South Asia (Page 2)

This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.

In Pahalgam, in Kashmir’s Baisaran grass on April 22, four jihadists armed with automatic rifle shot 26 visitors useless. All but one of the murdered victims was an Indian, and the rest were adult residents. Witnesses&nbsp, report&nbsp, that the intruders were Islamist radicals who determined whom to give based on skill to read Muslim lines. Those who couldn’t move the Islamic analyze were brutally shot at full range.

The Resistance Front ( TRF ) terrorist organization claimed responsibility for the mass casualty attack on Kashmiri civilians using the messaging app Telegram.

Founded in 2019, The Resistance Front may be understood as a close offshoot – or even just a front – of Lashkar-e-Taiba ( LeT ), the more well-known Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist organization behind the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, which seeks to establish an Islamic state in South Asia. According to one analyst,” All Cardio operations are largely Help operations.”

A few days after, TRF reversed its open stance and refuted organization participation in the attack. On its site, TRF&nbsp, issued&nbsp, this record claiming denial:” In the Name of Allah, the most courteous, the most generous. The TRF, or The Resistance Top, categorically refutes any role in the Pahalgam event. Any identification of this crime to TRF is fabricated, made-up, and a result of a planned effort to denigrate the Kashmiri weight.

Treatment tried to explain away the first attack credit state:” After an internal inspection, we have reason to believe it was the outcome of a planned cyber intrusion. We are conducting a thorough investigation to find the source of the violation, and early signs point to possible fingerprints from American cyber-intelligence agents.

According to Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, there is a shortage of” clarity about the blame” behind the civil massacre, which could lessen the likelihood of a rewarding response.

I have &nbsp, published&nbsp, heavily on the credit-claiming habits of criminal groups around the world. My research establishes without a doubt that the Islamist organization that launched the attack at the beginning claimed corporate credit.

Popular Front for the Liberation, Fatah, and Red Brigades are among the numerous violent organizations that have relied on the success of the problems ‘ media coverage to give credit.

The TRF denial&nbsp, reportedly&nbsp, came after the Bangladeshi security creation pressured the LeT-linked extremist group to distance itself from the mass murder, given the massive protests by Kashmiris that erupted across the Valley against the invasion and the international society’s natural expressions of pity towards the Indian victims.

With Justin Conrad and I, mathematically speaking, found that violent organizations are significantly more likely to assume corporate role when the goals are military personnel than civilians like the 26 tourists in Kashmir. In fact, it is common for perpetrators to avoid organizational responsibility when attacks harm civilians. For example:

• The African National Congress’s official position was that the attack on May 1988 had nothing to do with the attacks on amusement parks, fast-food restaurants, sports stadiums, and shopping centers in the vicinity of Johannesburg and Pretoria.
• Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly claimed that the vile reports of al-Qaeda’s attacks on civilians in Iraq were just “lies” that were spread throughout the media.
• Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy chief, swore in November 2005 that his group had “never been involved in or responsible for any of these incidents” against civilians.
• A Muslim woman was shot dead by militant Islamists in Hosingow, southern Somalia, in July 2014 because she refused to wear a veil. An al-Shabaab spokesman refuted the group’s claim that the woman had been killed in an effort to improve its image. An BBC analyst noted,” Al-Shabaab wants to distance itself from the shooting because it is likely to provoke a strong public reaction”.
• In the streets of Mogadishu in October 2017, a suicide bomber detonated a truck full of explosives in what was the largest terrorist attack ever to occur in Somalia. As was expected, thousands of Somalis took to the streets to protest the loss of more than 300 innocent lives. No official credit claim was issued, to mitigate the reputational costs to the group.
• In addition, Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria engaged in a denial strategy for the March 2017 suicide bombing of a Damascus restaurant, insisting that the group was “only focused on military targets.”
• In Charlottesville, Virginia, a Neo-Nazi named James Alex Fields threw his Dodge Challenger into a crowd of protesters in August 2017. Hours before the lethal car-ramming, he had been photographed brandishing a shield emblazoned with a white supremacist emblem and other insignia of Vanguard America. The hate group distanced itself from the suspect over Twitter by saying that the driver of the vehicle that hit counter protesters today was in no way a member of Vanguard America. By the time of the incident, all of our members were completely unharmed. The shields seen do not denote membership, nor does the white shirt. Anyone present at the ceremony was free to receive the shields.
• According to UNICEF spokeswoman Marixie Mercado, Boko Haram leaders are also suspected of denying attacks “typically against civilian targets.”

In South Asia, militant groups have a long history of conditioning credit claims on the target of the attack. The Taliban’s leaders frequently claimed organizational responsibility for attacks on military personnel but not civilians during the long insurgency.

