Moves (Page 39)

The recent replacement of Valeriy Zaluzhnyi as commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces may have put a temporary end to the increasingly public disagreements between the very popular “iron general” and the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

But it has not answered the fundamental question of what a winning – or even surviving – strategy in the war with Russia could look like as it moves into its third year.

Several dynamics have come together that are deeper and more complex than just a major reshuffle of the military leadership. The bigger picture that will shape the future of the war – and with it the future of Ukraine and the European and international security order – comprises four main factors. These need to be analyzed together to understand the present, and – most importantly – the future predicaments of Ukraine and its Western partners.

First, the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and the increasing pressure that Russia has put on Ukraine’s frontlines and hinterland put into serious question the ability of Kiev to win. This is especially the case if victory for Ukraine means forcing Russia’s complete withdrawal from all territory occupied since 2014.

The impending fall of Avdiivka, a town about 20 kilometers to the west of Donetsk in the east of Ukraine, suggests that Kiev ultimately has a weaker hand to play in a battle of attrition when confronted by a ruthless adversary with greater resources.

Much like the loss of Bakhmut in May 2023, or Soledar in January 2023, this was a symbolic rather than strategic defeat for Ukraine. It also represents, at best, pyrrhic victories for Russia – as in the case of Bakhmut.

But taken together, and seen in the context of the failed 2023 counteroffensive, these were not just symbolic defeats. They marked a real and extremely wasteful loss of financial resources, manpower and military equipment.

Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhny puts the blame for last year’s disappointed hopes clearly on the latter. It also indicates, more worryingly, a lack of learning the lessons of these setbacks on the part of the Ukrainian president.

The fact that the new commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, is associated with several of these costly defeats – notably Bakhmut – does not bode well for the necessary change in Ukrainian strategy.

To his credit, Syrsky also masterminded the defense of Kiev in the early days of the war in 2022 and the successful counteroffensive the following summer which saw Ukraine recapture significant territory first around Kharkiv in the north and then Kherson in the south.

Notably, these successes happened before Russia embarked on the first of several mobilizations and shifted its economy to a war footing.

Faltering international support

The second key factor to keep in mind is that Ukraine’s battlefield successes in 2022 occurred at a time when Western support for Ukraine was in full swing. Those days are long gone. This has been evident in the protracted battles in the US Congress over sending more military aid to Ukraine.

The comments by former president – and 2024 Republic nominee-apparent – Donald Trump on his lack of commitment to NATO should he be reelected in November are equally worrisome.

Despite some detractors, the EU remains committed to support for Ukraine. This became clear following the recent agreement on a new 50 billion euro (US$53.8 billion) funding package for Ukraine through 2027.

But this will barely cover Ukraine’s budget deficit, let alone make up for a potentially significant drop in US military aid. Combined with Ukraine’s own shrinking domestic capabilities to mobilize further resources, the war will have to be fought in far more difficult conditions than in the first two years.

War fatigue

Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is increasingly suffering from war fatigue. Military setbacks, economic decline, deteriorating living conditions, corruption and the scale of the loss of lives – among troops and civilians alike – make sustaining the war effort at present levels more difficult as well. Especially if the goal remains retaking all the land that Russia has occupied since 2014.

The amended law on mobilization, intended to underpin this strategy, was adopted in the Ukrainian parliament on February 6. Its provisions, including lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25 years, mandatory digital certificates and electronic prescription notifications, and stricter penalties for evading military service, are further evidence of the waning enthusiasm in Ukrainian society for the war effort.

Together with yet another 90-day extension of martial law and several financial measures designed to tighten the government’s control over the economy, the more draconian provisions in the new mobilization law also heighten the sense of uncertainty over Ukraine’s political direction.

Zelensky’s presidential term comes to an end in May 2024 and new parliamentary elections would normally be due in the autumn. While it is generally agreed that elections are close to impossible at present, both the president’s and parliament’s legitimacy after the expiry of their constitutional terms will be open to question.

This will ultimately be an issue for the constitutional court to resolve. But it has not stopped political forces within Ukraine opposed to Zelensky and his Servant of the People political party from piling pressure on the president to agree to a government of national unity.

Given the lack of popularity of this opposition, associated primarily with former president Petro Poroshenko – who Zelensky defeated in a landslide election in 2019 – this is hardly driven by popular demand. But it nonetheless signals further political turmoil at a time when Ukraine needs unity.

