Asked by North Korean state media on Sunday ( Nov 3 ), Yoon Suk Yeol is accused of exposing his nation to the danger of nuclear war through his policies toward the North, according to a white paper released by the country’s state media. The report, compiled by North Korea’sContinue Reading
Skydio, the largest drone manufacturer In the United States, has failed to obtain the batteries made by Japanese TDK’s unit in mainland China after it was sanctioned by the Chinese government three weeks ago.
The California-based company last week sought help from the Biden administration as its Chief Executive Adam Bry met with US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and senior officials at the White House, the Financial Times reported.
The Chinese government last month announced its sanctions against Skydio, Huntington Ingalls Industries and Edge Autonomy Operations LLC, as well as 10 senior executives of American defense contractors, and accused them of providing substantial military assistance to Taiwan. Observers couldn’t help noticing that the date of the announcement, October 10, marked the 113th anniversary of the Republic of China.
After the announcement, Chinese officials visited Skydio’s suppliers, including Dongguan Poweramp, a subsidiary of Japan’s TDK, and ordered them to cut ties with the American drone maker, a person familiar with the situation told the Financial Times on Thursday.
“This is a clarifying moment for the drone industry,” Bry told Skydio’s customers in a note obtained by the Financial Times. “If there was ever any doubt, this action makes clear that the Chinese government will use supply chains as a weapon to advance their interests over ours.”
He said Beijing wants to eliminate the leading American drone company and deepen the world’s dependence on Chinese drone suppliers.
Bry told US media that Skydio has a substantial stock of batteries on hand but it does not expect new sources of battery supply until next spring, He said the company has invested in domestic production and sourcing outside of China but batteries are one of the few components it has not yet moved out of China.
Skydio, which has sent more than 1,000 drones to Ukraine for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance purposes, is seeking alternative suppliers in Asia. It has been in touch with Taiwan’s Vice President Hsiao Bi-him about the issue.
China’s moves to curb Skydio’s battery supply coincided with North Korea’s plan to deploy troops to support the Russian army in Ukraine. US State Secretary Antony Blinken said Thursday that about 8,000 North Korean soldiers are stationed on the Russian border and are preparing to join combat in Ukraine “in the coming days.”
Although Beijing’s curbs have not yet been able to disrupt Skydio’s drone production, many Chinese commentators are now celebrating.
“China’s sanctions against certain US companies and individuals have initially shown their effects,” A Henan-based columnist using the pseudonym “Spirit No.1” says in an article published on Friday. “The curbs are having a real impact on American firms, as Skydio now has a limited battery supply and needs to seek alternative suppliers.”
The commentator adds, “It is difficult for the US government to help companies overcome the challenge in the short term given the complexity and time required to reconstruct the supply chain.”
He says, with its complete supply chain in the drone sector, China is able to limit the production and supply of the US military drone makers that rely on the Chinese manufacturing sector.
He says that the incident is only reflecting the intensifying technology war between China and the US. He says the US should think twice whether it wants any escalations as it will hurt itself one day.
According to an article by a Hainan-based writer using the pseudonym “No.14 Observation Room,” “China has previously launched several rounds of countermeasures against US firms but people do not know whether these measures really work. Now people are satisfied after seeing Skydio’s failure in getting Poweramp’s batteries.”
He adds that “the US has made up excuses when sanctioning Chinese firms and individuals, and it thinks China can’t do anything to its arms sales to Taiwan. Now China’s counterattack is completely beyond the United States’ expectation. Skydio does not have an alternative supplier.”
That writer says the current Chinese sanctions, which target US defense contractors and drone makers, have displayed only a small part of Beijing’s retaliation capabilities. He says the US defense contractors’ suppliers in China can be targeted.
John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the US and Chinese Communist Party, said the administration and Congress need to work together with industry to set guardrails that protect US companies from CCP economic coercion.
He said China’s control of supply chains for drones, pharmaceuticals and other sectors was a “loaded gun” aimed at the US economy. He said Beijing is weaponizing these supply chain dependencies against US people.
While Skydio is working on sourcing batteries elsewhere, TDK is also implementing its China Plus One strategy by adding new production facilities in India.
TDK Chief Executive Noboru Saito told Nikkei in 2022 that it is diversifying its manufacturing network by expanding in countries such as India. He said at that time that TDK no longer saw China as the world’s manufacturing hub although it would continue to treat the country as its main battery production base.
TDK and a long-term partner, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co Ltd (CATL), in 2021 set up two joint ventures in Xiamen, Fujian province, for the making of electric vehicle batteries.
Saito said in a speech on Investor Day on May 22 this year that TDK has started production of back-end processes for battery packs in India in 2017 to implement its China Plus One strategy. He said the company also started cell production in India in 2022 and will commence production in a new factory in Sohna of the same country in 2025.
“We will continue to expand gradually in line with growth in local demand,” he said. “In our materials procurement efforts, we will maximize business value by strengthening our value chain, including pursuing strategic initiatives such as investing in material suppliers.”
Meanwhile, several US academics co-write in an article published by The Conversation on Friday that, among the 23 battery plant projects announced or expanded since the Inflation Reduction Act became law in the US, construction for 72% of expected production is on track.
They say these 23 companies’ new US factories are expected to create about 30,000 new jobs, with projects mostly in the US Southeast, Midwest and Southwest.
Read: Latest Taiwan drills show off PLA deterrence
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Is the “smart” money still fleeing China? Whether it’s wise to leave Asia’s biggest economy is debatable. What’s not is that the mainland billionaire emigration trend continues and that their ranks have thinned by more than a third in just the last three years.
