Putinism making inroads in Central Asia’s Kyrgyzstan – Asia Times

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The Kyrgyzstani persons are well-known for their” city democracy”

Citizens in the Central Asian state have taken it upon themselves to ouster leaders who attempt to overstay their pleasant or participate in corruption since emerging from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

In fact, the country went through five national moves between 2005 and 2020, three of which occurred as a result of widespread protests and two through a peaceful democratic transition.

However, Bishkek, the country’s capital, seems to be experiencing a new pattern. Russian President Vladimir Putin is well-liked among Kyrgyz, and his bodybuilder leadership seems to be having an impact on the country’s leaders, in contrast to how he is perceived in some other former Communist nations. Recent legislation has been introduced to strengthen their power and combat protest.

I’ve been studying the unique trajectory of Kyrgyzstan for a long time and have always been interested in how this people’s power struggles with current trends toward authoritarianism. More was learned during a trip to the area in the slide.

locations for protests

The Ala-To Square and the opposite White House, which were generally the standard presidential office building, are Bishkek’s core of Kyrgyz road politics.

Askar Akayev, the country’s earliest post-Soviet president, tried to circumvent term limits and increase his strength in a protest protested that in 2005. Akayev was driven into exile in Moscow by their Tulip Revolution.

Five years later, people gathered at the same time for Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who had been charged with corruption, for the Women’s April Revolution.

A monument shows two people pushing a structure.
Monument to” Those Who Died For Freedom” in Bishkek. CC BY Keith Brown

Before being toppled, Bakiyev authorized lethal force against protesters. A dramatic monument stands on Ala-Tou Square to commemorate the 90 protesters who were killed to this day.

When anti-government demonstrations resurrected what some people saw as a stolen vote and removed President Sooronbai Jeenbekov from office, the square became the center of discontent once more in 2020.

A fresh political philosophy

Sadyr Japarov, Kyrgyzstan’s recent leader, is well-versed in this past because he lived it.

He helped organize mass rallies against newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev in 2012 after serving in Bakiyev’s government.

Japarov fled the country after participating in an military attack that attempted to overthrow Parliament. He was imprisoned when he returned to Kyrgyzstan in 2017 but he established a new political party after being released from prison.

Japarov ran for president in January 2021 with about 80 % of the vote, supporting a populist agenda that included calls to break down on corrupt elites and international corporations.

Japarov even emphasized the significance of Russia’s unique partnership with Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, Putin’s handbook is starting to appear in his leadership style. A vote that boosted the power of the office and diminished the significance of Parliament was accompanied by the presidential election in 2021.

Japarov is putting that move into practice by building a new national building just five kilometers south of the city center, which will lessen the chance that city politics will play a significant role in the country’s future.

Other indications of Japarov’s desire to reform Kyrgyz politics were evident during my October visit. Leading crime supervisor Kolya Kolbaev was shot and killed by security forces in a Bishkek restaurant he owned on October 4, 2023.

According to the state media, this was a crackdown on arranged violence, in line with Japarov’s vote promises. However, it was more of a acquisition of Kolbaev’s attractive criminal activities by the Kyrgyz state, according to many Bishkek residents.

Another possible example of Kyrgyzstan’s detachment from its people’s power was revealed a week later. On October 12 and 13, Bombek’s nurseries, universities, and colleges were immediately ordered to shut or simply operate online.

Putin, making his first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest, was scheduled to attend the Commonwealth of Independent States ‘ yearly conference in Bishkek.

Actually, the closures were merely to alleviate traffic. However, I’ve heard locals speculate that authorities prevented any youth-led protests against the nation’s dominant and potentially contentious visitor. Similar measures were introduced by the government on October 25 and 26, during Premier Li Qiang’s attend.

Additionally, in October, Parliament and the Senate discussed proposed legislation that resemble the ones that Putin introduced in Russia. The costs would restrict the right to free speech and give the government the authority to sue or shut down any business it considers to be a “foreign representative.”

The United Nations and the United States, which expressed their concerns in a text, prompting Japarov to criticise Washington of involvement, continue to advance the regulations despite opposition from Kyrgyz and foreign media freedom organizations. In a contentious Parliament voting in late February 2024, the 50 people existing, some of whom cast votes for their absent coworkers, received 62 vote to expand the law.

The memory’s endurance

Japarov is using some of Putin’s tactics to intimidate Parliament, eliminate powerful adversaries, and riggedly restrict completely media, all with a determined bet against the country’s new history of democratic activism.

