On July 29, 2024, a follow-up quadrilateral ministerial meeting was held in Tokyo. The Quad gathering of Japanese, American, Australian and Indian foreign ministers was overshadowed in media coverage by the more stimulating US-Japan 2+2 meeting and trilateral meeting of US, Japanese and South Korean defense ministers a day earlier.
Still, in diplomacy, even a meeting for the sake of a meeting can make good political sense. It can be an important tool for not only cultivating personal contacts but also for maintaining the visibility of institutionalized formats.
So what does the Quad do? The Quad is currently focusing its activities mainly in ten areas, namely:
- Addressing health security challenges, including pandemic response and vaccine distribution.
- Promoting initiatives to combat climate change and promote sustainable development.
- Developing infrastructure projects to enhance connectivity and economic growth.
- Enhancing the resilience of semiconductor supply chains.
- Collaborating on critical and emerging technologies like 5G and AI.
- Enhancing cyber resilience and cooperation to counter cyber threats.
- Prioritizing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) for providing aid and support during natural disasters and emergencies.
- Ensuring the security of maritime routes and combating illegal activities at sea.
- Tackling misinformation and promoting accurate information.
10. Strengthening efforts to combat terrorism and enhance regional security.
Ukraine war lessons
Notwithstanding friendly Russo-Indian ties, India and its fellow Quad members are learning valuable lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In modern conflicts, hybrid warfare—which combines military attacks with cyberattacks on vital infrastructure like power plants—is becoming common.
February 2022 saw the start of Russia’s actual invasion of Ukraine, although it is thought that over a year before Russia had already gained access to the electricity and telecommunications infrastructure in Ukraine, as well as government agency networks, and was planning sabotage operations.
The cyberattacks started to pick up steam approximately a month prior to the invasion, and by the eve of the assault on February 23, over 300 Ukrainian systems had been attacked. The invasion started on February 24 and caused a disruption in the satellite communication network.
It is therefore no wonder that Quad places much importance on cybersecurity and hybrid warfare. The Quad intends to accelerate its capacity-building projects seen in the international conference on cyber capacity building in the Philippines and the forthcoming Quad Cyber Bootcamp in India.
Quad members clearly understand that China could replicate Russian tactics using hybrid warfare as a precursor to an invasion of Taiwan or a border conflict with India.
Why does the Quad matter?
While the Quad is a far cry from the grandiose vision of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision for Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, it is still a meaningful part of the Indo-Pacific security environment.
Several commentators have noted that there is inflation in the number of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific, ranging from AUKUS and the Quad to various trilateral formats, which dilutes their meaning and distracts the focus of the US, Japan and other regional players.
Some even argue that the minilateral formats, instead of adding to the stability of the Indo-Pacific security environment, are causing further instability.
Each chain is only as strong as its weakest link. In the case of the Quad, India is the least integrated member. Both Japan and Australia are US allies and already well integrated.
Japan and Australia recently signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement, which makes them quasi-allies. Japan also signed RAAs more recently with the Philippines and the UK.
From Washington’s point of view, greater interoperability between its allies in the First Island Chain is more than welcome. The rapprochement between Japan and South Korea, which face similar security challenges, is also an important part of the US network strategy.
Unlike in the North Atlantic, since the dissolution of SEATO, there has been no Asian regional pact focusing on collective security. The reason is that, until now, there was no political will to create such an alliance.
The US, which is defending its primacy in the region, is focusing mainly on fostering bilateral alliances. A good example of this strategy is the recent Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) announcing the intention of the US to reconstitute US forces in Japan into a joint force headquarters, strengthening its command function in Japan in parallel with the creation of Japan’s SDF Joint Operations Command.
While AUKUS and the trilateral US-led cooperation relationships (US, Japan and Australia; US, Japan and South Korea; and most recently, US, Japan and the Philippines) are better integrated and clearly focused on security with an emphasis on extended deterrence, the Quad has shifted its primary focus to providing public goods and economic security.
Even though the Quad is not headlining the show, thanks to its flexibility and resilience, it retains relevance in the Indo-Pacific’s emerging new security architecture.