The latter dynamic, tracked by research group Hurun, spotlights how the fallout from the last few years of government crackdowns, slowing economic growth, volatile equities and property collapse is catching up with Xi Jinping’s policymakers and complicating their efforts to counter Wall Street worries that China has become “uninvestable.”
To be sure, the “avoid-China” vibe isn’t what it was, say, six months ago. As Nicholas Colas, co-founder of research firm DataTrek, notes, the recent “surprise announcement of aggressive fiscal and monetary policy action is spurring a reappraisal of the view” that Chinese equities are uninvestable.
“China’s leadership has finally acknowledged that the country’s economy needs much more monetary and fiscal stimulus if it is to achieve its growth potential over time,” Colas says.
Billionaire David Tepper has been making his own headlines by declaring it time to buy “everything” in China. And after “running around the world” in recent weeks, Kinger Lau, chief China equity strategist at Goldman Sachs, says that “for some investors who haven’t really looked at China over the past one to two years, certainly, the interest level has picked up a lot”
As Lau tells the South China Morning Post, “I’m not saying everyone is buying. But the level of interest has picked up a lot, very much consistent with the flows and positioning.” He’s among many who now see “upside” for Chinese equities.
Where this leaves China’s remaining billionaires in US dollar terms – Hurun says there are now 753 versus a peak of 1,185 in 2021 – is debatable. What’s clear, though, is that the stakes surrounding next week’s gathering of the standing committee of National People’s Congress are rising.
Rarely has there been a better opportunity for Xi’s inner circle to reassure the billionaire set at home and global funds abroad.
“The announcement of the NPC Standing Committee meeting for November 4-8 reflects Beijing’s strategic approach to the major economic policy U-turn underway,” says economist Diana Choyleva at Enodo Economics.
Choyleva noted that “by scheduling the meeting immediately after the US presidential election on November 5, the Chinese leadership has positioned itself to announce fiscal measures with full knowledge of the electoral outcome, enhancing its ability to manage market expectations and responses effectively.”
Next week’s confab will “allow Chinese policymakers to fine-tune their announcements and potentially adjust the scale or presentation of stimulus measures based on the new geopolitical context,” she says.
Choyleva notes that “a better-coordinated approach to policy announcements could actually enhance market stability. Investors should view the timing as a sign of careful planning rather than delay, particularly given the potential for more comprehensive and strategically calibrated announcements.”
Billionaires and global funds alike are craving a “well-thought-out approach” that “sets the stage for more impactful and sustainable market responses,” Choyleva says. “For investors, this timing and a more coordinated policymaking reduces uncertainty by ensuring that China’s fiscal response will be announced with full knowledge of the US political landscape, potentially leading to more stable and sustained market reactions rather than volatile short-term responses.”
The potential wildcard of a Donald Trump 2.0 presidency would be a game-changer for Asia, starting with a 60% tax on all Chinese goods that would upend Asian growth and supply chains.
Derek Holt, Bank of Nova Scotia’s head of capital markets economics, speaks for many when he warns that “Trump’s plans risk being highly destabilizing to world markets in a much more fractured world.”
Investors everywhere are bracing for a supersized US trade war in the event of a second Trump White House, including Europe. Germany’s recession is already casting a pall over European markets.
“In a worst-case scenario of a full-blown tariff war with retaliation, we estimate potential for a mid to high single-digit drag on European earnings-per-share growth,” says Barclays Plc strategist Emmanuel Cau. A “big chunk” of analysts’ worry more than 10% growth in earnings next year could disappear as trade tensions spike, he notes.
One worry is Trump’s desire to add fiscal stimulus via giant tax cuts into an economy that doesn’t need it. “The US economy doesn’t need pump-priming, it’s in excess demand and will remain there next year,” Holt notes. And while “the US needs to assert control over its borders, Trump’s extreme immigration policies would severely damage the US economy.”
Trump’s desire to weaken the US dollar also would increase inflation risks, complicating hopes the Federal Reserve might cut interest rates. Not that Vice President Kamala Harris has a great track record in global market circles, Holt notes. As a US senator in 2020, Harris was one of only a few lawmakers who voted against a revised US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement.
In Holt’s view, “it’s a matter of picking the one you think will be less damaging. As a professional economist, I have no doubt that this means voting against Donald Trump and the weak self-serving men behind him.”
Yet risks abound as the US national debt tops the US$35 trillion mark. “America’s fiscal position is living on borrowed time and the more damage that’s done now, the higher taxes will go in the future in a potentially more divided and more dangerous world,” Holt explains.
Reassuring China’s billionaires and overseas funds requires bold and transparent action by Xi’s inner circle.
Earlier this month, Beijing cut borrowing costs, slashed banks’ reserve requirement ratios, reduced mortgage rates and unveiled market-support tools to put a floor under share prices. Beijing is telegraphing bolder fiscal stimulus steps.
Team Xi also raised the loan quota for unfinished housing projects to 4 trillion yuan (US$562 billion), nearly double the previous amount. The bump was less than markets wanted, but pledges of more come has limited big negative market reactions.
The bigger issue, though, is repairing the balance sheets of giant property developers. Success in devising a mechanism to dispose of toxic assets could go a long way toward reassuring investors.
Xi’s inner circle has surely demonstrated it knows what’s needed to turn things around and reassure its capitalist class: a clear strategy to strengthen the finances of good-quality developers; incentivizing mergers and acquisitions; improving capital markets so that consumers stop seeing property as their only investment option; creating social safety nets so that households spend more and save less.
Beijing also must allay concerns that the tech crackdowns that began in late 2020 are over and done with.
Xi has left it to Premier Li Qiang to make the case for a more dynamic, competitive and predictable China. In January, Li said that “choosing investment in the Chinese market is not a risk, but an opportunity.”
He stressed that “investing in China will bring huge returns and a better future” and described CEOs on hand as “participants, witnesses, and beneficiaries of China’s reform and opening up.”