On the surface, the president’s chances appear to be favorable. In Kyrgyzstan, Putin also enjoys high approval ratings in comparison to other post-Soviet nations. After a decade and a half of social turmoil, as well as common corruption and organized crime, Japarov’s” strongman” image is appealing to many.

However, accepting Russian ties is a big deal for many other Kyrgyz people.

Georgia and Ukraine were subsequently founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both have since been attacked by Putin’s Russia.

In 1850, the king conquered a number of Central Asian city-states and wandering tribes under the pretense of a” pacifying goal.” Bishkek, then known as Pishpek, came under Soviet rule.

The nomadic people of Kyrgyzstan fought on throughout their peculiar way of life. However, brutal force was used to confront blatant opposition to Russian rule. When roman Russia began violently enlisting Kyrgyz soldiers in World War I in 1916, Kyrgyz rebelled.

Over 100, 000 Kyrgyz were killed in the assault that followed. Numerous women and children perished in China as a result of crossing the Tian Shan mountains to seek shelter from Russian oppression.

Russian concept allegedly sounded the door to better relations with Moscow. And finally achieving total nation standing in 1936, the Kyrgyz gained independence in 1926.

The massacres of Stalin were a symptom of the Soviet Union, as were many other Kyrgyz people. 138 Kyrgyz scholars were killed and buried in a large tomb outside Bishkek in 1938, where Stalin’s patients are remembered alongside other Kyrgyz republicans, at the Ata-Beyit monument close to Bishkek.

TKTK
A mural at Ata- Beyit depicts Communist authorities detaining Kyrgyz intellectuals. Keith Brown, CC BY

Kyrgyz citizens are supported by this commitment to memory preservation and a strong distaste for authoritarian excess. However, it contradicts where the nation is right now, in a dangerous position amid shifting politics.

China, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf state are also investing heavily in the region, while the US and Russia are competing for dominance in the region.

They must make difficult choices as Kyrgyzstan’s leaders attempt to maintain its sovereignty, expand and extend its economy, and strengthen its position internationally. They currently appear to be following Putin’s lead.

At Arizona State University, Keith Brown is an expert on international politics and world studies.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Study the article’s introduction.

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WWI lessons Ukraine needs to heed to win the war – Asia Times

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As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its third year, the war’s tactics increasingly seem to match scenes from the First World War: soldiers huddle in trenches along stagnant front lines and navigate intense barrages.

Beyond trench warfare, however, the Ukraine conflict resembles the strategic, operational and tactical situation faced by Allied commanders immediately prior to the 100 Days Offensive, and its lessons remain applicable to contemporary wartime political and military leaders.

The successes produced by the 100 Days Offensive that began in the late summer of 1918 were primarily influenced by the Allies’ reliance on a strategy of maximum effort, flexible campaigns and advances in tactics.

The 100 Days Offensive

Having suffered significant losses in the preceding months, and facing the possibility of growing German strength following the defeat of Russia, Allied leaders prioritized launching a decisive offensive before their own exhaustion forced them to settle for peace.

These strategic considerations led Allied commanders to shift the balance of their forces to seize opportunities along the front. Beginning with a surprise attack on Amiens, the Allies often rapidly shifted the center of their offensive efforts. These moves forced the German High Command to commit additional resources along the front, weakening its defenses.

While the Allies’ hurried tempo led to higher casualties, maintaining momentum was critical to eventually piercing the Hindenburg Line, the Germans’ most significant prepared defensive position.

Allied tactics forced combat into the open. While aircraft had been introduced prior to 1918, the Allies were able to rely on near-total control of the air. This allowed Allied forces to more effectively target their artillery fire and rely on better reconnaissance.

Moreover, the Allies were also able to introduce significant numbers of tanks to the battlefield. This development allowed Allied forces to gain localized fire support at key stages of the offensive and contributed to their string of victories.

Wartime challenges

The legacy of the 100 Days Offensive offers several strategic, operational and tactical lessons that remain highly applicable to the Ukrainian War. These include the importance of political timelines, the role of mobility in combat and the necessity of air power and infantry innovation.

Having dedicated a significant portion of its economy to war production, Russia will become more capable of replacing its wartime losses. This shift has occurred just as the United States and Europe have struggled to fulfill orders for ammunition and other equipment for Ukraine due to domestic political complications.

Moreover, Ukraine faces growing debt due to the war and lacks large numbers of available service personnel, mirroring the state of the Anglo and French militaries in 1918 and raising doubts as to how long Ukraine can continue to engage in high-intensity combat.

Russia’s strength has also been bolstered by its capacity to enact further rounds of conscription and ongoing public support for the war. In contrast, conscription remains a highly contentious topic in Ukraine, which may harm its future readiness.

