Can a wind turbine handle hurricane speed winds?

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Damaged wind turbines are seen in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria in Naguabo, Puerto Rico on October 2, 2017Getty Images
By Chris Baraniuk
Technology reporter

The world’s biggest storms, which whip the high seas into a frenzy or flatten buildings on land, have long daunted wind farm developers. But that is changing.

Operators are increasingly adopting turbines designed to withstand tropical cyclones. One of the latest examples is a “typhoon-resistant” floating wind turbine, which will soon help to power an offshore oil platform in China.

According to the manufacturer, MingYang Smart Energy, this 7.25 megawatt (MW) turbine can survive wind speeds of up to 134mph for 10 minutes. It has been installed at a facility 136km off the coast of the island province of Hainan.

MingYang did not respond to a BBC request for comment but theirs is not the first turbine designed to face down such an onslaught. In 2021, US firm GE received typhoon-certification for its mammoth Halide-X turbine. It is fixed, not floating, and has a capacity of up to 13MW.

The blistering growth of the wind energy industry is pushing turbines to their limits and some question whether the pace of the rollout is wise.

While components such as turbine blades are remarkably strong, they are not indestructible. And the forces of nature, especially out at sea, are notoriously unpredictable, meaning the pressure is on to prove that wind turbines really are hurricane-ready.

Tropical cyclones – often called typhoons or hurricanes depending on location – are a familiar threat in certain parts of the world, including in the Gulf of Mexico or around much of Southeast Asia.

Such storms can produce wind speeds well in excess of 100mph. The strongest one-minute sustained winds on record, of 215mph, were created by Hurricane Patricia in the Eastern Pacific in 2015.

Hurricane Patricia is seen from the International Space Station. The hurricane made landfall on the Pacfic coast of Mexico on October 23, 2015.

NASA

Despite the meteorological challenges in such regions, the expansion of wind energy is expected there in the coming years and decades.

Today’s turbines already put up with some powerful gales. Those positioned off the northeast coast of the UK in the North Sea are generally rated to cope with wind speeds up to 50mph or so, notes Simon Hogg at Durham University. Prof Hogg holds the Ørsted chair at the university, which is funded by energy firm Ørsted.

Leon Mishnaevsky of the Technical University of Denmark suggests that wind turbine blades are generally quite reliable. These days, they are made from strong but lightweight carbon fibre composites and automated manufacturing processes help to ensure the uniform placement of the fibres, which is important for the blades’ robustness, he notes.

Wind turbine makers also perform a range of stress tests on blades to ensure that they are up to scratch.

This can include attaching large “exciters” to the blades, which bounce up and down, simulating the repeated stresses of winds on the structure. Giant blades are also sometimes bent to the point of breaking, says Prof Hogg, which helps to confirm the maximum loads they can bear.

But the fallibility of turbines, especially the biggest ones, is becoming more apparent as time goes by. Insurer GCube notes in a recent report that offshore wind losses rose from £1m in 2012 to more than £7m in 2021.

Plus, machines with capacities larger than 8MW can suffer component failures within just two years of installation, the firm says, more than twice as fast as 4-8MW devices.

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Some of the most dangerous forces to trouble turbine blades are torsion, or twisting, loads, says Find Mølholt Jensen, chief executive of Bladena, a firm that specialises in diagnosing and repairing large turbine blades around 60m in length, or longer.

Repeated twisting of blades can induce difficult-to-spot fractures, he says: “The damage cannot be seen from the outside.”

The longer the blade, the greater the risk, comments a spokesman for Bladena.

Current testing and industry standards are not sufficient to prove that the largest turbine blades can withstand these stresses, argues Dr Jensen.

New designs could help, though. In Japan, Challenergy has been working on a turbine with tall, vertical blades that spin around a central tower.

While currently much smaller and less powerful than the biggest traditional, three-bladed turbines in operation today, Challenergy’s device is intended to cope with very high winds.

When a powerful typhoon called Hin Nam No struck the Philippines and Japan last August, it passed over two of the company’s turbines. One of the devices, at Ishigaki City in Okinawa, recorded wind speeds of around 64mph. The turbine continued to operate without any problems, according to Challenergy.