China, Li added, “stands ready to seriously look into and solve the difficulties and problems encountered by foreign enterprises” operating in the country. “We will take active steps to address reasonable concerns of the global business community,” Li said.
The bottom line, says Fred Hu, CEO of Primavera Capital Group, is that if China “really commits to rule of law and market reforms, I do think the confidence will slowly but surely come back, then the animal spirit will be rekindled.”
One reason the clock is ticking in Xi’s reform plans is that the 10-year mark of his “Made in China 2025” scheme is fast approaching.
When he took the reins of power in 2012, Xi promised to let market forces play a “decisive” role in Beijing’s decision-making. In May 2015, Xi unveiled his ambitious plan to morph China into a high-tech Mecca for semiconductors, renewable energy, electric vehicles, biotechnology, aerospace, artificial intelligence, robotics and green infrastructure.
A decade on, progress has been more sporadic than hoped. Team Xi has often proved better at treating the symptoms of China’s economic funk, not the underlying ailment.
It’s a lesson Japan taught the world: throwing money at an economy traumatized by plunging property values and deflationary pressures won’t work without supply-side moves to repair cracks in the economy.
Late last year, Xi introduced the buzz-phrase “new quality productive forces.” Though somewhat cryptic, Xi’s inner circle has been selling it as the answer to China’s economic future.
China wants to get its consumers to spend more and save less to keep growth near 5% year after year. That means continuing to raise incomes and building more robust social safety nets to encourage spending. It means creating deeper, trusted capital markets so the average Chinese can invest in stocks and bonds — not just real estate.
Beijing’s extreme focus on boosting consumption over the years has proved counterproductive, economists say. It leaves China susceptible to boom-and-bust cycles that require urgent attention at the expense of moving the economy upmarket. China’s heavy reliance on exports leaves the economy vulnerable to Trump-like antics.
There’s no better alternative to accelerating and broadening China’s evolution into a high-tech powerhouse, development experts say. And indications are, this is precisely the pivot Xi and Li are making as 2025 approaches.
At the NPC in March, Xi’s Communist Party said “it’s imperative to boost the endeavors to modernize the industrial system, and accelerate the development of new productive forces.” Billionaires skittish about China’s prospects couldn’t agree more. The days and weeks ahead offer Xi a ready opportunity to do just that.
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According to conventional wisdom, US voters are largely motivated by domestic concerns and especially the economy.
But the upcoming presidential election may be somewhat of an outlier. In a September 2024 poll, foreign policy actually ranks quite high in voters’ concerns – with more Democrats and Republicans combined saying it was “very important” to their vote than, say, immigration and abortion.
As such, understanding where Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and Democratic rival Kamala Harris stand on the significant international issues of the day is important. And we can do so by looking at the records of their respective administrations in the three regions they prioritized: the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East.
In his 2017 inaugural address, Trump painted a dark picture of the US In his telling, his country was being taken advantage of by other nations, especially in trade and security, while neglecting domestic challenges.
To disrupt this, Trump promised an “America First” approach to guide his administration.
And in practice, his foreign policy certainly proved disruptive. He showed a clear willingness to buck traditions and undid some of former President Barack Obama’s signature policies, such as the Iran nuclear deal, which exchanged sanctions relief for restrictions on Tehran’s domestic nuclear program, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.
In so doing, he ruffled the feathers of allies and foes alike.
Trans-Atlantic relations were tense under Trump, especially because of his hostility toward NATO. After deriding the Atlantic alliance on the campaign trail, Trump stuck to the same tune while in office. He routinely insulted allies at high-level summits and allegedly came close to withdrawing from the alliance altogether in 2018.
While NATO did make inroads in bolstering its Eastern flank in that period, the alliance was primarily defined by internal turmoil and limited cohesion during Trump’s time in office. US relations with the European Union hardly fared better. In 2018, the US imposed steel and aluminum tariffs on the European Union, citing national security concerns.
Trump also broke with previous US presidents in his administration’s Asia policy. One of his first moves in 2017 was to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal negotiated by Obama. Trump’s late 2017 national security strategy also announced a major shift toward China, labeling it as a “strategic competitor” – implying a greater emphasis on containing China as opposed to cooperating with it.
This hawkish turn played out especially in the field of trade. Trump’s administration imposed four rounds of tariffs in 2018-19, affecting US$360 billion of Chinese goods. Beijing, of course, responded with tariffs of its own.
The two countries did sign a so-called phase-one deal in January 2020 that sought to lower the stakes of this trade war. But the Covid-19 pandemic nullified any chance of success, and relations soured further with each Trump utterance of the pandemic being a “Chinese virus.”
Trump showcased somewhat contradictory impulses toward the Middle East and other issues. He pushed for disengagement and to undo Obama’s major policies.
Besides withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accords in 2017, Trump abandoned the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. His administration also signed a deal to end the US presence in Afghanistan, and it withdrew forces from northern Syria.
But at the same time, Trump continued the bombing campaign against the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq and authorized the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in 2020. The latter was consistent with a policy that aimed to pressure and isolate Iran economically and diplomatically.
The key example of diplomatic pressure came especially through the Abraham Accords, through which Trump helped facilitate the establishment of normal diplomatic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco.
Although not taking a driving role in foreign policy, Harris has been part of an administration that has committed the US to repairing alliances and engaging with the world.
This came across by undoing some major actions from the Trump administration. For example, the US quickly rejoined the Paris Climate Accords and overturned a decision to leave the World Health Organization.
But in other areas, the Biden administration has shown more continuity with Trump than many expected.
For instance, the US under Biden has not fundamentally deviated from strategic competition with China, even though the tactics have differed a little. The administration maintained Trump’s tariff approach, even adding its own targeted rounds against Beijing on electric vehicles.
