Asim Munir: Pakistan army chief’s Kashmir remarks cause anger in India

38 minutes ago
Farhat Javed

BBC News, Islamabad

Getty Images Members of Hindu right-wing outfits VHP and Bajrang Dal burn an effigy of Pakistan Army Chief Asif Munir during a protest against a terrorist attack in Pahalgam at a Noida Stadium on April 24, 2025 in Noida, India. Getty Images

Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, is not known for seeking the spotlight.

Yet in recent weeks, it has found him – not only in Pakistan, but across the border in India and in diplomatic capitals far beyond.

His remarks on Kashmir – made just days before a militant attack in Indian-administered Kashmir which killed 26 people – have reignited a debate over Pakistan’s military stance and its role in rising regional tensions.

Kashmir, which India and Pakistan claim in full but administer only in part, has been a flashpoint between the countries since they were partitioned in 1947.

Though not directly linked to the violence, Gen Munir’s words have been dissected and interpreted as a shift towards a more confrontational tone, both from him and the institution he leads.

He is viewed as the most powerful man in Pakistan, where the military has long been blamed for interfering in politics, installing and removing governments. As tensions with India rise again, he is being watched as the central figure in a volatile nuclear-armed rivalry.

So who is Gen Munir? And what drives him?

ISPR/X General Syed Asim Munir, wearing a military uniform, sits on a chair. He has many medals pinned on his uniform.ISPR/X

Gen Munir, who is in his late 50s, is the son of a school principal and religious scholar. He joined the army through the Officers Training School in Mangla in 1986, earning the prestigious Sword of Honour given to the best-performing cadet. He was then commissioned into the 23 Frontier Force Regiment.

Over nearly four decades, Gen Munir has commanded troops along Pakistan’s sensitive northern borders near Kashmir, led its intelligence services and served in Saudi Arabia to bolster defence ties.

He holds a masters degree in public policy and strategic security management from the National Defence University in Islamabad and is also an alumnus of military institutions in Japan and Malaysia.

I first saw Gen Munir in Islamabad in 2023, at a packed hotel hall filled with ministers, diplomats, generals and journalists. Dressed in civilian clothes, he moved with calm authority, scanning the room as he approached the podium.

He opened his speech with a recitation from the Quran, reflecting his rare status as a hafiz – someone who has memorised Islam’s holy book in its entirety – among Pakistan’s military elite.

In person, Gen Munir seemed soft-spoken and polite. On stage, he was stern, with the sharp gaze of a former spymaster. A man trained to watch, listen and wait. Now, his words are echoing beyond Pakistan.

Gen Munir became Pakistan’s chief of army staff in November 2022, stepping into the role amid a perfect storm of political upheaval, an economic crisis and public disillusionment with the military’s role in governance.

His appointment followed months of speculation, largely because of his fallout with the then-prime minister Imran Khan.

Gen Munir had served just eight months as the chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency before being removed by Khan in what many believe was a deeply personal and political move – though both sides deny this. That moment remains a turning point in their relationship.

Today, Khan is serving a sentence in jail and Gen Munir is the most powerful man in the country.

Gen Munir is regarded by many commentators as differing in temperament and approach from his immediate predecessor, Qamar Javed Bajwa.

Gen Bajwa was more public-facing, supported backchannel diplomacy with India and handled a major escalation of tensions between the countries in 2019 with caution.

Under what came to be known as the “Bajwa Doctrine”, he increasingly emphasised regional stability and geo-economics alongside traditional security priorities.

After a suicide bomb attack on troops in Indian-administered Kashmir at Pulwama in 2019, Gen Bajwa oversaw Pakistan’s military response to Indian air raids but refrained from escalation, returning Indian pilot Abhinandan Varthaman and helping avert a full-blown war.

“Bajwa was clear,” says Abdul Basit, senior fellow at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

“He had diplomatic channels open and was managing multiple fronts like Kashmir, Afghanistan and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan with pragmatism,” he said, adding that Gen Munir “is under immediate, intense pressure to act”.

“He has come in with unfinished business to stabilise the country’s security situation internally… The problems he faces (rising terrorism, political instability, an economic crisis, regional tensions) are urgent and worsening. He cannot afford long, drawn-out strategies like his predecessor Bajwa could. He needs quicker, firmer responses – both at home and abroad.”

Reuters Chairs and tables are scattered at the site of a suspected militant attack on tourists in Baisaran near Pahalgam in south Kashmir's Anantnag district, April 24, 2025.Reuters

The dispute over Kashmir is an issue that no Pakistani military leader can appear weak on, observers say.

“Kashmir is Pakistan’s national security interest – every child in Pakistani schools is taught this,” political and defence analyst Amir Zia told the BBC, adding: “It’s a basic understanding here that we cannot give India any leverage.”

Last week’s attack was the deadliest on civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir in two decades and led to India accusing Pakistan of supporting the attackers, charges Islamabad denies. There are fears India will respond with military action.

Since he took over, Gen Munir has mostly not spoken in public, but one pivotal speech has gained widespread attention.

On 17 April, he told a meeting of expatriates in Islamabad “we are different from Hindus” in every possible way.

He doubled down on Kashmir, calling it Pakistan’s “jugular vein”, and vowed Pakistan would “never abandon Kashmiris in their heroic struggle against Indian occupation“.

The speech might have remained one of many ideological statements made by Pakistani leaders over the years except for what happened next.

Just five days later, on 22 April, militants opened fire on tourists in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir.

“This was not standard rhetoric,” says Joshua T White, a South Asia expert at Johns Hopkins University.

“While the substance aligns with Pakistan’s ideological narrative, the tone – especially its direct invocation of Hindu-Muslim differences – made it particularly inflammatory.”

“Coming just before the Pahalgam attack, it has badly complicated any effort by Pakistan to claim restraint or pursue backchannel diplomacy,” he adds.

Mr Basit agrees the optics were damaging: “He [Munir] may have been caught up in the moment. He said things that, in a private setting, may not have raised eyebrows but on that public platform, as army chief, they came across as overtly confrontational.”

“Some saw it as a power move,” says Mr Basit.

“It felt like his arrival moment. A declaration that he’s now firmly in control, that Pakistan’s direction is once again in the army’s hands,” he adds.

Gen Munir made another speech earlier in the year, which some think may signal he is adopting a harder line than his predecessor. Speaking in Muzaffarabad on Kashmir Solidarity Day on 5 February, he declared: “Pakistan has already fought three wars for Kashmir, and if 10 more wars are required, Pakistan will fight them.”

But given the timing, it’s his latest speech that has fuelled speculation after the Pahalgam attack, with Indian officials hinting at a link. Though no evidence has been presented so far, the rhetoric has deepened mistrust.

Getty Images Indian paramilitary soldiers stand guard on the bank of Dal lake, amid heightened tensions following a deadly attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 tourists, on April 26, 2025 in Srinagar, India.Getty Images

At home, Gen Munir’s actions are being seen by many as those of a leader who is calculated, uncompromising and determined to reassert military authority.

After the 9 May 2023 riots sparked by Khan’s arrest, Gen Munir launched an unprecedented crackdown on his supporters.

Civilians were tried under military laws, a top general was forced into early retirement, and former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (retired), once close to Khan, was arrested.

Critics called it a purge of Khan loyalists; supporters saw it as restoring discipline to Pakistan’s powerful military whose authority – and that of Bajwa and Munir – had been challenged. The two men were being heavily criticised in public.

Gen Munir is just over two years into his five-year term, but the contours of his legacy are already taking shape.

Whether the simmering crisis with India escalates into a larger military stand-off or is tackled through diplomacy, the future of Pakistan’s relationship with its neighbour may well hinge on which direction Gen Munir steers it in.

Mr Basit warns the next few weeks “will determine how things unfold”.