University of Colorado Boulder test turbine

Kelsey Simpkins

In the US, a research team has taken a cue from nature in their design of an alternative hurricane-resistant turbine.

“We were inspired by palm trees,” explains Lucy Pao at the University of Colorado Boulder. “In high winds they kind of go with the flow, they bend with the wind.”

She and her colleagues designed a prototype two-bladed wind turbine design with flexible blades. Plus, the rotor faces downwind rather than into the wind, as is common in traditional configurations, helping it to absorb the impact of strong gales.

During tests at an onshore site in Colorado, the blade tips were observed deflecting by up to 600mm, more than half a metre. “None of them snapped,” says Prof Pao.

Wind speeds in the area can reach 100mph in the wintertime, she adds.

However, the wind energy industry has almost universally adopted the upwind, three-bladed design so selling a new concept is difficult, Prof Pao explains. Currently, her research in this area is on hold, pending further funding.

Lucy Pao at the University of Colorado Boulder

Kelsey Simpkins

She shares the concerns of other observers who question whether wind turbines are really ready for some of the strongest winds nature can hurl at them.

“The novel materials, they are stronger, they are pretty amazing, but I don’t know that they’ve been tested out as thoroughly as maybe they should be,” she says.

Then there are the tricky economics of siting turbines in places where winds are especially variable. James Martin is chief executive at Gulf Wind Technology, a company exploring the deployment of turbines in the Gulf of Mexico.

In this area, low wind speeds are common for most of the year – with the occasional hurricane blasting its way through.

“If you design that turbine to be strong enough to withstand the peak wind event, then you’ll be carrying a lot of extra cost for the times that you’ve got light wind,” notes Mr Martin. He declines to share details of the turbines or technologies his firm is considering.

In the coming years, you can expect to see more and more turbines arriving in regions affected by cyclones, though.

“We need [turbines] there as much as we need them in any other area of the globe,” argues Prof Hogg. “I don’t think we should shy away from it.”

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Shanmugam’s speech on Ukraine invasion reflects government’s views: Balakrishnan in response to Sylvia Lim

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On Monday, Ms Lim asked the Foreign Affairs Minister whether Mr Shanmugam’s remarks represented the government’s views, and whether there has been any revision to Singapore’s position on the invasion. Dr Balakrishnan said Singapore’s position remained unchanged, and he referred to a ministerial statement he delivered in parliament on FebContinue Reading

As US-China rivalry boils, Manila should play its cards well  

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As US-China rivalry intensifies, pressure on allies and partners grows. Strategic access in return for economic concessions or security assistance plays out in the Indo-Pacific region. Cases abound, from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines to the Marshall Islands and the Solomons.

Rational countries weigh in on the risks, push back or drive hard bargains as they – willingly or reluctantly – accommodate great-power interests. The pace at which such development is unfolding makes the Philippine case instructive. 

Despite a new government in Manila barely a year in office, the shift from striking a balance between the US and China to openly taking the US line has become manifest. The Philippine-US alliance is in high-octane mode.

Four new sites for US military access have been granted. One of the biggest iterations of annual joint military exercises was just concluded. The two sides are discussing plans to conduct joint naval maneuvers in the South China Sea.

Manila is being looped into the thickening web of hub-and-spoke trilaterals (US-Japan-Philippines, US-Australia-Philippines), as well as US-led minilaterals like the Quad and AUKUS.

Marcos in Washington

On the third day of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s second visit to the US, new bilateral defense guidelines were issued. Indeed, the alliance has evolved rapidly. 

The revival of the alliance under Marcos is a sea change from rocky times during the previous Rodrigo Duterte government. Possible irritants like human rights, ill-gotten wealth, and lawsuits faced by the Marcos family in US courts are unlikely to unsettle ties.

This leads to speculations of a quid pro quo between Marcos and the US. It highlights how personal and filial interests can influence foreign-policy swings for a crucial country on the front line of geopolitical flux.

Washington seems poised to insulate renewed relations from these issues lest access to Philippine military sites gets compromised. It is a déjà vu of how US dealt with the president’s father, the late strongman Ferdinand Marcos Sr, decades ago. 