It is not clear whether Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhny will strengthen or weaken any political opposition. In the short term, it is likely to benefit Zelensky whose popularity still dwarfs that of Poroshenko. Yet, because replacing Zaluzhny has not come with a signal that Ukraine’s war strategy will fundamentally change, this is a very risky move on the part of Zelensky.

Maintaining the current direction asks Ukrainians for yet more sacrifices. What Zelensky is offering in return depends on a range of at best highly uncertain returns that depend on many factors beyond the Ukrainian president’s control.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and Tetyana Malyarenko is Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Ambitious and mercurial, with a dark past, former army general Prabowo Subianto has spent a lifetime vying for the ultimate prize in Indonesian politics. Now, with a large lead in the latest polls ahead of this week’s election, it looks as though the presidency is finally within his grasp.

So, who is Prabowo and how will he change Indonesia if he wins?

Rapid rise and fall through the military ranks

Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo is a true Indonesian blueblood. His family claims to be descended from national hero Diponegoro, a prince of the Mataram sultanate who led the Java War rebellion against Dutch colonial forces in the 19th century.

Prabowo’s grandfather was the founder of Indonesia’s first state bank and a prominent member of Indonesia’s independence movement. His father was a leading economist who served as minister of finance, minister of trade and minister for research in the government. His brother is a wealthy tycoon.

Prabowo, too, has long sought national prominence. An ambitious military officer serving mostly in the Special Forces (Kopassus), his marriage to a daughter of the authoritarian former president, Suharto, fast-tracked his career. Prabowo rose to the rank of lieutenant general and, finally, the key position of commander of the powerful Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) in the capital, Jakarta.

As Suharto’s regime began to falter amid the financial crisis of 1997, Prabowo became involved in covert operations to defend Soeharto’s army-backed and repressive New Order regime against its critics.

Under his leadership, the Special Forces’ “Rose Brigade” was accused of abducting and torturing more than 20 student protesters, 13 of whom are still missing, presumed dead. Prabowo has admitted to the abductions but denies being involved in any killings.

Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. The allegations against him meant he was, for years, denied a visa to enter the US.

Prabowo also denies a wide range of earlier accusations relating to human rights abuses committed by Special Forces under his command in East Timor and Papua, including alleged torture and killings.

He also denies accusations he was involved in engineering the violent rioting in the capital in 1998 that contributed to the collapse of his father-in-law’s regime, likely the result of an internal military struggle to become Soeharto’s successor. It seems Prabowo hoped to climb high amid the chaos at the time.

After Soeharto resigned in May 1998, his newly installed successor, B J Habibie, refused Prabowo’s request to be made head of the army, instead effectively demoting him. Prabowo is said to have responded by arming himself with a pistol and driving to the palace with truckloads of soldiers, but was stopped outside the president’s office.

Soon after, Prabowo was cashiered for “misinterpreting orders”, although the precise details of his dismissal still remain mysterious. He went into voluntary exile in Jordan for some years and it seemed his career was over.

Three unsuccessful bids for higher office

But Prabowo remained an ambitious man. By 2009, he was a wealthy business figure and had co-founded his own political party, Gerindra. He had also rehabilitated himself enough to make a formal bid for power, running for vice president in the 2009 elections on a ticket with former president Megawati Soekarnoputri. They lost in a landslide.

In 2014, Prabowo tried again. This time he ran as a presidential candidate against Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Prabowo campaigned as a nationalist “strongman”, riding his horse around stadiums of cheering uniformed supporters and promising a return to the authoritarian model of the New Order. He lost both the election and a challenge to the results in the Constitutional Court.

In 2019, he tried once again against Jokowi, this time turning to conservative Islamists to support him. He was a strange choice as their figurehead, given he had a Christian mother and brother and, although a Muslim himself, had previously shown little public piety. In his 2014 campaign, he had even promised to protect religious minorities against Islamists.

Prabowo’s use of identity politics proved deeply polarising, strengthening the hand of hardline Islamist groups in Indonesia and deepening tensions between religious communities for years to come.

But Prabowo lost this election, too. He accused Jokowi of cheating, sparking rioting in Jakarta in which eight people died. He again contested the results in a highly publicized Constitutional Court challenge, which he also lost.