Moreover, it cultivated different diplomatic platforms in the Indo-Pacific to act as a counterweight to China. This included the cultivation of the Quad dialogue with Australia, India and Japan, and the AUKUS deal with Australia and the UK, both of which attempted to further the Biden administration’s strategy of containing China’s influence by enlisting regional allies.
Finally, the Biden administration did maintain some channels of communication with China at the highest level as well, with Biden meeting Xi Jinping twice during his presidency.
The Biden administration’s Middle Eastern policy displayed significant continuity with Trump’s approach – at first.
While it turned out to be chaotic, the US completed the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in summer 2021, as had been agreed under Trump. The Biden administration also embraced the format and goals of the Abraham Accords. It even tried to build on them, with the goal of fostering Israeli-Saudi diplomatic ties.
Of course, the attacks of October 7, 2023, in Israel completely changed the equation in the Middle East. Preventing the spiral of violence in the region has become an all-consuming task. Since then, Biden and Harris have tried, largely unsuccessfully, to balance support for Israel with mediation efforts to liberate the hostages and to ensure a cease-fire.
Trans-Atlantic relations, however, are an area where there were marked differences in the past four years. The tone of the Biden-Harris administration has been in sharp contrast with that of Trump, reaffirming frequently its clear commitment to NATO. And once Russia launched its illegal invasion in February 2022, the US placed itself at the forefront of supporting Ukraine.
Harris has suggested that she would continue Biden’s policy of providing Kyiv with extensive and continuous military support. In conjunction with allies, the White House of Biden and Harris also implemented a broad range of sanctions against Russia. But the US under Biden has not yet been willing to support Ukraine’s immediate entry into NATO.
Based on their records, what could we expect of a Trump or Harris presidency?
It’s unlikely either candidate will abandon strategic competition with China. But Trump is more likely to seriously escalate the trade war, promising extensive tariffs against Beijing. Trump’s commitment to defending Taiwan is also more ambiguous in comparison with Harris’ pledges.
US policy toward Europe will largely depend on the results of the election. Harris has frequently underlined her steadfast support for NATO, as well as for Ukraine. Trump, on the other hand, is showing signs that he is unwilling to further aid the regime in Kyiv.
And for the Middle East, it remains to be seen whether either Trump or Harris would be able to better shape events in the region.
Garret Martin is senior professorial lecturer, co-director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International Service
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Until recently, Xi’s stimulus was entirely a domestic affair.
Ministry-level officials have promised the largest one-time debt swap in recent years to improve municipal finances. The state will also buy unsold housing to stabilise property prices, as well as boost banks’ capital buffer to increase their willingness to lend in a weak economy.
All these are sensible blueprints to lift China out of deflation.
But a Trump win can change Beijing’s priorities again. His hawkish rhetoric on Chinese imports, as well as the wide latitude that the US president enjoys in setting and imposing tariffs, directly threatens Xi’s ultimate passion of transforming China into a high-end manufacturing powerhouse.
China has certainly reacted to Trump’s moves before. After Huawei was placed on the US trade blacklist in 2019, state resources were poured into industrial upgrades. Huawei alone received over US$1 billion in government grants last year, more than quadruple the amount in 2019, in part a reflection that President Joe Biden has furthered Trump’s tough trade policies.
Bank lending to industrial firms has also soared in that time; meanwhile, real estate developers are struggling to refinance. In July, the government said it would spend 300 billion yuan (US$42 billion) to expand an existing trade-in and equipment upgrade programme as a way to boost consumption but also to absorb industrial production.
The last two summits of BRICS countries have raised questions about the coalition’s identity and purpose. This began to come into focus at the summit hosted by South Africa in 2023, and more acutely at the recent 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia.
At both events the alliance undertook to expand its membership. In 2023, the first five Brics members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – invited Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join.
All bar Saudi Arabia have now done so. The 2024 summit pledged to admit 13 more, perhaps as associates or “partner countries.”
On paper, the nine-member BRICS+ strikes a powerful pose. It has a combined population of about 3.5 billion, or 45% of the world’s people. Combined, its economies are worth more than US$28.5 trillion – about 28% of the global economy. With Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as members, BRICS+ produces about 44% of the world’s crude oil.
Based on my research and policy advice to African foreign policy decision-makers, I would argue that there are three possible interpretations of the purpose of BRICS+.
Analyzing the commitments that were made at the meeting in Russia, I would argue that BRICS+ sees itself more as a self-interested reformer. It represents the thinking among Global South leaders about the nature of the global order and the possibilities of shaping a new order.
This, as the world moves away from the financially dominant, yet declining Western order (in terms of moral influence) led by the US. The move is to a multipolar order in which the East plays a leading role.
However, the ability of BRICS+ to exploit such possibilities is constrained by its make-up and internal inconsistencies. These include a contested identity, incongruous values and lack of resources to convert political commitments into actionable plans.
The trend towards closer trade and financial cooperation and coordination stands out as a major achievement of the Kazan summit. Other achievements pertain to global governance and counterterrorism.
When it comes to trade and finance, the final communiqué said the following had been agreed:
All nine BRICS+ countries committed themselves to the principles of the UN Charter – peace and security, human rights, the rule of law, and development – primarily as a response to the Western unilateral sanctions.
The summit emphasised that dialogue and diplomacy should prevail over conflict in, among other places, the Middle East, Sudan, Haiti and Afghanistan.
Despite the positive tone of the Kazan declaration, there are serious structural fault lines and tensions inherent in the architecture and behavior of BRICS+. These might limit its ambitions to be a meaningful change agent.
The members don’t even agree on the definition of BRICS+. President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa calls it a platform. Others talk of a group (Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi) or a family (Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jianan).