Under the second Marcos administration, not only is the alliance reborn, it is breaking new ground. For the first time since the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was signed in 2014, the US was given access to a Philippine naval base. Renewable every 10 years, EDCA allows the US to deploy troops rotationally and pre-position supplies in agreed locations throughout the country.

Broadening US presence

Four new sites were added to the existing five. The locations of these are telling. Three – a naval base, an army base, and a civilian airport – are in northern Luzon, close to Taiwan, and can be quickly activated to respond to a cross-Strait contingency. 

In contrast, the fourth one on Balabac Island does not have infrastructure that can immediately bear on the South China Sea, Manila’s primary security concern. A lush island far from the country’s outposts in Kalayaan, it has more value in monitoring maritime traffic crisscrossing the West Philippine and Sulu Seas.

Developing the naval detachment in Ulugan Bay, closer to the oil-and-gas-rich Recto Bank, might have been more sensible in enhancing Manila’s posture in the flashpoint.

The US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. Hence the use of such armaments as Patriot and Avenger missiles and HIMARS rockets in annual war games raises suspicions that they may eventually be installed in EDCA sites.

China deployed missiles in the Spratlys in 2018, and Manila, in response, aims to field a BrahMos battery this year. The stationing of US missiles in EDCA bases may thus worryingly elicit a Chinese reply. More toys in an already crowded pond may only raise the specter of accidents. 

Where the additional EDCA sites are situated, and the choice of recent Balikatan exercise areas (which includes Batanes and Cagayan close to Taiwan), reflect an accommodation of US priorities.

The pretext of boosting the capacity to react to disasters is doubtful. If humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is the priority, southern Luzon or eastern Visayas should have been more appropriate as these regions are at the forefront of ever stronger typhoons coming from the Pacific due to climate change. At the very least, one should have been put in either area to make the HADR pitch more tenable.  

It is also doubtful how greater military access will address China’s gray-zone activities in the South China Sea and whether other claimants will be amenable to joint patrols in contested waters. Manila is not the only target of Beijing’s incursions in the strategic waterway. But other disputants are able to push back and even make headway. 

Vietnam, with no foreign troops, no foreign bases, and no alliances, was able to occupy and control the most number of features in the Spratlys – more than the combined rocks, reefs and submerged banks held by the Philippines, China, Malaysia and Taiwan.

While Beijing’s Great Wall of Sand got much attention, Hanoi’s modest reclamation attracted less attention. While China’s unilateral fishing bans invite protests from other littoral states, Vietnamese – not Chinese – fishermen remain the most frequent poachers in the Philippines’ western exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

In 2016 and 2017, out of humanitarian considerations, former leader Rodrigo Duterte personally sent off two batches of Vietnamese fishermen caught in the country’s waters. 

Costs vs benefits

This raises the question of whether EDCA expansion is an effective calibrated response to Philippines’ major external security challenge and whether the costs and risks attendant to it outweigh the expected gains.  

EDCA expansion stoked fears among concerned local leaders and legislators that the Philippines might be drawn into a superpower clash over Taiwan. Marcos allayed such fears, saying that the country’s bases would not be used for offensive purposes or serve as staging posts for action against another country.

He also reassured Beijing, meeting with Foreign Minister Qin Gang a week before his trip to Washington. Marcos is in a difficult spot, hoping to soothe persistent domestic and regional concerns but not wanting overly to constrain the use of EDCA sites lest it diminish their supposed deterrent value. 

And while much focus was given to defense, one must ask how prepared Manila is to weather potential economic reprisals. This is especially so if China imposes sanctions in response to US missile deployment in new EDCA sites.

America’s oldest Asian ally is not only the most militarily disadvantaged in the South China Sea, it is also the most economically vulnerable in the First Island Chain. How can a country be so gung-ho on security issues and be a laggard in cornering trade and capital flows redirected to Southeast Asia?

While endorsing the Quad and AUKUS, the Philippines was the last member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (other than war-torn Myanmar) to ratify the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and has yet to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

If Manila wants the US and the international community to be invested in its security, it has to climb up the value chain. It should wisely leverage the alliance to this end.

If Taiwan has the Silicon Shield and Vietnam is the rising manufacturing powerhouse, the Philippines cannot just have call centers and strategic real estate. It should play its cards well to turn a crisis into an opportunity.  

