As the dust settles from the audacious – and swiftly aborted – attempted Wagner insurrection, the exact whereabouts of its architect is still unknown at this writing. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the brutish figure behind the paramilitary group, is meant to be somewhere in Belarus.
Still, the life – and, as someone who has so publicly crossed Vladimir Putin, perhaps eventual death – of Prigozhin is not the most important topic far from Europe.
Almost as soon as the insurrection was halted, African states began to wonder what effect the mutiny would have on the Wagner fighters in their midst. The Kremlin moved quickly to quash any talk of change, thereby demonstrating how valuable Wagner fighters are to Russia’s foreign policy.
Speaking on the Monday after the brief march on Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the fighters would remain in Mali and the Central African Republic as long as they were needed – the contracts that Wagner fighters sign are, after all, between them and the government. In other countries on the continent where Wagner operates, albeit with smaller footprints, the situation will be the same.
And that is for one simple reason: However angry President Putin may be with the head of Wagner, the group’s activities in Africa are too valuable for the Kremlin to give up.
The name may change, the leadership of the group may change – but the use of private military companies to provide protection, training and raw fighting force to Russian allies is here to stay. The Kremlin may cut off the head of Wagner, but the group’s tentacles in Africa will remain.
Wagner has a presence in as many as a dozen African states, but the exact nature of its work is extremely murky.
In Mali, the group has a contract directly with the government, and is reportedly paid millions of dollars per month. In the Central African Republic, the Russian government works with the CAR, and alongside the Wagner Group. The Kremlin said last week that the government-to-government relationship would continue, but the Wagner contract was for the CAR to decide.
Wagner also has – or had, it can be tricky to be sure – a footprint in Burkina Faso, Libya and Sudan, as well as other countries.
In addition to fighters, Wagner also appears to operate a number of other companies, or at least work closely with them. In the CAR, one company linked to Wagner buys gold and diamonds; in Russia another company buys gold from the first company, which then appears to fund the paramilitaries. Similar relationships occur in other countries where Wagner troops are present.
That murkiness is precisely why the group is so valuable to the Kremlin. With tentacles that stretch across military objectives and business interests, Moscow gains the ability to influence countries while maintaining plausible deniability, and also benefit from less than transparent business practices, while evading Western attempts to sanction companies and people.
In reality, Wagner is an arm of Moscow’s foreign policy.
Little wonder then that, whatever happened in the brief “internal affair” in Russia, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry referred to the mutiny, the use of private military companies on the African continent will continue.
(Indeed, it may even benefit the Kremlin: After years of denial, Prigozhin finally admitted last year that he was behind Wagner. Whoever replaces him will be more anonymous and offer further deniability.)
Benefits – and liabilities – for African countries
Certainly the mutiny will give countries where Wagner operates pause for thought. Private contractors can be disbanded easily, or their assets in Russia frozen.
No country needs a group of trained, armed, stateless men wandering around. For those extremely reliant on Wagner, such as the CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera, who has placed even his own personal security detail in the hands of Wagner, having their ties to Moscow hanging by such a loose thread will be a concern.
However, the benefits of Wagner flow both ways, and African countries appear to like them as much as the Kremlin.
In Mali, where Wagner fighters stepped in to fill the gap created by departing French troops, having hardened fighters without the necessity of creating new political allegiances is helpful.
In Libya and Sudan, where fighters from the group have been spotted over the past four years, Russian influence and fighting experience can be purchased and utilized, but without the political blowback that would come from soldiers in state insignia being involved.
A close adviser to the CAR’s president confirmed as much last week when he told the Financial Times that Wagner fighters were in the country with the blessing of Moscow. “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them,” he said.
At the murky nexus of private military contractors controlled by the Kremlin and African states looking to quietly bolster their fighting forces, a paramilitary group by any other name would smell just as sweet.
This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Follow him on Twitter @FaisalAlYafai,