So what could it be? BRICS+ is state-driven – with civil society on the margins. It reminds one of the African Union, which pays lip service to citizens’ engagement in decision-making.
One possibility is that it will evolve into an intergovernmental organization with a constitution that establishes its agencies, functions and purposes. Examples include the World Health Organization, the African Development Bank and the UN General Assembly.
But it would need to cohere around shared values. What would they be?
Critics point out that BRICS+ consists of democracies (South Africa, Brazil, India), a theocracy (Iran), monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia) and authoritarian dictatorships (China, Russia).
For South Africa, this creates a domestic headache. At the Kazan summit, its president declared Russia a friend and ally. At home, its coalition partner in the government of national unity, the Democratic Alliance, declared Ukraine as a friend and ally.
There are also marked differences over issues such as the reform of the United Nations. For example, at the recent UN Summit of the Future the consensus was for reform of the UN Security Council. But will China and Russia, as permanent Security Council members, agree to more seats, with veto rights, on the council?
As for violent conflict, humanitarian crises, corruption and crime, there is little from the Kazan summit that suggests agreement around action.
What about shared interests? A number of BRICS+ members and partner countries maintain close trade ties with the West, which regards Russia and Iran as enemies and China as a global threat.
Some, such as India and South Africa, use the foreign policy notions of strategic ambiguity or active non-alignment to mask the reality of trading with east, west, north and south.
The harsh truth of international relations is there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. The BRICS+ alliance will most likely cohere as a Global South co-operative, with an innovative self-help agenda but be reluctant to overturn the current global order from which it desires to benefit more equitably.
Trade-offs and compromises might be necessary to ensure “unity of purpose.” It’s not clear that this loose alliance is close to being able to achieve that.
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is professor of international and diplomacy studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South Africa
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Uthai Uthaisangsuk has been instrumental in leading SET-listed developer Sansiri Plc to record-breaking performances over the past three to four years, particularly during the pandemic period, notably adopting a “speed to market” strategy.
In early 2020 when Covid-19 first started to spread, nobody knew how long the impact would last. Yet Sansiri quickly made decisive moves, especially as the condo segment was facing obstacles.
At the time, the company held a substantial inventory of condos valued at around 20 billion baht, most of which were ready-to-move-in units. Sansiri was the first to launch special promotional discounts on these properties.
While this meant sacrificing some profit, it provided crucial cash flow during a stagnant market.
Despite the pandemic in 2020, Sansiri reported 30.6 billion baht in revenue from residential sales, a 60% increase from 19.1 billion baht in 2019.
This surge was primarily driven by condo sales, which more than doubled from 5.36 billion baht to 12.1 billion baht.
Though residential sales revenue dipped to 26.17 billion baht in 2021, it rebounded to 30.71 billion baht in 2022 and climbed to 32.83 billion baht in 2023.
Last year, the company recorded 49 billion baht in presales and 39 billion baht in consolidated revenue, both new highs.
Net profit also grew consistently, improving from 1.67 billion baht in 2020 to 2 billion baht in 2021, 4.28 billion baht in 2022 and reaching an all-time high of 6 billion baht last year.
Net profit margins improved from 4.8% in 2020 to 6.82% in 2021, 12.23% in 2022 and 15.51% in 2023.
“Speed to market was the key strategy that helped us navigate through 2020-21,” said Mr Uthai, Sansiri’s president, who has been awarded Bangkok Post CEO of the Year 2024 award in the residential development sector.
Sansiri has continued to rely on this strategy, maintaining agility and competitiveness in the face of various market challenges.
This approach has enabled the company to swiftly adapt to changing conditions, ensuring a steady and healthy cash flow.
In August 2024, the company announced that it would sell its 71% stake in US-based lifestyle hotel group Standard International Holdings, LLC, to the Hyatt Group for US$355 million.
This move once again demonstrates Sansiri’s speed and agility in strengthening its financial position during a time when the residential market appears sluggish and the debenture market remains unfavourable due to recent defaults by several companies.
Sansiri has debentures totalling 11 billion baht due in the next six months, with 4.9 billion baht maturing in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 6.1 billion baht due in February next year.
In terms of overall business performance, Sansiri recorded 37 billion baht in presales in the first nine months, or 71% of its annual target of 52 billion baht.
Its transfers have reached 31 billion baht, accounting for 72% of the milestone set at 43 billion baht.
“Speed will be impossible without a solid foundation,” said Mr Uthai, who was appointed Sansiri’s president in February this year after Srettha Thavisin resigned last year to become a prime ministerial candidate.
“One of our foundational strengths is our attention to detail, along with a focus on quality and after-sales service, which we have maintained throughout our 40 years,” he said.
Mr Uthai, who was previously chief operating officer, has over 30 years of extensive experience in property development and investment.
Known for his sharp market insight and strategic vision, he has played a key role in many of Sansiri’s landmark projects.
Under his leadership, Sansiri has launched iconic luxury developments, including the renowned 98 Wireless on Wireless Road.
This achievement cemented Sansiri’s reputation for quality and innovation in the high-end property market.
Mr Uthai has also been instrumental in fostering strategic partnerships that have expanded Sansiri’s growth, both domestically and internationally.
These include JVs with partners such as BTS Group for transit-oriented developments and Japan’s Tokyu Corporation for low-rise and high-rise projects.
Beyond real estate, he has been proactive in diversifying Sansiri’s business portfolio, venturing into promising sectors like hospitality, financial services and clean energy.
This strategic expansion not only drives business growth but also aligns with the company’s long-term vision for sustainability.
His commitment to sustainability is a driving force behind Sansiri’s ongoing initiatives.
