The high-stakes political chess game in Southeast Asia, where local social rivalries and physical power struggles collide in a weakening battle for dominance, is clearly illustrated by China’s sharpened rebuke of Asian plans to obtain America’s Existing missile system.
Many internet retailers reported this month that China had criticized the Philippines ‘ possible acquisition of the US Mid-Range Capability Missile System, dubbed the Typhon, with the accusations that it was irresponsible and confrontational.
Gilberto Teodoro, the government’s defence minister, defended the government’s right to purchase the missile program, which would allow the Philippines to attack targets in mainland China, including conducting areas for a potential invasion of Taiwan.
In reply, Lin Jian, China’s Foreign Ministry official, warned that the shift was fuel regional tensions and inspire political confrontation. Lin urged the Philippines to evaluate its choice, emphasizing the state’s needed for “peace and prosperity”.
The Chinese executive’s speech reflects China’s often-stated worries about the role of outside powers, spelled the US, in Southeast Asia and the probable increase of an arms competition.
China may get to use the Philippines ‘ status as the weak link in the US empire in the Indo-Pacific to prevent any upcoming Spanish consolidation plans, despite the US having eternally deployed the Mod missile system in the Philippines since September 2024.
The political history of the Philippines has a long history of elite co-optation. Political elites in Philippines have strong political support regionally but weak national support, leading to their subpar regimes.
That frequently results in a weak legitimacy, which is exacerbated by internal security threats like private armies and long-running Communist and separatist insurgencies.
While most Southeast Asian regimes consolidate and sustain legitimacy through economic growth, Philippine political elites have consistently failed to deliver, leaving the country a laggard compared to its neighbors, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Philippine political elites rely on outside parties to support their fragile regimes because they are unable to deliver the economic goods. Philippine elites have been fighting it out with the US ever since the Cold War, with the latter offering economic and military support in exchange for military stipends and basing rights.
However, as Richard Heydarian in Asia Times points out, China is in a crucial position because of the ongoing political conflict between Vice President Sara Duterte and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., which the latter has threatened to assassinate.
In April, Marcos Jr accused Rodrigo Duterte of entering a” secret agreement” with China on the South China Sea, where the two sides have various territorial disputes. Duette refuted the claim, saying Marcos Jr. was a” cry baby.”
When he and Xi Jinping met in Beijing in July 2023, the former president said he was ready to continue playing a key role in the promotion of the Philippines-China friendship, according to Chinese state media.
Heydarian claims that China’s alleged involvement in undermining Marcos, who leans toward the US, further complicates the Marcos Jr.-Duterte feud. He mentions that Philippine authorities have linked a deep-fake video that Marcos is ascribed to pro-China groups, implying that China is conducting covert operations to support the Dutertes and destabilize the current administration.
He adds that Duterte has threatened Marcos and his political clan with alarming frequency as the conflict escalates, accusing the president of betraying her through corruption investigations involving her family.
Furthermore, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has called for military and police action to “protect the Constitution” and stabilize a “fractured government” against perceived internal threats.
The former president’s call aims to sway the Philippine National Police ( PNP ) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines ( AFP ) with dangling slender promises of political sway, privilege, and impunity.
It might also serve as a distraction from the AFP’s ongoing efforts to shift its focus away from territorial defense threats, including those posed by Dutertes ‘ potential patron, China, to the south.
Nevertheless, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Jimmy Larida assured Philippine lawmakers that there are no “grumblings” in the Philippine military and that it remains a non-partisan institution.
In a possible weaponization of Philippine history, protesters were allegedly paid US$ 9 each to stage a mass gathering at the Epifanio De Los Santos Avenue ( EDSA ) shrine, the site of the historic 1987 People Power Revolution that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos Senior, the current president’s deceased father, after nine years of martial law marked by brutality, corruption, cronyism, impunity and economic decline.
These actions may have been intended to show that the Marcos Jr. administration is losing its hold on power and that the Marcos family’s atrocities are still relevant. Marcos Jr. has faced criticism for benefiting from his father’s regime and has resisted questions about the stolen wealth his family plunders.
Given Rodrigo Duterte’s vehement opposition to US non-interference in internal Philippine affairs during his six-year rule, the Dutertes ‘ continued deployment of the US Typhon missile system in the Philippines may be in jeopardy.
Looking past recent diplomatic encounters, US President-elect Donald Trump’s previous indifference to the Philippines and preference for strategic autarky may be a bad sign for the country’s pro-US elites and military modernization, while Heydarian contends that the Philippines could benefit significantly from the new Trump administration.
Other military modernization initiatives, such as the purchase of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and submarines, have been hampered by a lack of funding for decades, despite the Philippines ‘ modest advances in its military modernization efforts. However, recent developments may have had little impact on deterring China.
Teodoro’s statement regarding potential Philippine purchases of the Typhon system may be more grandstanding than a sincere statement of intent.  ,
For costs, each Tomahawk missile used in the system costs US$ 1.8 million while a Standard SM-6 missile is even more at$ 4.2 million. These are considerable sums given the Philippines ‘ modest$ 4.37 billion 2025 defense budget, with$ 850 million allocated for modernization.
A US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from April 2024 claims the project has been funded by US$ 233 million in procurement costs without mentioning the volume of the systems that were purchased.
Moreover, the US currently restricts the sale of these missiles to upper-tier allies such as the UK, Japan and Australia, which are vastly ahead of the Philippines in terms of resources, experience, capability and US-given trust.
The Philippines might also be attempting to expand US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty ( MDT ) coverage to potential US interests in the South China Sea disputes that are rife.
Given Trump’s known transactional approach to diplomacy, should the strategic-economic balance sheet with the Philippines not pan out in America’s favor, a second Trump administration may opt to sell out rather than bolster the Philippines vis-a-vis China.
The US has done this on numerous occasions, most recently with the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA ) ruling favoring China over the Philippines and the US’s involvement in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff versus China.
Similar things could be said about Washington’s somewhat muted response following this year’s Second Thomas Shoal’s escalating tactics by China.