“How Gen Munir navigates this crisis will define him as a soldier, as a power broker, and what kind of regional actor Pakistan wants to be. And right now, that choice sits largely with him.”

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India-Pakistan war fallout would spread far and wide – Asia Times

As tensions between India and Pakistan threaten to erupt into an empty armed conflict, international buyers are watching with growing concern. The adverse effects on areas may be more profound and urgent than many people realize.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, warned that an American military invasion is “imminent” following a fatal attack on travellers in Pahalgam, Kashmir, that left 26 people dying.

Along the frontier, troops have already been deployed. New Delhi is also considering options after accusing Islamabad of supporting the violent organization that has claimed role for the assault, a command Pakistan denies. &nbsp,

The risk of a weakening conflict between two nuclear-armed countries grows by the minute as complaints become more serious. One of the fastest-growing monetary regions in the world is plunged into confusion by the latest escalation, which markets detest. &nbsp,

Kashmir has always been a source of conflict for India and Pakistan, but the present conflict comes at a much earlier period: when global progress is fragile, danger appetite is declining, and major economies are extremely reversing their commitment to protectionism.

Traders are now starting to adjust. Forex dealers have begun to hedge against greater volatility in the Pakistani and Indian rupees. Geopolitical chance prices are beginning to be priced in the bond markets.

If hostilities escalate, particularly if energy supplies or significant regional trade routes are in jeopardy, global capital markets, which are already nervous from trade wars, may suffer yet another blow.

India is certainly a spectator’s paradise for international buyers. It is the fifth-largest economy in the world, an emerging industry powerhouse that receives billion in foreign direct investment and investment flows. A key issue, according to  , could stymie India’s system investment plans, stör supply chains, and undermine business confidence. &nbsp,

Multinationals with a strong presence in India, from software companies to energy companies, may experience the effects.

However, Pakistan’s economy, which is already strained by inflation, a poor rupee, and skyrocketing debt, may become more unstable. A drawn-out discord almost certainly would require additional funding, probably from the IMF or allies like China. That was alter local alliances and alter the balance of power in South Asia in turn.

The repercussions for the entire world might grow yet further. Washington and Beijing have stepped up to sailor the situation in past skirmishes. However, the political landscape is significantly more shattered right now.

The political safety nets that investors previously relied on are now looking exceedingly strained as the US is consumed by domestic conflicts and China asserts a harder line worldwide.

Energy businesses are especially vulnerable. Any intensification in South Asia may cause greater instability across power routes and shipping lanes, raising insurance costs, and compromising now fragile supply chains, despite that neither India nor Pakistan are the top-tier oil producers. The possibility of a price spike is true because global crude prices are sensitive to even minor geopolitical flareups.

Buyers should also think about the direct effects. Pakistan’s closing of its aircraft to Indian carriers and India’s expulsion of the Indus Waters Treaty are not just symbolic acts; they also destroy crucial economic links. &nbsp,

Liquid shortages in rural areas may cause food prices to rise in Pakistan. Travel and freight logistics may be affected by flight restrictions, which will tighten the worldwide web of business at a time when endurance is already stretched thin.

Regional tensions might have an impact on the software industry as well. The Indian tech sector, which is a vital source of international venture capital and offshoring contracts, thrives on balance. &nbsp,

A significant improvement in stability conditions may cause businesses to halt investments, reorganize operations, or change expansion plans. Systems stocks with a lot of exposure to South Asia might be susceptible to quick repricing.

The chance of misunderstanding increases as corporate calculations become more difficult. One mistaken turn or misplaced sign may turn skirmishes into far more dangerous ones. Traders who have grown accustomed to treating geopolitical risks as mere sound may soon face significant losses in an escalating conflict.

However, there might also be options for those positioned properly in the lessened challenges. Protection contractors and security companies are likely to experience a rise in demand. &nbsp,

Silver, which is already in high demand in the face of doubt in the world, may increase in value if tensions arise between India and Pakistan. Especially if wider regional security is in doubt, energy markets may become more constrained.

Safe-haven flows into German bunds, renminbi, and European euros, and other potential growth. Additionally, sovereign wealth funds and other global institutional investors may reevaluate risk-weighted allocations in favor of safer jurisdictions, causing a rise in the demand for assets in socially stable settings.

The old notion that local issues can be contained without causing greater market collapse is no longer admissible. Kashmir is more than just a local battleground; it poses a global threat. And in today’s highly connected, very delicate world, it could cause a chain of events to occur in markets far away from South Asia.

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The Resistance Front: the terror outfit driving India-Pakistan to war – Asia Times

26 travellers were killed on April 22 in a hotel in the lovely Pahalgam, injuring India. The murder is regarded as the deadliest tourist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir since 2000.

As thousands of people flocked to the popular tourist destination during the apex of the holiday season, the attack occurred. With the exception of one Egyptian federal, the majority of the victims were Indians. All of the patients were people.

Pakistan has denied any involvement, but there are major concerns about an increase between the two nuclear power. Rajnath Singh, India’s defence minister, openly accused Pakistan and threatened to sue Pakistan, saying,” We will not only targeted those who carried out the assault. We’ll even take aim at those responsible for this scheme on our soil.

India has suspended the monument Indus Waters Treaty, which allows the posting of waters between the two nations, and barred Pakistan’s officials from entering the country.

Given that these problems occur at a time when significant international and domestic occasions occur, it is noticeable. In light of the raging trade conflict between the US and China, the US vice president, J.D. Vance, arrived the day before with his Indian-American family Usha and their three children. Importantly, Pakistan has a history of referring to China as an all-weather ally and friend.

The Waqf ( Amendment ) Act, which seeks to change how billion-dollar-plus properties, including mosques, madrassas, graveyards, and orphanages, are run, comes a few weeks after the Indian government passed it.

Additionally, this action is accused of tarnishing the rights of India’s Muslim communities by allowing the nomination of non-Muslims to their board and judges.

Entrance of Opposition

The Entrance of Opposition (TRF) has claimed responsibility for the attack. A hitherto lesser-known armed group in the Kashmir region, TRF emerged in 2019 with the aim of fighting for Kashmir’s secession from India.

The Indian government designated it as a terrorist organization in 2023 under the Unlawful Activities ( Prevention ) Act, and Sheikh Sajjad Gul, the group’s founder, was made a terrorist.

Treatment was established in large part as a result of the American government’s decision to revoke Kashmir’s once-only Muslim-majority state’s semi-autonomous standing in 2019. Jammu &amp, Kashmir, and Jammu & Kashmir are the two union lands that the Modi government has currently undergone and has given it more clear governmental control.

The action also made it possible for non-locals to have access to government-sponsored employment quotas and more landownership rights. These modifications could significantly alter the demography of the area and prevent citizens of much-needed opportunities.

The group stated in a text on the messaging apps Telegram that “violence will be directed at those attempting to live fraudulently.” This tends to support the notion that the attack’s flow of “outsiders” was its justification.

In its brief existence, TRF has carried out numerous attacks against local officials, safety personnel, and residents. Social media is where the organization started and continues to concentrate on it to manage and recruit new members.

Importantly, TRF differs from the region’s traditional insurgent groups, the majority of whom have Muslim names. It allegedly does so in order to put a “neutral” ( read non-religious ) front on the front, rather than focusing on the struggle for Kashmiri nationalism.

Was Pakistan included?

Inter-Services Intelligence ( ISI), a Pakistani spy agency, is reportedly connected to the organization. These connections have not been proven by Pakistan. However, experts worry that any reprisals could rise and threaten the fragile stability along the border between the two nations.

Importantly, it is believed that the TRF is an offshoot of or perhaps just a front for the Pakistan-based armed group Lashkar-e-Taiba ( LET ).

