Malaysia , and , Thailand , just unveiled their plans to join BRICS, which has been rechristened as BRICS with the induction of new people. This international bloc of developing economies in the twenty-first century is frequently seen as an emerging administrative group of the Global South countries aiming to create a robust and diverse multipolar world order.
With its list of new entrants including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the clustering has expanded to a ten- associate- sturdy club from the four founding members – Brazil, Russia, India, China – and South Africa, which had joined the second four earlier to put the S to the name.
The BRICS team has been strengthened by China and Russia in the midst of the US punishment, as well as with the Middle East, particularly Iran.  ,
BRICS now represents roughly 3.64 billion persons who constitute about 45.78 percent of the country’s inhabitants. Together, people ‘ markets are worth more than ,$ 28.5 trillion , – about 28 % of the global economy.
At least 34 different nations have indicated their interest in joining the bloc, according to South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation.
The gathering makes significant inroads in the ASEAN place now that Malaysia and Thailand have expressed their intentions to join BRICS . Indonesia, a former part of the ASEAN, has also expressed an interest in joining, despite having been more obnoxious about the situation. Moving ahead, Vietnam, the Lao PDR and Cambodia may be possible candidates. Rumours claim that Türkiye is considering a potential BRICS membership, which will take time.
Why are Thailand and Malaysia interested in joining?
BRICS aims to establish itself as a , a platform for developing countries to voice their concerns and pursuits regarding the development and operation of the global financial system. The deterioration of the existing global order is a tell-tale indicator of the growing acceptance of BRICS/BRICS . The emerging relationships may not be adequately explained by looking at the BRICS/from the US-China/Russia rivalry’s files.
A closer examination of the positions of the BRICS members on issues involving international institutions and foreign governmental organizations reveals that their positions align with one another, particularly in the area of international financial architecture.
The BRICS encourages the use of local currencies in transactions between its member state while also avoiding deal in US dollars. They also support rules-based, opened, and clear global business. This goal is supported by the growth of its membership. A new choice by Saudi Arabia to , ending a 50- time consists package with the US for multi- currency sales  , may also be read in this context.
BRICS and BRICS represent the tones of the Global South, which have been urging the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund , ( IMF)  , to make substantial changes and to be more accountable ,  , and diverse in their view.
Moreover, BRICS has been fighting ever-present for a complete overhaul of the UN Security Council, arguing that its latest membership structure, which includes the five permanent members, does not adequately represent the interests of the worldwide community.
Malaysia’s determination to steer clear of any part results amid the growing US- China competition is natural. However, choosing the BRICS for Thailand, a long-standing and near alliance of the US, surprises some. Reading too much of the” China element” into this would be misleading.
For one thing, Malaysia joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework ( IPEF ) much before it expressed any interest in the BRICS, despite Malaysia having yet to make its position known. Furthermore, there has been no downward tendency in Thailand’s relationships with the US and the West. BRICS, therefore, is more about grabbing more international opportunities than being a part of an pro- US/anti- Western club. The presence of India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE now dilutes any such attempt or tales, for that matter.
ASEAN and de- dollarisation
At the 42nd , ASEAN Summit, part states agreed to encourage the use of local money for purchases. The bloc’s approach to changing from widely used economies like the US dollars appears to be this. ASEAN nations appear to be preparing themselves for any situation in which their business is impacted by any sanctions because Washington has increasingly harmed the US dollar with punitive sanctions.
It is natural that nations feel vulnerable combining robust business with China and a dependence on the US buck for trade, especially with the US- China trade war and de-coupling going on for a long time. They should be able to deal in both local and foreign currencies.
In other words, de-dollarization is a precautionary measure to guard against the event that the US imposes more sanctions on its rivals and adversaries, including Russia ( but also China ). According to Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia needed to look at de- devaluations, and he even , backed the concept of an Asian Monetary Fund. South Asian countries are becoming more cautious because of the economy’s involvement in US-imposed sanctions.  ,
US punitive punishment
These fears are no unfounded. For example, Anwar has received threats of punishment from European nations and their staff in Malaysia because he has been very vocal about his concerns about the Palestinians ‘ situation. In December 2023, the US Treasury Department fined four Malaysian-based companies after they claimed they had assisted Iran in producing robots.
