South Asia (Page 5)

The insurgency in Balochistan has intensified, marked by a surge in violent attacks by Baloch insurgents across the region. On August 26, the anniversary of the death of Baloch autonomy leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) orchestrated a series of deadly assaults in Lasbella, Makran and Gwadar, resulting in significant casualties.

Notably, in Lasbella, the Frontier Corps’ check post was attacked by a female suicide bomber – Maheel Baloch – leading to the death of several security personnel. Maheel Baloch was the third Baloch female, after Shari Baloch and Sumaiya Qalandrani, who have carried out suicide attacks.

For the first time, BLA militants extended their operations into the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, where they intercepted passenger buses and brutally executed 23 individuals from Punjab province after scrutinizing their identity cards. This attack underscores the increasing ferocity of the insurgency.

Balochistan is now grappling with the most intense phase of its fifth insurgency. The first Baloch uprising erupted in 1948, followed by subsequent rebellions in 1958, 1963, and 1973 during the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The current wave is the fifth in this series, which began in 2004. It gained strength after the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed on August 26th, 2006, in the district of Kohlu.

The response of Pakistan’s military establishment, often referred to simply as “the Establishment,” has been fundamentally flawed from the outset. What began as a political issue has been mishandled and transformed into a purely security matter by both the federal government and the military.

This heavy-handed approach has aggravated the situation, plunging the entire province into a state of perpetual insecurity and chaos. The failure to grasp the complex socio-political underpinnings of the Balochistan conflict has only fueled resentment, deepened grievances and intensified the cycle of violence.

Balochistan is a province of immense strategic significance for Pakistan, both geopolitically and economically. It is home to Gwadar, a deep-sea port that is poised to become an important economic hub, contingent upon proper management and development.

Gwadar’s pivotal location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf offers direct access to the Arabian Sea, making it a vital node for regional and global trade routes. It is a linchpin of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion dollar infrastructure and development project aimed at enhancing connectivity between China and the Arabian Sea, thereby providing China with an alternate route for its energy imports.

The CPEC, a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), passes through Balochistan, making the province crucial for its success. China has invested significantly in Gwadar Port’s development and surrounding infrastructure, with plans for extensive highways, railways and energy projects to integrate the economies of China, Pakistan and other regional players.

The CPEC’s completion and operational success would not only elevate Gwadar to the status of a bustling trade and logistics hub but it would also potentially shift the region’s economic balance, enhancing Pakistan’s economic sovereignty and regional influence.

However, Gwadar’s strategic importance and its potential to enhance Sino-Pakistani economic collaboration have made it a target for regional adversaries. Pakistan’s hostile neighbors, wary of China’s growing presence in South Asia and the Arabian Sea, view a fully functional Gwadar as a threat to their strategic interests.

Consequently, these states may resort to sponsoring militant groups, inciting unrest and fostering instability within Balochistan to undermine the CPEC initiative. The use of non-state actors to perpetuate chaos serves as a primary strategy for these adversarial states to sabotage both China-Pakistan relations and the CPEC master plan.

This geopolitical tug-of-war over Balochistan has manifested in a multi-faceted insurgency that has escalated in recent years. Insurgent groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which have previously expressed grievances against Islamabad, are now increasingly perceived as proxies for foreign powers intent on destabilizing the region.

The province’s vast natural resources, including significant reserves of gas, coal and minerals, further complicate the situation as they represent not only a source of wealth but also a point of contention among various local, national and international actors.

To ensure stability and capitalize on Gwadar’s strategic potential, Pakistan must adopt a comprehensive approach guided by a series of pragmatic policy options that address Balochistan’s political and developmental needs while countering external factors seeking to undermine its progress.

First, the federal government must be genuine in its willingness and commitment to address the crisis in Balochistan. The dismissive attitude exemplified by statements like those of Mohsin Naqvi, the interior minister, who trivialized the Baloch insurgency as merely a task fit for a local police officer (SHO), is not only irresponsible but also counterproductive and condemnable. Such remarks reflect a lack of understanding and empathy for the complex dynamics at play in the region.

Second, meaningful development initiatives are urgently needed in Balochistan to create an environment conducive to dialogue. Long-standing grievances rooted in economic deprivation and underdevelopment must be addressed through targeted investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. Economic empowerment is crucial to winning the trust of the local population and laying the groundwork for constructive negotiations.

Third, an empowered committee should be established to initiate dialogue with Baloch insurgents. This committee must be composed of members whose histories show character and credibility from reputable political parties. Including figures perceived as mere puppets of the military would only exacerbate the problem, undermining the legitimacy of the peace process and alienating key stakeholders.

Fourth, reconciliation efforts are essential to appease disgruntled Baloch nationalists and those who have taken up arms. The government should prioritize dialogue and negotiation over force, offering political amnesty and reintegration programs for those willing to abandon violence and work toward peace.

Fifth, human rights violations in Balochistan, which have been rampant and unchecked, must come to a permanent end. Such abuses only serve to reinforce the narrative of the insurgents and fuel the cycle of resentment and conflict.

The government should ensure strict adherence to human rights standards, holding accountable any state actors found guilty of violations. This is crucial for building confidence among the local population and increasing the prospects for a successful peace process.

