POSSIBLE HEADWINDS IN 2024 MPA attributed 2023’s strong performance to the recovery in regional trade and the “robust tripartite co-operation among the unions, industry and government to consistently enhance the consistently enhance the efficiency, reliability and safety in the Port of Singapore”. “The COVID-19 pandemic was a test for us,Continue Reading
Srettha aims to meet gov on weekly basis
The government respects the central bank’s independence and would never interfere with any of its decisions, according to Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin.
However, he expressed his wish to meet the governor of the Bank of Thailand (BoT) on a weekly basis in the hope of improving their work consistency.
Mr Srettha and BoT governor Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput met yesterday at Government House to discuss the central bank’s strategy for raising the policy rate.
The meeting was held after Mr Srettha voiced his opposition to the policy, saying it would cause problems for the poor, as well as for small-and medium-sized businesses.
On Sunday night, he posted on X that the central bank is planning to raise its policy rate.
Speaking after meeting Mr Sethaput, Mr Srettha said he had no authority to interfere with the central bank’s interest management policy.
He said he discussed with the governor the overall economic situation in Thailand, the global economic situation, Thailand’s negative inflation rate, the domestic market, and how people were being affected by all of this.
The PM said he also discussed with the BoT governor the issue of negative inflation, which has been occurring for several months now following the government’s interference in oil and electricity prices — moves carried out with the aim of helping to curb living costs.
“In this regard, I have told the BoT governor that we should meet up over a coffee every week. If he wants me to go to the BoT’s headquarters, it’s okay. I can do that because we need to be in constant communication,” he said.
Mr Srettha, who is also the finance minister, said he did not discuss with the BoT the government’s plans for its 10,000-baht digital money handout scheme as that matter could be discussed later at a meeting of the main parties involved in implementing it.
Pichai Naripthaphan, deputy chairman for strategies and politics of the ruling Pheu Thai Party, meanwhile, elaborated on his recent call for the BoT to come up with more financial policies to help revive the economy, which has been in a sluggish state for years.
Considering the various financial tools at its disposal, the BoT could help support the government’s efforts to revive the economy, he said.
The BoT’s authority to regulate commercial banks is one of these mechanisms, he said.
Public discontent has been rising after it was known that these banks had in the past year netted 220 billion baht in combined profit, while the country’s economic situation was not good, he said.
The BoT could help by better controlling these banks in terms of their profit margins, he said.
In 2020 when the entire country was badly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic consequences, which resulted in negative 6.1% economic growth, commercial banks here netted 146 billion baht in combined profits, said Mr Pichai.
Most if not all commercial banks in other countries at the same time recorded heavy losses, he noted.
That has raised doubts over the BoT’s efficiency in regulating commercial banks, preventing them from making too much profit and ensuring sufficient access to loans offered by these banks, he said.
Mr Pichai also outlined areas of work the BoT is encouraged to do more to help boost the country’s economic growth.
The BoT should demonstrate to the public what it can do to help accelerate the country’s slow economic growth, tackle the more than 16.5-trillion-baht household debt (90% of gross domestic product), improve the situation of bad debts facing small- and medium-sized enterprises and other problems involving debt.
On top of those things, it must also deal with negative inflation which has continued for three months and now risks become deflationary, and improve the negative value of exports and low liquidity in the country’s economic system, said Mr Pichai.
“I’d like the BoT to offer an explanation as to what it could do to help tackle these problems because it always said everything is going well and the country’s economic engine is going full steam ahead,” said Mr Pichai.
Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, will go to the polls next month. The country’s 200 million voters, and 1.75 million members of the Indonesian diaspora, will vote to elect a new president and vice-president.
The stakes are high. President Joko Widodo will leave office with a flawed but positive legacy on human rights, including an attempt to right the wrongs of Indonesia’s dark past. But this year’s election threatens a return of that past, with Indonesia’s old guard looking to return to power. If they are successful, Widodo’s legacy will be threatened.
Widodo was elected promising to deal with Indonesia’s poor human-rights record and atone for its history of atrocities. This includes the killing of about 500,000 people during anti-communist purges under president Sukarno in the 1960s and the Wamena Incident, where the Indonesian military killed or forcibly displaced civilians in Papua.
While Widodo has been criticized for slow progress on human rights, last year saw significant moves to address Indonesia’s dark history. A speech last January saw Widodo express regret for past atrocities, and this was followed by the announcement of a reparations program for its victims.
Both are seen as landmark moments for human rights in Indonesia because of a reluctance by previous governments to address the issue. According to Widodo, the moves were not only an atonement of the past, but also signaled “the government’s commitment to prevent similar abuses in the future.”
