South Asia

India’s ground-breaking hypersonic missile test places it among the elite group of nations with the ability to master the next-generation of weapons, a revolutionary strike capability that will transform South Asia’s geopolitical environment.

The first long-range hypersonic missile, the country’s first, was successfully tested on the ground by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization ( DRDO ), according to Naval News this month.

The Indian Armed Forces ( IAF ) has three branches using the missile, which reportedly performed successful terminal maneuvers and had a high-speed impact.

The Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile ( LRLACM)’s maiden flight test from a mobile articulated launcher this month follows this one.

The Indian Navy’s ( IN ) currently has the most powerful missile, the supersonic BrahMos missile, along with the subsonic LRLACM, according to a report from the Naval News.

As for the hypersonic missile’s specifications, the report states it likely features a delta-winged hypersonic glide vehicle ( HGV ), offering enhanced maneuverability compared to traditional ballistic trajectories.

The LRLACM, which was developed by the Aeronautical Development Establishment of the DRDO and is capable of being launched from both ground and maritime platforms, is anticipated to have a collection of more than 1, 000 kilometers.

It notes these innovations mark important advancements in India’s weapon capabilities, providing long-range regular hit options for the American government.

A K Sachdev mentions the rationale behind India’s fast weapons program in an article from the Indian Defense Review in July 2023 that HGVs and HCMs are praised for their extreme maneuverability, low radar visibility, and ability to evade contemporary air defenses.

Sachdev says these arms, flying at lower altitudes than nuclear missiles, reduce monitoring windows, with HCMs skimming only 200 feet above the ground, making intrusion by ground-based systems nearly impossible.

He notes their capability to deliver precision strikes against strategic targets —such as command centers, fortified bunkers, or moving naval assets —at continental ranges amplifies their utility.

He adds that fast weapons can perform both, carrying either regular or nuclear warheads, giving them more flexibility in conflict escalation scenarios and enhancing their proper appeal.

This unquestionable ability to reach defenses makes for reputable retaliation, which could deter adversaries and stop a nuclear escalation.

In a June 2022 Center for Land Warfare Studies ( CLAWS ) issue brief, Rajesh Gupta mentions that India’s main objectives are to improve security and deterrence in a nuclearized neighborhood.

Gupta highlights that these weapons, with their great speed, flexibility, and accuracy, can work as important tools in India’s broader plan of “dissuasive deterrent” against China and “punitive deterrence” against Pakistan.

He claims that India hopes to prevent future dangers from adversaries ‘ growing fast army and reduce its ability to incur significant costs in the event of an uprising.

Dissuasive punishment, also known as “deterrence by denial,” involves dissuasive punishment by demonstrating a strong desire to stop an attack from achieving desired benefits.

Punishing punishment, or “deterrence by punishment”, &nbsp, involves threatening severe punishments, like nuclear increase, to increase the cost of an attack. Instead of just providing strong defense, it emphasizes more severe penalties.

Gupta claims that HCMs and HGVs are crucial for enhancing regular and nuclear weapons and preventing high-value assets from being stolen from the enemy. He makes the case that having these weapons is necessary to safeguard strategic interests and mitigate vulnerabilities posed by sophisticated army systems.

He points out that India’s investment in fast defense systems and defense mechanisms is in line with its desire to become one of the few nations with hypersonic weapons, which would allow it to establish proper parity and effectively hinder adversaries.

Granath Vanaik mentions in a 2021 Air Power blog article how China’s development of hypersonic weapons poses a major challenge to India’s strategy of deterrence and its newly developed fast weapons development efforts.

Vanaik mentions that China’s use of the DF-ZF hypersonic glide aircraft and DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile highlights its focus on avoiding innovative missile defense systems, which has repercussions for local rivals like India.

He claims that these developments shorten India’s response times, putting up a threat to its nuclear command and control systems, and raising the risk of an escalation due to ambiguities regarding the types of warheads and the intended targets. He points out that China’s advancements could cause India to lower its nuclear arsenal or adopt more aggressive strategies, increasing the risk of an unintended escalation.

Vanaik mentions that India’s limited advancements in hypersonic technology and its incomplete nuclear triad, which could lead to a costly regional arms race, are compounded by the two countries ‘ asymmetric capabilities.