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The U.K. has a new king. What does that mean for ASEAN?

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The bars in Singapore’s Boat Quay glowed gold with celebratory pints and the glare of television screens on Saturday as customers flocked the popular tourist and expat hotspot to watch a man almost 11,000 miles away make the biggest career move of his life.

On 6 May, the coronation of Charles III, formerly Prince of Wales, marked his formal accession to the throne of England. Since the passing of his mother, Elizabeth II, on 8 September from old age, the role of monarch has passed to her eldest son and heir. Charles’ second wife, Camilla, was crowned queen. 

The British monarchy has a longstanding history with Southeast Asia. For some countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, the gilt and pomp of the ceremony holds vestiges of a colonial past. For others, their own monarchy has ties with the British family. 

The late Queen Elizabeth’s second visit to Thailand coincided with the Golden Jubilee of Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX. She recalled that her great-great-grandmother, Queen Victoria, had been penpals with King Mongkut, Rama IV, and that the bond “has been carried forward to our generation”.

As the British monarchy enters a new era, Charles Dunst, senior associate and deputy director of research and analytics at The Asia Group advisory firm, spoke to Southeast Asia Globe about the coronation’s significance in the region and the next frontier of U.K.-ASEAN relations. Dunst is also the author of a recently published book titled Defeating The Dictators: How Democracy Can Prevail In The Age Of The Strongman.

People watch coverage of the coronation of Britain’s King Charles III at a pub in Bangkok on 6 May, 2023. Photo: Jack Taylor/AFP

Do you think this coronation is significant to Southeast Asia? 
The coronation is something of a soft power moment of the United Kingdom, with the eyes of the world on London for the pomp and circumstance – rather than the recent chaos of British politics. 

For Southeast Asian countries which hold historical colonial relationships with the U.K., such as Singapore, Malaysia and Myanmar, how do you feel this coronation and the monarchy will be received? 
Singapore and Malaysia both have cooperative relations with the United Kingdom. And while the coronation might dredge up some memories of empire, both countries’ leaders welcome U.K. economic and security engagement. Burma’s junta was not invited to the coronation, likely hardening the regime’s negative view of the U.K. and broader West. Overall, there is much more resentment towards the British in Africa and the Caribbean than in Southeast Asia, where views of the U.K. are mostly positive.

What impact do you think this coronation will have on other monarchies, in particular those in Southeast Asia?
The British monarchy offers a bit of an example of how monarchies can transition from powerful entities to more cultural ones. But most of Southeast Asia’s monarchies are focused on holding power – not relinquishing it in the name of democracy.

Can Charles be a similar figurehead as Elizabeth was in the region?
Charles is something of an unknown in much of Southeast Asia. Elizabeth was well-liked in many circles, but that seems like mostly because of what she represented rather than her personality. Charles is well-placed to carry on the legacy, particularly given his demonstrated interest in Islam – which may be well-received in Indonesia and Malaysia. 

Does the U.K. still hold significance in Southeast Asia?
Southeast Asian leaders see the United Kingdom as a practical partner on economic and security issues. Most officials, especially younger ones, have largely moved beyond the issue of empire. As Southeast Asia looks to diversify its relations in the era of U.S.-China competition, the region will welcome U.K. investment and security assistance.

The British High Commissioner to Singapore spoke at the end of last year about the “strong ties” between U.K. and ASEAN. What are your thoughts on this, and what do you think it means for their trade and defence relations going forward?
U.K.-ASEAN ties are reasonably strong, and should be able to go from strength to strength. The U.K. has already joined the CPTPP [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership], has a trade deal with Vietnam, and is pursuing a trade deal with Indonesia. Westminster may look to strike similar deals with the other Southeast Asian countries sooner rather than later. 

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Avoiding worst-case scenario for South China Sea

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China’s position, policy and practices in the South China Sea have become counterproductive to its attempts to enhance its soft power and relations with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless it continues them and has even doubled down on its historic claim – which was rejected by an international arbitration panel – to much of the Sea by enforcing it with its maritime militia, coast guard and occasionally even its navy.

