South Asia

Virtually redrawn, South Asia’s digital geopolitical map is basically being redrawn, not with bold declarations, but with deliberate, quiet strokes.

The coexisting background and hard-won emancipation have been a testament to the centuries-old friendship between India and Bangladesh. But that unshakeable cooperation is starting to wane as a result.

Nobel prize Muhammad Yunus, who is currently in charge of Bangladesh’s interim government, is at the center of this change. Dhaka is looking past the common accept of New Delhi under his watch and waving a careful hand toward Islamabad, an implausible partner.

This is not just a political gesture, though. It was the first public melt in a long-frozen marriage when Yunus met Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif last year on the fringes of the D-8 Summit in Egypt.

Since that moment, which was rarely visible outside the press rooms for the foreign ministry, has gained momentum. The subsequent outreach to Beijing, which was highlighted by Yunus’s well-known visit and rumors that China’s infrastructure is extremely southeastern of India, has only heightened New Delhi’s unease.

The picture of a national head shaking hands with a Muslim rival is jarring for many Bangladeshis who grew up in the darkness of 1971. The Liberation War, which was the result of murder and trauma, is more than just a historical incident; it is also a deeply embedded national storage.

Releasing with Pakistan was a dark line under the previous Bangladeshi president, Sheikh Hasina.

Bangladesh, nevertheless, is indicating that it no longer views its international coverage from a single perspective. Dhaka is playing a more unexpected game in a place where relationships are shifting and power is at stake.

The message is clear for India, who has grown accustomed to treating its neighbor as a political frequent: nothing in South Asia can be changed, not even the past.

people summits, explicit exchanges, and summits

Certainly their material, but rather their showmanship, is what has been most revealing about the recent burst of Bangladesh-Pakistan political and cleverness exchanges.

These are not hidden from view or quiet summits like backchannel efforts. They’re calculated people displays that combine photo ops with press releases and talk levels.

This is a lifeline for Islamabad, which has long been marginalized in South Asian politics. It offers a chance to reshape a location where it has gradually lost influence and a new partner in Dhaka.

Financial incentives, assistance in defense, and even shared interests in international forums are all currently on the table. Additionally, Pakistan is not wasted time.

But, Bangladesh’s justification is more about widening the playing area than it is about rekindling old relations. Dhaka is hedging as India’s local dominance is being progressively seen through the lens of disparity and aggressiveness.

Detached from political dynasties ‘ personal weight, the time government is adopting a more transactional, cold diplomacy.

However, this new rationality comes with dangers. The national brain still carries a lot of the trauma of 1971, including the murder, the mass displacement, and the war crimes. Healing is both a matter of policy and principle for the thousands of Bangladeshis.

Any action that yet suggests absolution or amnesia is susceptible to stoke public outcry, especially among a younger generation who is both politically engaged and previously aware.

It’s unknown whether this diplomatic thaw will produce anything sustained or simply fizzles as a result of the pain experienced in the past. However, one thing is certain: the geographical balance is changing.

Bangladesh is no longer content to play the improbable darkness of India’s future. The nation is pushing the boundaries of its independence in this emerging post-Hasina surroundings, carved out space for its own-defined alliances.

Remembrance and unification

The latest foreign secretary-level discussions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, the first in more than 15 years, brought the past to life.

The consultations, which were held in Dhaka, were nothing short of habit. UNpaid war dues and hurricane relief, US$ 4.52 billion in reparations, and an unwavering, unequivocal explanation for the holocaust of 1971 were proudly direct.

One of the most persistent injuries in South Asian politics is that Islamabad has consistently dodged responsibility by offering only warm emotions of “regret” while dodging accountability.

And while the time management may look more eager to veer off, these demands are consistent with those made by every previous Awami League-led authorities. The message is clear: remembering is not the only thing that can be improved.

Dhaka is diversifying its security and geopolitics, despite the fact that traditional wounds are still untreated. Bangladesh’s involvement in Pakistan’s AMAN-25 naval exercises and its alleged involvement in Pakistan’s JF-17 warrior jets represent a subtle but significant change from its traditional martial sources.