Lessons for Ukraine

However, the Allies’ experience in 1918 is instructive. Even a weakened Anglo-Franco-American coalition remained capable of winning dramatic victories over a powerful adversary, so long as its political leaders remained fully committed to the war.

The operational challenges facing Ukraine and Russia are also akin to those faced by the Allies during the war. Russian forces have constructed miles of prepared defenses on its occupied territories, much of which Ukraine has yet to overcome.

These defenses have contributed to the static position of both militaries and will likely force Ukraine or Russia to shift their forces along the front in bids to make a breakthrough.

While Russia has continued to send waves of unprepared units into intense combat, Kiev must be careful to conserve its combat power for future offensives.

Further, Ukraine should also maintain its commitment to misdirection, as it did earlier in the war by reportedly focusing on Kherson before attacking Kharkiv, to prevent Russian forces from consolidating their lines. This tactic would follow the Allies’ attempt to spread German forces thin and prevent their reinforcement of the Hindenburg line.

Lastly, the role of air power and innovative infantry tactics remain as critical to contemporary offensives as they were during 1918. Though neither Ukraine nor Russia has been able to establish complete control over the air, Ukraine’s use of drones has allowed its forces to direct pinpoint artillery fire against Russian positions.

Additionally, the relative independence of the American Expeditionary Forces and the Canadian Corps allowed new tactics to be tested in combat, bolstering their contribution to the offensive. This model will continue to be beneficial to Ukraine’s push to allow more junior officers to act on their own during combat.

Over the course of the 100 Days Offensive, the Allies managed to overcome three years of unrelenting trench warfare, along with a prolonged last-ditch German offensive, before bringing the war to an end. This series of events was precipitated by a growing strategic emphasis on waging a decisive campaign, adopting new operational doctrines, and relying on new tactical approaches, all of which remain applicable to the current war.

However, perhaps the lasting lesson of the 100 Days Offensive is that the campaign led to victory despite its failure to fully eject German forces from France. Looking toward the third year of the war in Ukraine, it is important to recognize that victory wears many disguises beyond golden laurels.

John Long Burnham is a policy research assistant at the China Institute of the University of Alberta.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Election Commission to seek Move Forward’s dissolution

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Move cites Constitutional Court’s finding on party’s lese majeste policy

PUBLISHED : 12 Mar 2024 at 15:13

Election Commission to seek Move Forward's dissolution
Pita Limjaroenrat, left, former leader of the Move Forward Party, and his successor Chaithawat Tulathon, right, hold a press conference at parliament after the Constitutional Court ruled against its lese majeste law policy on Jan 31. (Photo: Nutthawat Wichieanbut)

The Election Commission on Tuesday resolved to ask the Constitutional Court to dissolve the election-winning Move Forward Party, citing the court’s recent finding against the party’s policy on the lese majeste law.

The EC said in its statement issued on Tuesday that the decision was unanimous.

The Move Forward Party has a policy to amend Section 112 of the Criminal Code, known as the lese majeste law, which it says is being misused for political purposes.

Based on the recent finding of the Constitutional Court, the EC argues that the MFP is in violation of Section 92 of the organic law on political parties. The section gives the Constitutional Court the power to  dissolve any political party that is seen to threaten the constitutional monarchy.

The Constitutional Court agreed unanimously on Jan 31 that the MFP must cease all attempts to amend the lese majeste law, and that campaigning on the issue is considered an attempt to overthrow the constitutional monarchy.

The court found that the party’s plan to amend the royal defamation law showed “an intent to separate the monarchy from the Thai nation, which is significantly dangerous to the security of the state”.

Move Forward’s proposed amendments included the requirement that a complaint must be filed by the royal household itself, along with reduced sentences. 

As they read out their opinions, the judges pointed to past actions of Pita Limjaroenrat, the former MFP leader, and the party, including moves to propose amendments to Section 112, participate in campaigns with groups opposing Section 112, and their actions in applying for bail for lese majeste suspects.

The court said that Mr Pita and the party tried to either change or revoke Section 112 when its 44 MPs submitted a bill to amend Section 112 on March 25, 2021.

According to the court, the bill was aimed at lowering the status of the royal institution because it required the Bureau of the Royal Household to file lese majeste complaints. Consequently, the institution would be placed in direct opposition to members of the public in defamation cases.

That would be against the constitutional principle that elevates the royal institution above any political issues, because the royal institution is a pillar of national security, the judges said.

