Ukraine is currently facing an existential threat similar to that experienced immediately following the Russian invasion of Crimea in February 2022. However, improvements are unlikely – at least not immediately – in contrast to that.
The Ukrainian commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, claims that the situation has significantly worsened along the front, and that even General Sir Richard Barrons, the former commander of the UK’s Joint Forces Command, has been openly discussing the possibility of a Polish defeat.
On April 13, Barrons stated to the BBC that Ukraine might lose the war in 2024 because it might come to believe it ca n’t win. When that happens, why will people continue to fight and die just to defend the indefensible? ”
His attempt to pressure the east to give Ukraine more military aid may be influenced by this. The fact that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has publicly acknowledged that Ukraine will need to negotiate with Russia and decide “what kind of compromises they are willing to make” is a clear sign that things are n’t going well for Ukraine.
What seems to be a more condescending narrative has a number of causes. Second, the front-line situation is getting worse, with Ukraine lagging behind in both labor, tools, and ammunition. This wo n’t change in a very long time. The recent approval of the new Ukrainian recruitment law is in order. New soldiers will need time to be trained, deployed, and integrated.
Russia’s market has remained resilient despite Western sanctions and seen expansion driven by the war at the same time. On top of sales from Iran and North Korea dual-use systems, including electronic components and equipment tools for hands production, has been supplied by China.
Additionally, Russia has been successful in producing a lot of its own weapons and technology. Much of this is produced in facilities that are beyond the reach of Russian arms.
This does not mean that all is well with Russian supplies, but they are better than what Ukraine can do on its own in the presence of American assistance.
Dark view
The Kremlin has adopted a method of grinding down Ukrainian threats along long reaches of the front, particularly in Donbas in the south, where Russian force has been applied in recent months, thanks to this changing harmony of capabilities to support the war effort, which is now increasingly favoring Russia.
Russian forces are currently stationed across the frontier from Kharkiv in large numbers. Over the past few weeks, Russia has launched an expanded attack on Ukraine’s second-largest city, which has resulted in mandatory evacuations from three districts in the area.
The nearly 100,000 to 120,000 Soviet troops would not be enough for another powerful Russian cross-border unpleasant, but they are enough to tie over large numbers of Ukrainian forces which, therefore, cannot be used in another potentially more prone areas of the front.
A significant Russian advance is unlikely in the foreseeable future, especially if a significant portion of the Ukrainian defense lines suddenly collapse. But part of what Russia is trying to do right now is look for weaknesses to exploit in a bigger offensive in the spring or early summer while its broad assault on Ukraine’s defenses is ongoing.
In this context, it is crucial to keep in mind Russia’s stated overall objectives, particularly the Kremlin’s territorial ties to all four of the regions Moscow annexed in September 2022. No evidence that these goals have changed, and Russia’s current operations on the battlefield do so in accordance with this.
The first step would be to capture the remaining Donetsk region, which would set the stage for further expansion in the Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine and the Kherson region in the center, particularly by retaking the city of Kherson, which Ukraine liberated in late summer 2022.
A Ukrainian withdrawal from the current frontline in Donbas would increase Russia’s ability to capture all of Donbass, but it would also undermine the Kremlin’s success in Zaporzhiya and Kherson.
Additionally, it would thwart any Russians ‘ attempts to capture the remaining portion of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast all the way to Odesa. However, whether or not this Ukrainian strategy succeeds will depend in large part on how much Western support will be available and when.
Help wanted – right now
The outcome that Kiev’s Western allies will soon increase is the most optimistic.
This must include ammunition, air defense systems, armored vehicles and drones. At the same time, the Western defense industrial base, especially in Europe, needs to switch to a similar war footing as in Russia.
On this basis, the situation on the frontlines could stabilise, and any offensive maneuvers Russia has in place right now would not add much new ground. Anyhow, it is unlikely that this outcome would result in a slightly better situation for Ukraine at this time.
The worst scenario would be the collapse of regions of the frontline that would lead to additional Russian gains. If it did occur, Ukraine’s morale would suffer significantly if it were to suffer as things were going as they stand.
Even though almost three-quarters of Ukrainians are open to the idea of negotiations, it would empower doubters in the West to pressure Ukraine into negotiations at a time when it would be weak. Therefore, a military defeat of Ukraine in all but name would be the worst outcome rather than Moscow taking Kiev.
A major Russian offensive in the summer, if successful, would force Kiev into a bad compromise. Beyond a defeat for Ukraine, it would also result in humiliation of the West and a likely complete fracturing of the country’s already moderately divided front of support for Kiev, giving the Kremlin more power.
In such a scenario, any agreements made by Russia with Ukraine on the back of the Kremlin’s victory on the battlefield would likely be mere stepping stones in Putin’s never-ending quest to reclaim the Russian empire of his Soviet dreams.
Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.