The calculus is unmistakable for some hawks of foreign policy: While China may continue to be the dominant supplier, strategic diversification is then a top priority in Dhaka.

This rebalancing even extends beyond the China-Pakistan shaft. The introduction of Russian ships in Chittagong along with the recent visit of Bangladeshi Army chief common Waker-Uz-Zaman to Moscow underscores Bangladesh’s desire to strengthen its security alliances.

And Khalilur Rahman’s appointment as national security adviser, who was the administration’s minister for the Rohingya crisis, demonstrates a more forceful, regionally focused strategic outlook.

The pressure from the United States has only increased the bets. Washington’s demands for more coherence with Myanmar coverage add another layer of complexity to Dhaka’s now delicate balancing act.

Fundamental principles

The difficulty lies in managing expectations while maintaining autonomy while no simply choosing allies. However, it would be mistaken to associate Bangladesh’s altering unusual plan with its abandonment of its founding principles.

The refusal of the Awami League’s authoritarian ideology does not mean that the principles established in 1971—freedom, justice, and sovereignty—were not respected. These are the aspirations of a new era demanding respect at home and trustworthiness worldwide, not just slogans for the record books.

New Delhi ought to notice. A social change in Dhaka does not automatically mean respect. If India doesn’t expect to be loyal without getting involved, it is misinterpreting the situation.

Bangladesh’s position with its foreign policy is no longer a foregone conclusion. And the path ahead calls for more than just passing press releases or sporadic delegations: it calls for fair examination of history, of each other, and of the local realities of a fast-changing world order.

Abu Jakir is a columnist based in Dhaka.

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Alliance for Witness Transparency, a US-based human rights organization, has published a series of interviews with people coerced by Hasina into giving false statements against leading opposition officials handed out living words by Hasina’s court.

“ I hope he forgives me. May God forgive one whom only a human being has the right to accept? ” a teary-eyed poverty-stricken old Bengali Muslim man in the Northwestern Bangladeshi district of Rangpur, a couple of hundred kilometers far from the capital city of Dhaka ,  said, speaking  in a native Bengali slang.

The man’s title is Mokbul Hossain. During the 1971 civil war in previous East Pakistan, Mokbul saw his mother fatally wounded by Muslim military people as the mother and son were fleeing to safety. He had to leave his dying mother on.

They had fled to escape the fury of the military unleashed on the Bengali-Muslim-majority East Pakistan by West Pakistan’s fundamentalist, pro-Soviet head Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto dreaded the idea that military king Yahya Khan had transfer power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a Bengali Muslim bagging the 1970 public votes, as Bhutto himself wanted to be the elite, notwithstanding the poll results.

About five decades after the civil war that led to the formation of Bangladesh from the remains of East Pakistan, the Bangladeshi authorities contacted Mokbul and asked him to speak in his mother’s murder trial.

The accused was not a part of the Muslim infantry, as the criminal had been, but a crucial criticism Bengali Muslim innovator combatting Hasina’s increasingly autocratic turn – so much so that she would have a bloody revolution in 2024 to remove her after she removed all political means to oust her.

Mokbul had no say in who had to taking responsibility for his mother’s dying. He could only testify against this politician by the name of A T M Azharul Islam, the then Secretary General ( Acting ) of the country ’s second-largest opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami.

Mokbul’s hands were tied. He did not witness the presence of Azhar or any Burmese male in his mother’s terrible death, but Hasina’s forces in uniform chased him down and terrorized him into testifying that the younger Mokbul saw Azhar provide alongside the army during the incident.

In addition, Hasina had Mokbul testify that Azhar was involved in a mass killing in Dhappara, Rangpur.

Based on Mokbul’s testimony, in 2014 a court that Hasina had set up in Dhaka to try whomever she labeled collaborators of the Pakistan army pronounced Azhar to death. After that, Azhar languished in a death row cell in Bangladesh’s horrifying prison system. Now, although Hasina is gone, Azhar remains imprisoned.

Azhar is lucky, however, to survive the Hasina regime. Hasina executed six of his colleagues – all top leaders from the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its ally Jamaat – between 2013 and 2016. Several others died in prison.