There are two realistic contenders to succeed Widodo. One represents a continuation of the president’s legacy, while the other may signal a return to strongman politics and the involvement of the military in Indonesian political life.
Ganjar Pranowo, governor of Central Java province, is the candidate for Widodo’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle and shares many similarities with the current president.
Like Widodo, Ganjar is not part of the traditional political establishment – or old guard – made up of military figures and prominent wealthy families. Instead, he cut his teeth in local politics in Central Java before serving two terms as governor. Ganjar is arguably the best candidate to continue Widodo’s human-rights legacy given his background and similar ideological leanings.
The second candidate is Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, the antithesis to Widodo. He is firmly part of Indonesia’s political elite, once married to Suharto’s daughter, and a former member of the Indonesian military, serving as a special-forces commander. Subianto has used his military background to create a strongman image, modeling himself on his former patron Suharto.
But Subianto’s controversial military career continues to haunt his political aspirations, losing elections to Widodo in 2014 and 2019. He has been accused of serious human-rights violations, including atrocities in East Timor and Papua and the abduction and torture of pro-democracy activists in 1997.
He was also dismissed from the military in 1998, allegedly because of these atrocities and after storming the presidential palace to threaten his ally Suharto’s successor as president, B J Habibie. Subianto has rejected the allegations against him, claiming in a televised debate last month that “I think I’m a staunch defender of human rights.”
This has seen Subianto attempt to soften his image in the eyes of voters, and he has even chosen Widodo’s son, Gibran Rakabuming, as his running mate to attract support from young Indonesians. These moves saw Subianto surge ahead in the polls, with Kompas showing Subianto and Gibran garnering 39.3% of the vote as of December.
Ironically, Widodo has played a role in Subianto’s chance at the presidency. He controversially appointed Subianto as defense minister in 2019, providing him with legitimacy and visibility. The choice of his son as vice-presidential candidate is also seen as an attempt to gain influence over Subianto if he is successful in February’s election.
But Subianto is a threat to Widodo’s legacy. He represents the old guard and a return to strongman politics. Victory for Subianto would also see a return to military dominance in Indonesian politics, something Indonesians voted against when they elected outsider Widodo in 2014 and 2019.
This would be a dangerous step back for human rights in Indonesia. Subianto’s dark history suggests he is unlikely to follow through with Widodo’s reparation scheme for families of the victims of atrocities and will not respect human rights in the present. This would be especially dangerous in Indonesia’s flashpoints, such as the ongoing human-rights concerns in Papua.
Widodo may think he can retain influence over Subianto, but this appears naive. While Widodo remains popular with Indonesians, he will always be an outsider in an Indonesia dominated by the military establishment. Once he relinquishes power, Widodo may quickly see himself on the periphery and Subianto in charge.
All Indonesian elections are important, but February’s poll is a watershed moment that may determine the country’s future. Widodo has attempted to deal with Indonesia’s bloody history and has made substantial progress, but Subianto threatens a return to this dark past.
And that is in nobody’s interest.
Getty ImagesAll eyes will be on Taiwan when the self-governing island of 23 million people goes to the polls on 13 January.
Whoever is elected president on Saturday will shape relations with both Beijing and Washington – Taiwan is a key flashpoint in their tussle for power in this region.
And it will also have crucial implications for the island’s neighbours as well as allies like Japan who are wary of Beijing’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea.
China is among the top concerns for most voters, given that its People’s Liberation Army has dialled up pressure on the island over the past year with a record number of incursions.
Beijing has long claimed the island, but ties have especially soured in recent years under President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Her careful but unwavering defence of the island’s sovereign status led to China suspending formal communications with Taiwan – Beijing said it was because of Taiwan’s refusal to accept the One China principle, which is the belief that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and will be unified with it one day.
Things got worse in 2022, when then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei infuriated Beijing – it staged elaborate military drills in the Taiwan Strait that resembled a near-blockade of the island. Later that year, the US said Xi Jinping had sped up the timeline for unification.
During this time, Taiwan has grown close to the US, including securing billions of dollars in new weapons from Washington.
The DPP’s vice-president William Lai, who has been pegged as the frontrunner in the presidential race, is deeply disliked by Beijing. It sees him as an advocate for Taiwan independence, based on his younger, more vocal days, but he now rejects that description.
If the DPP wins an unprecedented third straight term, Beijing could up the ante on military pressure in the Taiwan Strait. It could also cut internet cables or supply routes to outlying Taiwanese islands.
Mr Xi and his foreign minister Wang Yi have repeatedly warned that the Chinese military is prepared to take Taiwan by force if necessary. But many experts believe that the prospect of a full-blown war is low, at least for now, given how much it would cost China when its own economy is struggling.