Prabowo then made the extraordinary decision to reinvent himself again. Dumping his supporters, he took the position of defense minister in the cabinet of his rival, Jokowi. The two former foes were photographed shaking hands and sharing jokes to seal their extraordinary deal.

For the next four years, Prabowo dutifully performed the role of loyal minister – even when Jokowi’s government moved against some of the Islamist organizations that had backed him in his last bid for the top job.

Controversial political moves

Now 72, Prabowo’s ambitions are undiminished, but his tactics have, once again, changed dramatically.

In his current run for president, Prabowo has selected Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his vice-presidential running mate. And Jokowi himself now backs him. (Although Jokowi has never explicitly endorsed Prabowo, Gibran’s candidacy makes Jokowi’s preferences crystal clear.)

Jokowi’s decision to join forces with Prabowo and his Gerindra party was driven by the fact he was prevented from running himself by the two-term presidential limit in the constitution. He therefore needed to find another way to maintain influence. Having his son as vice president would certainly suffice.

Jokowi is hugely popular, with approval rates still well over 70%. This means his decision to back Prabowo may – at last – deliver the presidency to the former general.

But building a new alliance with Prabowo has proved to be a seismic event in Indonesian politics, for two reasons.

First, according to the country’s election law, candidates for president and vice president must be at least 40 years old. The 36-year-old Gibran didn’t qualify.

Helpfully, the chief justice of the Constitutional Court was Gibran’s uncle and had been appointed by Jokowi. The court duly delivered a ruling that younger candidates could run if they had held elected office as a regional head. Gibran just happens to be mayor of the city of Solo (a position his father once held), so he was now eligible.

Uproar ensued, and the chief justice was demoted for his obvious conflict of interest. But, incredibly, the decision stood, and Gibran is running.

Second, Jokowi is a member of the PDI-P party, which had twice nominated him for president. The party has its own candidate running for president, Ganjar Pranowo.

So, by backing Prabowo, Jokowi has effectively turned his back on his own party and may help defeat its candidate for the presidency.

His actions also pose a major threat to PDI-P’s prospects in the legislative elections (held at the same time as the presidential vote). To the PDI-P leader, former president Megawati, and many of her supporters, Jokowi is now a traitor and enemy who may inflict huge damage on their political prospects.

Why this election matters

Prabowo’s big lead in the polls is partly thanks to Jokowi’s support and the many government officials now openly backing him. However, Prabowo has undergone (yet another) spectacular reinvention in recent months that has helped as well.

His campaign team has heavily promoted him as a baby-faced gemoy (cute) grandpa, using viral memes, video clips and even huge screens with anime avatars of Prabowo and Gibran smiling and winking at passers-by.

But Prabowo is not cute. In fact, he has repeatedly said Indonesia’s democratic system is not working and the country should return to its original 1945 constitution. This would mean unraveling most of the reforms introduced since Soeharto fell, which are largely based on constitutional amendments.

Among other things, Indonesia’s charter of human rights would go, as would the Constitutional Court. The courts would no longer be independent, direct presidential elections would end, the two-term presidential limit would go and the president could again control the legislature.

Of course, these changes might not be easily done, but it is a chilling prospect if Prabowo wins. And that may happen because much of the electorate doesn’t seem to care all that much about the consequences of picking him.

The average age of Indonesia’s 205 million eligible voters is just 30, and more than half are millennials or Gen Z. This means many have no memory of Soeharto’s oppressive and abusive New Order that Prabowo seems to want to revive.

Young voters also seem untroubled by Prabowo’s dark past and the credible allegations of violence and human rights abuses made against him. Instead, they seem captivated by the cute Prabowo and cool Gibran imagery saturating social media, backed by the charisma of Indonesia’s most popular public figure, Jokowi.

If Prabowo does become president, as many now expect, Indonesia’s fragile democratic system may be the next thing he reinvents – or, more likely, dismantles.

Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith is Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The US-Japan alliance has been a cornerstone of Japan’s foreign and security policy and in the Indo-Pacific region. This alliance has persevered through several distinct hurdles since its founding in 1951 by adapting to shifting geopolitical and internal political forces.

