KUALA LUMPUR: A total of 121 people, mostly Malaysians suspected of being victims of job scams, were evacuated from Myanmar on Friday (Dec 1) after being stranded by fighting between the military and rebel groups in the country’s north, Malaysia’s foreign ministry said. The group, which included an Indonesian national,Continue Reading
The debate over copyright has been seen around the world, with some artists angered by AI copying the styles they have sacrificed years to develop, often without consent or compensation. This has sparked questions of intellectual property ownership and legal challenges in countries like the US.
But this is only one of the ground-up fears that AI has brought on. Some are worried about losing their jobs, while others say the technology could be used for nefarious purposes.
AI systems used in recruitment and judicial processes also risk perpetuating biases, as the training data they use could be encoded with socio-economic, racial, religious and gender prejudices, experts say.
At the same time, the potential of using AI to do good is also there – from driving automation to predicting illness.
Against this backdrop, a race for AI regulation is taking place to avert the risks while hopefully reaping the rewards – with action being taken at the global, regional and national levels.
An international milestone was logged just a month ago. The first-ever AI Safety Summit, held in the UK on Nov 1, saw the US and China coming together with more than 25 other countries to affirm the safe and responsible use of AI.
The landmark agreement also places “strong responsibility” on developers of frontier AI to test their systems for safety.
Frontier AI often refers to the first wave of mainstream AI applications like ChatGPT.
On a regional scale, the European Union is in the final stages of formulating its AI Act, a far-reaching law that would classify AI systems by risk and mandate various development and use requirements.
Closer to home, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is planning to draw up governance and ethics guidelines for AI, which analysts told CNA are expected to suggest “safeguards” that can mitigate identified risks.
While the guide is not expected to translate into regional legislation, it could spur individual member states to create new laws or tweak existing ones to regulate the technology, they added.
Countries behind the AI curve will also get a leg up as they can benefit from the sharing of knowledge.
“The public should care about AI regulation because the technology is more pervasive than we normally think,” said Dr Karryl Sagun-Trajano, a research fellow for future issues and technology at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), pointing out that AI is used in sectors like healthcare, education, transport and crime fighting.
The potential for AI to upend the labour market and disrupt industries has been much discussed. A Goldman Sachs report predicts that as many as 300 million jobs could be impacted by AI automation.
Observers have warned that faster, smarter and cheaper AI-powered chatbots could replace outsourced call centres handling customer service for many companies.
This is especially stark for countries like India and the Philippines, where call centres provide modest-paying work and surveys have shown automation could render over a million jobs obsolete.
BEIJING: China on Thursday (Nov 30) hailed the late Henry Kissinger as an “old friend”, paying tribute to a diplomat central to establishing ties between Beijing and Washington. Kissinger, a former US secretary of state whose unapologetic promotion of raw American power helped shape the post-World War II world, diedContinue Reading
As US President Joe Biden recently attempted to charm Chinese President Xi Jinping into standing down from his imperial ambitions of obtaining more Lebensraum for his country, all should question Xi’s right to claim dominion over the South China Sea.
Without legal authority or historic precedent, China has audaciously and arrogantly claimed most of the South China Sea as its “domestic” waters. By militarizing its presence in the South China Sea and harassing Philippine vessels (and also shadowing American ships and planes), China is risking war.
On November 25, near the Paracel Islands, China deployed naval and air forces to “track, monitor and warn away” the US destroyer Hopper.
China said the incident “proves that the United States is an out-and-out security risk creator in the South China Sea.”
On November 27, the US Seventh Fleet issued a statement that:
“Unlawful and sweeping maritime claims in the South China Sea pose a serious threat to the freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded commerce, and freedom of economic opportunity for South China Sea littoral nations.
“The United States challenges excessive maritime claims around the world regardless of the identity of the claimant. Customary international law reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention protects certain rights, freedoms and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by all nations. The international community has an enduring role in preserving the freedom of the seas, which is critical to global security, stability, and prosperity.
“The United States upholds freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle. As long as some countries continue to claim and assert limits on rights that exceed their authority under international law, the United States will continue to defend the rights and freedoms of the sea guaranteed to all. No member of the international community should be intimidated or coerced into giving up their rights and freedoms.
“US forces operate in the South China Sea on a daily basis.… The operations demonstrate that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows – regardless of the location of excessive maritime claims and regardless of current events.”