Any escalation between China and Taiwan runs the risk of turning into something bigger and more dangerous – the US has a big naval presence in the region, and bases from Australia in the south to Japan in the north.
Washington is yet to clarify exactly what form its support will take in the event of a Chinese attack – and it’s unclear if Japan, which hosts the largest concentration of US troops in the region, will itself fight.
Washington hopes the possibility of its involvement will deter Chinese aggression. And many analysts say Beijing also wants to avoid conflict, pointing to its refrain of “peaceful unification”.
Managing these many possibilities and alliances – and crucially the US relationship, which could very well change if Donald Trump wins the presidency – will fall to Taiwan’s next president.
The US has said a win for the opposition – Kuomintang (KMT) – could increase Chinese sway over Taiwan. But analysts say a Lai presidency also worries Washington.
If it happens, a war in Taiwan would be devastating – both in its human toll and as a blow to the island’s democracy.
It would also devastate the global economy. Close to half of the world’s container ships pass through the Taiwan Strait every year, making it a critical hub for international trade.
Taiwan also makes most of the semiconductors that power modern life, from cars to refrigerators to phones. Any disruption to this would paralyse the global supply chain. Sanctions against China would only aggravate the damage to the global economy.
According to several estimates, a complete disruption of China’s trade would reduce world trade in added value by $2.6tn, or 3% of the world’s gross domestic product.
Mending ties with China, Taiwan’s biggest threat but also its biggest trade partner, is a top agenda for whoever governs the island. Cost of living and jobs are major domestic issues on the ballot.
Analysts expect a divided government, where the executive and legislative will be controlled by different parties. Despite the possibility of political gridlock, some are hopeful that a more experienced DPP and a less powerful KMT could strike the right balance between spurring the economy and keeping peace with China.
TOKYO — For the Bank of Japan and US Federal Reserve, what a difference a week makes.
As 2023 ended, the BOJ was almost universally seen as “tapering” on the way to exiting quantitative easing (QE). Governor Kazuo Ueda’s team was viewed as setting the stage for a pivot that would send the yen skyrocketing.
Markets were convinced, too, that Fed Chairman Jerome Powell would be easing three times or more this year. Perhaps more as inflation pressures recede thanks to the highest US yields in 17 years undermining gross domestic product (GDP).
These rather pragmatic predictions have collided head-on with 2024. First came a 7.6 magnitude earthquake that further shook confidence in Japan’s government and economic outlook.
Then, four days later, came news that the US added a greater-than-expected 216,000 non-farm payroll jobs in December. It capped off a buoyant year for the US labor market and rapidly altered expectations for Fed rate cuts.
This U-turn in economic reality has the yen falling rather than rallying. And it’s delaying, at least for now, any plunge in the US. As these most crowded late 2023 trades go awry, Asia is reappraising economic trajectories.
For one thing, if the Fed fails to lower borrowing costs with the haste investors hope, Asian markets could give up gains driven by those very expectations.
In December, emerging markets from Jakarta to Sao Paulo enjoyed confidence-boosting rallies on hints by the Fed that US rate cuts are imminent. In Tokyo, the Nikkei Stock Average’s recent return to 33-year highs was predicated in part on anticipated powerful Fed rates to come.
Expectations for a big Fed pivot also had officials in Beijing breathing easier. Last month, Chinese leader Xi Jinping looked forward to a period when his team could address a property crisis, deflationary pressures and record youth unemployment without headwinds from Fed headquarters in Washington.
But are Asian markets sufficiently positioned for the likely disappointments to come? Odds are they’re not.
“Solid employment gains, low unemployment and sticky wages suggest no immediate need for Federal Reserve rate cuts,” says economist James Knightley at ING Bank.
This argument, though, is being made even before the real spoilers that could confound bond markets and, by extension, equity valuations as 2024 unfolds.
One is surprisingly robust US labor conditions adding upward pressure on wages. The December jobs data showed the extent to which wage gains are outpacing inflation.
Average US hourly earnings rose 4.1% over the past year compared with a 3.1% national inflation rate. The risk is that this dynamic blows up today’s investor optimism about a “soft landing” in the globe’s biggest economy.
As economist Mark Zandi at Moody’s Analytics points out, Americans’ real purchasing power is improving, and consistently so. This, he argues, is having a lagging effect on overall confidence.
In the post-Covid-19 period in 2021 and 2022, US households “got creamed” as inflation outpaced wages, Zandi notes. That shock, he says, explains why many are still “so uncomfortable with their financial position.” Now, he adds, things are “improving very quickly as wage growth remains strong.”
