In a high-tech effort to change the military stability toward China, the US is one step closer to being able to install subtle, semi-autonomous helicopter swarms to flood the Taiwan Strait.
Multiple media outlets reported this month that the US Air Force had begun ground tests for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA ) program, a significant milestone ahead of the YFQ-44A and YFQ-42A drones ‘ upcoming summer debut flights.
The tests, which address propulsion, avionics, independence integration, and ground control interfaces, are intended to justify performance and set up both autonomous fighters, which are classified as “fighter drone” FQ series, for functional use.
Fury, Anduril’s YFQ-44A, has advanced design features, including possible infrared sensors and stealth-optimized use shapes. General Atomics makes use of its knowledge of unmanned systems like the XQ-67A to improve the YFQ-42A, which aims to expand the scope of unmanned systems ‘ administrative roles.
Due to their semi-autonomous character, Beale Air Force Base in California was chosen to house the new Aircraft Readiness System, which is tasked with keeping robots available for global rollout with less staff needs.
A dynamic production decision is anticipated by the US Air Force in fiscal 2026, with an emphasis on cost between US$ 25 and US$ 25 million per drone.
The program is a crucial part of the US Air Force’s wider plan to connect autonomous systems with manned fighters like the F-35, improving operational readiness and fight effectiveness in disputed environments.
In an article from January 2024 Air &, Space Forces Magazine, Mark Gunzinger mentions that CCAs can become jammers, decoys, and strike platforms, promoting attack defenses, facilitating targeting, and absorbing fireplace to reduce crewed aircraft retention.
He points out that some variations will be launched from scattered locations, avoiding the need for set airfields and increasing mobility while complementing, no replacing, fifth-generation fighters.
According to the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power Report ( CMPR ), which covers land areas and extends up to 300 nautical miles from its coastline, China has a robust and redundant Integrated Air Defense System ( IADS ) that covers land areas and extends up to 300 nautical miles.
The report notes that this system combines a sizable early-warning radar network, cutting-edge fighter jets, and various Surface-to-Air Missile ( SAM ) platforms, including the indigenous CSA-9 ( HQ-9 ) and its upgraded version HQ-9B. These are used in conjunction with the advanced SA-21 (S-400 ) Triumf, which is renowned for its longer range and superior radar systems, as well as the SA-10 (S-300PMU), SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2 ) and SA-20 (S-400PMU2 ).
Additionally, it mentions that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force ( PLAAF ) of China uses Airborne Early Warning and Control ( AEW&, C ) aircraft to expand radar coverage beyond ground radar limitations.
The report claims that PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation run the third-largest aviation force in the world, with 3,150 aircraft, including 1, 900 combatants, in addition to split air defenses. China produces planes at a ratio of 1.2:1 over the US.
In a February 2025 article for the Institute for Security &, Development Policy ( ISDP ), Rohith Stambamkadi mentions that drones have limited flexibility because they lack real-time adaptability for air superiority because they rely on data from sensors and predefined algorithms.
According to Stambamkadi, drones have limitations in range, speed, and payload, which undermine the idea that they can freely reach air superiority.
He contends that drones only cannot substitute for guarded plane, with the latter’s air defenses properly thwarting mass helicopter attacks from Russia and Hamas enemies. Combat experience in Ukraine and Israel has shown this.
He adds that stealthy systems that can survive in an A2/AD ( access/area denial ) environment, such as the B-21 bomber, will continue to be crucial because a force susceptible to attrition may not retain enough mass to remain effective.
Admiral Samuel Paparo mentions in a June 2024 content in the Washington Post that he intends to change the location into an “unmanned hellscape” to allow US forces to prepare for an action in regards to how the US had install CCAs in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
In a July 2024 USNI content, Bob Work mentions the method, which involves thousands of pre-positioned water, air, and ground drones flying in tandem across the Taiwan Strait to end the “tyranny of distance” that characterizes operations in the Pacific theater, while Paparo did not provide specifics.
Apart from the Hellscape strategy, Work makes mention of the US Replicator initiative’s announcement in August 2023 that forced PLA planners to reconsider their plans for force projection in the South China Sea and combating Taiwan.
However, the US strategy may have unintended consequences. Demri Greggo asserts in a Stars and Stripes article from July 2024 that the strategy may deter China and potentially stifle it while undermining Taiwan’s long-viewed strategic uncertainty as a stabilizing factor in cross-Strait tensions.
Greggo also points out that the strategy could force China to redouble on those fronts and that it does not address China’s “other warfares” – psychological, economic, or legal ones.
Greggo contends that the strategy risks indirectly signaling US intervention while undermining the US’s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity.
He believes that ambiguity deters China by keeping its leaders guessing what the US is doing and stifles Taiwan’s confidence by articulating its security with self-reliant deterrence, which is not guaranteed US support.
The US must weigh the promise of unmanned mass against the risks of strategic overreach, miscalculation, and, perhaps most dangerously, eroding strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait as it bets on drone fighters to deter China.