For instance, when operatives attacked Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the leader of the coalition that overthrew the Taliban in 2001, on a road in northern Kunduz in July 2009, the Taliban “quickly claimed responsibility”

By contrast, the Taliban released the following statement when operatives struck the International Committee of the Red Cross in Jalalabad:” The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to clarify to everyone that it was neither behind the May 29th attack on the ICRC office in Jalalabad city nor does it support such attacks”.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan ( UNAMA ) asserts that Taliban attack denials are “frequently issued following civilian casualty incidents… perhaps highlighting the Taliban’s persistent interest in gaining the Afghan people’s support.”

The Taliban, according to Farah Province’s governor, “deny responsibility whenever there are civilian casualties.” After a Taliban attack on a Kandahar wedding for which the group denied responsibility, Radio Free Europe reported that the leaders “routinely deny causing civilian casualties”.

In fact, the Taliban leadership was known to reverse its public stance after discovering an attack that had harmed civilian targets rather than military ones. Instead of blaming civilian attacks, the leaders attempt to credit them on the government.

In February 2014, for instance, UNAMA published a detailed report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan. 6 374 or 74 % of the 8, 614 that occurred in the previous year were deemed to be the work of the Taliban. However, it should be noted that the Taliban leadership denied responsibility for these attacks and claimed that” the enemy is responsible for the majority of civilian losses” ( insertly ).

Its spokesman protested that such reports linking Taliban fighters to civilian casualties in Afghanistan are “propaganda”, “far from reality”, and “lies, all lies” intended to” cover up the blatant crimes of the Pentagon”.

The Resistance Front appears to have engaged in a public relations campaign that I have dubbed “denial of organizational,” in addition to the Taliban and many other militant groups to help with the political fallout from the contentious Pahalgam attack. TRF attempted to avoid responsibility by blaming the opposing government, just like those other groups.

Watch for an Indian military response

For a simple reason, civilized attacks tend to backfire on the perpetrators, both politically and organizationally, making a credit claim less likely.

I’ve conducted , published , numerous , statistical , and published studies that demonstrate that civilian attacks significantly reduce , the odds of government concessions while reducing , the odds that the target nation will use military force – often in devastating fashion, as Hamas and many other terrorist groups have learned.

On a sample of hundreds of militant groups, I&nbsp, find&nbsp, that governments are over four times as likely to employ lethal violence against a group that attacks civilians as opposed to military targets.

Given the civilian carnage, my political science research indicates that India will forcefully respond to the most recent Pahalgam attack.

India has already taken retaliatory measures against the terrorist attack, including extinguishing Pakistani nationals from the nation, suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, shutting down airspace, and launching fire across the Line of Control.

But we should expect a proper military response, my research indicates. A useful comparison point is the Pulwama attack from February 14 to February 14. The Pulwama suicide attack was directed at Indian security personnel rather than civilians, unlike the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam. And, predictably, the Islamist terrorist group claimed organizational responsibility.

Twelve days after the Pulwama attack, the Indian Air Force launched Operation Bandar, which saw the drop of bombs on a terrorist training camp in Balakot, Pakistan, after 12 Mirage 2000 jets crossed the Line of Control.

Given the target selection of the Islamist extremists, regardless of whether they support their heinous attacks, the Indian military response will be even more extensive this time.

Max Abrahms ( m. abrahms@northeastern .edu ) &nbsp, is a tenured professor of political science at Northeastern University and a leading expert on terrorist group dynamics.

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The Hindu Kush–Himalaya–Karakoram mountain range, which is frequently referred to as the” Third Pole” because of its huge glacier reserves, provides people in South Asia with essential water sources, particularly in India and Pakistan. &nbsp,

These glaciers reserves feed into rivers that run upstream to India and Pakistan, supporting both countries ‘ communities, agriculture, and home water needs. However, this area has become more resilient as a result of the fast accelerating effects of climate change.

Research comparing the years 2000–2009 and 2010–2019 found that the rate of glacier melt has increased by 65 %, leading to an increase in water supply in the near future but posing severe long-term dangers of water scarcity and chaotic movement systems.

The stakes couldn’t get higher for Pakistan. Low foreign direct investment, prolonged political volatility, and deteriorating security problems have severely hampered the country’s economy, which is mostly economic.

In consequence, the agricultural industry, which is heavily dependent on the Indus River system, continues to provide the majority of lives. Both canal water and water recovery are highly reliant on farmers and smallholder agribusinesses.

But, groundwater is being extracted in some places at untenable rates, with aquifers showing disturbing levels of depletion. The government’s agriculture is still in decline, but the extended overextraction threatens both the future availability of water and its long-term viability.

In this context, India’s recent decision to “abey” the Indus Waters Treaty ( IWT ) has sparked alarm in Pakistan, with Islamabad officials calling the suspension an “act of war.” Starting with the provisions of the treaty itself, the viability of such a disqualification and, more important, its effects, must become thoroughly evaluated.

The treaty, which President Ayub and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed in 1960, specifically gave India the waters of the western rivers ( Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab ) and the eastern rivers ‘ waters ( Ravi, Sutlej, Beas ) to them. In the end, the treaty resulted in the receiving of 20 % of the water from the Indus River system to India, while 80 % of the water did Pakistan receive.