This dynamic may give the Fed pause as the world’s most-watched central bank mulls an about-face in policy. Hitting the monetary accelerator prematurely would squander the effects of the most aggressive Fed tightening since the mid-1990s.
As such, says strategist Matthew Ryan at global financial services firm Ebury, “we stand by our stance that calls for a first US rate cut in March are premature and that the Fed will need to see more evidence of a cooling in the jobs market, particularly in wages, to have confidence in achieving its medium-term inflation objective.”
George Mateyo, chief investment officer at Key Private Bank, concurs. The US, he says, “closed out the year on a high note, with stronger than expected labor market trends,” meaning the Fed maintains a “higher for longer” crouch for the foreseeable future.
Mateyo’s bottom line: Those “who thought the Fed will be aggressively cutting rates in 2024 will need to walk back their forecasts.”
The view, of course, isn’t universal. Kelvin Wong, an analyst at OANDA, points to hints in recent data that 11 Fed rate hikes in less than 20 months are having a cumulatively negative effect on US growth.
“Overall,” Wong says, “the mixed US jobs report for December has indicated the prior US Federal Reserve’s interest rate hike cycle has started to inflict some adverse impact on the labor market, which in turn keeps the expectation of a Fed dovish pivot alive in 2024.”
Tom Orlik, global chief economist at Bloomberg Economics, adds that “central banks are looking forward to a victory lap as inflation tracks back to target with only a modest blow to growth. Markets cheering the policy pivot will provide the appropriate soundtrack.”
Yet the plot for such debates thickens when considering the geopolitical hellscape that might lie ahead in 2024.
The number of flashpoints that could boost energy and food prices anew is increasing by the day. Top risks include Russia intensifying attacks in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia’s determination to slash oil production among OPEC+ members and the Israel-Hamas war widening into a full-blown regional catastrophe.
News in late 2023 that the US military responded to attacks by Iran-backed Houthi militants by sinking a number of ships raised the stakes for a wider Middle East conflagration. Any extended disruption in shipping patterns near the Suez Canal would have central banks everywhere rethinking inflation risks.
Not surprisingly, the Middle East stands among Ian Bremmer’s top global risks for 2024.
“All these pathways pose risks to the global economy,” warns Bremmer, CEO of the Eurasia Group political risk advisory. “Most of the world’s largest shipping companies have already suspended transit through the Red Sea in response to the Houthi strikes, paralyzing a critical waterway that sees 12% of global trade pass through it.”
Bremmer adds that “ongoing Houthi attacks will keep freight insurance rates elevated, disrupt global supply chains and create inflationary pressure. In addition, the closer the conflict comes to Iran, the greater the risk of disruptions to oil flows in both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, pushing crude prices higher.”
At the same time, Bremmer notes, any moves by Israel, the US or others to block Iran’s 1.4 million barrels per day of oil exports via sanctions or military strikes “would provoke retaliation by Tehran that puts larger volumes of oil and LNG exports from the region at risk.”
Even if this worst-case scenario, a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, remains a “very low probability,” Bremmer says, the mere specter could spook investors.
All this is complicating the BOJ’s 2024, and fast. After taking the BOJ reins last April, Governor Ueda passed up numerous opportunities to signal an end to 23 years of QE.
There were several moments in 2023 when global markets — and, grudgingly, Tokyo’s political establishment — were primed for a BOJ shift away from ultraloose monetary stimulus. Ueda demurred, opting instead for only technical tweaks.
There’s been a question for years about how ready Japan Inc was for an end to the free-money gravy train. In 2013, Ueda’s predecessor Haruhiko Kuroda was hired to expand a QE program first introduced in 2001.
Kuroda acted fast to grow the BOJ’s balance sheet. His team cornered the government bond market and became the biggest investor in Japanese stocks, topping the gigantic US$1.6 trillion Government Pension Investment Fund.
Such largesse, though, has a way of warping a financial system. Over time, trading in Japanese government bonds (JGBs) all but seized up. There have been countless days in recent years when not a single debt issue traded in the secondary market.
Thus when the highest inflation in 40 years arrived in 2022, JGB yields didn’t spike the way they did in the US and Europe. One reason: the unusually high percentage of bonds held by banks, companies, local governments, pension and insurance funds, universities, endowments, the postal savings system and retirees reduces incentives to sell.
In December 2022, Kuroda tiptoed up to signaling a move away from QE by letting 10-year yields rise as high as 0.5%. It shook global markets and sent the yen skyrocketing. That prompted Kuroda’s BOJ to increase bond purchases to communicate that QE wasn’t going away.