Japan is in a vulnerable position due to its strategic location, as it faces difficulties and security threats from neighboring countries including North Korea, China and Russia. The US-Japan Security Treaty was premised on the fact that Japan provided bases and the US provided security. 

Managing regional instability in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters has left the United States overburdened in its role as a security guarantor to its allies and partners in Europe and Asia. This has made the security conundrum worse and caused allies to have second thoughts about US security promises.

A significant transformation in the US-Japan alliance occurred last year when Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited the US in January last year. Washington welcomed Tokyo’s strong reaction to the Ukraine situation and its recent security changes.

They highlight Japan’s increased resolve to fortify its defenses and support regional deterrence, as well as its newfound capacity to use the bilateral relationship to address significant threats to the “global order.”

In December 2023, Japan also hosted the US government for an Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), which was founded as a forum for discussions on how to maintain and enhance extended deterrence. The two countries agreed that the Japan-US alliance’s deterrent and response capabilities must be strengthened in the face of an increasingly difficult regional security environment.

Japan’s revised National Security Strategy (NSS) document explicitly mentioned China as an unprecedented challenge and also put forth Japan’s intention of developing a counterstrike capability to attack an enemy. It further outlined Japan’s plans to increase GDP by 2%.

However, the document did not mention how Japan would carry out these objectives, how much funding it would need, or how much it would work with the US to achieve them. Encouraged by the US administration, Japan has also increased security cooperation with Australia, the United Kingdom and India. Japan’s deepening relationships with these nations shows efforts by Japan to diversify its defense partnerships further. 

Recently, a dozen warships from the US and Japan, including two US aircraft carriers, have been displaying their military prowess in the Philippine Sea, which lies east of Taiwan. According to analysts, notwithstanding the ongoing hostilities in the Middle East, the joint exercises demonstrate that the US Navy’s ability to respond to emergencies over a wide range of Asian waterways where tensions with China are still high.

It is noteworthy to note that American alliances and ties in the Indo-Pacific region are arguably at their strongest and most comprehensive points in history. Under President Joe Biden’s administration, the Japan-US alliance has been bolstered to enhance deterrence against China and North Korea. 

The United States holds a traditionally dominant position in Northeast Asia. Although Washington’s strategy in the area has always been based on the US-Japan security alliance, the two partners now collaborate and coordinate on almost every facet of their foreign and defense policies.

Alongside Australia, India and the United States, Tokyo is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as a democratic state with similar goals and aspirations for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP).

In recent years, Japan has been trying to escape from the constitutional constraints due to Article 9 of its constitution to allow military operations away from Japanese shores, such as joint patrols with the US Navy and other countries in the South China Sea.

Japan also emphasizes the need to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait, which further antagonizes China. To counter such threats, Washington and Tokyo are strengthening their intelligence sharing, and Japan is stepping up security cooperation with other partners and friends of the United States, including the Philippines, South Korea, India and Vietnam.

There has been a lot of conjecture on the level of US involvement in the conflict in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although the US does not officially recognize Ukraine as an ally, Japan and other allies are likely to view US actions and behavior as a sign of the US commitment to its partners.

Beijing hasn’t backed down from its geopolitical rivalry with Washington, both within and outside of the area. North Korea’s persistent threats of more nuclear and ballistic missile tests are also drawing US allies in Northeast Asia closer together.

It’s unknown how this new geostrategic balancing will affect the likelihood of preserving peace and stability on a worldwide scale. In any case, it is unquestionably positive news for the US, which is strengthening and growing its already strong network of partnerships and alliances.

While there is room for improvement, it’s also critical to remember that Washington cannot realistically hope to win over every nation in the Indo-Pacific region. This might also not be a good idea, because it could lead to serious strategic imbalances and instability in the area.

Having said that, the US will probably keep strengthening and enlarging its network to impede and hinder any future moves that the two revisionist nations in the area, China and North Korea, might make to threaten, subvert, or otherwise destroy the Indo-Pacific order.

To guarantee that China adheres to international law and pursues a benign foreign policy, the US-Japan alliance’s deterrence force must be combined with efforts to find a way to more meaningful engagement.

Now that Japan is a peaceful nation, the Kishida administration needs to complement its security reforms with a diplomatic plan to improve relations with its neighbors. Japan has emphasized and must continue to emphasize the significance of non-military ways to create peace to support the US-Japan alliance.