After Hasina fled to India – her prime backer in consolidating and retaining her authoritarian regime – on August 5, 2024, following the student-led July Revolution, Mokbul appeared on camera and recalled his experience of being forced by Hasina to be a party to the misery of a man he considers innocent.

Deeply suffering from moral and spiritual crises, Mokbul now seeks redemption – for both himself and the man his testimony almost sent to the gallows.

A judicial killing machine

Others have come out and recalled to the public how Hasina instrumentalized their grievances into unjustly murdering– or attempting to murder – opposition politicians.   Alliance for Witness Transparency ( AWT), a US-based rights group, has so far interviewed five individuals, including Mokbul.

Ainul Haque, the first person  interviewed by AWT, was hanging out at a local tea stall when he was picked up by Hasina’s police officers and then forced to testify against Matiur Rahman Nizami, the then-chief of Jamaat, in a war crimes case. Nizami was later executed based on Ainul’s testimony.

Ainul now claims that he barely knew Nizami back in 1971 and he did not witness Nizami involved in the events in which Hasina implicated Nizami but had to falsify his testimony due to the pressure from the state.

Mahtab Hawlader and Altaf Hawlader  told AWT  that they were targeted by Hasina’s police to put another senior opposition leader with Jamaat, Delwar Hossain Sayedee, to death. Sanaullah, a police officer, held the Hawladers at gunpoint and threatened to dispose of them in the Buriganga River if they refused to testify against Sayedee, a wildly popular preacher and two-time member of the parliament.

Training the Howladers in what to tell the court were state minister Kamrul Islam, former top leader of Bangladesh’s most influential communist student body Golam Arif Tipu; prosecutor and Hindu communal leader Rana Dasgupta; and prosecutor-turned-politician Barrister Sumon, the duo told AWT.

As if forcing them to lie were not enough, the top judge of the court, Nasim, assured the Howladers that they should not worry about lying since he was in charge of sending Sayedee to the gallows.

The Howladers ’ testimony made Sayedee out to be complicit in rape, murder and persecution of the Hindu minority during the 1971 civil war. That triggered Sayedee’s death sentence, later commuted to life imprisonment following country-wide protests condemning the death sentence.

Hasina had  over a hundred pro-justice protesters massacred, prompting the opposition leader Khaleda Zia to  term  the brutality a genocide.

The irony of the matter is that Hasina’s judges did not need to coerce these individuals to perjure themselves in the first place. Such was the law under which these trials were conducted that individuals could have been convicted based on unsubstantiated news reports and dominant caricatures of these individuals masquerading as “facts of common knowledge. ” In other words, this court was a specifically designed killing machine.

Defying India and Hasina

From the tragedy arise the stories of Prodip Kumar Dev and Sukhranjan Bali, two Bengali Hindu men who dared to speak truth to India and its lackey Hasina. While Bali’s story has attracted the attention of  rights groups, Dev’s story has recently been made available to the public by AWT.

In his interview with AWT, Dev  tells a story  of state-sponsored kidnapping, coercion and illicit offers ( of a million Bangladeshi taka, approximately US$ 8,500 ), all of which he defied on the day of his testimony against Nizami. Although Hasina presented Dev as a witness against Nizami’s alleged war crimes, Dev informed the court that he had no knowledge of Nizami’s wrongdoing, thereby forcing Hasina to declare Dev  a hostile witness.

Although Dev’s heroic efforts could not help Nizami, the leader of the country ’s largest Islamist outfit, escape the death penalty, his standing up against the oppressive state shattered the Indian narrative that Hasina was the friend of the Hindu and the likes of Nizami, the enemy.

Dev’s bravery can be better appreciated when we look at Bali’s experience and understand what Dev was up against.

Hasina charged Sayedee for the murder of Bali’s brother during the civil war and enlisted Bali as a witness to the incident. When Bali  refused  to play ball and, instead, offered to be a witness to Sayedee’s innocence, Hasina had him picked up in front of the courthouse.

Bali was later found in an Indian prison, underscoring India’s complicity in judicial killings of politicians critical of Indian hegemony in South Asia and enforced disappearances in Bangladesh.