Ueda read from the same playbook in 2023 as he moved to let 10-year yields top 0.5% and then 1%. Both times, the BOJ scrambled immediately after to intervene in markets to avoid a jump in JGB rates. Absent, though, are concrete signs that Ueda sees room to begin wrapping up QE in 2024.
Reports this week that Tokyo inflation slowed for a second month in December, a sign that cost-push inflation is easing, gives Ueda cause to stand pat. Last week’s earthquake, which killed 168, adds to the reasons why Ueda might not act.
So is the high likelihood that Japan ended 2023 in recession. And with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s approval rating at 17%, will Ueda think now is the time for a revolutionary change in the BOJ’s stance?
“We continue to expect that the timing of elimination of the negative interest rate policy is close, though uncertainty related to the earthquake has risen,” says Takeshi Yamaguchi, chief Japan economist at Morgan Stanley MUFG.
Economist Daisuke Karakama at Mizuho Bank thinks that the BOJ stepping away from negative rates in the first half 2024 has “become doubtful.”
So has virtually everything markets thought they knew about Asia’s 2024 and where the BOJ and Fed would be taking global interest rates.
Follow William Pesek on X, formerly Twitter, at @WilliamPesek
Global attention is understandably riveted by the two deadly wars being waged in Ukraine and the Middle East. But an exchange of artillery fire on January 5 in drills held by North and South Korea near a disputed border area served to remind the world that there is a forgotten front in the global wars.
The North Korean regime launched some 200 artillery shells into the waters off its western coast near two South Korean-held islands on the maritime border of the Northern Limit Line, or NLL.
The South Korean military announced plans to conduct its own “naval fire” drills. It is precisely that location that the two Koreans last had a deadly exchange of fire in 2010 and came perilously close to wider conflict.
The artillery exchange marked the end to a tenuous 2018 agreement to withdraw armed forces from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where hundreds of thousands of heavily armed troops, including US forces, face off.
The General Staff of the North Korean People’s Army claimed they were only acting in response to the actions of the South Korean “military gangsters” and warned that “if the enemies commit an act which may be regarded as a provocation under the pretext of so-called counteraction, the KPA will show tough counteraction on an unprecedented level.”
All this comes within a week of a gathering of the North Korean communist party where leader Kim Jong Un declared in unprecedented fashion that they were abandoning the goal of reunification and now would treat the South as an enemy state under the control of the United States.
In his speech to the meeting, Kim called on the People’s Army to be prepared to carry out a “great event” in the South where they would “subjugate the entire territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces, including nuclear forces.”
Analysts closely monitoring the Korean situation are increasingly concerned about the danger of escalating tensions, not only because North Korea has declared hostility but also the tough-minded attitude of the conservative government of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol.
“2024 is shaping up to be a year for provocations, heightened tensions and greater potential for tactical clashes along the DMZ and NLL,” Bruce Klingner, former CIA analyst and senior research fellow at the Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation, told this writer.
“The potential for stumbling into conflict is rising. Both Koreas are leaning further forward on bold military moves close to the DMZ and President Yoon has shown a greater willingness to respond more firmly than his predecessor.”
The collapse of the Comprehensive Military Agreement reached in 2018 means that armed troops from both sides will now be in effectively closer contact.
The danger of exchanges of the kind that took place along the NLL is that “both sides will likely strive to avoid appearing weak,” says Andrei Lankov, a respected Russian-trained expert long resident in South Korea.
“Neither party is inclined to yield first, which could potentially lead to escalation. It’s quite conceivable that the North Koreans might decide to teach the Yoon administration a lesson, punishing it for its hyper-hawkish policy line.”
In an eerie replay of the Korean War, the rise in tensions comes as the Korean peninsula is again a zone of confrontation between Russia and China, backing the North, and the United States, standing alongside the South.
After a summit meeting last September between Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his North Korean counterpart, the two countries have tightened their military and economic ties.
The North Korean regime has unloaded large amounts of its stored artillery ammunition onto trains heading to the frontlines of the Ukraine war. In recent days, according to US officials, the Russians have fired North Korean-supplied ballistic missiles at Ukraine.
The North Koreans have stepped up the pace of their missile testing, including the recent launch of a spy satellite mounted on a long-range missile, along with further tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
Nuclear facilities that can ramp up production of fissile material for warheads have recently been activated and there are indications of preparations for a new nuclear test, possibly of a thermonuclear warhead.
South Korean intelligence officials believe the Russians are actively assisting the perfection of their missile systems and may also supply advanced aircraft and other weapons.
“The regime’s latest rhetorical barrage signals the door for inter-Korean dialogue remains firmly closed as it continues to bulk up its nuclear and missile arsenals,” says Klingner.