China’s rival claimants – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – are pushing back with their own enhanced military presence, upgrades and collaboration with the US and other outside powers. This increasing militarization of the South China Sea disputes sets the stage for the worst-case scenario: frequent and widespread conflict that eventually results in a military confrontation between China and the US. 

China has been trying to build up its soft power in the region. It has stepped up its economic and diplomatic efforts via its Belt and Road Initiative to persuade its rival South China Sea claimants to compromise and recognize its interests and concerns. It is proposing an “inclusive” Indo-Pacific as an alternative to the United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision that excludes China.

Its new Foreign Minister Qin Gang has renewed diplomatic efforts to broaden and deepen engagement with Southeast Asian nations including its rival claimants and pledged to “keep the South China Sea peaceful and stable.” 

Now it has also proposed an overarching grand Global Security Initiative (GSI) that includes a promise “to conduct bilateral and multilateral security operation with all countries and regional organizations.”

As a counter to what it sees as US-led cabals against it, Beijing may even try to build its own economic and security grouping in the region beginning with China-leaning Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. It could try to persuade Thailand to join it and Vietnam at least to remain neutral.

But if these soft-power efforts do not persuade its rivals to compromise on their claims, it may well decide to do whatever it takes to achieve its interests in the South China Sea. This would be a realization of the ancient Thucydian proverb that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Indeed, it could well mean a heavy-handed use of its military “stick” and its economic might to reward and punish “uncooperative” rival claimants. 

In this scenario, China would generate widespread opprobrium and rival claimants would likely move even closer to the US. But China may calculate that it can weather the ensuing political storm.

It knows that it holds long-term advantages over the US as well as its rival claimants. It is a permanent fixture in the region – it will always be there – and its economic and military might are rapidly and inexorably expanding. 

Indeed, it may assume that there is really very little the rival claimants can do but whine, wail, and plead with the US to back them up militarily. China may calculate that that is unlikely because, notwithstanding US rhetoric, no core US security interests are directly threatened and that the US public and Congress will not support another potentially disastrous foreign adventure in defense of vague concepts like the “international order.”

Moreover, if China feels sufficiently threatened it may counter US initiatives to surround and contain it by implementing America’s worst nightmare – drawing closer to Russia militarily.

Yes this is a worst-case scenario. But it is a realistic alternative response to the disputes that China may find increasingly attractive as its rival claimants’ positions harden and the US becomes ever more deeply involved. The US and China’s rival claimants should at least consider the possibility that the “chickens” of their anti-China policies and actions will come home to roost.

Of course China’s rival claimants – and the US – want to avoid this worst-case scenario. But to do so they will have to compromise and address some of China’s concerns and interests. Perhaps the best that can be accomplished is to negotiate a series of “deals.” 

For the US, this would include agreement to back off on its enhanced diplomatic embrace and military support for Taiwan. For China’s rival claimants in the South China Sea, that means reaching a modus vivendi with China.

Perhaps the best they can hope for is arrangements in which China maintains its historic claim to placate its nationalists but does not enforce it. This could include China’s priority access, under rival claimants’ management, to a share of what they consider their fish and petroleum resources.

This might be in exchange for China’s restraint from intimidating its rivals and providing its forefront technological and capital assistance in harvesting next-generation methane-hydrate resources on their continental slopes. 

This scenario is not about “right and wrong.” Rather, it is about relative power. The reality is that China, its rival claimants and the US have to compromise. No compromise means an end point of China’s absolute hegemony over the South China Sea or a universally catastrophic conflict.

Political and military analysts should realize this and advise accordingly. However, if they have realistic alternatives short of risking war that do not include the forlorn hope that China will back off its claims, I and the region are all ears.

An edited version of this piece appeared in the South China Morning Post. 

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Targeting online IP infringement in Southeast Asia

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Intellectual property (IP) infringement is perhaps the most common crime in our lives. Using unlicensed software programs or images, consuming and sharing pirated content, buying fake or counterfeit items – these are the things a lot of people may have done, intentionally or unintentionally, regardless of their socio-economic background and the direction of their moral compass.

In an everyday situation, it should be clear to anyone that stealing money or other items is morally wrong and illegal. But when it comes to intellectual property, one may argue that nobody really gets hurt.