In a 2021 article in the Islamabad Policy Research Institute journal, Adil Sultan and Ifta Khursheed mention that Pakistan faces significant strategic challenges as a result of India’s advancements in hypersonic weapons.

Sultan and Khursheed say that hypersonic systems, characterized by their speed, maneuverability, and ability to evade missile defenses, could enhance India’s capacity for preemptive counterforce strikes. They point out these capabilities align with India’s Cold Start Doctrine, potentially targeting Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and strategic missile systems.

Such developments, they say, might compel Pakistan to adapt its Full Spectrum Deterrence posture, possibly through heightened missile alert statuses, an expansion of mobile launch platforms, or the initiation of its hypersonic program.

As Vanaik, Sultan, and Khursheed caution, these responses risk exacerbating an arms race in South Asia, undermining crisis stability, and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation.

Sultan mentions that India’s purchase of hypersonic weapons is anticipated to worsen regional unrest in a National Security Journal article from December 2021. These weapons are particularly effective against mobile ground-based missile systems, such as Pakistan’s short-range ballistic missiles ( SRBMs), which are seen as critical to deterring India’s limited warfighting strategy of proactive operations.

Sultan claims that India might want to use hypersonic weapons to launch a preemptive strike on Pakistan’s SRBMs, potentially putting pressure on Pakistan’s ability to use nuclear weapons because it is likely to carry conventional warheads. He claims that this scenario could give India a chance to start a limited conventional military conflict.

Sultan states Pakistan might feel compelled to raise the level of its SRBMs’ security, increase their numbers, and increase their mobility in order to counteract the threat of a preemptive strike. According to Sultan, these actions, alongside other countermeasures, could further destabilize the strategic balance in the region.

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The notion of a significant political space called the” Indo-Pacific” has evolved over the past ten years as a key component of the royal strategizing of nations both within and outside this vast geographic area.

The word is not new, yet. In the 1970s, Australia, one of the few genuinely Indo-Pacific nations, drew inspiration from it to ink a hopeful picture of a future where it was economically and socially linked to its neighbors in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

But, since Japan ( under the command of Shinzo Abe ) first used the word in 2007 as a way of conceptualizing relations with India in the environment of” a broader Asia”, Indo-Pacific has evolved considerably.

And now it’s common to refer to the Indo-Pacific as either a place or a super-region with the onset of the AUKUS security agreement in 2021. But this oversimplifies what is, in fact, a far more sophisticated political reality.

What is a area?

The best way to describe a region as a geographically isolated difficult is. Social scientist David Lake believes that actions taken by one representative and considerable security-related developments within one member have a significant impact on others because they are” so interconnected in terms of their security.”

The Indo-Pacific, at its broadest concept, extends from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of South America, making up more than half the Earth’s surface.

Simply put, the Indo-Pacific is very large to effectively fathom of as a place or even a super-region.

Furthermore, although many a state has adopted an Indo-Pacific outlook in its strategizing, typically states ( save for greater powers ) still think of their national security in a strict regional sense.

Thus, the Indo-Pacific as a political place looks considerably different in Washington DC than it does in Jakarta, Wellington, Tokyo or Manila ( to decide but a dozen ).

This is not to suggest the Indo-Pacific strategy may be ignored. It represents a significant advancement in global security. It is true that it has experienced the most significant political change in the last ten years, and this trend is likely to continue.

The China issue

If not a place or super-region, therefore, what is the Indo-Pacific?

It might be better understood in terms of what “macrosecuritization” is defined as by foreign relations experts Barry Buzan and Old Waever as a “existential threat” to something that is deemed valuable and worthwhile and necessitates an instant and, if necessary, amazing social response to protect it.

The United States, which is still by far the most effective global actor, publicly placed the Indo-Pacific idea at the center of its strategic thinking in 2017, gave this a significant boost.

In the process, it identified China as a distinct corporate rival. This choice had urgent real-world implications.

Firstly, it helped resuscitate, after nearly a decade of impasse, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ( Quad ) involving the US, Australia, India and Japan.

