The cards Europe can play on Trump – Asia Times
When someone threatens to impose a 20 % tax on your vineyards, it becomes clear that you no longer have a friendly relationship with that nation, let alone an ally.
Donald Trump’s approach toward Europe has the significance of being crystal clear, disagreeable though it may be. He thinks that America would benefit from operating alone, and he believes that because it is so strong, “it has all the tickets,” in his own thoughts.
Europe has two significant advantages over the United States: it has other allies beyond America, and ( counted as the European Union plus the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey ) its economy is comparable in size to the United States*.
This gives Europe a lot of opportunities to use in negotiations with Americans and for its unique long-term gain. Trump’s own defamatory tax policies have actually caused the value of the nation’s market to rise.
The US dollar’s new power in comparison to the euro has exaggerated the country’s wealth, a trend that is now in reverse.
It is crucial to keep in mind both what has changed and what is new when considering how to listen to the new position. The physical surroundings, which extends across the Atlantic and separates Russia from Russia, has drastically altered. However, the local environment has never, if only in one crucial way.
In response to the physical risk, we may both applaud the restoration of Franco-German cooperation and Britain’s resumption as a European power. However, we must also bear in mind that the local politics of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and other countries are still seriously affected by anger over emigration and economic discontent.
Even though Sir Keir Starmer’s Communist authorities is defended from it by a sizable parliamentary majority, this also applies to Britain.
A weak leader like France’s Emmanuel Macron agrees with the powerful, recently elected leaders in Germany and the United Kingdom that any improvements made to the local grievances that have fueled the rise of extremist parties should help foster a sense of unity and solidarity.
This won’t remain simple. Starmer has already caused one of his government ministers to retire by cutting foreign help to fund increased defense spending, and he is now facing a new case revolt due to security spending cuts.
Germany’s Merz may have to deal with the same issues as his competitors in the far-right Alternative for Germany and the Linke parties as he attempts to increase security and open infrastructure spending.
Macron, Merz, Starmer, and their relatives have one essential benefits, though: that Trump’s harsh treatment of Ukraine and his trade war with Europe, combined with the ever-evident threat from Russia, both in the information war and the dynamic kind, are changing the definition of nationalism and nationalism, all over the continent.
The issue is perfectly exposed by Germany’s Alternative for Germany ( AfD ), which has historically been pro-Putin while claiming to be nationalist. Chancellor-elect Merz is then able to directly criticize the anti-German AfD.
Marine le Pen in France is faced with a similar set of issues because of her anti-patriotic earlier ties to Russia. Matteo Salvini and the Lega now need to be cautious with Giorgia Meloni’s partnership, just like Meloni herself.
Although it is still early in the process, these shifting exterior and local forces are influencing Europe. Four fundamental designs can get identified.
The first is that because participation on military operations and protection investments are becoming more important, they are doing it primarily at the level of national institutions outside of established Union institutions.
Presidents, chancellors, and prime ministers are making the most magnificent moves, while the German Commission handles the tedious business of establishing new borrowing facilities, purchasing joint defense, and other similar matters.
This prevents angry people like Hungary from preventing things from going on while allowing non-member nations like Norway and Britain to participate.
The next concept centers on Ukraine’s crucial place in the present and future of Europe. Ukraine’s military power and knowledge, as well as the war itself, contribute a significant amount to the continent’s potential military strength and security, as well as its expanding, battle-tested defense sector.
If a peaceful resolution of some kind can be reached, the restoration of Ukraine’s destroyed cities and the inclusion of its economy can both contribute to boosting growth across Europe. This makes it even more crucial that Ukraine’s politics is shielded from Russian and American influence.
A solid Italian accent is present in the second style. National federal security and public investment programs must be directed in a way that promotes long-term, widely accepted, sustainable growth.
The plan for Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as president of the European Commission heavily relies on the reports released last year on EU profitability and the second business under Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta’s management.
Their recommendations were very strongly geared toward lowering federal barriers and promoting cross-border integration, which Unicredit found difficult to convince Germany to acknowledge its takeover bid for Commerzbank.
The root of the obstacle to European integration lies in the way that national weight obstructs it if it wants to revive it and counteract the challenges from Trump and Putin. The biggest problem will now be overcoming that opposition.
There is a possibility that obstacles like Hungary may be dealt with more effectively and that inner resistance to connectivity can be lessened due to the American and Russian bullies.
The third theme for additional negotiations is clear, and the problems are there. Bullies can only be dealt with in one way: by retaliating harshly and resolutely, whether it is through military damage or tariffs.
Happily, this can also be accomplished in concert with friends, of which Europe currently has more than either Russia or America. It is now time to collaborate with countries like Japan, Canada, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as regional associates like the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Europe is not at its own.
Bill Emmott, a freelance writer and consultant on foreign politics, served as editor-in-chief of The Economist from 1993 to 2000.  ,
This content was first published in La Stampa in Italy and Bill Emmott’s Global View, his Substack publishing, in English. ( Subscribe here  , for free to receive his posts. ) With your style authority, Asia Times republished it. Following the author on Twitter at @bill_emmott  .