The LeT participated in numerous terrorist attacks on American soil, most notably the 2008 Mumbai criminal attacks, which reportedly resulted in the deaths of 176 people. Many people, including the US state, are of the opinion that the perpetrators of the crime were assisted by the ISI.

Although it is not specifically linked to the Pahalgam harm, it is worth noting that Tahawwur Rana, a French citizen who was suspected of being the mastermind of the Mumbai attacks, was deported to India on April 10 from the US. Rana will face trial in India on ten legal charges, according to a statement from the US Embassy in New Delhi.

The LeT ( which is pronounced Army of the Righteous/Pure ) is a Sunni terrorist organization in contrast to the TRF’s purported “neutral” ostensibly non-Islamist nature. Its main objectives are to build an Islamic state in Central Asia and pieces of South Asia, with Kashmir a key component of its objectives.

Since its emergence in the early 1990s, the organization has focused on attacking martial and civil targets in Kashmir while supporting Pakistan’s say to the area.

Bill Clinton, the then-US chairman, described South Asia as the most dangerous place on Earth in the late 1990s. This may well be the situation once more given the possibility of an India-Pakistani conflict that is quickly advancing.

University of Bradford associate professor of peace reports and international development, M. Sudhir Selvaraj

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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Pahalgam attack: Will India suspending Indus Waters Treaty affect Pakistan?

2 nights ago
Navin Singh Khadka

BBC World Service editor, setting

Getty Images The image shows a landscape of the Indus river in the Karakoram mountains rangeGetty Images

May India be able to quit the Indus River and two of its streams from entering Pakistan?

Following Tuesday’s horrifying strike in Indian-administered Kashmir, India suspended a significant agreement governing the water sharing of six rivers in the Indus valley between the two nations. That is the question that is on some people’s minds.

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty ( IWT ) was regarded as an example of trans-boundary water management because it survived two wars between the nuclear rivals.

India has taken a number of actions against Pakistan, including one that accuses it of supporting cross-border violence, which Islamabad vehemently refutes. Additionally, it has responded by imposing mutual sanctions on Delhi, and it has stated that preventing water flow” will be regarded as an Act of War.”

The Indus basin’s three eastern river, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, were given to India by the convention, while Pakistan received 80 % of the three northern people, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab.

In the past, there have been heated arguments, with Pakistan responding to some of India’s electricity and water infrastructure projects because they would lower river flows and violate the treaty. ( About 80 % of Pakistan’s agriculture and roughly a third of its hydropower are dependent on the water in the Indus basin. )

EPA An Indian paramilitary soldier stands guard on the banks of Dal Lake in Srinagar, India, 24 April 2025. Protests by locals continued for a second day in Kashmir against the killing of 26 people, attacked by gunmen in the popular tourist destination of Pahalgam in south Kashmir on 22 April. EPA

In response to factors like climate change, India has been pushing to revise and change the treaty. It is citing changing needs, ranging from water and having water to hydropower.

Pakistan and India have engaged in legitimate fights as a result of the World Bank’s mediation of the agreement.

However, this is the first time either side has announced a expulsion, and somewhat, India, the inland nation, gives it a distinct advantage in terms of geography.

What does expulsion, however, actually mean? Could India restrict or hold back Pakistan’s supply of water from the Indus basin, thereby denying it its lifeline? And is it actually capable of doing so?

According to experts, it’s virtually impossible for India to stop the northern rivers from releasing tens of billions of square meters of water during high-flow times. It lacks both the considerable canals and the huge storage infrastructure required to divert these quantities.

According to Himanshu Thakkar, a local water resources analyst with the South Asia Network on Dams, Streams, and People,” the system in India is primarily run-of-the-river hydropower plants that don’t require extensive storage.”

Without reserving a lot of water, these hydropower plants use the power of running water to roll windmills and produce electricity.

American experts claim that the treaty’s limited infrastructure has prevented India from using yet its 20 % of the Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus waters. This is a major justification for creating storage structures, which Pakistan opposes citing agreement provisions.

Without Pakistan’s knowledge, experts claim that India is now update its existing infrastructure or construct new ones to divert water.

” Unlike in the history, India may now not be required to reveal its task documents with Pakistan,” said Mr. Thakkar.

Getty Images A photo of a dam in the background, with a winding road and mountains with green foliage in the foreground. Getty Images

However, obstacles like challenging terrain and protests in India itself over some of its jobs have prevented the construction of water equipment in the Indus basin from moving quickly enough.

American officials from the government of water resources had promised to speed up the construction of many dams and waters safe-keeping projects in the Indus valley following a violent attack in Indian-administered Kashmir in 2016.

Sources claim that development has been slow despite there being no established information on the status of these projects.

Some experts believe that Pakistan may experience the effects during the dry winter, when water supply is already at its lowest, if India begins controlling the flow with its existing and potential system.

In the Dawn paper, Hassan F. Khan, associate professor of industrial environmental legislation and environmental studies at Tufts University, wrote that” a more pressing problem is what happens during the dry period- when the flows across the lake are lower, storage matters more, and timing becomes more crucial.”

” That is where the absence of treaty constraints could start to become more perceptive.”

Getty Images Buddhist prayer flags adorn the Indus River Valley in the Cold Desert of Ladakh.Getty Images

India is required to share hydrological data with Pakistan in accordance with the treaty, which is essential for flood forecasting and planning for irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water.

Former Indian IWT commissioner Pradeep Kumar Saxena informed the Press Trust of India news agency that Pakistan can no longer share flood data with the nation.

The monsoon season, which starts in June and continues until September, causes severe flooding in the area. However, Pakistani authorities claim that India was already sharing a sizable amount of hydrological data.

India’s former Indus Waters Treaty additional commissioner Shiraz Memon told BBC Urdu that “only about 40 % of the data was shared by India before it made the most recent announcement.”

If the upstream country can “weaponize” water against the downstream country, another problem that arises frequently when there is water-related tension in the area.

This is frequently referred to as a “water bomb,” in which the upstream nation can temporarily hold back water before suddenly releasing it without any prior notice, causing significant downstream damage.

India: Could it do that?

According to experts, India would first run the risk of flooding its own territory because its dams are far from the Pakistani border. However, it may now be able to remove silt from its reservoirs without giving a damn about it, potentially causing damage downstream in Pakistan.

High silt levels are carried by Himalayan rivers like the Indus, which quickly build up in dams and barrages. Significant downstream harm can be caused by sudden flushing of this silt.

The Brahmaputra basin’s downstream of China and Tibet are two other important Brahmaputra basins, respectively, where the Indus originates.

After India warned that “blood and water cannot flow together” following a militant attack in northeast India, which India blamed on Pakistan, China blocked a Yarlung Tsangpo tributary, which would become the Brahmaputra.

China, which has Pakistan as an ally, claimed to have done it because it was necessary for a hydropower project they were building close to the border. However, it was believed that Beijing was intervening to aid Islamabad at the right time.

China approved the construction of what will be the largest dam in the world along Yarlung Tsangpo after it constructed several hydropower plants in Tibet.

Beijing claims that the river’s flow has little to no impact on the environment, but India fears that it might exert significant control over its flow.

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India shouldn’t weaponize water in fight with Pakistan – Asia Times

Although South Asia has experienced some political bulwarks, New Delhi’s most recent move may have spelled out a risky new chapter of geographical brinkmanship.

India unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty ( IWT ) with Pakistan, a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation for more than 60 years, on April 23 just one day after a deadly terrorist attack in the Kashmir-administered region, killing 26 people.

The decision was made in addition to the closing of a significant border crossing, the termination of Pakistani citizens ‘ regional immigration privileges, and the deterioration of diplomatic ties. With liquid at the center of what started out as a drama at Kashmir’s Pahalgam hill station and then having the opposite effect, it is quickly turning into a political crisis.