Second, it resulted in the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 and the release of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity in 2022. Joe Biden ran for president on an” America must direct once” system.

Geopolitical difficulty

Interestingly, not only the US is involved in this macrosecuritization. Australia, India, Japan and, more recently, the United Kingdom and European Union ( and particular member states, such as France ) are all involved.

Together, they are pushing for the creation of an Indo-Pacific strategy based on the recognition that China’s increase and perceived assertiveness pose a threat to the rules-based global order.

The frame of China as a” risk” rather than an “opportunity”– which dominated the previous” Asia-Pacific” construct – indicates a radically different view in the countries adopting Indo-Pacific perspectives.

This obviously matters greatly to provincial politics. But it still does not mean the Indo-Pacific has to be seen as a location or super-region.

Instead, the idea is distorting the politics of different locations – particularly East Asia, South-east Asia, South Asia and the South Pacific.

These areas have their own distinct surveillance dynamics, but they still exist. However, they are being encased in the Indo-Pacific concept, which causes the dynamics to shift more negative and anxious.

A’ New Cold War ‘

Instead of being a cluster of distinct regions, the Indo-Pacific is currently a worrying habit of being treated as a cohesive unitary geopolitical space.

This gives cred to the overarching comparison of a” New Cold War” starting in the Indo-Pacific. And it disregards the viewpoints of the smaller nations who are being drawn into this growing conflict.

It is crucial to develop more cohesive and subtle policies that adequately reflect the political complexity of the Indo-Pacific constellation by seeing it for what it really is, not as a normal geographical phenomenon but as a construct.

However, this goes against the current macrosecuritization approach.

There are many reasons why the Indo-Pacific’s recent state is unlike the Cold War’s. But the borrowing procedure is simplifying the politics, at least in belief, into something suggestive of it. The consequences may be devastating.

Nicholas Ross Smith is a senior research fellow at the National Center for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, and Paul M. Bacon is a doctor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Pacific Forum published this article at its original publication. It is republished with authority.

The American people’s choice of leader is the common social shame, which is very accurate.

The empire has endured under the leadership of 14 US president and 16 Australian prime ministers since the signing of the ANZUS convention in 1951. One of those prime ministers, Kevin Rudd, now Australia’s ambassador in Washington, draws on that history to buttress the bromide:” We actually&nbsp, do n’t have a view&nbsp, about partisan preferences within this country. That’s a decision for you all to sort out”.

However, the bromide has various Republican and Democrat resemblances as Canberra approaches the US election results.

Australia believes that Donald Trump and Kamala Harris both provide “more of the same” in their respective forms. The meaning of” same” is where Canberra’s alliance confidence takes on contrasting hues. Canberra had &nbsp, expect&nbsp, more of the same from a Harris management and&nbsp, hope&nbsp, for more of the same from another Trump presidency.

The Harris” identical” is a significant improvement over the Trump administration, which delivered. The Trump” equal” is based on the success of the diplomatic partnership during his presidency from 2017 to 2020, despite a&nbsp, serious early&nbsp, alarum.

Under either Harris or Trump, Australia wants to dig what’s been achieved by Joe Biden. An impressive accomplishment is expanding and approving a proper empire that is in its eighth decade, especially given the significant role the US plays in American plan. However, Biden’s plan for an ally was accomplished in the following ways:

the AUKUS&nbsp, atomic submarine&nbsp, arrangement,
• the creation of the Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US,
• America’s step-up in the South Pacific, as Washington declared a “renewed relationship with the Pacific Islands”, responding to Australia’s see that China’s problem creates” a&nbsp, state of permanent contest&nbsp, in the Pacific”,
• and the influx of US military personnel onto American ground in a new era of alliance integration, which will result in the establishment of a US-Australian mixed intelligence center in Canberra.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (” Quad” ) is one embodiment of Australia’s more-of-the-same ambition. The value of the grouping has been boosted by Biden, who held six Quad conferences, four of them in person. The second Quad ministerial meetings happened during Trump’s president, but, so Trump has some basic possession. Trump’s supporters say he will keep the Quad. A recent example of Asian proper structures benefits from both Republican and Democratic roots.

Any mention of China is avoided in the standard dialect of Quad. If the conference is the information, however, finally it’s all about China and Beijing’s violent searching in Asia.