A committee set up by the interim government of Nobel laureate Yunus to investigate the allegations of enforcement disappearances during Hasina’s rule has found  over 3,500 cases of enforced disappearances.   India was involved  in many of them.

What now?

Even nearly a year after Hasina’s ouster, Azhar remains in prison. Those who were executed through this judicial killing machine still remain the villains in the dominant narrative, as well as on paper.

The reason for this is that the India-sponsored nationalist history of Bangladesh has made the 1971 civil war a sensitive issue. Anyone perceived to have supported Pakistan during the civil war is automatically rendered a war criminal.

On the other hand, Bangladesh has given blanket immunity to pro-India forces for their crimes committed between March 1, 1971 and February 28, 1972. The  indemnity order, put into effect by Hasina’s father in 1973, prevents prosecution of the non-Bengali genocide and other crimes against humanity that pro-India forces in East Pakistan engaged in before, during and after the war that lasted from March 25, 1971, until December 16 the same year.

The famous Anthony Mascarenhas  report  on the atrocities of the Pakistani army, dubbed by  BBC “one of the most influential pieces of South Asian journalism ” after it was published in  The Sunday Times, tilted global public opinion against Pakistan during the civil war. The same report claimed that anti-Pakistan forces had initiated the Bihari genocide much before the Pakistan army’s “counter-genocide” began and massacred hundreds of thousands Biharis within a few weeks.  

Amnesty International  called  for bringing to justice everyone who violated human rights during the war  irrespective of their allegiance. But pro-India forces in Bangladesh  responded heavily  to this demand and claimed that only Pakistan was responsible for war crimes in 1971.

Although India’s proxy Hasina was ousted in the July Revolution, justice for Azhar and non-Bengali victims of the long civil war, be they Bihari or Chakma, us still denied because the hegemonic Indian narrative cannot see beyond the “good India, bad Bangladesh” dichotomy. Insofar as Azhar and other victims of the continued battle over the war’s narrative are categorized as pro-Pakistani, it is difficult for any Bangladeshi government to deliver justice to them lest the pro-India forces wreak havoc in the country.

Md Ashraf Aziz Ishrak Fahim has a first degree in International Relations and Global Affairs from Mahidol University, Thailand, and an MA in Social and Political Thought from the University of Leeds, UK. He is currently a graduate student of Contemporary Islamic Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar. He can be reached at  mdfa48907@hbku. edu. qa

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China’s ambitious program to create the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River marks a major and important turning point in South Asia’s geopolitical environment.

This job is more than just a Taiwanese technical masterpiece, it heralds a profound change in regional power relationships, particularly in the realm of intergovernmental water politics.

While Pakistan views the bridge as a strategic benefits that aligns with its broader political goals, India perceives it as a looming danger to its liquid security, boundary stability and local influence. When China just announced the bridge program, India responded that it would “protect its interests”.

The Brahmaputra River, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, arises near Mount Kailash and enters China, India and Bangladesh before merging with the Ganges in the Bay of Bengal.

The water’s unique geography, especially at the” Excellent Bend” in Tibet, offers tremendous potential for electricity generation.

Recognizing this, China has embarked on constructing a huge reservoir capable of generating an extraordinary 60 gigawatts of power, three times the power of the renowned Three Gorges Dam.

Beijing justifies this effort as a critical step toward its 2030 coal independence goals. However, the proper repercussions of controlling the Brahmaputra’s top reaches may be overlooked.

By harnessing the river’s stream at its cause, China secures unprecedented leverage over river countries, especially India and Bangladesh. Moreover, the groundwater closeness to India’s northern border, a area fraught with regional disputes, adds a layer of political complexity.

For Pakistan, China’s Brahmaputra bridge project is a delightful growth that bolsters its historic strategic relationship with Beijing while simultaneously countering India’s regional hegemony.

As a lower downstream state, Pakistan has huge grappled with liquid management problems, particularly concerning shared river with India. Despite the Indus Waters Treaty providing a platform for water posting, conflicts persist.

China’s command over the Brahmaputra introduces a new powerful that could weaken India’s liquidity in future water-related discussions.

With China strongly positioned as a key player in South Asia’s liquid politicians, Pakistan gains a strategic alliance capable of influencing local hydro-diplomacy.