Kashmir Weight, a violent organization that claims responsibility, is a common name in a region full of acronyms and confusion.

However, India has taken a number of punitive measures that target Pakistan’s monetary arteries and, more dangerously, its waters lifeline without providing any practical evidence of external involvement.

Fears of an escalation are now growing in Islamabad, according to press reports. Social insiders and national security officials worry that India might consider engaging in punishing military action once more, in a similar vein to the Pulwama-Balakot incident in 2019, in which 40 Indian paramilitary staff were killed in an attack on which India responded with cross-border strikes.

Pakistan then launched its own airstrikes, and for a quick, menacing moment, the region sank on the verge of a full-fledged conflict between two nuclear powers.

Major military and civilian officials from Pakistan’s government met for an emergency meeting of its National Security Committee on April 24. The meeting was chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar called out India’s actions as “premature and provocative,” noting that no evidence of Pakistani involvement in the attack has been made public.

The Indus Waters Treaty itself, however, is the true powder tank.

The convention has been a unique, resilient bridge between two nuclear-armed foes, as it was mediated by the World Bank in 1960. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab river, which account for nearly 80 % of Pakistan’s water supply, are distributed according to their rules.

However, the Indus Waters Treaty is not a typical diplomatic deal. Because it is a part of global laws, it cannot be. Pakistan can make a compelling argument that it is in the international community’s best interest to preserve partnerships made through meticulous politics.

This is philosophical, not just a political complexity. The Indus program is a major source of power for all four of Pakistan’s counties. Pakistan’s vulnerability is normal, absolute, and agricultural with few other sources, most prominently a few Afghan rivers.

Not only for Pakistan but for the entire place, the increase is deeply disturbing. More than any other asset, water reveals the power imbalance between upstream and downstream says in South Asia.

India’s decision to “hold the treaty in abeyance,” a legitimate grey area without any real precedent, creates a disturbing example. In a time of grief and anger, it weaponizes a shared tool, undermining both local norms and international legislation.

For its part, New Delhi has not been overly diplomatic about its long-standing frustration with the convention. It fully sent a notice to Islamabad last year asking for a revision of the terms, which Pakistan quickly rejected.

The coercive “abeyance” of this week appears to be an illegal attempt to put Pakistan on the defensive. Beyond the constitutional posturing, there is a more nuanced calculus, known as financial attrition.

Analysts believe that India’s overall intention is to stifle Pakistan’s now depressed economy, especially its agriculture, which is largely dependent on the Indus River system.

Practically speaking, withholding water may require a large amount of equipment on a scale that isn’t currently in place. Even if these projects were started soon, they may require years and billion to be realized.

Also, symbolism has the potential to be effective. Yet symbolic techniques may have long and short tempers in South Asia, where recollections are long and emotions are small.

And what guarantees do the region’s smaller North Asian countries, like Bangladesh and Nepal, have?

A collective message from South Asia’s louder regions, such as Dhaka, Colombo, and Kathmandu, is now desperately needed to convince New Delhi and Islamabad of their obligations to the wider South Asian area.

The continent cannot afford for diplomacy to be stricken by fractious politics, and rivers to be used as retaliators.

Muktadir Rashid serves as Bangla Outlook, a media website based in Dhaka.

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Trump pushing India into high-stakes, high-risk China clash – Asia Times

No president has felt the sting of US President Donald Trump’s tax war as strongly as India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite the fact that no other leader has. Caught in a high-stakes political connect, India is grappling with an philosophical problem: balancing its crucial economic ties with China against the beauty of the American business.

The Trump administration imposed a 26 % “reciprocal” tax on American goods on April 2, 2025, putting New Delhi in tense negotiations to gain access to the country’s largest export location, the US.

India’s response has betrayed a shocking respect, as evidenced by the rapid and significant trade work cuts on Harley-Davidson scooters and American-made whiskey liquor amid a large pledge&nbsp to lift down trade barriers. New Delhi has furthermore announced plans to buy more US strength and protection products in a bid to appease Trump.

The Trump administration has used a 90-day relief on the tariffs to pressure India into a more comprehensive National strategy to isolate China financially and carefully. US Vice President JD Vance made a notable four-day visit to Delhi on April 22 as part of this political unpleasant.

Ostensibly a family affair—Vance, with his Indian-origin wife and children, framed the trip as a nod to his Sasural ( “in-laws” ) and his kids ‘” Nana-Nani” ( maternal grandparents ) —the visit’s true purpose is to tighten the screws on India and secure its alignment against Beijing.

Trump uses the rod of tariffs to fudge Modi’s wishes in his second term, replacing the vegetable of American investment moving from China to India in his first.

Ajay Seth, the secretary of economic affairs, claimed this week that the” first order” hit from 26 % tariffs on India could reduce GDP by between 0.2 % and 0.5 %, which he said was” not a significant impact.” However, underscoring the urgency of the situation, New Delhi planned to transport both its chief trade communicator and finance secretary to Washington this week before the terrible Kashmir problems.

India’s plight is rooted in its divided financial fact. To produce ultimate products for trade, especially to the US, its business center, which is frequently just an “assembly line,” relies heavily on Chinese transitional goods, raw materials, funds equipment, technology, and investment.

In 2024-25, China accounted for over 14 % of India’s full international trade, while India’s goods contributed a simple 1.9 % to China’s international trade, highlighting a striking imbalance. India can import Chinese components, arrange them, and trade finished goods to the US now because a 35 % value addition there qualifies as enough for a “rules of origin” certificate.

Nevertheless, this type makes India susceptible to a proportion readjustment. Tilting toward the US challenges Chinese retribution that could drown its production ranges, leaning toward China threatens to renounce US market access.

India’s fundamental problem is this. Beijing may impose a bombardment of punitive measures, both explicit and implicit, that would deteriorate India’s economic trajectory, erode its security, and weaken its regional influence, much like it did in 2020 in a punitive response to the tensions in the Himalayas.

China’s most immediate tool would be business adjustment, exploiting India’s$ 100 billion deal gap in 2024-25. India’s exposure to Chinese and allied markets may be restricted by Beijing’s imposing steep tariffs or non-tariff obstacles, such as stringent quality checks, on American exports like agro products, textiles, and leather goods.

China might restrict exports of important inputs, including smartphone components, pharmaceutical precursors ( 70 % of India’s supply ), and industrial machinery, even more severely. In 2020, when India tightened attention on Chinese opportunities, Beijing retaliated by blocking engineers ‘ and technicians ‘ visits and technology shipments, a methodology it may rise to even more damaging effect immediately.

Such restrictions would stifle India’s tightly bound smartphone, pharmaceutical, and solar energy sectors, which are all closely linked to Chinese supply chains. China could further skew the trade balance, shrinking India’s export revenues, by selectively lowering imports of Indian goods.

With China constituting over a third of India’s foreign trade, these measures could precipitate a severe economic contraction, hobbling India’s industrial ambitions and global market competitiveness.

China has another means of squeezing India with financial leverage. Beijing could stifle trade financing for Indian businesses by tightening payment terms, putting off processing, or restricting credit flow through Chinese banks with$ 3.24 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and significant influence in global finance. After India’s 2020 ban on Chinese apps, Chinese investors curtailed funding to Indian startups, a precedent that could expand to broader sectors.

China might halt investments in recently approved joint ventures like Vivo, Suzhou Inovance, and ZNShine if India’s US alignment is further strained, undermining India’s plans for manufacturing growth and technology transfer.

By putting Indian projects prioritizing them, China may have a more subtle impact on India’s access to multilateral financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the New Development Bank. These financial chokeholds could starve India’s industrial and infrastructure initiatives, limiting its ability to scale up domestic production or diversify away from Chinese inputs.