Under his leadership, Sansiri became the first real estate developer in Thailand to pledge to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
His vision for sustainability encompasses creating impactful environmental changes, ensuring Sansiri remains a pioneering force in the industry’s green transition.
Uthai Uthaisangsuk
President of Sansiri Public Company Limited
As political miscalculations go, it’s hard to top Shigeru Ishiba’s decision to hold a snap election Sunday, just 30 days after his own shock rise to Japan’s premiership.
Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost its majority for only the third time since 1955. But this latest indignity for a party that long took for granted the priorities of Japan’s 125 million people could be the most impactful yet.
Ishiba’s blunder, and the political upheaval it’s causing, come amid a bewildering array of headwinds zooming the nation’s way.
They include slowing growth at home, China’s downshift, North Korea’s provocations and the increasing odds Americans will return Donald Trump and his trade wars to the White House.
It comes as Japanese inflation outpaces wages at a moment when the Bank of Japan mulls whether to continue hiking interest rates. It comes as investors assess whether the Nikkei 225 Stock Average’s surge to record highs is sustainable as policy instability reigns in Tokyo.
At the very least, Ishiba seems more destined than ever for short-timer status as Japanese leader following Sunday’s disastrous election showing for his LDP.
“Japan now enters a period of political uncertainty about whether a new coalition government can be formed,” says David Boling, analyst at Eurasia Group. Economist Takeshi Yamaguchi at Morgan Stanley MUFG adds that “political uncertainty will remain high in the near term.”
Granted, one silver lining for the LDP is that opposition parties didn’t join forces to win a majority or cobble together a governing coalition. Yet the best-case scenario for the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito is to find additional seats via a third party.
Still the damage has been done, particularly to Ishiba and his ability to retain the premiership or claim he has a mandate to lead.
Though predecessor Fumio Kishida stuck around for three years and mentor Shinzo Abe lasted nearly eight, most Japanese prime ministers get 12 months to make their mark – and most don’t.
Chalk it up to leaders spending so much time keeping their jobs there’s no time to do their jobs. The cycle, especially prevalent since the mid-1990s, seems certain to come for Ishiba. Even before Sunday’s repudiation from voters, Ishiba had suffered one of the most precipitous drops in public approval political observers had ever seen.
In late September, when Ishiba shocked the political establishment by navigating past the two front runners for the premiership, Ishiba enjoyed support rates north of 50%. But after four weeks of policy U-turns and managerial chaos, his numbers fell into the 20s.
That’s far from what Kishida had expected when he stepped aside last month. With his own approval in the low 20s amid scandals and soft economic conditions, Kishida opted to let his party head into Sunday’s contest with a fresh face.
It surprised many that this meant swapping one 67-year-old conservative with another. Ishiba’s man-of-the-people persona led LDP bigwigs to hope he might revive the party’s image.
Instead, reality caught up with Ishiba – and fast. For years, Boling notes, Ishiba polled very favorably with the public.
He benefited from being seen as an outsider within the LDP because he was willing to criticize the party. That made him unpopular with many LDP lawmakers but popular with the public.
But “since becoming prime minister, he has made some missteps that have opened him to attack,” Boling notes. That Sunday’s results mean Ishiba is “weakened” and that the “odds would be against him rebounding.”
If Ishiba does stay in, he’ll be busy struggling to save his premiership. Odds are he’ll be too preoccupied to address the economic headwinds racing Japan’s way.
Chief among them is an economy fast losing altitude. This might come as quite a surprise to LDP elders who encouraged Kishida to stand down.
Back in mid-September, when these machinations were in motion, the party figured the economy was on sound footing.
At the time, the Nikkei index was testing all-time highs amid stable economic growth, 10 years of corporate governance reforms were gaining traction and hopes were high that wages gains would accelerate.
Earlier this year, labor unions scored the biggest wage bump in 33 years. That fueled optimism that the “virtuous cycle” Tokyo had craved for decades had arrived.
All this encouraged the BOJ to begin exiting 25 years of zero interest rates and quantitative easing. On July 31, BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda’s team hiked short-term rates to 0.25%, the highest since 2008. That sent the yen skyrocketing.
Since then, a clear deceleration in retail sales, exports, industrial production, machine tool orders and other sectors has Team Ueda hitting the pause button on additional tightening moves.
It also had Ishida’s government pivoting to the kinds of short-term stimulus maneuvers he claimed his government would avoid. A long-time fiscal hawk, Ishiba also was a proponent of higher rates and a stronger yen. Not anymore.
Ishiba’s reversal on these and other policies has sent the yen tumbling past the 150-to-the-dollar mark. It’s also generating increased volatility in Japanese government bond yields.
For one thing, Ishiba’s government having to rely on opposition parties to retain power makes it harder to champion fiscal consolidation and monetary liquidity normalization. For another, the clock is now ticking faster and faster for Japanese leaders to act on implementing economic reforms.
The LDP’s stumble could not be worse timed for Asia’s second-biggest economy. The export boost on which Tokyo was betting is in growing doubt as Chinese growth slows. China is slow-walking moves to address a property crisis that many compare to Japan’s 1990s bad-loan debacle.
Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management, notes that Beijing is “trying to talk the talk, with more noise about stabilizing the property market.” Generally speaking, though, Innes says, “China’s property mess isn’t something that can be patched up with a few speeches and half-baked measures.”
Macquarie Bank economist Larry Hu adds that measures taken so far “may not be enough to turn the housing market around.”
Meanwhile, Germany’s recession weighs on Europe’s prospects. The US is showing signs of wear. The geopolitical environment is hardly ideal as Middle East tensions flare and Russia’s Ukraine invasion drags on.
The rising odds that Trump might be re-elected on November 5 to supersize trade wars is a major source of global uncertainty.
