What didn’t happen in Russia

Everyone is talking about what happened in Russia, but almost no one is talking about what didn’t happen in Russia.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, co-founder of the Wagner group, mustered about 8,000 men and entered Russian territory on what he called a march for justice. He was heading for Moscow. Prigozhin’s aim apparently was to take over the Russian defense ministry in Moscow. After all, he’d been able to occupy the local Ministry of Defense headquarters in Rostov-on-Don.

He demanded the immediate resignations of the current defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, and the chief of the General Staff of Russia’s armed forces, Valery Gerasimov.

As is well known, his forces didn’t make it to Moscow. A convoy of a few thousand Wagnerites, under the command of the group’s other co-founder, Dmitri Utkin, stopped some 120 km from Moscow. Prigozhin himself stayed in Rostov-on-Don at the Defense Headquarters – trying to call first Vladimir Putin, who refused to talk to him, and then lower-rank officials.

Finding himself without support, his small force facing annihilation and his family threatened, Prigozhin sought an intermediary and found one in Putin ally Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus.

With Putin hovering in the background, a deal was struck. Prigozhin and the 8,000 men he brought with him, would be going into exile in Belarus. Treason charges were dropped. The remaining Wagner troops, somewhere around 12,000, were offered contracts with the Russian army, or they could go home. Many of them, according to reports, are taking the deal and signing up.

To launch his operation, Prigozhin took a number of steps over the past six or more months. Among these were constant, and provably false, accusations that he was not getting enough ammunition to fight in Bakhmut. Along with that, Prigozhin charged that the army leadership was corrupt, that they refused to defend his flanks during the Bakhmut operation and that they were losing massively in the Ukraine war. None of these accusations was true.

In the past few weeks, the Russian army leadership demanded that Wagner be brought under their control and they required each and every member, Prigozhin most of all, to sign a contract with the Russian command and thus submit to Russian army orders.

Prigozhin refused. He then fabricated a couple of incidents, claiming that his forces were attacked from the rear by the Russian army. He published two fake videos that made the rounds of social media, along with a one-man diatribe against the rotten army leadership.

And unconfirmed reports making the rounds on Twitter, Telegraph and Substacks say there was more to it than that: Prigozhin had been in touch with Ukrainian military intelligence (known as the HUR MO), at least since last January. Some sources say that he also flew to Africa, where Wagner forces are operational, to hold a meeting with Ukrainian intelligence officials.

Similarly there are reports that he also was talking to a number of special force units inside Russia, asking them to join him.

People forget that the Wagner Group is a product of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. While Prigozhin himself has no military background, the other co-founder, Dmitry Utkin, was a GRU Spetsnaz special operator.

Spetsnaz units have been around at least since 1949, perhaps before. They carry out clandestine operations, usually behind enemy lines. They are armed with the latest gear and have been suspected of being capable of planting small nuclear weapons in the backyards of Russia’s enemies.

A number of Spetsnaz units including some from the FSB (the successor to the KGB) have been identified on the internet as pro-Prigozhin, meaning that there could have been a power struggle in the army, perhaps also in the FSB, and possibly not only aimed at replacing the current military leadership but really aimed at humiliating and replacing Putin.

Prigozhin’s ultimate goals could have been included in the information that he is said to have conveyed to Ukrainian intelligence interlocutors. The reports say, again without hard proof, that Prigozhin also promised the Ukrainians he would reveal to them where Russia’s main command elements were situated, aiming to use Ukraine to destroy them.

While it isn’t possible at this point to confirm any of this, it seems likely to be the case that Prigozhin was hoping for a general uprising so that his march for justice would be filled out by thousands of highly placed supporters, including the police, army and intelligence.

We now know there was no uprising and no one offered to join Prigozhin on his furtive quest.

Indeed, even Sergei Surovikin – the real operational commander of the Wagner forces, though officially an advisor, and the deputy head of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine – after being threatened by Prigozhin refused to go along with him.

Surovikin published a video in which he told Wagner forces not to go into Russia or fight Russians. In the video, he is shown sitting with an automatic machine pistol clutched in his right hand.

Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation zone. Photo: screenshot / Russian Defense Ministry

The lack of support does not mean that Prigozhin was poorly regarded by Russians. In fact, Prigozhin was cheered in Rostov-on-Don, perhaps because he is seen as the hero of Bakhmut.

But there are things about Prigozhin that are starting to leak out that will tarnish his popular image. To begin with, he said there was no bloodshed in his march for justice, a blatant lie. Thirty-seven pilots and crew members of Russian helicopters and a transport aircraft that were shot down by the Wagnerites are evidence that there was killing.  

Nor is Prigozhin free from corruption. He had sweetheart deals with the Russian army where Prigozhin’s companies provided supplies at inflated prices. Those contracts were canceled a week or so before Prigozhin initiated his crossing into Russian territory.

But the real problem for his reputation is found in the reports of his contacts with Ukraine’s secret intelligence services, his alleged offers to sell out Russian command centers and his bargaining for support – not so much from Ukraine but from the United States. It should surprise no one to hear that the CIA was fully informed by its Ukrainian counterparts, who are desperate to see Russia’s leaders overturned and NATO coming to their rescue.

According to the unconfirmed reports, Prigozhin offered a very good deal. In exchange for outside support, he would take over Russia, reorient to the West, and leave Ukraine. The offer, at a critical moment when the Ukrainian offensive is faltering, was an offer hard to refuse.

Putin has a major challenge now to deal with the dissidents in his regime who oppose him.  While none of them came forward overtly, it appears likely the FSB and Putin know with whom Prigozhin was talking. They will have to judge whether those individuals and organizations are reliable, or if they will have to be dealt with by Russian security.

Putin also has to crack down on the widespread sabotage in Russian cities. Not all of this can be blamed on Ukrainians. Many of the perpetrators are Russians and, from the looks of things, they are professional – a perception that again points a finger at those who are in positions to carry out such attacks.

Beyond sabotage, there have been assassinations of prominent pro-Putin leaders. Putin must realize by now that he also is on the list and that the support for these attacks is mostly from internal sources.

The night of the long knives may happen soon if Putin is to survive as Russia’s leader.

It isn’t clear what will happen to Prigozhin and to his collaborator Utkin. While the Wagner force remains a potent and useful tool for Russia, its current leaders are a major liability.  

What didn’t happen in Russia was a general uprising and an open fracturing of the security apparat. But what didn’t happen may yet happen, unless Putin can act decisively. No one can say if he can, or if he will.

Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. This article was originally published on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.