China might target India’s nascent digital and defense sectors in the technological sphere. Chinese tech companies like Huawei and ZTE have a share of the power behind India’s 5G networks and smart city projects. Beijing could derail India’s digital infrastructure by restricting access or withholding technical support.

In a report from the Harvard Belfer Center for 2021, China’s dominance in semiconductors, 5G, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence was highlighted. India’s newly established semiconductor industry and defense manufacturing, which depend on Chinese inputs for advanced electronics, could be hampered by an embargo on semiconductors or high-tech components.

China could also complicate operations for its tech firms in India, halting solar panels or telecom equipment supplies. Such alterations would halt India’s advancement in technology and weaken its strategic abilities, particularly in defense systems that are crucial for battling regional threats.

An even greater existential risk is posed by China’s stranglehold on critical raw minerals ( CRMs) and rare earth elements ( REEs ). In 2023, India identified 30 critical minerals vital for electric vehicles ( EVs ), semiconductors, defense equipment, and renewable energy, including lithium, cobalt, gallium, titanium, graphite, silicon, bismuth, tellurium, and REEs like neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.

India is the fifth-largest store in the world with 6.9 million metric tons of REE reserves, but its processing and refining capacity is inestimable. It imports 60 % of its REE imports from China, and over 40 % of its six CRMs, including graphite ( 42.4 % ), lithium ( 82 % ), silicon ( 76 % ), titanium ( 50 % ), and lithium ( 85.6 % ), lithium ( 82 % ), and titanium ( 50.6 % ) ) and lithium ( 42.4 % ) of those products. Beijing controls 87 % of global REE processing, 58 % of lithium refining and 68 % of silicon refining.

India’s plans for 30 % EV penetration by 2030, its semiconductor manufacturing plans, and its defense production, which rely on REEs for missiles, radar, and guidance systems, could be devastated by a Chinese export ban. India’s smartphone sector, which relies heavily on Chinese components, and its pharmaceutical sector, which relies on China for 70 % of its precursors, would experience severe shortages.

While India seeks alternatives through the Mineral Security Partnership and Australian partnerships, decoupling from China’s dominance could take decades. Thus, India’s industrial and strategic goals would suffer a terrible blow if an embargo were to be implemented.

China might use its diplomatic position to isolate India from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and BRICS by portraying its US support as a betrayal of collective interests. In 2024, China’s foreign ministry condemned such alliances, and Beijing could rally SCO members like Pakistan and Russia to obstruct India’s initiatives.

China might strengthen ties with Brazil, South Africa, and other newly incorporated nations in BRICS , which would marginalize New Delhi. Regionally, Beijing could intensify Belt and Road Initiative projects in India’s neighbors—Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh—eroding India’s” Neighbourhood First” policy.

Chinese ambassador Chen Song emphasized BRI’s role in South Asia in 2023, signaling Beijing’s desire to encircle India. Such maneuvers would undermine India’s regional influence, isolate it diplomatically, and alienate it from its allies in the Global South, and make it appear as a Western proxy.

If India persists in antagonizing China, Beijing could escalate to hard measures. As seen in the 2020 Galwan clash, border tensions may rekindle with incursions in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh. China deployed 100 advanced rocket launchers along the Line of Actual Control in 2021, indicating its readiness to escalate.

Naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, leveraging ports like Gwadar, Hambantota and Chattogram, could challenge India’s maritime dominance. India’s telecom, energy, and banking sectors could be targeted by cyberattacks, such as the 2020 Mumbai power outage brought on by Chinese state-sponsored organizations, potentially suffocating its economy.

Proxy threats made by Pakistan or Myanmar, which are potentially armed by China, could put strain on India’s security apparatus on multiple fronts.

Soft power offers China a subtler tool to destabilize Modi’s domestic standing. A goodwill gesture was made in 2024 to allow Indian pilgrimages to begin at Tibet’s Kailash Mansarovar, a sacred site for Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists. These communities may react negatively to a new ban, putting strain on Modi’s political standing.

In Washington, India’s trade talks with the US this week will test Modi’s ability to navigate this minefield. Beijing clearly has the upper hand with its outsized role in India’s supply chains and minimal reliance on Indian trade.

Modi might have to balance the risks of defiance against the risks of dependence as a result of a mistake that could plunge India into economic turmoil, compromise its security, and weaken its reputation globally.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at&nbsp, @BhimBhurtel

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Pahalgam attack: How will India respond to the Kashmir killings

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AFP Activists of India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) take part in a protest against Pakistan, in Amritsar on April 23, 2025, condemning the Kashmir tourist attack. Gunmen in Indian-run Kashmir killed 26 people on April 22, according to a hospital list of the dead that was verified by police, the region's deadliest attack on civilians since 2000. (AFP

The deadliest violent assault in Kashmir since 2019 is the violence that occurred on Tuesday in Pahalgam, where at least 26 travellers were killed in a slew of gunshots.

The subjects were citizens taking vacations in one of India’s most lovely hills, not men or officials. This strike is both terrible and metaphorical, an intentional assault on a delicate sense of normalcy that the American state has worked hard to task in the disputed area.

According to experts, India’s answer is likely to be shaped as much by law as by force given the complex history of Kashmir, which is claimed in total by both India and Pakistan but only partially governed by both.

Delhi has also quickly taken a number of retaliatory measures, including closing the key border crossing, suspending a crucial water-sharing agreement, and expelling officials.

Significantly, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has pledged to take actions against both the perpetrators and the schemers responsible for the “nefarious functions” committed on American soil.

The question is not whether there will be a defense response, say experts, but when, how well-equipped will it be, and how much will it cost.

We are likely to notice a robust response, one that shows Pakistan’s actors and local audiences that they are united. According to military historian Srinath Raghavan, the boundary for retribution has been set at cross-border or air strikes since 2016 and especially after 2019, according to the BBC.

The state will have to be difficult to act below that right then. Pakistan will most likely listen, just as it did previously. The danger is, as always, misunderstanding on both edges. “

Mr. Raghavan makes reference to two other significant reprisals by India in 2016 and 2019.

India launched what it called” surgical strikes” across the de facto border, also known as the Line of Control ( LoC), after the deadly Uri attack in September 2016 that claimed 19 Indian soldiers were killed, targeting what it claimed were militant launch pads in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

India launched its first attacks deep inside Pakistan since 1971 after at least 40 military staff were killed in Pulwama in 2019. Pakistan conducted airstrikes, which resulted in a battle, and the arrest of a short-lived Indian aircraft. Although neither side displayed any force, the other avoided a full-fledged conflict.

Two years later, in 2021, they reached an agreement to an LoC peace, which has generally been followed despite repeated violent attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir.

A senior international policy analyst, Michael Kugelman, believes that the recent attack’s combination of high fatalities and the targeting of American civilians” suggests a strong chance of an American defense response against Pakistan, if Delhi determines or simply assumes any level of Muslim complicity.”

The main benefit of a response for India may be democratic, he said, adding that there would be intense public pressure to do so.

” Restoring punishment and degrading an anti-India danger would be another advantages,” he said. The drawback is that a retaliation would run the risk of a significant problems and even issue. “

What are India’s choices?

According to Christopher Clary of the University at Albany in the US, coercive behavior offers deniability but may not fulfill the social need to clearly restore punishment.

He points out that that this leaves India with two probable lines.

First of all, the 2021 LoC peace has been strained, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi might permit a gain to cross-border shooting.

Similar to what happened in the air skirmishes that followed, airstrikes or even regular cruise missile attacks, like in 2019, are also on the table, each of which are susceptible to a hostile spiral.

No way is risk-free. According to Mr. Clary, who studies the politicians of South Asia,” the US is distracted and may not be willing or able to help with crises management.”

One of the biggest challenges in any India-Pakistan conflict is that neither side is nuclear-armed. Every choice is shaped by that point, which affects both political calculations and military strategy.