Although India has the right to use all of its resources, about 2 million acres of ocean still flows into Pakistan from the River Ravi. Two rivers, Indus and Sutlej, originate in Tibet but pass through India before entering Pakistan, while four of the six rivers ( Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab ) are entirely indigenous.

This geographical dominance gives India an upper downstream position, which is one of the reasons Pakistan has expressed concern about India’s downstream dominance. The Sutlej and Ravi river ‘ waters must flow freely before entering Pakistan’s place. Pakistan is required to allow for this to happen.

Before the streams have suddenly crossed into Pakistan, Pakistan may deflect these lakes in the reaches. In other words, Pakistan is unable to remove water for large-scale watering or storage even though these rivers may go through some of Pakistan if they haven’t actually entered the country.

Any river that joins Pakistan’s country becomes Pakistan’s unlimited water supply when these tributaries enter the country, and if Pakistan adds any water from those tributaries downstream before the last crossing, India cannot use that water, and both nations are required to keep records of flows.

For the lakes of Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, Pakistan has full, unrestricted access to the ocean, and India is legally obliged to allow the waters to flow freely to Pakistan without any detour or delay. In terms of Pakistan, India is prohibited from stifling the flow of northern rivers, aside from the portion of the river’s drainage basin on the American side.

Both sides may employ rivers for non-consumptive purposes, but the treaty states that both sides may do so may not change the flow in ways that may impair the other country’s constitutional status.

However, both nations are permitted to perform dredging, degradation control, and gravel, stone, and sand removal in ways that don’t hurt the other country. &nbsp,

What India has made an implication from its expulsion speech is “interference” with the lakes, as of right now. Interference is any natural obstruction of the flow of water that can alter the country’s normal flow of water, as defined by the treaty, but this obstruction may only result in minor and extraneous changes caused by temporary bypasses or bridge piers.

Additionally, a thorough decision process is in place in the event that a problem contradicts the terms of the treaty. Perhaps a rudimentary dispute may indicate a infraction, and the Indus Waters Commission should do so in the first instance.

Each commissioner has the right to send the matter to be handled by a natural expert if there is a disagreement that turns into a difference. If the issue is deemed to be policy-related and is escalated to a full dispute if it doesn’t qualify for the natural professional’s jurisdiction or if the issue doesn’t count for the treaty’s” Negative” expert’s jurisdiction.

If a dispute has been identified, either inspector may request a report from the commission to both administrations, and the report may contain arguments between the commissioners, disagreements, and positions and logic of each director. Following diplomatic negotiations between institutions, where each of the parties is required to name their negotiators and set up a meeting place and time.

In three different ways, a court of arbitration can be established as a last resolution system: through mutual agreement between the two governments, through punitive request by one government after intergovernmental negotiations have begun, but by the party believing the dispute didn’t get settled in this way, and through punitive request if the invited party doesn’t listen or delays negotiations for more than a month.

India’s recent strong statement regarding the Indus Waters Treaty’s suspension and its use of the term “abeyance” could have a significant impact on the nation’s reputation abroad.

Any unilateral suspension would constitute a potential breach of international law, and the treaty does not contain any provision that would allow it to be held in abeyance. Such a move might undermine India’s standing as a trustworthy and accountable partner in international agreements.

A mere verbal declaration is neither sufficient nor legitimate, so it is important to point out that formal procedures must be followed when changing or withdrawing from treaties.

Although the availability of water in Pakistan has been a concern, the practical application of this declaration is much more complicated. Although India has an upper-riparian advantage, it is neither rational nor feasible to reduce or divert river flows during the upcoming monsoon season.

Diversion operations are technically challenging and risky due to the high water volume and flow velocity during this time and the wide riverbeds. Any water that is diverted could inundate Indian territory, causing unintended flooding.

However, if India takes these actions, the effects would be greater in the winter, when river flows are already at their lowest and Pakistan’s reliance on irrigation is at its highest.

Pakistani policymakers should reevaluate their internal water management strategies in light of the doubtful viability of India’s plan.

First, it emphasizes the need for improved water conservation techniques and a stoppage of the overuse of both surface and groundwater resources. Particularly, groundwater extraction has reached unsustainable levels, which is made worse by lack of regulatory oversight.

Surface water is also managed poorly, and large amounts of it are lost to evaporation from open canals in the summer due to inadequate infrastructure and the lack of lining in the irrigation system.

Additionally, floods waste a lot of water, which makes it necessary for better flood management and storage systems. Additionally, Pakistan’s economy is still heavily dependent on agriculture, a highly water-intensive industry.

Greater investment is required to diversify the economy and grow the industrial sectors to relieve pressure on water resources. In contrast to agriculture, where untreated or recycled water raises serious health and safety issues, industries are better equipped to use treated wastewater.

The author worked for the World Wildlife Fund as a researcher.

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