Donald Trump had promised to put an end to the Soviet aggression against Ukraine in the 24 days that he had promised. But Trump’s second month since his inauguration on January 20, 2025, has yet been a busy one regarding Ukraine.
Trump criticized his father Joe Biden of running a “government that has given unrestricted cash to the defense of international borders but refuses to support American borders” in his inauguration address, making just a passing and direct reference to Ukraine.
Trump threatened Russia with fees, taxes, and restrictions if his Russian counterpart doesn’t agree to a deal soon in a blog on his TruthSocial community. He reiterated this on January 23 in remarks made at the World Economic Forum in Davos, adding that he “really would like to be able to meet with President Putin.”
Trump’s candidate for government secretary, Scott Bessent, had previously backed Trump’s view during his Senate confirmation hearing on January 16. Bessent especially emphasized increasing sanctions against Russian crude companies” to levels that would take the Russian Federation to the table” in the same way as Trump.
Putin responded the following day, saying that Trump and he should actually talk about Ukraine and fuel prices. But this was much from a strong commitment to provide into discussions, and especially not with Ukraine.
Putin alluded to an October 2022 order by Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, banning any agreements with the Kremlin after Russia fully annexed four parts of Ukraine. Since then, Zellensky has stated that all except him is covered by the decree, indicating that he won’t interfere with any direct conversations with Russia.
However, Putin is likely to remain playing for time. A ceasefire that stops the line of communication at the time of agreement will be the most good first step in a Trump-brokered package. Every day of fighting gives Putin more territorial gains because his forces are also advanceing on the ground in Ukraine.
Russian friends ‘ aid is showing no signs of waning, either. Few and far between as they may remain, China, Iran and North Korea have been important in sustaining the Kremlin’s war effort. Moscow has then ratified a comprehensive strategic agreement with Iran in addition to the one it signed with North Korea in June 2024.
However, the Russia-China no-limits association of 2022, more deepened in 2023, shows no signs of strengthening. Additionally, it’s unlikely that Putin is all too concerned about extra US sanctions given that Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko won a sixth consecutive term on January 26.
Zelensky, like Putin, may sing for day. Trump’s hazard of sanctions against Russia good indicates a US president’s feeling of frustration that Putin doesn’t seem to be willing to compromise. Russia may continue to expand its regional ties to eastern Ukraine, but it hasn’t made any proper strides.
War of attrition
Since September 2024, the US military has probably increased significantly, and Kyiv has likely been able to maintain its current protective efforts through 2025 as a result of commitments from European allies, including the UK.
Ukraine might not be able to build a major offensive, but it may still be able to keep Russia’s costs higher. On the field, these fees are estimated at 102 fatalities per square mile of Ukrainian place captured. Beyond the frontlines, Ukraine has likewise continued its aircraft battle against targets inside Russia, particularly the government’s oil facilities.
Trump won’t succeed in putting an end to the fighting in Ukraine, that is for sure. However, a significant distinction can be made between a peace and a lasting peace deal. And while a peace, at some point, may be in both Russia’s and Ukraine’s attention, green harmony is much more difficult to achieve.
Putin’s goal of a complete success poses the same challenges as Western reluctance to offer Ukraine reliable security guarantees.
At this point, it seems unlikely to be possible to join the NATO or join a western-led security power that may serve as a credible deterrent.
Without a doubt, it would be impossible for Europe to carry the 200 000 soldiers Zelensky had in mind for a implementation to Ukraine to ensure any offer with Putin. But a smaller power, led by the UK and France, may be achievable.
No one has blinked in Kyiv or Zelensky’s ongoing retention conflict, which continues to be waged by them in Kiev and Moscow. It is not clear but whether, and in which manner, Trump did bend the stability and how this may affect either side’s commitment to submit to his deal-making work.
Thus far, Trump’s moves are certainly a game-changer. This is the first major attempt to put an end to the battle in nearly three years of conflict, though. Whether Trump, and everyone else, have the mind and may persevere to ensure that this course will inevitably lead to a just and stable peace for Ukraine remains to be seen.
Stefan Wolff is professor of global surveillance, University of Birmingham
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