Nuclear weapons” a both a threat and a caution,” as they force decision-makers on both sides to work with prudence. Any answer is likely to be brief and specific. According to Mr. Raghavan, Pakistan may fight in kind and then seek an off-ramp.

This structure has been observed in various conflicts, such as Israel-Iran-caliber strikes that were followed by de-escalation efforts. However, there is always the possibility that things won’t always go according to plan. “

Images courtesy of Getty Heavy security deploys outside the Government hospital where tourists receive treatment after being injured in a militant attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, India, on April 23, 2025Images courtesy of Getty

According to Mr. Kugelman, “each state is secure using limited register retaliation.” One of the lessons of the Pulwama problems is, according to Mr. Kugelman, “is the lack of retaliation.

India will have to consider the potential for a significant problems or conflict against the social and military benefits of retaliation. “

Former Pakistani embassy to the US Hussain Haqqani thinks escalation is possible this day, with India likely to consider a few” medical attacks” except in 2016.

According to Mr. Haqqani, a senior colleague at Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy and Hudson Institute,” these cuts demonstrate to the American people that India has acted,” given that they are limited in scope and that Pakistan does not have to answer.

However, Pakistan, which claims that it is being blamed for the strikes in a knee-jerk effect without any analysis or proof, may also be a target. “

Whichever path India chooses, and how Pakistan reacts, is full of danger. The delicate peace in Kashmir dries up even more as a result of the threat of an increase.

India has also take responsibility for the safety problems that caused the initial assault. The fact that this attack took place during the busiest time of year, according to Mr. Raghavan, “points to a critical error, particularly in a Union Territory where the federal government has direct control over law and order.” “

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Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw putting the heat on India – Asia Times

Virtually redrawn, South Asia’s digital geopolitical map is basically being redrawn, not with bold declarations, but with deliberate, quiet strokes.

The coexisting background and hard-won emancipation have been a testament to the centuries-old friendship between India and Bangladesh. But that unshakeable cooperation is starting to wane as a result.

Nobel prize Muhammad Yunus, who is currently in charge of Bangladesh’s interim government, is at the center of this change. Dhaka is looking past the common accept of New Delhi under his watch and waving a careful hand toward Islamabad, an implausible partner.

This is not just a political gesture, though. It was the first public melt in a long-frozen marriage when Yunus met Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif last year on the fringes of the D-8 Summit in Egypt.

Since that moment, which was rarely visible outside the press rooms for the foreign ministry, has gained momentum. The subsequent outreach to Beijing, which was highlighted by Yunus’s well-known visit and rumors that China’s infrastructure is extremely southeastern of India, has only heightened New Delhi’s unease.

The picture of a national head shaking hands with a Muslim rival is jarring for many Bangladeshis who grew up in the darkness of 1971. The Liberation War, which was the result of murder and trauma, is more than just a historical incident; it is also a deeply embedded national storage.

Releasing with Pakistan was a dark line under the previous Bangladeshi president, Sheikh Hasina.

Bangladesh, nevertheless, is indicating that it no longer views its international coverage from a single perspective. Dhaka is playing a more unexpected game in a place where relationships are shifting and power is at stake.

The message is clear for India, who has grown accustomed to treating its neighbor as a political frequent: nothing in South Asia can be changed, not even the past.

people summits, explicit exchanges, and summits

Certainly their material, but rather their showmanship, is what has been most revealing about the recent burst of Bangladesh-Pakistan political and cleverness exchanges.

These are not hidden from view or quiet summits like backchannel efforts. They’re calculated people displays that combine photo ops with press releases and talk levels.

This is a lifeline for Islamabad, which has long been marginalized in South Asian politics. It offers a chance to reshape a location where it has gradually lost influence and a new partner in Dhaka.

Financial incentives, assistance in defense, and even shared interests in international forums are all currently on the table. Additionally, Pakistan is not wasted time.

But, Bangladesh’s justification is more about widening the playing area than it is about rekindling old relations. Dhaka is hedging as India’s local dominance is being progressively seen through the lens of disparity and aggressiveness.

Detached from political dynasties ‘ personal weight, the time government is adopting a more transactional, cold diplomacy.

However, this new rationality comes with dangers. The national brain still carries a lot of the trauma of 1971, including the murder, the mass displacement, and the war crimes. Healing is both a matter of policy and principle for the thousands of Bangladeshis.

Any action that yet suggests absolution or amnesia is susceptible to stoke public outcry, especially among a younger generation who is both politically engaged and previously aware.

It’s unknown whether this diplomatic thaw will produce anything sustained or simply fizzles as a result of the pain experienced in the past. However, one thing is certain: the geographical balance is changing.

Bangladesh is no longer content to play the improbable darkness of India’s future. The nation is pushing the boundaries of its independence in this emerging post-Hasina surroundings, carved out space for its own-defined alliances.

Remembrance and unification

The latest foreign secretary-level discussions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, the first in more than 15 years, brought the past to life.

The consultations, which were held in Dhaka, were nothing short of habit. UNpaid war dues and hurricane relief, US$ 4.52 billion in reparations, and an unwavering, unequivocal explanation for the holocaust of 1971 were proudly direct.

One of the most persistent injuries in South Asian politics is that Islamabad has consistently dodged responsibility by offering only warm emotions of “regret” while dodging accountability.

And while the time management may look more eager to veer off, these demands are consistent with those made by every previous Awami League-led authorities. The message is clear: remembering is not the only thing that can be improved.

Dhaka is diversifying its security and geopolitics, despite the fact that traditional wounds are still untreated. Bangladesh’s involvement in Pakistan’s AMAN-25 naval exercises and its alleged involvement in Pakistan’s JF-17 warrior jets represent a subtle but significant change from its traditional martial sources.

The calculus is unmistakable for some hawks of foreign policy: While China may continue to be the dominant supplier, strategic diversification is then a top priority in Dhaka.

This rebalancing even extends beyond the China-Pakistan shaft. The introduction of Russian ships in Chittagong along with the recent visit of Bangladeshi Army chief common Waker-Uz-Zaman to Moscow underscores Bangladesh’s desire to strengthen its security alliances.

And Khalilur Rahman’s appointment as national security adviser, who was the administration’s minister for the Rohingya crisis, demonstrates a more forceful, regionally focused strategic outlook.

The pressure from the United States has only increased the bets. Washington’s demands for more coherence with Myanmar coverage add another layer of complexity to Dhaka’s now delicate balancing act.

Fundamental principles

The difficulty lies in managing expectations while maintaining autonomy while no simply choosing allies. However, it would be mistaken to associate Bangladesh’s altering unusual plan with its abandonment of its founding principles.

The refusal of the Awami League’s authoritarian ideology does not mean that the principles established in 1971—freedom, justice, and sovereignty—were not respected. These are the aspirations of a new era demanding respect at home and trustworthiness worldwide, not just slogans for the record books.

New Delhi ought to notice. A social change in Dhaka does not automatically mean respect. If India doesn’t expect to be loyal without getting involved, it is misinterpreting the situation.

Bangladesh’s position with its foreign policy is no longer a foregone conclusion. And the path ahead calls for more than just passing press releases or sporadic delegations: it calls for fair examination of history, of each other, and of the local realities of a fast-changing world order.

Abu Jakir is a columnist based in Dhaka.

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Justice remains elusive for Hasina killing machine’s victims – Asia Times

Alliance for Witness Transparency, a US-based human rights organization, has published a series of interviews with people coerced by Hasina into giving false statements against leading opposition officials handed out living words by Hasina’s court.

“ I hope he forgives me. May God forgive one whom only a human being has the right to accept? ” a teary-eyed poverty-stricken old Bengali Muslim man in the Northwestern Bangladeshi district of Rangpur, a couple of hundred kilometers far from the capital city of Dhaka ,  said, speaking  in a native Bengali slang.