Amid such uncertainty, investors have valid reasons to question Tokyo’s ability to get the reform process back on track. In the 12 years since the LDP returned to power, few big-picture upgrades have been implemented.
In 2012, the Prime Minister Abe pledged to modernize labor markets, reduce bureaucracy, increase innovation and productivity, empower women and strengthen corporate governance. Abe succeeded with this last endeavor.
The Nikkei’s surge to record highs is partly a result of steps to increase returns on equity, give shareholders a louder voice and diversify boardrooms. It’s also the result of ultra-low interest rates.
Yet surging stocks have meant little to the average Japanese household. Wages have generally lagged the rate of inflation. Japan ranks 30th among the 38 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members in productivity.
What so-called Abenomics did, ultimately, was prove that “trickle-down economics” still doesn’t work. And that sporadic stimulus packages don’t alter economic trajectories nearly as much as structural changes. Now, the clock is already ticking as Japan’s latest government inherits a uniquely lopsided economic trajectory.
On the one hand, the inflation Tokyo had been craving for 25 years is here. And the BOJ is finally trying to normalize a super-aggressive interest-rate regime. On the other, that very rising-price dynamic is wrecking household and business confidence. It makes Japan the economic equivalent of the dog that caught the car. Consumers find themselves missing deflation, which many viewed as a stealth tax cut.
This balancing act proved too much for Kishida, who took power in early October 2021. Ostensibly, Kishida’s dismal approval ratings reflected political funding scandals within his LDP. In reality, it was mostly an underperforming economy that ended his tenure.
Like his mentor Abe, Kishida did himself no favors by prioritizing foreign policy over reforms. Ishiba, a former defense minister, irked voters by appearing to do the same. An old-school China hawk who favors creating an “Asian NATO,” Ishiba seemed more interested in creating a bulwark against Beijing than tackling kitchen-table issues.
Now, with political winds shifting, Tokyo seems even more captive to events in Beijing and Washington.
Recently, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s government conceded that the globe’s No 2 economy is in trouble.
Earlier this month, Beijing unveiled aggressive stimulus measures to support an economy grappling with a deepening property crisis. The People’s Bank of China announced its first simultaneous cut in key short-term rates and banks’ reserve requirements since at least 2015.
Mainland stocks have tried to rally on the news. And PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng is hinting at further cuts in the amount of cash banks must hold as reserves.
The faster Beijing puts a floor under the economy, the more Japan’s prospects will improve. China is by far Japan’s biggest trading partner. Having the top customer for your goods battling deflation is rarely a plus for economic confidence.
On top of that, the specter of Trump trade 2.0 is keeping many Tokyo officials up at night. Preparing for a Trump or Kamala Harris administration will be a major preoccupation for LDP officials. Yet not as great as figuring out whether the nation’s dominant party can find a way forward. With, or without, Ishiba in the mix.
Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
China stages such patrols around Taiwan several times a month, but this was the first since Beijing held a new round of full-blown war games near the island this month. In a statement late on Saturday, China’s foreign ministry said it strongly condemned and firmly opposed the latest US weaponsContinue Reading
Just because something is dormant, it doesn’t mean it’s dead. That was how sceptics described efforts in parliament to push through an bill granting amnesty to political offenders in the name of social healing after years of bitter divisions in the country.
These efforts have reached the stage where an ad hoc House committee has finalised a study on the design of the amnesty bill, which has run into problems over whether offenders of Section 112 of the Criminal Code, or the lese majeste law, should be granted an amnesty too.
Critics have argued that most lese majeste offenders, particularly those charged in connection with the youth-led protest movement in recent years, are facing the consequences for defaming the monarch, which is a criminal offence and for that reason, they should be punished.
A source noted only two parties, the ruling Pheu Thai Party and the main opposition People’s Party (PP), backed an amnesty covering lese majeste law violators.
No other parties have stepped forward to support them.
Even the opposition Thai Sang Thai Party has warned that including Section 112 violators among amnesty beneficiaries would derail the law’s original goal of absolving political offenders.
Critics have chastised Pheu Thai and the PP for having a vested interest in making an “all-in” amnesty law a reality.
Pheu Thai’s alleged de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, was arraigned on June 18 on lese majeste and computer crime charges, which stem from comments he made during an interview with the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo on May 21, 2015.
Thaksin allegedly defamed the monarchy by claiming privy councillors supported the 2014 military coup that ousted his younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra.
Thaksin was released on 500,000-baht bail and is prohibited from leaving the country without court permission.
The PP, on the other hand, has a lot riding on the youth-led protest leaders and members — several of whom are being tried or were convicted on multiple lese majesty counts — being amnestied.
The movement trumpets reform and advocates radical changes to Section 112, deemed by conservatives as vital for defending the monarchy. The reforms sought by the protest group, which commands a large student and young voter following, are closely aligned, if not identical, to those of the Move Forward Party (MFP), which was dissolved for allegedly attempting to overthrow the constitutional monarchy. The MFP was reborn as the PP.
The source said the PP stands to gain more than it loses from having youth-led protest leaders exonerated with an amnesty law.
The party, through successive dissolutions of its predecessors going right back to the Future Forward Party, could be running out of luminaries among its leadership, who exude magnetism and the calibre needed to maintain and expand the PP’s support ahead of the next general election in three years.
Leaders of the youth movement, such as former human rights lawyer Anon Nampa, currently jailed on a lese majeste charge, could fill a void in the party, according to the source.
However, some observers have argued that admitting protest figures to a political party has significant risks. For one, there is no telling if, after an exoneration, they will insult the monarchy again, which could cause the party’s downfall.
Many observers believe the prospect of Section 112 offenders being incorporated into an amnesty bill that will be passed by parliament is very slim, and the Senate is unlikely to support it.