Washington accuses Iran of providing deadly robots to Russia for use in Ukraine and as a proxy for Middle Eastern terrorists, according to Washington. One of the 300 companies that Washington placed sanctions on next month is Malaysia-based semiconductor company Jatronics Sdn Bhd, which is said to have had ties to Russian military supplies.
Anwar Ibrahim made the keynote address at the SEMICON Southeast Asia 2024 technical meeting last month, claiming that his nation is the ideal “neutral and non-aligned” number for semiconductor manufacturers in the wake of the US-China technology conflict and that his government plans to entice US$ 100 billion in new investment.
Anwar praised the US as a significant investment partner and a major export market place for Malaysian chips, but he emphasized that his administration could not impose unilateral sanctions that would impede his nation’s independence.
China: not the only factor
By 2050, the BRICS members will account for about 40 % of the global economy, according to Goldman Sachs ‘ economist Jim O’Neill’s projections. Between 2012 and 2022, the BRICS countries combined contributed more than 45 % of the world’s GDP, with China alone accounting for about 25 % of this growth.  ,
China is viewed as a key member of the BRICS because of its economic strength and growing role in international affairs, both from the perspective of intra-bloc trade flows and the bloc’s foreign policy perspectives. From 2009 to 2023, China has remained Malaysia’s most significant trading partner, accounting for US$ 95.8 billion in total trade.
Naturally, China’s prominence in the BRICS makes Malaysia feel more secure. China is Thailand’s largest trade partner as well. The trade between China and Thailand increased by US$ 13 billion in 2023 despite continuing to grow for the past five years. For Malaysia and Thailand to join the BRICS makes sense in terms of business.  ,
That said, China is not the only factor binding BRICS together. Russia or China for that matter are both much more important than the BRICS. Southeast Asian nations like Malaysia and Thailand are already interconnected with China in a number of ways through bilateral and ASEAN-led multilateral agreements, so they do n’t need to approach BRICS forums to engage with China.
India, South Africa, and Brazil are the three main emerging economies in the modern financial system and global politics with strong ties to the US and its allies in the West and Asian worlds as well. While assessing the BRICS, it is unfortunate that these three nations have their own minilateral, IBSA, despite how inactive it is.  ,
Conclusion
Despite China being neither a rising economic nor military power, it is actually one of the two superpowers and technically does not belong to the Global South any longer. BRICS, which started as a primarily economic initiative to facilitate the transmission of economic clout to the Global South, has grown into an important multilateral grouping representing the rising powers of the world. The BRICS face challenges and opportunities because of their diverse membership and the presence of China and Russia.  ,
It is not likely to be a Sino-Russian-centric bloc aimed at drawing diplomatic blows at the US, though one cannot look into a crystal ball and predict the future of BRICS/BRICS . When at their best, BRICS will counteract the current West-led liberal international order by combining the world’s various viewpoints into one that best fits the bloc’s shared minimum goals rather than a Sino-Russian club with some friends.
Members ‘ deteriorating sentiments regarding Beijing’s diplomatic acceptability and the bloc’s heavy economic and trade dependence on China make the bloc vulnerable. China’s hegemonic ambitions have  , subverted this grouping of solidarity , of the Global South especially in the context of relations with India. India’s explosive growth and growing geopolitical influence also put a strain on the BRICS’s ability to stay China-focused.
A growing multi-regional and multilateral bloc may not be able to produce any alliance-style outcomes based on the examples of other large groups like the EU or ASEAN, given the differences in economic status, cultural background, individual country agendas, and their respective balancing acts in relation to the US and its allies.
The BRICS multilateral will be further democratized by the addition of Malaysia and Thailand, keeping it a few more steps away from member dominance. Avoidance of domination, after all, is precisely what BRICS stands for.