The man’s title is Mokbul Hossain. During the 1971 civil war in previous East Pakistan, Mokbul saw his mother fatally wounded by Muslim military people as the mother and son were fleeing to safety. He had to leave his dying mother on.

They had fled to escape the fury of the military unleashed on the Bengali-Muslim-majority East Pakistan by West Pakistan’s fundamentalist, pro-Soviet head Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto dreaded the idea that military king Yahya Khan had transfer power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a Bengali Muslim bagging the 1970 public votes, as Bhutto himself wanted to be the elite, notwithstanding the poll results.

About five decades after the civil war that led to the formation of Bangladesh from the remains of East Pakistan, the Bangladeshi authorities contacted Mokbul and asked him to speak in his mother’s murder trial.

The accused was not a part of the Muslim infantry, as the criminal had been, but a crucial criticism Bengali Muslim innovator combatting Hasina’s increasingly autocratic turn – so much so that she would have a bloody revolution in 2024 to remove her after she removed all political means to oust her.

Mokbul had no say in who had to taking responsibility for his mother’s dying. He could only testify against this politician by the name of A T M Azharul Islam, the then Secretary General ( Acting ) of the country ’s second-largest opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami.

Mokbul’s hands were tied. He did not witness the presence of Azhar or any Burmese male in his mother’s terrible death, but Hasina’s forces in uniform chased him down and terrorized him into testifying that the younger Mokbul saw Azhar provide alongside the army during the incident.

In addition, Hasina had Mokbul testify that Azhar was involved in a mass killing in Dhappara, Rangpur.

Based on Mokbul’s testimony, in 2014 a court that Hasina had set up in Dhaka to try whomever she labeled collaborators of the Pakistan army pronounced Azhar to death. After that, Azhar languished in a death row cell in Bangladesh’s horrifying prison system. Now, although Hasina is gone, Azhar remains imprisoned.

Azhar is lucky, however, to survive the Hasina regime. Hasina executed six of his colleagues – all top leaders from the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its ally Jamaat – between 2013 and 2016. Several others died in prison.

After Hasina fled to India – her prime backer in consolidating and retaining her authoritarian regime – on August 5, 2024, following the student-led July Revolution, Mokbul appeared on camera and recalled his experience of being forced by Hasina to be a party to the misery of a man he considers innocent.

Deeply suffering from moral and spiritual crises, Mokbul now seeks redemption – for both himself and the man his testimony almost sent to the gallows.

A judicial killing machine

Others have come out and recalled to the public how Hasina instrumentalized their grievances into unjustly murdering– or attempting to murder – opposition politicians.   Alliance for Witness Transparency ( AWT), a US-based rights group, has so far interviewed five individuals, including Mokbul.

Ainul Haque, the first person  interviewed by AWT, was hanging out at a local tea stall when he was picked up by Hasina’s police officers and then forced to testify against Matiur Rahman Nizami, the then-chief of Jamaat, in a war crimes case. Nizami was later executed based on Ainul’s testimony.

Ainul now claims that he barely knew Nizami back in 1971 and he did not witness Nizami involved in the events in which Hasina implicated Nizami but had to falsify his testimony due to the pressure from the state.

Mahtab Hawlader and Altaf Hawlader  told AWT  that they were targeted by Hasina’s police to put another senior opposition leader with Jamaat, Delwar Hossain Sayedee, to death. Sanaullah, a police officer, held the Hawladers at gunpoint and threatened to dispose of them in the Buriganga River if they refused to testify against Sayedee, a wildly popular preacher and two-time member of the parliament.

Training the Howladers in what to tell the court were state minister Kamrul Islam, former top leader of Bangladesh’s most influential communist student body Golam Arif Tipu; prosecutor and Hindu communal leader Rana Dasgupta; and prosecutor-turned-politician Barrister Sumon, the duo told AWT.

As if forcing them to lie were not enough, the top judge of the court, Nasim, assured the Howladers that they should not worry about lying since he was in charge of sending Sayedee to the gallows.

The Howladers ’ testimony made Sayedee out to be complicit in rape, murder and persecution of the Hindu minority during the 1971 civil war. That triggered Sayedee’s death sentence, later commuted to life imprisonment following country-wide protests condemning the death sentence.

Hasina had  over a hundred pro-justice protesters massacred, prompting the opposition leader Khaleda Zia to  term  the brutality a genocide.

The irony of the matter is that Hasina’s judges did not need to coerce these individuals to perjure themselves in the first place. Such was the law under which these trials were conducted that individuals could have been convicted based on unsubstantiated news reports and dominant caricatures of these individuals masquerading as “facts of common knowledge. ” In other words, this court was a specifically designed killing machine.

Defying India and Hasina

From the tragedy arise the stories of Prodip Kumar Dev and Sukhranjan Bali, two Bengali Hindu men who dared to speak truth to India and its lackey Hasina. While Bali’s story has attracted the attention of  rights groups, Dev’s story has recently been made available to the public by AWT.

In his interview with AWT, Dev  tells a story  of state-sponsored kidnapping, coercion and illicit offers ( of a million Bangladeshi taka, approximately US$ 8,500 ), all of which he defied on the day of his testimony against Nizami. Although Hasina presented Dev as a witness against Nizami’s alleged war crimes, Dev informed the court that he had no knowledge of Nizami’s wrongdoing, thereby forcing Hasina to declare Dev  a hostile witness.

Although Dev’s heroic efforts could not help Nizami, the leader of the country ’s largest Islamist outfit, escape the death penalty, his standing up against the oppressive state shattered the Indian narrative that Hasina was the friend of the Hindu and the likes of Nizami, the enemy.

Dev’s bravery can be better appreciated when we look at Bali’s experience and understand what Dev was up against.

Hasina charged Sayedee for the murder of Bali’s brother during the civil war and enlisted Bali as a witness to the incident. When Bali  refused  to play ball and, instead, offered to be a witness to Sayedee’s innocence, Hasina had him picked up in front of the courthouse.

Bali was later found in an Indian prison, underscoring India’s complicity in judicial killings of politicians critical of Indian hegemony in South Asia and enforced disappearances in Bangladesh.

A committee set up by the interim government of Nobel laureate Yunus to investigate the allegations of enforcement disappearances during Hasina’s rule has found  over 3,500 cases of enforced disappearances.   India was involved  in many of them.

What now?

Even nearly a year after Hasina’s ouster, Azhar remains in prison. Those who were executed through this judicial killing machine still remain the villains in the dominant narrative, as well as on paper.

The reason for this is that the India-sponsored nationalist history of Bangladesh has made the 1971 civil war a sensitive issue. Anyone perceived to have supported Pakistan during the civil war is automatically rendered a war criminal.

On the other hand, Bangladesh has given blanket immunity to pro-India forces for their crimes committed between March 1, 1971 and February 28, 1972. The  indemnity order, put into effect by Hasina’s father in 1973, prevents prosecution of the non-Bengali genocide and other crimes against humanity that pro-India forces in East Pakistan engaged in before, during and after the war that lasted from March 25, 1971, until December 16 the same year.

The famous Anthony Mascarenhas  report  on the atrocities of the Pakistani army, dubbed by  BBC “one of the most influential pieces of South Asian journalism ” after it was published in  The Sunday Times, tilted global public opinion against Pakistan during the civil war. The same report claimed that anti-Pakistan forces had initiated the Bihari genocide much before the Pakistan army’s “counter-genocide” began and massacred hundreds of thousands Biharis within a few weeks.  

Amnesty International  called  for bringing to justice everyone who violated human rights during the war  irrespective of their allegiance. But pro-India forces in Bangladesh  responded heavily  to this demand and claimed that only Pakistan was responsible for war crimes in 1971.