A credible gauge of the Senate’s stance on the issue may be the Bhumjaithai Party’s position not to support an amnesty law covering lese majeste offenders. After all, some 150 of the 200 senators have been labelled as having a “blue” affiliation. Blue is the colour of Bhumjaithai.
As resistance mounts against the amnesty push in parliament, the House study panel has delayed tabling its report on the bill to lawmakers for consideration.
The PP and Pheu Thai are pushing for an amnesty to be accepted by parliament. However, the push is stalled pending a parliamentary debate on the study panel report.
According to the panel, there are three camps: those who want the Section 112 offence excluded from the amnesty bill, those who favour its inclusion, and those who want it included under special conditions.
Last week, the study report reached parliament, and a lengthy debate got underway, only to be cut short by Deputy House Speaker Pichet Chuamuangpan, who adjourned the session. Mr Pichet said he had to call a halt as the debate had become a drawn-out affair and inconclusive.
Nikorn Chamnong, secretary to the study committee, said the committee’s report recommends the government sponsor the amnesty bill but an amnesty should only be limited to 25 crimes.
As for Section 112, he agreed it is a delicate issue which requires deeper discussion.
Despite what some observers have interpreted as the committee’s aptness to backtrack on its commitment to have an amnesty bill enacted, the source said the moves seeking amnesty for Section 112 offenders may be losing momentum. However, they can eventually succeed as long as Pheu Thai and the PP are up for it.
The Senate may not pose a hindrance if Pheu Thai can cut an irresistible political deal with Bhumjaithai, compelling it to soften its opposition to Section 112 offenders gaining an amnesty.
Despite not yet accepting a petition against former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Pheu Thai Party, the Constitutional Court’s request for details from the Office of Attorney-General (OAG) is expected to create unease within the ruling party, according to political observers.
Pichet: Had to halt debate
First, the petition in question was lodged by lawyer Teerayut Suwankesorn, who previously earned recognition for his petition asking the court to order the then Move Forward Party (MFP) to cease all activities related to the lese majeste law.
The court ruled in Mr Teerayut’s favour in January this year, and the ruling triggered a series of events that resulted in the disbandment of the MFP and political bans for the party’s executives.
Next, the accusation against Thaksin echoed those made against the MFP. Mr Teerayut also requested that the court stop Thaksin from committing actions that might undermine the constitutional monarchy by influencing the Pheu Thai Party.
Mr Teerayut outlined six key events to back his allegation against the Pheu Thai patriarch.
They covered Thaksin’s extended stay at the Police General Hospital (PGH), the government’s plan to negotiate with Cambodia over territorial claims and the Pheu Thai’s charter rewrite bid. They all involved Thaksin pulling the ruling party’s strings, according to Mr Teerayut.
The government policy statement delivered to parliament by PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, his daughter, also reflected Thaksin’s vision outlined at a forum on Aug 22.
A gathering of core coalition party figures at his Bangkok home to find a prime ministerial candidate after Srettha Thavisin was removed from office on Aug 14, and the coalition expulsion of a faction led by Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) leader Gen Prawit Wongsuwon, were examples of the influence exerted over Pheu Thai, the petitioner alleged.
And should Mr Teerayut’s claim stick, the case is shaping up to be more than just a legal battle, according to observers. It will be a fight for survival for the party and its leader, Ms Paetongtarn, who has had a more difficult start as premier than most of her predecessors.
Thanaporn Sriyakul, director of the Political and Public Policy Analysis Institute, told the Bangkok Post that the court’s action clearly demonstrates court president Nakharin Mektrairat’s commitment to supporting public scrutiny of politicians and political parties.
Mr Teerayut initially submitted the complaint with the OAG on Sept 24, asking it to investigate and forward the case to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. He went on to file the complaint directly with the court after the OAG failed to act on his request within 15 days.
According to Mr Thanaporn, the court’s request for information from the OAG can be seen as a signal that the court might step in and consider the petition itself if the OAG fails to act.
Of the six events listed by Mr Teerayut, the one surrounding Thaksin’s extended stay at the PGH can put Thaksin in a particularly tight spot, considering the court’s rulings regarding actions that undermine the constitutional monarchy, said the analyst.
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was the first independent agency to look into the matter and submitted its damning findings to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to consider further action.
The NHRC concluded that the Department of Corrections (DoC) gave privileged treatment to Thaksin, and both the DoC and the PGH helped Thaksin serve all his jail time in comfort in the PGH instead of a prison cell or in the DoC’s hospital.
Mr Thanaporn expressed scepticism about the Pheu Thai legal team’s ability to counter the allegations, saying the party rarely won cases brought before the Constitutional Court and other independent agencies.
According to the analyst, Thaksin’s only legal victory was in 2001 when the Constitutional Court ruled 8:7 in his favour to clear him of an asset concealment charge. He narrowly escaped a political ban and removal from office.
The NACC had charged Thaksin with failing to declare the transfer of shares worth more than 600 million baht to his driver, gardeners and close associates, although he did declare ownership of a 60-billion-baht stake in Shin Corporation.
“It is the only time he won a case. He can’t rely on the party’s legal team and will need to employ similar tactics [as he did in the asset concealment case] to get himself out of this situation, especially since he coined the phrase, ‘politics is the art of mystery’,” said Mr Thanaporn.
However, Pheu Thai heavyweight Chousak Sirinil said earlier that the accusation against Thaksin and the party lacked sufficient grounds to be considered actions aimed at undermining the constitutional monarchy.
Mr Chousak, who is the ruling party’s legal adviser, argued that the petitioner tried to draw a comparison between Pheu Thai’s actions and those that led to the court’s ruling against the MFP.
He insisted that the two cases were entirely different.