By leveraging the production capacities of critical allies like Japan and Australia, the US Navy’s novel, affordable sea hit weapons program aims to recharge dangerously depleted stockpiles of long-range strike munitions in a possible Taiwan conflict.
The US Navy has begun a search for industry input on a novel medium-range maritime strike weapon, the” Coalition Affordable Maritime Strike Weapon System” ( CAMS ), according to a report released this month from Breaking Defense, with plans to start production by the year 2027.
Breaking Defense says the July 16 call shows a need for an affordable, widely sellable tool system deployed across several domains—air, floor and sub-surface. This program addresses the declining returns that some coalition partners are facing in maintaining and modernizing their mid-range maritime strike capabilities.
According to the Breaking Defense report, CAMS is designed to strike targets at a minimum of 140 nautical miles, with adaptability for launches from aircraft’s vertical launch systems (VLS ) and at altitudes up to 40, 000 feet.
It mentions that the US Navy intends to develop a system that will cost about US$ 1.5 million per product and have a production capacity of at least 250 rounds per year.
According to Breaking Defense, the program aims to leverage global interest and increase the capacity for collective defense use of munitions production while the specific coalition nations that are interested in CAMS remain unnamed.
The Ukraine war has shown that large-scale industrial wars of attrition are here to stay, with the industrial capacity to manufacture and replenish precision-guided munitions ( PGM ) a key strategic-level decisive factor.
Seth Jones warns that the US may face a munitions shortfall in a potential conflict with China, especially for long-range PGMs, in a report from January 2023 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank. Jonese points out that this might prevent the US from continuing to fight in the Taiwan Strait.
Jones raises questions about the preparation of the US defence industrial base as the country reports that China’s price of acquiring high-end arms techniques is said to be five to six times faster than the US.
He highlights that it can take two years to replace certain missile types, such as the Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3, Tomahawk Block V, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile ( JASSM) and Precision Strike Missile ( PSM).
Jones mentions that CSIS war game suggest that in a three-week issue, the US may destroy over 5, 000 long-range weapons, with critical shortfalls occurring within the first year.
Further, according to a US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from October 2023, significant consolidation in the US defense sector may have weakened competition, potentially leading to higher costs and less innovation.
According to the CRS report, reliance on a small number of manufacturers, particularly for sophisticated devices like PGMs, raises the possibility of offer disruption and national security concerns.
Additionally, it asserts that the US relies on foreign sources for corporate and crucial elements, which could prevent the production and distribution of precision-guided weapons in times of issue.
In response to potential output bottlenecks in US PGM, the US has considered co-production with friends like Japan and Australia.
The US Department of Defense ( DOD ) reported in March 2024 that the US is working with allies to increase defense production capabilities.
According to the statement, US Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Supportment William LaPlante cited the Ukraine conflict as a turning point for increased global cooperation in producing crucial weapons before the US Senate Appropriations Committee’s Defense Subcommittee.
The US , according to the DOD, is expanding this cooperative model to include PSM munitions and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System ( GMLRS ), with plans to collaborate with Japan to create missile defense interceptors.
It notes that this strategic move aims to protect allied security industrial bases, particularly in response to Russia’s increased military investing, estimated now at 7 % of GDP, and China’s boom in military result under its military-civil integration development strategy.
In a March 2024 New York Times article, Damien Cave reported that the US is partnering with Australia to ramp up the production of precision-guided munitions.
Cave mentions that US and Australian defense companies are working together to create artillery shells and guided missiles, like the GMLRS, in accordance with US DOD specifications.
He asserts that these weapons will replenish US stockpiles and be accessible for sale to allies, noting that US munitions stockpiles have been stretched by the conflict in Ukraine and Gaza.
Cave points out that the former’s expansive interior houses Australian production facilities for US munitions, with the Benalla munitions factory and Mulwala explosives factory playing important roles.
However, Japan’s and Australia’s defense industries are struggling to increase PGM production due to their small, aging workforces and lack of production bases.
Valerie Insinna mentions that Japan’s defense sector is dealing with an aging workforce and a shrinking supply chain in a June 2024 Breaking Defense article.
In order to address those issues, Insinna points out that the” Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases” ( also known as the” Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases ) is being revived in Japan.
The law encourages advancements in manufacturing productivity and cybersecurity, and rewards achievement of goals.
However, Insinna points out that these reforms may be too little, too late in the current volatile strategic landscape. She adds that the Japanese defense sector faces additional challenges, such as labor shortages brought on by an aging population and the need to incorporate cutting-edge technologies like robotics and AI.
Gordon Arthur claims in a Defense News article this month that Australia’s domestic small and medium enterprises ( SMEs ) are hampered by the government’s preference for large foreign contractors like Lockheed over domestic small and medium enterprises ( SMEs ).
Arthur points out that Australia does n’t have a clear path for the gradual transition of PGM production from large contractors like Lockheed to Australian SMEs.
He notices that there are more and more calls for the Australian government to support SMEs ‘ capacity-building initiatives. Additionally, he points out the strategic need for an indigenous defense sector that can deal with upcoming conflicts.