Vladimir Putin was greeted as an old friend in the Asian capital Hanoi shortly after making his journey to North Korea last month. His 22-hour state visit was greeted with the best possible level of respect and led to a number of contracts on electricity, science, and technology. There was also speak of the once-close supporters working together on defense and security.
In many ways, this display of affection comes as no surprise. After all, it was the socialists in North Vietnam who, with the help of the Soviets, won the war in 1975 and then joined Saigon ( then Ho Chi Minh City ) and the west in uniting.
Many of Vietnam’s current political, business, and academic elite members have previously studied or worked for the Soviet Union in the past ten years, and they are acutely aware of how close the country is to the Communist Party of Vietnam ( CPV ).
However, the myriad of movements to a growing participation and the greeting of old friends sparked questions and concerns. If the West be concerned about Putin’s warm welcome in Hanoi after decades of cooperation and soaring integration with the US and european marketplaces?
We think no. While the present rulers of the CPV, as well as other rulers, were shaped by the apex of the Soviet- Asian attachment, Vietnam’s younger generations are no.
The government’s 100 million inhabitants displays a very unique – and more American – orientation. The rulers of Vietnam’s flourishing digital market, for example, generally studied in the West and talk English, rather than Russian.
The US has a lot more control on Vietnam than the time-tested Russian companion does. This is especially true for the generations born after or after 1986, when the state implemented a number of free-market measures known as “i Mimi.” For most of these individuals, Russia is mysterious, outside of past training and a few regions where it invests or sends visitors.
Their coming-of-age has been a result of growing northern acclaim. Russian language programs in Vietnamese schools and universities have drastically decreased, and Russian language courses are much less popular than French and Chinese. The widespread import of Western information, such as the global standard certificate for tertiary education curriculum and the Scholastic Aptitude Test, has contributed to Vietnam’s rise of global education.
Go west, young gentleman
Young Vietnamese, including the sons and daughters of Russian-educated social, business, and scientific officials, are also becoming more widespread. Our own study, which was published in 2021, compared the background of Vietnam’s online leaders, who were mostly born after the Soviet Union decline, with those of the country’s leading businesses in more traditional fields like caffeine, furniture, and steel.
A significant change was observed when looking at the international experience of both founders. Returnees from the West are increasingly at the forefront of Vietnam’s rising startups, as opposed to the former Soviet Union.
In comparison to their older counterparts, the owners of Vietnam’s high-performing technology companies are 15 times more likely to have US experience. And they are 35 times more likely than the heads of Vietnam’s large, standard companies to be graduates of American institutions.
The businesses who are generating new success in Vietnam and shaping the speed of its cultural norms, economic growth, and modern connections have backgrounds that are greatly different from those of the older technology.
This generational shift towards a Western context, both in business and past, suggests to us that Putin’s state visit may really add up to a largely ceremonial training. As part of their long-standing “bamboo diplomacy,” in which Vietnam pragmatically engages with all powers, we see Vietnam’s leadership rolling out the red carpet for Putin.
For two interrelated reasons, it is unlikely to reflect deeper ambitions or future plans for the nation’s transition from bamboo diplomacy.
First, over the past 30 years, the West has established a strong and tangible footing in Vietnam’s every aspect of cultural, economic, and technological life, from Ho Chi Minh City in the south to Hanoi in the north. Indeed, Hanoi even seems to welcome the West when it comes to security, a juxtaposition with Vietnam’s inventory of Russian- made arms.
Second, Vietnam’s political leadership will steadily come to have more Western- educated returnees in senior positions. The Vietnamese elites ‘ strong ties to Russia will grow as the commitment to making agreements with their former allies grows.
Not to mention the country’s already somewhat Westernized economy, which is supported by the growing Western-educated business community and is fueled by free trade agreements and foreign investment.
The fact that the CPV welcomed a US assistant secretary of state, Daniel Kritenbrink just three days after Putin left is perhaps the most obvious indication of Vietnam’s commitment to its bamboo diplomacy. The American friend’s visit to the US confirmed the country’s position of being a” comprehensive strategic partner” in Vietnam, placing it on par with both China and Russia.
Ba- Linh Tran is a senior lecturer at the University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, while Robyn Klingler-Vidra is associate dean for global engagement and associate professor of entrepreneurship and sustainability at King’s College London.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.