The regime has also made it clear that it has no interest in pursuing talks or diplomacy of any kind with the Biden administration, understanding perhaps correctly that the Americans have no interest in such contacts either.
Moscow undoubtedly would not be unhappy if the US was faced with yet another front in the global contest for power, though it is not clear that this new axis has emboldened Kim to act to seek strategic confrontation.
Nor is it evident how China, which remains the main supplier of economic aid and trade to North Korea while it faces severe economic conditions at home, would respond.
China may not be happy with the current honeymoon between Russia and North Korea, argues Professor Kim Byung-yeon, a prominent North Korea expert and head of the Institute of Future Strategy at Seoul National University.
“A North Korea backed by Russia and with advanced nuclear weapons on its hands may no longer kowtow to Beijing,” Kim wrote recently. “China could attempt to tame North Korea by cutting back on its economic assistance to the country.”
Provocation may not serve the purposes of China’s Xi Jinping, especially at a moment when he is trying to ease tensions with Washington and also improve ties with Seoul and Tokyo.
However, cautions Lankov, a long-time observer of North Korean relations with its powerful neighbors and allies, “we can imagine scenarios where China might try to send a signal to the Americans about its ability to create additional troubles – especially if preparations for a Taiwan invasion accelerate.”
Even so, Lankov believes that “North Korea has some reasons to confront South Korea – and also some reasons to remain quiet – but none of those reasons are significantly influenced by the situation in the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triangle.”
The North Korean leadership may see a confrontation with Yoon and the conservatives as a useful way to influence the upcoming elections for the South Korean National Assembly, feeding fear of war and thus aiding the progressive opposition.
But the end-of-year policy shift made it clear that Kim also has little use for the progressives. In a statement issued on January 5, Kim Yo Jong, the flamboyant sister of the dictator, dismissed the previous liberal leader Moon Jae-in as “a wicked man with honey in his mouth and a sword in his heart.”
Still, most Korean analysts tend to believe that the Kim regime is not yet prepared to risk the potential benefits of the resurgence of trade with China and the new ties with Russia to push a confrontation past a certain point.
“Despite harsh rhetoric such as ‘pacifying South Korea’s territory,’ it is unlikely that Kim Jong Un will push the nuclear crisis to the extreme from the beginning of the year,” Kim of Seoul National University told Japanese media outlet Toyo Keizai.
“This is because they believe they have an advantage due to the competition for hegemony between the US and China and the war between Russia and Ukraine.
It is also expected that the economy will improve due to arms exports to Russia and the resumption of trade between North Korea and China. Therefore, it is likely that they will try to avoid actions that will significantly change the situation for the time being.”
The upcoming US election may also factor in Pyongyang’s calculations. “If candidate Donald Trump is re-elected, there is a high possibility that a summit between the United States and North Korea will be held,” says Professor Kim, “so it may be a good idea to wait for that time.”
But Kim also warns that if the North Korean economy does not revive due to help from China and Russia, the regime could act more aggressively.
The most optimistic view is that, for the moment, “Pyongyang is unlikely to initiate a strategic conflagration,” as former intelligence analyst Klingner put it. “In short, get your helmets on, but no need to get under the desk just yet.”
Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy and East Asian studies at Stanford University and a non-resident distinguished fellow of the Korea Economic Institute. Follow him on Twitter at @DCSneider
This article was originally published by The Oriental Economist. It is republished with permission.
Critics say lawsuit could be brought
PUBLISHED : 9 Jan 2024 at 05:58
A leading critic of the 10,000-baht digital wallet handout has said that the government might face a lawsuit if it decides to continue to try and fund the scheme through its 560-billion-baht loan bill.
The criticism comes after the Council of State — in response to the Finance Ministry’s inquiry on the scheme’s progress — said it was still undecided if the government’s loan bill to fund the handout is legally doable.
However, according to a source, the council has suggested that some issues in the loan bill might violate Section 53 of the State Fiscal and Financial Disciplines Act, BE 2561 (2018).
Political activist Srisuwan Janya posted on his Facebook account on Monday, suggesting that the government might receive a court order if the scheme continues.
Srisuwan: Warns government
Mr Srisuwan said that according to the law, a government loan administered to anything other than public debt is permissible.
“Do you think that just because you have state power in your hands, you can do anything?” he said in his post.
Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, a former election commissioner, meanwhile, posted on his Facebook page that the Council of State’s response to the issue cannot be disclosed without consent from the Finance Ministry.
Therefore, those who reveal it might face a defamation lawsuit, especially if the loan bill is legal, Mr Somchai said.
On the government side, Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin said that it would take the government at least two days to announce its next moves on the loan bill.