Although India’s proxy Hasina was ousted in the July Revolution, justice for Azhar and non-Bengali victims of the long civil war, be they Bihari or Chakma, us still denied because the hegemonic Indian narrative cannot see beyond the “good India, bad Bangladesh” dichotomy. Insofar as Azhar and other victims of the continued battle over the war’s narrative are categorized as pro-Pakistani, it is difficult for any Bangladeshi government to deliver justice to them lest the pro-India forces wreak havoc in the country.

Md Ashraf Aziz Ishrak Fahim has a first degree in International Relations and Global Affairs from Mahidol University, Thailand, and an MA in Social and Political Thought from the University of Leeds, UK. He is currently a graduate student of Contemporary Islamic Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. He can be reached at  mdfa48907@hbku. edu. qa

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China’s strategy in the tariff wars – Asia Times

Xi Jinping, the president of China, is making position trips to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia between April 14 and April 18. It is Xi’s first outside visit this month, following the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries held in Beijing from April 8 to 9. When asked what the main point of the meeting was, Renmin University’s Professor Jin Canrong, a well-known Chinese analyst frequently cited in Western media, stated to the Chinese website” Observer” ( guancha.cn ) that Beijing would talk to its Asian trading partners to counteract the effects of US tariffs. According to Jin, China will keep investing in Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, but it will also increase domestic need to purchase more from its Eastern trading partners. ASEAN nations could buy Chinese state securities denominated in RMB, and China could use the money to buy more, replacing to some extent the US need. Jin’s remarks are above:

This conference on work related to neighboring nations was held in response to the extreme global condition brought on by the United States ‘ desire to impose tariffs. It showed that we hope to make for work a still higher goal in our country’s global strategy.

China and the United States are currently at odds with one another. China’s ties to its neighbors have grown even more significant in this regard. Constantly developing and maintaining such relations has distinct and far-reaching importance for China. &nbsp,

We can keep our nation’s good placement in the Sino-US tactical game as long as we can perform a good job of home work and neighborhood diplomacy.

Over the past few years, despite the numerous global issues and very difficult circumstances, China and its surrounding regions have remained relatively stable. &nbsp,

China’s surrounding areas will develop into a unique “island of balance” in the future and will experience robust economic advancement momentum. The area will see outstanding prospects and excellent value in the future.

The populations of the nations that surround China are also sizable, with groups exceeding 1.4 billion as well. Additionally, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have a large population, with 290 million, 250 million, and 180 million people, both. China and its surrounding countries account for about 56 % of the country’s total population.

Nevertheless, we have had good relations with our neighbors, but there are some flaws that are related to our growth rate. We are still not at the point where we are completely modernized. Our per capita GDP is approximately$ 13, 000, while that of the United States is over$ 80, 000.

Although development is the main goal of humanity, China is still in its early stages of development and hasn’t yet established modernization standards.

Our enhancement also has limitations, especially in soft energy, from the standpoint of a comprehensive national power standpoint. If our country’s per capita GDP exceeds$ 50, 000, and we have a population of 1.4 billion, we may create a huge impact. But, we are still not certain of it at this time. China is just a recent grad if the United States is a doctoral fellow in terms of the degree of development.

From now on, we may change our development strategy, increase our usage capacity and enhance people’s living standards. To do this, we must properly raise person’s income levels and give them total social stability. &nbsp,

In the past, many of our government’s governmental expenditures were used for investment and growth. The government may spend more money right now on enhancing people’s lives by using sources that are unrelated to significant industries. &nbsp,

By allocating and adjusting public tools, we can ultimately resolve problems in four key areas: accommodation, health care, knowledge and retirement. We can make domestic need and obtain inner circulation by improving welfare and increasing people’s investment in their livelihoods.

From a local view, the development of China’s domestic market will support the nation’s attractiveness to neighboring nations, boost the region’s job markets and development environment, and reduce its dependence on US and European markets.

Our practical work should focus on soft cooperation in the economy and technology. China first needs to strengthen its platform for regional economic cooperation and push for the implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ). Although the agreement became effective on January 1, 2023, it has not yet been fully understood. Under the RCEP framework, we should strengthen economic ties with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

In addition to strengthening economic ties with neighboring nations, we should continue to support the Belt and Road Initiative, put our emphasis on promoting subregional cooperation platforms like the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, the China-South Asia Dialogue, and the China-Central Asia Dialogue.

Guancha.cn: Most of China’s neighboring economies agreed not to retaliate against Trump but to engage in tariff negotiations with the United States. How should China explore its economic and trade potential with neighboring countries?

Trump’s recent decision to suspend the imposition of “reciprocal tariffs” on 75 trading partners for 90 days and concentrate on business with us can be attributed to two factors: On the one hand, it is punishing China because many nations have shown an attitude of surrender and kneeling to the US. ( While most others chose to compromise, Canada and the European Union vowed to retaliate. ) On the other hand, it is also intended to appease different opinions at home.

In this context, China’s external trade situation is unquestionably severe. &nbsp,

Some experts pointed out that when the tariff level between China and the United States exceeds 54 %, most of the commodity trade between the two countries will no longer have room for profit. The US increased its tariffs to 104 % and 145 %, but nothing much changed.

We must be fully prepared psychologically and willing to pay a certain price. Some scholars estimate that the impact of this tariff war on China may be as significant as that of the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic.

During the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemic of 2020, China significantly changed its policies. To combat the crisis, the central government spent 4 trillion yuan ($ 547 billion ) plus local government loans in 2008 to address the crisis. In 2020, our country used its “whole-of-nation” system, similar to military mobilization, to overcome the pandemic. &nbsp,

We must act now and act now to combat the US tariff war and to prepare as we did in 2008 and 2020. &nbsp,

About 19 % of our GDP is exported abroad, but only 14.5 % of all exports to the US are made up of exports. Because some of our products are exported through third-party channels, the proportion may be even higher.

In the last round of tariff war, large-scale capital outflows from the mainland involved mainly Taiwanese and US firms, while the outflow of domestic capital was relatively low.

Let’s say that US exports account for about 20 % of our total exports. If China and the US’s trade is completely stopped, we will need to take steps to lessen the pain caused by a decline in exports to the US, which accounts for 4 % of our GDP.

Based on common sense, we can take three measures:

  • increase domestic demand through fiscal stimulus while pursuing internal consumption,
  • promote re-export through nations that are only subject to 10 % US tariffs,
  • explore new markets such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

China and the United States could begin negotiations once they realize that China will not give in. &nbsp,

We can work together to negotiate tariff exemptions for some goods that are produced in China and then shipped to the United States, like Tesla and Apple, for example. This has already been approved by the US. – eds ]

We’ll press the other party into negotiations after the confrontation. After all, engaging in a trade war is intended to produce bargaining chips to keep China from losing some exports. If we can reach an agreement, all products made by American companies in China for the US market can be exempted from tariffs. This could lessen China’s desire to diversify its markets.

With all of the above measures, China’s GDP will be impacted by the tariff war overall, falling from 4 % to less than 2 %.

At the strategic level, I remain optimistic about China’s overall outlook. We can use this tariff war to prompt local businesses to make adjustments, promote the establishment of a domestic market with internal and dual circulation, and turn “bad things into good things” with internal circulation.

I can make a second suggestion. Faced with a 10 % US tariff, many countries will see a decline in their trade surplus to the US and receive fewer US dollars, which may cause a global shortage of US dollars. &nbsp,

China has the potential to use this opportunity to issue renminbi bonds in politically stable nations in large numbers.

The international market has a specific demand for renminbi. Renminbi bonds ‘ large-scale issuance can encourage Chinese investors to shop and invest there and help the country attract foreign investors. &nbsp,

Such a move will also help promote the use of the renminbi in global transactions and agreements, creating favorable conditions for its internationalization.

This article is republished with permission from guancha.cn, which was originally published on April 14, 2025.

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