Also this month, the US and China held “candid” talks on maritime issues, including the contested South China Sea, where Washington underlined its concerns about what it called “dangerous and unlawful” Chinese actions.
In late October, Chinese coast-guard and maritime-militia vessels “recklessly harassed and blocked” Philippine Coast Guard boats on their way to resupply a Manila-held outpost in the South China Sea. One Chinese ship fired a water cannon at a supply boat, Philippine forces said.
Ship-tracking data showed at least two dozen Chinese vessels, including large ships of the China Coast Guard, descending on Philippine-controlled Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands archipelago.
Decades ago when he was US ambassador to Thailand, my father bought an old naval map of Southeast Asia showing in great detail the entire South China Sea. In that expanse of water, not one Chinese name appears. The only places identified with Chinese names are on the coasts of Hainan Island and the Chinese mainland.
Similarly, names on the coast of Vietnam are shown in Vietnamese, while along the coasts of Malaya, Borneo, and around the Philippine Islands names are shown in Malay.
Nearly all land features in the South China Sea are identified with names in English.
This is evidence that the Chinese had no occupation or permanent presence in the South China Sea as of 1794.
(The map was published in London by Laurie and Whittle on May 12, 1974, based on the last edition of the Neptune Oriental by Monsieur D’apres de Mannervillette, and using drafts and journals of British navigators and a Dutch coastal chart.)
Second, in 1816 the king of Vietnam, Gia Long, planted his flag on the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea with no objection from China.
French priest J L Taberd wrote in 1837:
“The Pracel or Parocels, is a labyrinth of small islands, rocks, and sand-banks, which appears to extend up to the 11th degree of north latitude, in the 107th parallel of longitude from Paris. Some navigators have traversed part of these shoals with a boldness more fortunate than prudent, but others have suffered in the attempt.
“The Cochin Chinese call them Con uang. Although this kind of archipelago presents nothing but rocks and great depths which promises more inconveniences than advantages, the king Gia Long thought he had increased his dominions by the sorry addition. In 1816, he went with solemnity to plant his flag and take formal possession of these rocks, which it is not likely any body will dispute with him.”
Third, there is a 1905 Chinese map of China that does not show the South China Sea at all, implying that China had no claim to those waters or any islands in that sea.
Fourth, on March 30, 1933, the government of Vietnam, then a French protectorate, placed administration of the Paracel Islands under its province of Thua Thien. The government decree stated that such islands had been under the sovereign authority of Vietnamese for many generations under previous Vietnamese dynasties.
Fifth, on December 21, 1933, the French colonial administration of Cochin China decreed that the Spratly Islands, and the islets named Amboyna Cay, Itu-Aba, and Two Islands Group – Loaito and Thi-tu – would be subordinated to the administration of Baria province.
Previously on July 26, 1933, the Official Gazette of the French Republic published an opinion of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to the occupation of certain islands by French naval units. On August 24 and September 14, 1933, the governor general of Cochin China annexed the islands and islets of the Spratly or Storm Group.
The Chinese government did not protest these claims by the governments of Vietnam and the Cochin China colony nor did it assert its own rival claim to sovereignty over those islands.
So today, why is the international community in general and the United States, in particular, not formally rejecting China’s claim to “rule” the South China Sea and taking effective steps to enforce the claims of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia to those waters and the right of free passage through international waters beyond the jurisdiction of any nation?
Should China make good on its pretense that the South China Sea is part of its Lebensraum, it will be able to impose restrictions on and even a blockade of the shipping which sustains the existence of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, not to mention the wealth earned by countries which trade with those Asian nations by sea.
Art lovers will be glad to know that they can chase their post-holiday blues away this January as Singapore Art Week returns for its 12th edition. Organised by the National Arts Council and supported by the Singapore Tourism Board, the event features more than 150 art exhibitions and programmes by over 400 partners from all over the world – from art exhibitions showcasing local and global talent to live music shows.
Some of the programmes will even run till February 2024.
To whet your appetite, there are already some ongoing shows to check out, including Singaporean artist Ho Tzu Nyen’s Time And The Tiger at the Singapore Art Museum at Tanjong Pagar Distripark. The mid-career survey of his works that include paintings, films and video installations is running until Mar 3.
Over at the National Gallery Singapore, there’s Tropical: Stories From Southeast Asia And Latin America. The blockbuster show, which runs until Mar 24, features 200 artworks from more than 70 artists, including the works of famous Mexican artists Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera.