Given the complex history of ocean disputes between India and Pakistan, Beijing’s rising part may serve to adjust power dynamics in Islamabad’s favor.

This shift aligns with Pakistan’s broader objectives of securing its water resources and challenging India’s supremacy in the region.

For India, the implications of China’s dam project are profound. The Brahmaputra is a crucial lifeline for India’s northeastern states, supporting agriculture, drinking water supplies and hydropower generation.

Any alteration to its natural flow could disrupt these essential functions, posing severe risks to millions of Indian people who depend on the river.

Reduced water flow and sediment deposits could negatively impact agriculture, fisheries and local ecosystems, exacerbating socio-economic vulnerabilities in the region.

The dam’s location near Arunachal Pradesh, an area claimed by both India and China, further complicates matters. Given the recent military standoffs along the Sino-Indian border, Beijing’s control over a major water source could be perceived as a strategic pressure point.

Any manipulation of water flow, whether intentional or due to mismanagement, could escalate tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

Environmental concerns also loom large. The Himalayas are one of the most seismically active regions in the world, making large-scale infrastructure projects highly risky.

A potential dam failure or mismanagement during extreme weather events could lead to catastrophic flooding in downstream areas, posing serious humanitarian and economic consequences for India.

Adding to India’s apprehension is China’s history of unilateral decision-making on transboundary rivers. Unlike the water-sharing treaty India has with Pakistan, Beijing has refrained from entering legally binding agreements with downstream nations.

The lack of transparency in China’s hydropower projects has fueled mistrust, leaving India with limited diplomatic avenues to address its concerns.

China’s Brahmaputra dam project signifies a broader trend of increasing competition over water resources in South Asia. Water is fast emerging as a critical geopolitical asset, and Beijing’s ability to regulate the Brahmaputra’s flow places India and Bangladesh in a precarious position.

For Bangladesh, which relies heavily on the Brahmaputra for agriculture and drinking water, the project raises fears of water scarcity and accelerated riverbank erosion.

Disruptions in river flow could impact millions of livelihoods, pushing Dhaka to seek greater engagement with both India and China to mitigate potential risks. However, the power imbalance between these nations complicates the possibility of meaningful negotiations.

The dam also aligns with China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI), which seeks to expand Beijing’s economic and strategic influence across Asia. By developing critical infrastructure in key locations, China aims to deepen regional dependencies on its economic and technological prowess.

The Brahmaputra dam is yet another step in this strategy, offering China both hydroelectric capabilities and geopolitical leverage over its South Asian neighbors.

India has responded to China’s dam project with plans to construct its own hydropower infrastructure on the Brahmaputra. The proposed Siang dam in Arunachal Pradesh is intended to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure India’s water security.

However, given the region’s geological sensitivity, executing such a project presents significant technical and environmental challenges.

Beyond infrastructure, India has sought diplomatic avenues to address its concerns. Indian officials have urged China to engage in greater transparency and consultation on water-sharing matters.

However, Beijing’s preference for unilateral decision-making limits the effectiveness of these efforts. In response, India may need to strengthen regional partnerships, particularly with Bangladesh, to present a united front against China’s growing hydro-hegemony.

New Delhi is also exploring technological solutions such as advanced satellite monitoring of water flows and predictive modeling to anticipate and mitigate any adverse impacts from China’s dam.

Additionally, India’s emphasis on diversifying its energy sources, including a push for domestic hydropower projects, aims to reduce dependency on transboundary river flows.

Still, China’s decision to build the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River represents a watershed moment in South Asian geopolitics.

As the dam project progresses, India faces the challenge of formulating a comprehensive strategy to protect its water interests while navigating its complex relationship with China. Diplomatic engagement, regional partnerships and domestic countermeasures will be key in shaping India’s response.

Ultimately, China’s increasing control over South Asia’s water resources has altered the balance of power, tipping the scales in favor of Beijing and Islamabad.

As competition over water intensifies, the possibility of escalating tensions in the region grows. The era of hydro-diplomacy in South Asia is evolving rapidly, and the stakes have never been higher.

Sara Sheikh is an Islamabad-based political analyst

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