At Biden’s last Quad conference in Delaware in September, the leader had a “hot camera” instant when he was heard telling the other leaders in what was supposed to be a closed session:” China continues to behave violently, &nbsp, testing us all&nbsp, across the region, and it’s real in the&nbsp, South China Sea, the East China Sea, South China, South Asia, and the Taiwan Straits”.

Biden said that while Chinese president Xi Jinping was focusing on “domestic financial challenges”, he was even “looking to get himself some political place, in my watch, to aggressively pursue China’s attention”.

Australia finds peace in the fact that there is a rare bipartisan consensus in Washington regarding the conflict with China despite all the groups in US politics. And, whether Trump or Harris is the champion, the next president may realize that the core balance of global power this century may be&nbsp, set in the Indo-Pacific.

The balance-of-power assessment drives official statements of American strategic doctrine. Canberra’s 2023 Defense Strategic Review declares:” The Indo-Pacific is the most&nbsp, essential geostrategic region&nbsp, in the world”. The 2024 National Defence Strategy courts that the world opposition is” sharpest and most consequential&nbsp, in the Indo-Pacific”.

The alliance should be strong and growing in value as a result of this proper logic. That’s why Canberra&nbsp, expects&nbsp, more of the same if Vice President Harris is elected as president. The&nbsp, hope&nbsp, about a minute Trump administration is the crunch when approach comes up against character.

Australia tries to bolster the alliance with several layers of past and determination. The art of this endeavor is to lavish compliment on the US while not criticizing Donald Trump. This is the powerful method employed the first time, and the current Labour government is following the text.

Prime ministers who are retired do n’t have to follow diplomatic orders. And Australia’s next longest serving excellent chancellor, John Howard, has damned Trump as unfit for office.

As primary minister from 1996 to 2007, Howard was the heartiest of US friends. In 2009, President George W. Bush presented Howard with America’s highest human pride, the Presidential&nbsp, Medal of Freedom.

In typical circumstances, Howard said, “instead of supporting a Democratic success,” but not with Trump as the applicant:” I believe his refusal to accept the outcome of the most recent election and his numerous attempts to reverse that outcome were not compatible with politics. When you play the democratic game, you’ve got to accept the democratic result”.

Malcolm Turnbull, the Liberal prime minister who addressed Trump as president in 2017, predicts that Trump will win once more this time.

In an article for&nbsp, Australian Foreign Affairs, &nbsp, Turnbull describes Trump as “bombastic”, “erratic”, and “very much the&nbsp, big, bullying billionaire personality“, writing:” This type is narcissistic, driven, totally focused on accumulating wealth and power for themselves. The one thing I knew about this personality was that if you bully or deceive them, you only get one more bully. Punching them in the nose ( metaphorically or actually ) is rarely successful either. To succeed with them, you need to stand up to them&nbsp, – but courteously. The only thing they respect is strength”.

Turnbull writes that Australia’s current prime minister, Anthony Albanese, ca n’t grovel but must be professional, courteous, and disciplined in disagreeing with elements of Trump’s agenda “on climate, trade and, potentially, Ukraine”. If Australia has business to do with Trump, Turnbull says, only the prime minister can seal the deal, concluding:” The leaders of America’s friends and allies, including Australia, will be among the few who can speak truthfully to Trump. He can shout at them, embarrass them, even threaten them. But he cannot fire them. If there is a second age of Trump, their character, courage, and candor may be the most significant aid they can offer to the United States.

As the bromide proclaims, Australia will work with either Harris or Trump. However, a Biden administration that served Australia’s interests and strategy would provide “more of the same” from Harris. In order to keep the alliance in place and stop it from faltering or falling, Canberra will use all manner of personal, political, and policy ratchets to do so if Trump is elected president. The alliance’s long history provides a lot of advice on how to balance individual policy differences using broad agreement. even negotiating deals between leaders who have opposing or conflicting personalities.

Graeme Dobell&nbsp, ( graemedobell@aspi .org. au ) &nbsp, is a senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Since 1975, he has covered Australian and international politics, foreign affairs, defense, and Asia-Pacific.

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