More Bersatu MPs may jump ship now that it is clear the anti-hopping does not work in practice. There are rumours that another three or four opposition MPs may switch their support to Mr Anwar before the end of this year, with the incentive simply the ability to access government funding for their constituency.
This would have increased political pressure on Muhyiddin to take political responsibility for losing the MPs. But after the Bersatu Supreme Council’s swift rejection of his decision to step down, Muhyiddin has confirmation that he is safe politically.
Muhyiddin’s “24-hour resignation” was a shrewd political move. He has emerged stronger politically after the annual party congress when it could easily have turned against him.
More importantly, he is now in pole position to retain the presidency in Bersatu internal elections next year. If he wins without a challenger, then all he has to do is to wait for the next general election, due by 2027 at the latest.
If PN wins that election, then he will break Mahathir’s record as a second-time prime minister.
The bad news, of course, is that Malaysian politics is wholly unpredictable. Anything can happen between now and 2027.
But Muhyiddin’s political stunt ensures that no matter what happens over the next four years, he will remain a major player in Malaysian politics.
James Chin is Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania and Senior Fellow at the Jeffrey Cheah Institute on Southeast Asia.
Even as they share similar concerns about economic security and resilience, the United States’ trading partners in Asia wonder what Washington’s new embrace of industrial policy means for their own development.
With deep government pockets, a large domestic market and potent research and development capabilities, the United States has the economic power to capture a significant share of global investment in targeted industrial sectors.
The US turn towards protectionism and its desire to shift trade to “like-minded” friends raise fears that the US market will be closed to Asian exports unless US demands for common standards and supply chain configurations are met.
The CHIPS and Science Act, passed by the US Congress in 2022, illustrates Washington’s “reshoring” intentions and their implications for trading partners. The act is designed to “bring back” domestic semiconductor manufacturing that is presently concentrated in Asia by offering a menu of subsidies, tax credits and domestic content rules that promote onshore research, development and manufacturing.
Bipartisan support for the funding comes from the centrality of semiconductors to civilian and military technology and concerns over the geopolitical vulnerability caused by fabrication that has moved to mainland China and Taiwan.
The CHIPS Act subsidizes onshore investment in semiconductor fabrication, promising US$39 billion of manufacturing incentives on top of 25% investment tax credits. These incentives seem to already be attracting the major semiconductor fabricators and their suppliers to invest in the United States.
According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, from the CHIPS Act’s introduction in 2020 to June 2023, 67 new projects and expansions of existing US facilities were announced in research and development, intellectual property, chip design, semiconductor fabrication and manufacturing equipment, supplies and materials.
This new activity contrasts with the steady decline in the US share of global semiconductor manufacturing, which fell from 19% in 2000 to only 12% in 2020.
Assessing how many of these projects have been attracted to the United States because of CHIPS Act subsidies is difficult. The allocation of these funds has not occurred yet and some of these investments might have been made regardless.
But US export controls on advanced chips and the equipment and supplies needed to produce them have undoubtedly affected decisions within the industry because they limit the materials that can be sent to China for manufacturing.
The CHIPS Act explicitly pulls investment from global semiconductor companies to the United States, raising fears that US industrial subsidies will hollow out tech industries in other regions. East and Southeast Asia is home to 10 of the 16 semiconductor exporters and the top six suppliers, accounting for 84% of global exports in 2021.
While US subsidies are clearly a response to this regional concentration, expanding production capacity in the United States will affect the markets that these exporters now serve. On the one hand, US chip-related activities may reduce US chip imports from some Asian suppliers. But they may also expand trade in materials, equipment and more labor-intensive activities, such as testing and packaging.
How the industry and the market for Asian semiconductor-related exporters evolve in the future also depends on the actions of other countries. In response to the CHIPS Act, the European Union, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have initiated or extended subsidy programs of their own.
In 2022 the EU launched the European Chips Act to ease government funding rules for semiconductor plants. In August 2023, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced plans to build a $11 billion chip manufacturing plant in Germany, in a deal that reportedly includes up to $5.5 billion in government subsidies.
The United Kingdom also announced a 20-year strategy for its domestic semiconductor industry, recognizing its inability to compete with massive US and EU subsidies and focusing on areas where it already has competencies.