Although he wants the scheme committee to discuss the adaptation of the bill, Mr Srettha said that the revision might not be finalised by the next House assembly on Tuesday.
In the meantime, Anutin Charnvirakul, Minister of Interior and the Bhumjaithai leader, said that his party would be ready to follow any of the government’s moves just as long as they are legal.
Varawut Silpa-archa, Minister of Social Development and Human Security and the leader of the Chatthaipattana Party, also added that his party is ready to push the scheme, as it will benefit the public.
An Islamic mass-based organisation established in 1971, ABIM started out in student and youth activism on Malaysia’s university campuses. ABIM quickly gained fame and expanded its members’ activities into the education and economic sectors, including lecturing at the International Islamic University of Malaysia. ABIM gradually moved into local and global humanitarian and charitable causes, and was a pioneer in promoting interfaith dialogue in Malaysia.
ABIM was an instrumental ally to Anwar when he was part of then prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s administration in the 1980s and 1990s. This was not surprising since Anwar was one of the founders and former leaders of ABIM.
In fact, ABIM activists spearheaded the Policy on Inculcating Islamic Values introduced by Mahathir at that time. ABIM was also seen as responsible for promoting the concept of “Madani” which Anwar first coined in 1997.
Unlike groups such as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) which had direct links with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), ABIM was known for utilising MB’s recruitment methods and activities to expand their membership, although they emphasised a Malaysian approach.
In her post on X (formerly Twitter) welcoming Zulkifli to the administration, Minister of Education Fadhlina Sidek stated that he has been her “source of reference” on various issues, adding that he is an authoritative and young intellectual. This is significant, given that Fadhlina is the daughter of the late Siddiq Fadzil, the great maestro of ABIM who served as its president from 1983 to 1991. He was famous among university students, cultural activists, educators and even clerics for his leadership style.
BANGKOK: According to Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, the central bank’s price increases have had no positive effects on the economy and should be avoided by low-income individuals and small companies. Thailand trails local rivals with growth projections of approximately 2.4 percent last time, short of the 2022 target, accordingContinue Reading
Political pundits predict that three Constitution Court decisions this quarter and the possible release of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in February may have a significant impact on the nation’s political scenery for months to come. The year has off to an amazing start.
Saksayam Chidchob, secretary-general of the Bhumjaithai Party, is accused of hiding assets and using a candidate to conceal possession of an organization that won numerous government construction projects. The court is expected to rule on this case on January 17.
When the situation was accepted by the court on March 3 of last year, Mr. Saksayam, a former transport secretary, was removed from his position as secretary. Following the opposition’s grilling of him over the alleged use of a candidate to hold shares in an upcoming censure discussion in July 2022, some opposition Members asked the court to act on his position.
Pita Limjaroenrat, a former leader of the Move Forward Party ( MFP), is scheduled to be decided by the court on January 24. He is currently the main opposition party’s advisory chairman.
Until the court rules on his internet shareholding in a media company, he is barred from performing his MP responsibilities. Mr. Pita does gain his MP position if the court determines that he ran for office while aware of his ownership of shares in the now-defunct broadcaster iTV.
The judge will then act on a case that could possibly result in the MFP’s dissolution on January 31. The MFP’s approach to Section 112 of the Criminal Code, also known as the der guess law, is being questioned by the court regarding whether it attempted to topple the constitutional monarchy.
Pita’s situation is more serious than his.
In Mr. Saksayam’s event, observers claim that if the court rules against him, it will have an impact on the Bhumjaithai Party, which is currently the second-largest coalition group.
Mr. Saksayam, the group’s secretary-general, is one of its most powerful figures, and if he loses, it may be necessary to change its technique by changing the inner dynamics and power structures of the group.
According to spectators, the decision in Mr. Pita’s advertising share-holding situation may have far-reaching ramifications that go beyond just his own political career.
If the judge laws against the original MFP head, Stithorn Thananithichot, an analyst at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, warned the Bangkok Post that it might also compel those in authority to reevaluate their political methods.
The opposition group will need to choose a new leader for the upcoming general election if Mr. Pita loses his MP reputation. He acknowledged that it might be challenging to find one as well-liked as Mr. Pita.
After the Future Forward Party was dissolved for accepting 191.2 million ringgit from an illegal origin and its chief Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, who is now the president of the Progressive Movement, was given a social restrictions, Mr. Pita rose to the position of party chief.
Under Mr. Pita’s leadership, the MFP grew stronger rather than weaker, and it easily won the general election in May of last year. The group received 152 House seats and up to 14 million seats.
Mr. Stithorn speculates that Mr Pita’s reputation may have also peaked, and if he enters elections once more, it will be simpler for rivals to predict his next move.