Unfortunately, this is not the case. Counterfeiting and online piracy are often linked to organized crime, which entails other illegal activities and deplorable deeds affecting society, such as forced and child labor.

This is also a concern for Southeast Asia, a major target for organized crime syndicates according to a 2019 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

In recent years, the front line for the fight against IP crime has shifted to cyberspace. Thanks to modern-day technology and the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been a surge of Internet usage and the consumption of goods and services online.

According to a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), online retail sales rose by 41% in major economies between 2018 and 2020, compared with less than a 1% rise in total retail sales.

Counterfeiters have exploited this opportunity to expand their illegal business. In Southeast Asia alone, the report by the UNODC mentioned estimates that the counterfeit goods market, excluding fraudulent medicines, generates illicit revenues of between around US$33.8 billion and $35.9 billion annually.

IP rights violation chiefly happens online in two ways. One is the selling of counterfeits on the Internet, and the other is online piracy.

For IP Key South-East Asia (IP Key SEA), an EU-funded technical cooperation project directed by the European Commission and implemented by the EUIPO, these are two important topics on which we have been cooperating with IP offices, brands and other IP practitioners to protect both IP rights owners and consumers. 

In the European Union, two voluntary agreements have been facilitated by the EC to combat online IP infringement. These are the memorandum of understanding on the sale of counterfeit foods on the Internet and the MoU on online advertising and IPR.

The former, first concluded in 2011, targets the removal of counterfeit products from online marketplaces, while the latter, signed in 2018, strives to disrupt the advertising revenue of websites and apps that infringe IP rights. 

In Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines have adopted their own MoUs to curb the online sale of counterfeits, while a code of conduct on e-commerce aimed at tackling the same issue is being negotiated in Indonesia. With regard to advertising on IP-infringing websites and apps, Thailand is currently the only country to have such an MoU in effect. 

The implementation of all these MoUs has seen positive results. For example, based on a series of studies on the impact of the MoU on online advertising and IPR, the share of advertisements of EU businesses on IP-infringing websites has dropped by 12% since the signing of the MoU.

At recent events organized by IP Key SEA, representatives from the EC, IP offices in Southeast Asia and IP rights owners reported several benefits of these two kinds of MoUs.

The advantages include trust and frank conversations between rights owners and the platforms, reduced administrative burden on all parties and speedy action against infringing posts, better management of limited resources in fighting infringement, the protection of privacy of involved parties, and the preservation of reputation of legitimate brands and e-commerce platforms, which warrant consumer trust and confidence.

Another strong point of MoUs and codes of conduct is that such soft law is easier to draft and implement than hard law.

The cyberworld and online IP infringement have become more and more complex and attempts to resolve the issue requires goodwill and cooperation among all stakeholders, two things that voluntary agreements can help create.

Regular meetings between signatories not only facilitate a flow of knowledge but also enhance accountability, enabling each party to do better in their fight against IP crime. Once adopted, an MoU can always be expanded to include new signatories, who will further contribute to improved IP protection and enforcement.

A few final words for countries in Southeast Asia hoping to draft similar MoUs to address online IP infringement: Suggestions from the signatories already implementing these MoUs in the region include reducing the barrier to join an MoU but enhancing the signatories’ accountability through key performance indicators (KPIs), which allow for the evaluation of progress and success.

Also, inclusion of other government authorities, such as law enforcement, in the MoU membership may be explored for a more coordinated approach with IP rights owners and intermediaries, such as e-commerce platform operators and online advertisers.

It is the mandate of the IP Key SEA Project to support Southeast Asian countries in enhancing their IP protection and enforcement. We stand ready to provide technical assistance should more IP offices and their stakeholders wish to implement similar soft-law solutions to online IP infringement.

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Press freedom & activist shooting

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Hello Globe readers,

This is Andrew Haffner, the Globe’s editor-in-chief, filling in for Beatrice as she heads back to Europe for a week to work on her master’s degree. As a mostly remote student, she’s been putting in nights and weekends on her coursework – I commend the hustle (not sure I could match it) and hope she finds time to take a breather while she’s back on home turf.