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Beijing has protested in solemn démarches to the United States over the interrogations at American airports since November of tens of Chinese students per month.

Some of the students had been repatriated to China. Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at least eight Chinese students had been deported groundlessly by US immigration authorities at the Dulles International Airport in Washington DC. 

He said the moves of US law enforcement authorities seriously violated the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of the students concerned and disrupted China-US cultural exchanges and cross-border travel.

He added that the practice went against the common understandings reached by the Chinese and US presidents in San Francisco last November on enhancing and facilitating cultural and people-to-people exchanges. 

“The US likes to portray itself as open, inclusive and a place advocating academic freedom and ‘no border in science’ but it politicizes and weaponizes academic research, and over-stretches the concept of national security to wantonly suppress and ill-treat Chinese students,” he said. “The moves by the US driven by ideological bias with no respect for truth or rationality are discriminatory and politically motivated law enforcement and will eventually undermine America’s own image.”

Wang’s comments came after Xie Feng, Chinese ambassador to the US, said in a Chinese New Year event on January 28 that blocking Chinese students from entering the US will hurt Sino-US relations.

“Recently, Florida has unveiled a law to ban Chinese students from entering public schools’ laboratories,” Xie said. “On a monthly basis, tens of Chinese students, who hold valid visas and have no criminal records, have been denied entry to the US recently.”

He said these students, who returned to the US after traveling overseas or going home, were taken to a small dark room and interrogated by officers for up to eight hours.

“They were not allowed to contact their parents. They faced groundless accusations and were forcibly repatriated and banned from entering the US,” he said. “This is absolutely unacceptable.”

He said the chilling effect of the United States’s “China Initiative” program has not yet gone away. 

The China Initiative program was launched by the Trump administration in 2018, aiming to prosecute perceived Chinese spies in American research and industry. In February 2022, the US Department of Justice announced the end of the program, which was accused of racially profiling Chinese American citizens and other residents of Chinese origin or ancestry. 

On Monday, the Chinese Embassy in the US said the Chinese students, who were interrogated by officers at the Dulles International Airport, also had their electronic devices checked. It said some students were restricted from personal freedom for more than 10 hours and prohibited from contacting the outside world. 

“The relevant practices of US law enforcement officers at the border have seriously affected the studies of Chinese students and caused great psychological damage to them,” it said. “We strongly urge the US to stop its wrong practices.”

Lacking confidence?

Chinese columnist Mei Zhengqing says in an article published on Thursday that, after then-US President Donald Trump signed an executive order in May 2020 to suspend the entry of certain Chinese students and researchers into the US, the Biden administration further strengthened the practice. 

“The number of Chinese students who received their visas from the US significantly dropped in 2023. Even if they got the visas, some students were denied entry to the US due to national security reasons,” Mei says. “They included science, engineering, liberal arts students and business students.”

She says the US lacks confidence in itself as it discriminates against and persecutes Chinese students and scholars by denying their entry to the country.

“As the only superpower on this planet, the US lacks confidence in itself as it treats all things, including Chinese students, as its enemy,” Wang Zhongyu, a Hunan-based commentator, writes in an article. “The United States is losing international support due to its hegemonic practice against China.”

There were cases that Chinese students or scholars were caught spying for the Chinese government in the US. But some faced false accusations.

In January last year, Ji Chaoqun, a 31-year-old former Chicago graduate student in electrical engineering, was convicted of acting as an agent of China’s Ministry of State Security and making a material false statement to the US Army. 

Last May, Xi Xiaoxing, a professor at Temple University, said he would sue the Federal Bureau of Investigation for falsely accusing him of spying for China. 

People-to-people exchanges

Public data showed that about 290,000 Chinese students were in the US last year, representing 27% of the foreign students in the country. China said it has more than 1.3 million students studying abroad.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met face-to-face in Bali in November 2022, both sides said they welcomed strengthening people-to-people exchanges between students, scholars and businesses. 

In their last meeting in San Francisco on November 15 last year, the two leaders reiterated the same goal. Xi said China wants to invite 50,000 American young people to study in the country in the next five years. 

Last year, there were only 350 American students studying in China, down from 11,000 in 2019. The decline was a result of the pandemic and rising tensions between the US and China.

Read: US research firm curbed over alleged Xinjiang spying

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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