The recent approval of a significant change in the US nuclear weapons approach by President Joe Biden highlights how focused are China’s national security officials on their international ambitions.
The US military adjusts its proper emphasis, budgets, and planning as changes in the types of threats that the US faces. For example, after September 11, the US military switched from its Cold War focus on combating the Soviet Union to combat little terrorist and rebel groups.
Over the past century, the Pentagon’s initiatives have shifted back to preparing for what officials call “great energy competition” among the United States, Russia and China.
Concentration on deterrent is the most crucial strategic change that can be seen in strategy for great strength competition. Deterrence is the key to deterrence in traditional martial strategy because it focuses on making an adversary believe it can never achieve its objectives by using military force because the response may be crucial and overwhelming.
The report that sets out the world’s goals, objectives, and asset allocation for the next two decades, the National Defense Strategy, which was released in October 2022, directly acknowledges the possibility of tensions and open conflicts with Russia and China, and calls for “integrated deterrence” to stop them. That entails coordinated attempts from the government, intelligence, and political departments throughout the US government.
The US military forces ‘ contribution to that energy is described in the National Military Strategy, which is the military branch of the overarching National Defense Strategy. As a past assistant secretary of defense and chief of staff for the Pentagon, I observe that the government is focusing on three primary objectives to achieve integrated punishment and stop a conflict with China or Russia.
New operating programs
Integral punishment for the military means that the armed forces will depend on where their troops are located as well as what they can do once they are in action to influence their opponents ‘ decisions regarding when, where, how, and whether to use military power against the US or its interests.
The Defense Department has developed innovative strategies in response to the shift from terrorism toward planning for a great energy conflict by acknowledging that Russia and China may struggle anywhere in the world, on property, and at sea, as well as online and in place.
The Pentagon refers to “dynamic power employment,” which involves US military forces moving quickly and without set rotational intervals. This strategy can reassure friends who are facing challenges from China or Russia.
For instance, the US has, at times, deployed as many as 10, 000 soldiers to Poland. Although the troops are not completely stationed there, a constant presence of US troops keeps Russia guessing as to how big and powerful the army is and demonstrates a commitment to supporting anxious NATO allies in Eastern Europe.
Second is a change of personnel and capabilities to what is called “multi-domain operations“, in which units with various missions across heat, land, sea, area and cyberspace plan and train up. In that manner, they can be prepared to collaborate effectively in problems.
The state can respond to challenges in a variety of ways thanks to this level of cooperation. For instance, challenges to the US Navy on the high seas do n’t need to be directly met with corresponding naval action; instead, they can be resolved with cyberattacks or space-based maneuvers.
This strategy may prompt the Taiwanese People’s Liberation Army to reconsider launching military activities against Taiwan. US digital and space operations may destroy or destroy Chinese military communications, preventing their attack, along with the possibility of a furious strong conflict between the Chinese and US.
Investments in industrialization
Recent research has revealed that China’s opportunities in its military officers and features, especially those in the air, marine, and nuclear forces, have increased exponentially over the past 20 years, to an extent that is thought to be close to par with the United States.
This has prompted the US to upgrade its own government’s related skills. For the 2024 resources, the Department of Defense allocated a staggering US$ 234.9 billion for applications to assist integrated punishment, which likely represents a 10 % increase over previous investing strategies.
Some of this money will go to developing and acquiring F-35 fighter jets and building Columbia-class, nuclear-powered submarines. When the US and its allies in the Pacific region, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, deploy these planes and submarines, they will remind potential adversaries of American military power – which is itself a deterrent against foreign aggression.
Senior US policymakers have been alarmed by China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons supply over the past ten years. Although Barack Obama, the then-President, pushed nations to create a world without nuclear weapons, he approved the most expensive and significant upgrade to the US nuclear arsenal to date.
In 2022, the Biden administration renewed a financial commitment to “field a modern, resilient nuclear triad” consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range nuclear bombers.
Advancing technology
The Space Force was established as a distinct branch of the armed forces in 2019 and has the responsibility to protect American space-based assets and uphold international law.
The Space Force collaborates closely with Cyber Command, the military branch responsible for defending the country against cyberattacks, to stop malicious hackers from hacking into global positioning systems, such as the Global Positioning System, widely known as GPS, because of the significance of satellite communications to military operations and civilian life, including internet connectivity.
Recent information suggests that China intends to attack US critical infrastructure, including the electric grid, during any conflict with China. Cyber Command is advancing its capabilities to protect US systems and businesses from cyberattacks as well as to launch attacks against systems in other nations in response to those plans.
Through a program called the Replicator Initiative, the Pentagon also tries to counterbalance China’s rapidly expanding military. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, the effort aims to create thousands of low-cost, AI-directed autonomous aircraft and boats that can be used in combat.
Integration with allies and partners
Over the past four years of the Biden administration, the US military has also made efforts to strengthen alliances with other nations.
NATO’s membership and the number and strength of troops at its disposal were both increased as a result of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By investing nearly$ 3 billion in funding for additional fighter aircraft, air-defense batteries, and munitions, the US has strengthened its commitment to NATO, increasing troop deployments in Eastern Europe, and supporting European defense initiatives.
The US has strengthened alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in Asia, both close to the Indian Ocean and across the Pacific Ocean, a vast region that the government frequently refers to as” the Indo-Pacific,” by holding numerous military exercises and increasing military support. Chinese military and political influence is being fought with strategies like the yearly Marine Aviation Support exercise.
By 2030, the US has pledged to sell up to five conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to the Australian Navy as a means of strengthening its ties with the UK and Australia.
The US has put all of these efforts into a single plan to avoid a public conflict with China and Russia. But the work is not yet done: The global political and military landscape is ever-changing, and new security challenges are always emerging.
At Harvard Kennedy School, Eric Rosenbach is a senior lecturer on public policy. Grace Jones, a master’s student in public policy and research assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, contributed research to this article.
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