This high level of intervention in the industry raises the specter of a coming glut of semiconductors and falling world prices, even as the cost of production by new players is expected to exceed those in more established locations. If such a scenario plays out, governments will be tempted to protect subsidized manufacturers behind import tariffs or offer customer subsidies conditioned on domestic content requirements.
The US turn to such restrictions is evident in the Inflation Reduction Act, passed in August 2022, which provides subsidies to purchasers of electric vehicles assembled in the United States. The threat to Asian suppliers is clear if the subsidy race blocks semiconductor export markets and lowers world prices.
Another concern for Asian suppliers may arise from US demands to reduce Chinese involvement in supply chains. To date, Washington has not made such demands directly, but the CHIPS Act’s investment tax credits are contingent on recipients refraining from significant new investments in manufacturing facilities in China. This indicates that the United States intends to reduce links to the Chinese industry.
The implications of such ambitions are unclear. Silicon is produced by a handful of countries, but the largest supplier by far is China. Pressure to find alternative sources will be a problem throughout the industry.
Even if the United States completely removes China from the supply chains that serve domestic chip manufacturers, it will still rely on imports of legacy chips from foreign partners.
Through ongoing consultations, facilitated in part by the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework’s new Supply Chain Council, Asian exporters may be able to moderate negative spillovers from the emerging semiconductor subsidy race and open up space for their participation in the expanding US industry.
The Council, envisioned to meet at least annually, is tasked with exploring options to diversify concentrated supply sources for sectors and goods of shared interest. Member countries could work to avoid duplication, maintain open trade among members and gradually modify critical material sourcing.
Mary E Lovely is the Anthony M Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
Indonesia should focus on renewable energy to meet its future electricity needs, argued Mr Putra Adhiguna of the US-based think tank, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).
“Our electricity system is currently too reliant on coal-fired power plants, which already creates an oversupply and in turn creates a disincentive for our electricity provider, PLN, to add more capacity,” he said, referring to Indonesia’s state-owned firm, Perusahaan Listrik Negara.
Another factor “hindering Indonesia’s energy transition efforts”, he said, is the price cap on coal.
Depending on its quality, Indonesia’s energy and mineral resources ministry caps the price of coal for electricity production at US$70 per tonne. The PLN estimates that this year, Indonesia would need 161 million tonnes of coal to feed its power plants.
The coal price cap makes it difficult for renewable energy to compete. In some countries, the levelised cost of solar energy over a 25- to 30-year life cycle is cheaper than fossil fuels, but that is not the case yet in Indonesia because of the artificial price ceiling for coal.
According to the Jakarta-based think tank Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), the levelised cost of electricity from solar is 5.79 US cents per kilowatt hour, while that from coal is 5.68 US cents, making it the cheapest source of energy in the country.
When you meet a child who has gone through the trauma of sexual exploitation and abuse, you never forget it.
In Southeast Asia, millions of child sexual exploitation images are downloaded, copied, forwarded, and shared in the blink of an eye, perpetuating trauma and stigma. In the borderless world of the Internet, national law-enforcement agencies find themselves limited.
Behind every abusive video and image is the life of a child, forever altered.
Asia already registers the highest rate of child Internet users globally. Alarmingly, up to one in five Internet-using children in ASEAN has experienced child sexual exploitation and abuse online. With Internet use continuing to grow rapidly, all signs suggest this frightening number will only increase over time.
This means accelerating action for child online protection is a matter of extreme urgency. Every child has the right to be safe from harm, both online and offline. And this is the collective responsibility of governments, of industry and the private sector, of parents and caregivers, of family members and young people themselves.
There is increasing awareness of the pivotal role industry can, and should, play. Technology companies can help design innovative solutions to tackle online abuse, identify and rapidly take down abuse materials, cooperate with law enforcement to report illegal and suspicious activities, and adopt corporate policies on child protection.
This week, with the support of UNICEF, Southeast Asian governments and industry representatives are convening in Bangkok at the second ASEAN-ICT Forum on Child Online Protection to discuss just that.
The call to the technology industry to step up and improve child online protection is not just being made by us: It is being made by children and young people themselves. They have been asking for easily accessible online reporting mechanisms, for the rapid takedown of harmful content and for perpetrators of abuse to be swiftly removed from online platforms, and for child-friendly information about staying safe online and protecting their privacy.
Yet among the children and young people surveyed ahead of this week’s forum, 51% told us they still see worrying or offensive content on a daily basis.