Finally, political participation in Balochistan must be free from military involvement. The province has long been notorious for electoral manipulations, through which the role of the “Establishment” in determining political outcomes has undermined democratic governance and fueled distrust among the people.

To ensure stability, the military must cease its interference in the political process, allowing for genuinely fair and transparent elections. Only through such a commitment to democratic norms can Islamabad hope to achieve lasting peace and stability in Balochistan.

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India’s commissioning of a second nuclear-powered submarine marks a bold, if not provocative, step in its nuclear deterrence amid rising geostrategic rivalry with China and ever-present tensions with neighboring Pakistan.

The move raises the nuclear stakes on the subcontinent while raising key new questions about the status of India’s long-standing policy of minimum deterrence amid growing strategic ambitions and risks.

Last month, The War Zone reported that India has commissioned the INS Arighat, marking a significant advancement in its strategic nuclear capabilities.

Commissioned in a low-key event attended by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, the submarine is an improved version of its predecessor INS Arihant. Launched in 2017, the INS Arighat has undergone extensive testing and is now fully operational.

It comes equipped with indigenously developed ballistic missiles, including the K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with an approximate range of 750 kilometers. This will enhance India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, a crucial component of its “no first use” nuclear policy.

To be sure, India’s SSBN fleet is still significantly outmatched by China’s in terms of numbers and missile range, The War Zone report notes.

The INS Arighat is part of India’s broader effort to develop a more robust and survivable nuclear triad, with plans for a larger INS Aridhaman and additional SSBNs under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program.

India’s drive to enhance its SSBN capabilities is driven by the looming threat of China, which is seeking to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, and the nuclear threat posed by its longtime rival Pakistan.

India’s  new submarine base in the Bay of Bengal, known as Project Varsha, will enable it to implement a bastion strategy, with the Bay of Bengal’s deep waters providing better cover for India’s SSBNs compared to the Arabian Sea and allowing undetected SLBM launches, Asia Times noted in June 2024.

India’s upcoming third aircraft carrier and escorts will safeguard the Bay of Bengal as part of its SSBN bastion strategy. The strategy will create a secure zone from which India can conceivably launch SLBMs unnoticed toward Chinese and Pakistani targets.

However, India’s undersea nuclear deterrent may be handicapped by the short range of its SLBMs, including the K-15, and will arguably lack credibility vis-à-vis China until it fields SLBMs with intercontinental range.

Until then, India’s SSBNs are limited to striking targets in southern Pakistan and would have to sail through the Malacca Strait to potentially hit targets in mainland China.

Asia Times noted in March 2024 that India’s primary nuclear arsenal deficiency is its limited warhead yields. This limitation would not be overcome by merely increasing the number of low-yield warheads in its inventory.

India’s nuclear capabilities are primarily geared toward power generation rather than nuclear weapons production, which is why its fissile material production is relatively slow despite its substantial nuclear infrastructure.

Yogesh Joshi points out in a March 2020 article for The Nonproliferation Review, a peer-reviewed journal, that the command and control of undersea nuclear weapons present several complex challenges for India, not least consistent communications with the surface.

He says this creates a dilemma where nuclear warheads must be pre-mated with missiles before patrols, effectively making the arsenal ready for use.

He points out that this situation complicates the “always-never” challenge of nuclear command, ensuring that authorized launches always happen while preventing unauthorized ones.

While India has developed procedural controls such as permissive action links (PAL) to mitigate risks, these mechanisms require extensive testing to ensure reliability during a crisis, Joshi says.

He notes that the effectiveness of these systems and the decision on whether to adopt a bastion strategy or continuous patrols remain significant issues as India seeks to secure a credible second-strike capability with its nascent SSBN fleet​.

Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda note in a July 2022 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that aircraft such as the Mirage 2000 and Jaguar serve as India’s primary nuclear delivery platforms as they have been modified to carry nuclear weapons.  

Kristensen and Korda mention that India’s land-based missiles, including the Prithvi and Agni series, are stationed strategically to ensure a credible second-strike capability, covering regional and intercontinental threats.

They say cruise missiles like the Nirbhay are being developed to complement these capabilities, offering a versatile platform India can launch from land, air or sea.

Kristensen and Korda say these platforms enhance India’s nuclear deterrence by ensuring multiple delivery options. They note that India’s multiple nuclear delivery systems complicate adversaries’ strategic calculations and reinforce India’s doctrine of credible minimum deterrence.

However, Zafar Khan argues in a November 2020 article in the peer-reviewed Comparative Strategy journal that India’s commitment to that policy faces challenges as the nation advances its strategic capabilities.

Khan mentions that India’s ambitious pursuit of deterrent force projects, such as the development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), suggests a shift away from its stated minimalistic nuclear approach.

He says these changes and India’s growing strategic alliance with the US signify a broader transformation in its nuclear strategy, which is aimed at establishing a reliable deterrent against China and Pakistan, securing dominance in the region.

However, Khan notes these advancements create a paradox where India’s evolving nuclear strategy may no longer align with its original minimum deterrence policy.

He argues that India’s efforts to become a major global power could lead to regional instability, fuel an arms race with Pakistan and create new destabilizing complexities in South Asia’s security dynamics while sparking uncertainties about India’s supposed commitment to minimum nuclear deterrence.

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