For the rest of us here, the Globe keeps turning for another week of stories. We had a very diverse slate of articles, leading off with a Tuesday Q&A with freelance conservation photographer and naturalist Jeremy Holden, a fixture in Cambodia’s jungles for nearly 20 years now. Globe reporter Anton Delgado spoke with Jeremy about his guiding ethos, his personal disdain for chemical sunscreens and insect repellants – they’re “kind of cheating”, according to Jeremy – and his love of frogs. 

That last one led to his latest work, a comprehensive field guide to the Kingdom’s 75 known species of froggy friends. It all makes for a fun and interesting read, so give it a look. 

Out of the jungle, Beatrice came in with two very different pieces for us from Laos, where both mental health services and freedom of expression remain elusive. On Tuesday, we explored the former with a feature on the lingering stigma around mental health in a country with almost no medical infrastructure for psychology. Beatrice found that while the government and its partners – including youth-led advocacy groups – have made significant progress in recent years, major service gaps still define the system.

Wednesday marked World Press Freedom Day, which Anton explored with an article on the unacknowledged elephant in the room of UN-organised events in Cambodia – the abrupt closure of the independent outlet Voice of Democracy (VOD) and the broader chill of domestic media in the lead-up to the July election. 

On Thursday, brought us a happier ending to a grim story with the survival of Lao youth activist Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom, 25, who had been declared dead after an as-yet-unidentified gunman shot him twice in a Vientiane cafe. The news of his supposed death made international headlines, and Beatrice reported new details for what remains a blurry picture. Learn more here. 

Finally, rounding out our week, on Friday we published an opinion-analysis on Timor-Leste’s prospects for ASEAN accession from contributor Guteriano Neves, an independent policy analyst based in Dili. What will it take for accession to finally happen? Hit the link to find out. 

That’s all for today, so enjoy this week’s features and have a wonderful weekend.

Globe’s Beatrice Siviero

Lao democracy activist shot in cold blood survived the attack. Meanwhile, human rights groups are calling on the Lao authorities to launch an independent investigation and find the shooter. 

Globe’s Anton L. Delgado

World Press Freedom Day in Cambodia was preceded by a UN-organised media event where speakers failed to address the country’s alarming decline in free press.

Globe’s Beatrice Siviero

Artwork by Globe’s Emilie Languedoc

Lao youths are opening up about mental health, but with one licensed psychiatrist in a 7.4-million-population country, Laos is still lacking mental health support and effective resources.

Globe’s Anton L. Delgado

Southeast Asia Globe interviewed Jeremy Holden, a naturalist, wildlife photographer and frog enthusiast who specialised in amphibian conservation in Cambodia. 

Guteriano Neves

After decades from the first official request to join the regional group, ASEAN has allowed Timor-Leste to join the bloc as an observer in the lead up to the country’s definitive admission.

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Strong earthquake shakes central Japan

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TOKYO: On Friday, May 5, a significant earthquake struck western Japan, briefly suspending shot train services, but no tsunami warning was issued, according to authorities. According to the Japan Meteorological Agency, the 6.5 magnitude earthquake struck the central Ishikawa region at 2.42 PM( 1.42 pm, Singapore time ) at aContinue Reading

EU carbon limits to pinprick Vietnam export boom

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Beginning in October 2023, the EU intends to implement the first carbon border adjustment mechanism( CBAM ).

The program will mandate that buyers disclose the amount of embedded coal in their imported goods during the transition period. To close the gap between the EU’s coal price and the price in exporting nations, extra fees will be imposed on imported goods starting in 2026.

Iron and steel, concrete, metals, manure, electricity, and hydrogen will be the initial targets of the CBAM. The CBAM is anticipated to have a significant effect on emission-intensive markets like Vietnam, which export goods to the EU. It has the potential to reduce trade attrition from the government’s affected sectors by about US$ 100 million.

According to estimates, the EU’s CBAM in its present form has had the greatest impact on the Vietnamese metal industry. An extra cost of about US$ 80, or 10 % of the trade price, could apply to a tonne of metal that is exported to the EU.

Steel’s import value could drop by up to 3.7 %. Some industries that are impacted include cement and aluminum. Additionally administrative costs associated with testing, monitoring, and verifying the embedded emissions in their exported products may be incurred by exporting businesses.

