This article originally appeared on Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished with authority. Read the original around.
Soft power is a government’s ability to attract and co-opt rather than pressure. In practice, soft energy allows countries to work their values, ideals, and society worldwide to , foster , kindness, improve security, and develop long-term partnerships.
Australia has long been a pillar of historical charm, democratic values and academic excellence—these elements have formed the core of Australia’s soft energy in the post-war time.
But, Australia’s soft power ratings have shown a distinct upward trend over the past decade. Ranking 6th in 2015 in the , The Soft Power 30 score,  , Australia slipped to 10th in 2019 and to 14th by 2023 in Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index.
In a time when non-coercive energy is extremely important, this constant decline has significant implications for Australia’s security and role.  ,
For instance,  , Edelman’s Trust Barometer , highlights the general decrease in Australia’s confidence levels in Southeast Asia: Australia was marked as one of the biggest losers on the score between 2021-2023, constantly landing in the hostility class with low scores between 1-49 out of 100.
This raises a significant issue for American politics in the Indo-Pacific region’s current state of global power competition. Before it is too late, Australia needs to strengthen its soft power politics to ensure its local influence and safety.
Canberra’s shifting interests in the region
The fiscal outlook for Australia’s existing national channels that support gentle power have gotten worse in recent years.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ( DFAT ) has massively shrinking funds, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation ( ABC ) has seen an , A$ 526 million  ,  , ( US$ 357 million ) reduction in funding since 2022, and , tightening visa policies , is expected to affect educational diplomacy with tertiary institutions projecting an , A$ 310 million  , revenue shortfall in 2024.
While the Albanese state has pushed for financial , boosts , in specific areas, the general administrative environment is excessively negative. Why has this happened?
One explanation is that in the wake of Australia’s prolonged economic downturn and soaring debt following Covid-19, Canberra’s policies have increasingly prioritized domestic issues.
Faced with an expected gross debt of , A$ 598.5 billion  , for the fiscal year ending June 2024, the government has needed to redirect funds towards pressing domestic concerns such as healthcare, economic stimulus, infrastructure, and social services.
This fiscal realignment is also likely driven by the need to concentrate on policies that have a direct impact on voter approval as the elections approach. Yet despite these fiscal constraints, defense spending has surged.
The government has allocated a record , A$ 36.8 billion  , to defense in the 2024-2025 budget,  , marking a 6.3 % increase from the previous fiscal year.
This boost in defense expenditure reflects a return to hard power, in response to increasing , geopolitical tensions , and strategic imperatives of AUKUS over the next decade. Considering all factors, Australia has, unfortunately, pushed public diplomacy to the back burner.
These trends are troubling. However, it is also important to recognize Australia’s soft power efforts have always been relatively meager.
Australia has never established an international cultural agency, unlike the British Council ( 1934), the Japan Foundation ( 1972 ), and the Korea Foundation ( 1991 ). Since the end of World War II, Canberra has given economic and strategic interests precedence over soft power, preferring to invest money in areas that are directly related to national interests, such as trade and defense.
Public diplomacy has always been Australia’s weakest area of foreign policy, according to John McCarthy, the former ambassador to Indonesia.” Canada invests more in public diplomacy than Australia allocates for its entire foreign service.
That said, Australia’s soft power decline stems from more than just budgetary restraints. Controversial policies on , Indigenous rights , and , asylum seekers, perceived inaction on , climate change, inconsistent approach to , human rights issues, restrictions on , freedom of expression, and disputes over environmental management have all complicated our global image in the region.
Canberra’s foreign policy should be at the forefront of a concerted effort to prioritize the development of soft power through public diplomacy because we have so few resources available to advance our national interests.
Addressing the problem
First, Australia needs to make the most of its national assets by providing more pro-Australian leaders with international education. For many years, international education was one of Australia ‘s , triumphs , in public diplomacy.
The country’s higher education system is globally renowned for its quality and inclusiveness, attracting global talent from nations including China, India, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and more. In 2023,  , eight , of Australia’s top ten source countries for international students were from Indo-Pacific nations.
Therefore, investing in international education not only improves Australia’s reputation abroad, but also cultivates generations of pro-Australian young leaders. Alumni of Australian universities frequently travel back to their home countries to take eminent positions in government, business, and civil society, acting as informal ambassadors and championing Australian values and policies in the area.
For instance, as Beijing ramps up policy and , security assistance , to Fiji and Papa New Guinea, investing in pro-Australian leaders is crucial for maintaining regional stability and promoting democratic principles, transparency, and sustainable development.
However, Australia’s reputation in international education has taken a hit following the recent tightening of visa policies. This has led to the , rejection , of over 50, 000 international applications between November 2023 and February 2024, and as visa rejections reach record-high numbers, students are  , seeking , educational opportunities elsewhere.
This opens the door to rival regional countries, which might otherwise have attracted students from other regions, and it goes in the wrong direction. While Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil emphasizes the need for , curbing migration levels,  , this approach has significant long-term consequences for Australia’s educational diplomacy and, by extension, public diplomacy.
There must be ongoing efforts to balance migration while preserving Australia’s reputation as a premier educational destination. One possible solution would be to adopt a program similar to Canada’s Student Direct Stream, which would help international students from important Indo-Pacific nations streamline visa requirements and sustainably manage migration levels.
Second, Canberra should prioritize investing money in public broadcasting to restore Australia’s international media presence.
As Australian Strategic Policy Institute senior fellow Graeme Dobell , writes,” Until the last decade, Australia was the pre-eminent international media voice in the South Pacific, as we had been since World War II”.
What was once a news presence in the 1990s that was comparable to CNN and the BBC has since vanished. In fact, Canberra’s continued efforts to withdraw resources from Australia’s broadcasting company ( ABC ) in an “sting_and_Public_Diplomacy_in_the_21st_Century”>evidence , that international public broadcasting is still a powerful tool in promoting public diplomacy in the 21st , century.
Many of our regional competitors have also shown persistent growth in their media influence through continued financial investment by their governments, such as China ‘s , CCTV , and Japan’s NHK.
In comparison, the ABC’s budget is now among the smallest globally, a situation that must be urgently addressed. Without substantial financial support from the Australian government, Australia’s global voice cannot be rebuilt.
This additional funding must be implemented strategically. Over the past ten years, the majority of the ABC’s original programming has been geared toward Australian viewers, a situation that is being exacerbated by persistent financial constraints.
Rebroadcasting this kind of content in the Pacific, as expected, has had very limited impact because it lacks the necessary language and cultural relevance for regional viewers.
To address this challenge, the ABC must prioritize creating content that resonates with the varied interests, languages, and cultures of Indo-Pacific audiences. China’s successes in multilingual programming and content diversification serve as a compelling illustration.
By enhancing our media capabilities, Australia can better shape perceptions, boost visibility, and strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific audiences.
Australia’s decline in soft power is cause for concern. Despite making incremental improvements, our progress has not been quick enough to keep us in line with other regional, rapidly expanding competitors.
Canberra must improve its soft power projection to avoid falling irreversibly behind if Australia wants to defend its national security interests in a region with a shifting balance of power.
Helen Wu , ( [email protected] )  , is an Emerging Leader at Pacific Forum and a senior at New York University majoring in International Relations.
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