Eyes on the liberal head, Stithorn
However, if Mr. Pita is absent, the MFP’s adversaries will probably encounter confusion and risk when dealing with a new chief. He noted that it is more difficult to make plans when they are unsure of the candidate for the position.
Regarding the MFP case, observers tend to concur that it wo n’t lead to the dissolution of the party and that, in the event that the court renders a negative decision, it might only order the policy to be abandoned.
Theerayut Suwankesorn, who brought the case before the court, claimed last month that his complaint did not request the dissolution of the group. The complaint sought to force the group to stop acting in a way that might offend the king.
Thaksin’s end
All eyes will be on Thaksin in February to determine whether he will gain from the Department of Corrections ‘ ( DOC ) regulation, which permits the detention of prisoners outside of prison.
After 15 times of self-imposed captivity, Thaksin, 74, who is well-liked by the ruling Pheu Thai Party, returned to Thailand on August 22 of last year and was given an eight-year prison term.
Nevertheless, he spent that evening at the Police General Hospital after being transported it from Bangkok Remand Prison for medical reasons. He has since stayed it with a number of illnesses. A royal forgive was given to him, reducing his sentence to a time in jail.
The DoC and the government denied the DOC’s say that the legislation was revived specifically to assist Thaksin in avoiding serving out his remaining term. Thaksin appears to meet the requirements for early release, which state that those who qualify may become serving one-third of their word and the jail term cannot be longer than four years.
Even though he has n’t spent a day behind bars, the former premier will have served one-third of his commuted one year in prison by the time February rolls around.
There is also widespread speculation that the DoC’s rules will persuade his younger girl and ex-prime secretary Yingluck Shinawatra to think about leaving his self-imposed exile.
Yingluck, 56, was given a five-year prison term on the cost of neglecting his duties while participating in the rice-pledging program, which resulted in losses totaling at least 500 billion rmb, some of which were caused by corruption. She was just cleared of misconduct, though, for the 2011 transfer of Thawil Pliensri, the secretary-general of the National Security Council at the time.
Legal expert and former deputy prime minister Wissanu Krea-ngam said last month that while Yingluck could ask for a royal forgive like her brother, she would first need to go back to Thailand and deal with the legal structure there. Typically speaking, observers believe that she will probably act similarly to her brother.
Political scientist Phichai Ratnatilaka Na Bhuket from the National Institute of Development Administration ( Nida ) claimed that Thaksin’s alleged VIP medical care outside of prison and eagerly anticipated release in February have rendered the Pheu Thai Party a sitting duck.
According to Mr. Phichai, the ruling party is attempting to avoid being directly involved in the controversy by appointing Deputy Prime Minister and Energy Minister Pirapan Salirathavibhaga to oversee the Ministry of Justice ( MoJ), which was previously overseen by Somsak Thepsutin.
He claimed that the nomination of Mr. Pirapan, a part of another party, to oversee the MoJ has strengthened rumors that Thaksin is meddling in secret affairs while the party does not want to appear to be acting in the interests of one specific person or its own.
” Mr. Pirapan must take into account the political reality of his party and its chances in the upcoming polls, even though he does n’t have the same ties to Thaksin as Mr. Somsak.” He suggested that his group might be more inclined to support Pheu Thai.
Pheu Thai is a sitting bird, says Phichai.
additional important focus details
The ruling party’s top priorities this year are the 10, 000 bass digital pocket scheme and contract rewrite, which are expected to rule the political landscape.
The Pheu Thai Party will have its hands tied with the digital wallet program and contract article in March and April, according to Jade Donavanik, a legal expert and former adviser to the charter writing panel.
All Thais 16 years of age and older who earn less than 70, 000 ringgit per month and have fewer than 500, 00 bank deposits are eligible to participate in the modern wallet plan, which aims to distribute 10,000 Baht to them.
Its application is still a mystery despite being estimated to cost 500 billion ringgit and being scheduled for release in May. The Council of State is looking into the legality of the government’s plan to apply for loans to finance the system.
The policy act is still up for debate because a vote is necessary to draft an entire document. According to him, the government has not yet decided how many elections on the contract amendment will be held or what the questions would be.
When the military-appointed Senate’s term expires in May, another significant growth is expected to take place, according to Mr. Jade.
200 members of the new Senate may be chosen from a variety of social and professional organizations. Cross-voting will be used to reduce stop votes and candidate collusion during the district, municipal, and federal levels of the elections.
The process, according to Mr. Jade, is meant to prevent politicians from interfering with the process, but it is unclear how successful it will be in preventing parties from influencing or ensuring a Senate that is truly independent and official.
Jade: Fixing the stasis charter