Southeast Asia has shown strong commitment to addressing child sexual exploitation and abuse. Robust frameworks for child online protection are already in place, notably the 2019 ASEAN Declaration to Protect Children from All Forms of Online Exploitation and Abuse.
What needs to be done now is accelerate the implementation of the framework and its action plan, particularly through urgent action and accountability on the part of the private sector, in addition to appropriate regulation by states.
As we work to keep children safe online, one of the fine balances we must continue to strike is ensuring they can still unlock all the precious new opportunities afforded by the Internet.
The Internet has helped children and young people learn, connect with and support one another, play, and make their voices heard. For more marginalized boys and girls living in remote areas and disadvantaged households, being connected to the Internet can change lives and open entirely new horizons.
In a debate that has often been prolonged and polarizing, our actions must systematically be guided by children’s rights. At the heart of all dialogue, policies and measures should be children’s right to protection from harm, their right to privacy, to information, to education, to association and to speech. We can, and must, do better to uphold this range of rights online.
SINGAPORE: A woman forged a university degree and deceived four companies into hiring her for editing jobs that paid monthly salaries of between S$4,300 (US$3,200) and S$6,800.
Fonseka Wannerichega Hema Ranjini, a 44-year-old Singaporean woman, pleaded guilty on Thursday (Nov 23) to two charges of cheating and one count of forgery, with another two charges to be taken into consideration.
The court heard that Fonseka had matriculated at Nanyang Technological University in 1998 to study mechanical and production engineering. However, she struggled academically and with tuition fees, so she withdrew from the programme in 2004.
A year later, she forged a certificate and printed it on cardstock paper before laminating it. This gave the impression that she had a Bachelor of Engineering degree from NTU with third-class honours. Her actual highest academic qualification was the A-Levels.
Fonseka then applied for jobs using the forged document, hoping that a university degree would result in higher salaries. In August 2005, she found a job as an assistant managing editor at Marshall Cavendish Education that paid S$4,200 a month.
She later became an acquisition associate with the same company from November 2012 to 2013, earning the same salary.
The Marshall Cavendish job was not included in the list of companies she cheated in court documents, although she had used the forged certificate in her job application.
In June 2015, Fonseka sought to switch jobs and applied for a job at Scholastic Education International (Singapore), a publisher and distributor of books and educational materials. She used the forged certificate again in her application and was hired as an assistant managing editor for S$4,300 a month.
She worked in this role from July 2015 to June 2016, after which she was promoted to managing editor with a pay bump of S$300. However, the company fired her in February 2017 for unsatisfactory work performance. In total, Scholastic Education had paid Fonseka about S$83,800.
A representative from the company later confirmed that there was a minimum qualification requirement of a Bachelor’s degree for the roles Fonseka had held.
This meant that the company would not have employed her if they had known she did not have a degree.
In 2021, Fonseka submitted a job application to The Walt Disney Company (Southeast Asia), which hired her as a learning editor in publishing from June to December that year.
Her monthly salary was S$6,800, with an additional transport allowance of S$1,084 a month, resulting in a total of S$7,884. She received around S$47,300 from the company during her employment there.
After Fonseka started working with The Walt Disney Company, the company sent her certificate to be validated by a third-party vendor specialising in background checks.
The vendor sent a request to the Office of Academic Services in NTU to validate Fonseka’s forged certificate.
When NTU confirmed that they had not issued the certificate, but that Fonseka had withdrawn from the university in 2004, the vendor informed The Walt Disney Company.
Fonseca was asked to explain herself. She first claimed that she had withdrawn from NTU in her final year but had the certificate issued on her request for paperwork to prove that she had been enrolled at the university.
She said that she was unaware that the certificate was invalid.
An NTU employee lodged a police report over the certificate, and Fonseka tendered her resignation to The Walt Disney Company in December 2021.
A representative from the company similarly said they would not have employed her if they knew about her lack of qualifications.
Apart from Marshall Cavendish Education and The Walt Disney Company, Fonseka had also cheated Cengage Learning Asia and Oxygen Studio Designs into hiring her. They paid her around S$190,500 and S$25,400 during her employment with them.
She will return to court for mitigation and sentencing in December. For each count of cheating, she can be jailed for up to three years, fined, or both. For forgery, she faces a fine and up to seven years’ imprisonment.