As a result, the CBAM may hinder Vietnam’s trade profitability. Risks are present in the EU’s CBAM as it evolves. If embedded emissions boundaries are extended to include the entire value chain of production inputs, its effects may increase quickly. The effects may also increase if some nations, like the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, follow the EU’s lead and implement their own CBAMs.

Therefore, it’s crucial to prepare for the CBAM later. The eleventh-largest producer to the EU is Vietnam. Vietnam will need to lessen the effects of the CBAM in order to increase its exports and wholly reap the significant advantages of its trade, agreements, andnbsp with the EU. This can be partly accomplished by lowering the emissions levels of Vietnam’s exported goods.

This picture taken on December 3, 2015 shows Vietnamese workers riding motorcycles as they leave the site of the Taiwain-owned steel plant Formosa in the central province of Ha Tinh.This picture taken on December 3, 2015 shows a couple riding a motorcycle pulling a cart on a road past a newly developped residential area for resettled families who were displaced from the site of the Taiwain-owned steel plant Formosa in the central province of Ha Tinh. / AFP PHOTO / HOANG DINH NAM
Workers from Vietnam leave the location of the Taiwain-owned steel plant Formosa in the Ha Tinh western province on motorcycles. AFP / Hoang Dinh Nam image

Decarbonizing the light field will significantly contribute to emission reductions in the CBAM sectors because they use a lot of electricity. Luckily, Vietnam has a lot of ability to harness solar and wind energy and nbsp to speed up the renewables of electricity. Nearly 46 times greater than the nation’s installed capacity in 2022 is the combined future of solar and wind energy.

Vietnam may concentrate on increasing its penetration of solar and wind energy. To remove current barriers to the adoption of renewable energy, such as the reduction of solar and wind outputs due to & nbsp, the constrained grid capacity, it is crucial to track the upgrading of grid systems quickly.

If constructed, a South-North home high-voltage clear present subsea cable could help with grid management and make sure that the most affordable electricity generation opportunities are taken advantage of.

Industries would be able to purchase solar and wind power directly from independent renewable producers if the electricity market were to be reformatted, including allowing & nbsp and direct power purchase agreements. The public would then have less to worry about maintaining energy security because the competition would be more active in promoting renewables.

In the upcoming seventh National Power Development Master Plan, ambitious goals for solar and wind power could be set as additional steps to encourage the adoption of renewable energy sources.

This enormous potential source of renewable power, of which Vietnam has the largest possible in Southeast Asia, may be unleashed by enacting regulations to force and lease onshore wind power projects andnbsp. Increasing energy efficiency through industrial best practices and technical advancements could also aid in achieving this objective.

Phasing out unabated coal power would also contribute to reducing emissions. Imposing a carbon price would reduce CBAM certificate payments. Carbon pricing could enable the revenues to be recycled in the Vietnamese economy and used to support initiatives like technological renovation to improve energy efficiency and promote the uptake of renewables.

Asian businesses covered by CBAM will gain from using coal capture, utilization, and storage technologies as well as later switching production inputs from fossil fuels to renewable sources like natural hydrogen. However, these systems are still in their infancy and are not yet price-competitive.

In the short term, Vietnam will need to improve its capacity for testing, monitoring, and identification as well as participate in constructive dialog with the EU to find CBAM-favorable problems.

At the Phu Lac weather land in the Binh Thuan state of southern Vietnam, there are solar panel deployments and a wind turbine. AFP / Manan Vatsayana, a portrait

In addition to lessening the effects of the CBAM, accelerating the switch to solar power would make Vietnam achieve its ambitious goal of peaking its energy emissions by 2030, which it pledged in December 2022 under the Just Energy Transition Partnership.

Contributing to Vietnam’s climate and national emissions goals, such as achieving net zero emissions by 2050, lowering local air and pollution levels, and creating a & nbsp, domestic renewable energy industries, are additional advantages of the energy transition.

Vietnam can lay a solid foundation for pursuing natural and green growth by increasing its uptake of renewable energy.

At the Crawford School of Public Policy and the Institute for Climate, Energy, and Disaster Solutions, The Australian National University, Thang Nam Do is a Fellow in the Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Grand Challenge Program.

This andnbsp, post, and was originally published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with permission from Creative Commons.

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