also made easier by the fact that only three states, until late, still depended on Russian supplies.
Austria stopped receiving fuel in November after a legal debate with Gazprom, but the country had plans in place that were quickly and effectively implemented to reduce disturbance.
Hungary can make up for its shortfalls by supplying its goods mainly via the Turkstream pipeline. Additionally, it may purchase more LNG from Croatia, where the EU constructed a sizable new switch to practice goods, generally from the US.
For Slovakia, also, the vitality risks are minimal. The nation has available options for the supply of electricity and gas because it is well integrated into the EU energy system.
In any case, just about one-third of the roughly 12 billion cubic meters of Russian oil are used for private use. The remaining portion was profitably sold within the EU. The government’s Russia-friendly perfect minister, Robert Fico, tried hard to get the travel package renewed. False allegations of an energy crisis in Europe, risks to condemn Ukraine for breaking the transit agreement, and a trip to Moscow in December, which is unusual for an EU head of government, were included. But all to no cost.
Crisis in Moldova
Even worse, the days of Putin being able to quickly sabotage energy resources against EU people are now over with the end of the gas transits through Ukraine. However, the close of Russian gas transits through Ukraine is not without victims.
Moldova has been seriously affected. And in government-controlled areas of the country, a 60-day strength state of emergency introduced in December has imposed major restrictions on domestic use.
Moldova’s state seems convinced that the country you survive the winter. However, its lack of preparedness for the crisis, which was already evident since Ukraine announced in the summer of 2023 that it would not renew its travel agreement with Russia, led to the departure of its energy secretary and principal state power company head in November.
This does not reflect well on the pro-European state, which will have parliamentary elections in 2025. It is still recovering from a greatly contentious referendum on a possible future EU membership and national elections in October 2024, both of which were hampered by large Russian voter-buying and propaganda campaigns.
The far more perilous position in the rebel area of Transnistria may be an even bigger issue. Around 300,000 people there were entirely dependent on Ukrainian oil that was delivered through Ukraine.
They have no heat or warm fluids as of January 1. Although the state’s primary power plant has switched from gas to coal, petroleum has only been available for about 50 times.
The population’s only bare necessities are those that are domestic, and Transnistria’s financial model was fully based on the availability of effectively free Russian gas. With this now being unavailable, there is a chance that an economical and humanitarian crises will quickly spiral out of control.
This, in turn, poses significant social and security threats for Moldova. Moldova is already buckling under its own financial and energy crises, but it has little choice in helping Transnistria or handling the large number of migrants.
Although this may provide an ideal opportunity to reshape the situation, Moldova may take an enormous risk in doing so. Following a quick, violent discord in the early 1990s, Russian forces were stationed there as “peacekeepers” and guarded an outdated Russian munitions backup facility. Its population has been largely influenced by separatist and Russian propaganda for more than three decades, which had scarcely help the pro-European ballot.
None of this implies that Moldova may experience violent trauma or that Russia will somehow be able to influence the situation so that Ukraine’s back had become a target for a minute front. With its last major piece of the power battle with Europe now over, Russia is the biggest loser in the long run as a result of the ending of gasoline transits through Ukraine.
The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant teacher of global security.
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