The court also said that Mr Pita and the party continued to call for the amendment of Section 112 during election campaigning last year. It was a campaign policy.

MFP won the May 14, 2023, general election, getting 14.4 million votes, but was unable to form a coalition government. Now it is the main opposition party. The Pheu Thai Party, which finished second, leads the present coalition government.

MFP spokesman Parit Wacharasindhu said on Tuesday that the party would defend itself in the court, and it had already made preparations in the event it was disbanded.

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NATO’s nuclear deterrent just got more precise – Asia Times

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The F-35A Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) armed with the B61-12 thermonuclear weapon is slated to be the cornerstone of NATO’s next-generation air-based nuclear deterrent, reigniting debate over the logic of US extended deterrence and deploying nuclear weapons in Europe.

This month, multiple media outlets reported that the F-35A JSF has officially been certified to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear bomb, marking a significant development in nuclear deterrence capabilities. This certification signifies the F-35A’s unique ability to penetrate enemy air defenses, making it NATO’s latest dual-capable aircraft for nuclear deterrence in Europe.

The F-35A’s stealth and advanced capabilities are expected to alter Russia’s defensive strategies and predictive modeling of strike success probabilities.

The aircraft’s certification, achieved in October 2023 ahead of the previously scheduled January 2024, underscores intense collaboration among 16 government and industry stakeholders over the past decade.

The F-35A is increasingly becoming Europe’s dominant 5th-generation stealth fighter. European Security & Defense notes in a July 2023 article that the UK, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Finland, Poland and Germany have acquired or plan to acquire the aircraft.

Significantly, the F-35A does not require the Block 4 upgrade for B61-12 usage, alleviating concerns amid ongoing delays in the Block 4 and Technology Refresh-3 updates.

The certification process does not imply that all F-35As will actively participate in nuclear missions; only specific squadrons will have the qualifications and infrastructure to undertake such operations.

The deployment of the B61-12 in Europe remains a closely guarded secret, with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands expected to continue hosting these weapons.

The B61-12’s capabilities, including a new guidance package, signify a substantial advancement over the older B61 gravity bomb.

A US Air Force F-35 Lightning performs a drop test of a B61-12. Credit: US Department of Defense / F-35 Joint Program Office

The nuclear weapon’s guidance system gives it a circular error probable of 30 meters, combined with variable yield capability, allowing it to be used for tactical purposes on the battlefield and attack deeply buried targets such as command posts.

This certification also underscores the strategic importance of the F-35A amidst increasing tensions between NATO and Russia.

These spiking tensions could potentially impact NATO’s nuclear weapons-sharing program and its deterrent posture in Europe and beyond.

The move highlights the ongoing modernization of nuclear capabilities, reflecting the evolving security landscape and the critical role of stealth technology in nuclear deterrence.

Extended deterrence based on nuclear-sharing in Europe was a crucial part of US and NATO strategy throughout the Cold War, with Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine reigniting debate about its relevance.

The 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the importance of extended deterrence as a critical pillar of the US approach to maintaining strategic stability.

The document says extended deterrence involves leveraging the full spectrum of US military capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic tools, in coordination with diplomatic efforts and alliances to deter adversaries and reassure allies.

The NDS underscores the vital role of allies and partnerships in amplifying US strategic efforts while advocating for increased cooperation, interoperability and burden-sharing to enhance collective defense and deterrence capabilities.

Nuclear sharing is a critical component of the US extended deterrence posture. In a November 2023 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and other writers note that, contrary to common misconceptions, hosting nuclear weapons doesn’t grant non-nuclear states direct control over their launch or control.

They say that the governance of US nuclear weapons in Europe, facilitated through specific agreements with host nations, encompasses a wide array of collaborative activities ranging from storage and safety to delivery system provision.

They point out that US moves to modernize its nuclear infrastructure in Europe, alongside Russia’s aggressive posture and nuclear-capable deployments in Belarus, have put a new spotlight on nuclear-sharing arrangements.

As NATO integrates new members such as Sweden and Finland, the complexity and scope of nuclear sharing are expected to deepen in the years ahead.

Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow note in a March 2023 Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) article that while the scale of current US nuclear stockpiles in Europe remains classified, it is estimated that the US has 100 nuclear bombs stored there.

Masters and Merrow note that the US’s current nuclear arsenal in Europe consists entirely of B-61 gravity bombs, which have been in service since the 1960s.

In terms of the operational impact of nuclear-armed F-35As in Europe, Frank Kuhn mentions in a September 2023 War on the Rocks article that NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy, based on the US B-61 gravity bombs, may be obsolete and no longer credible.

However, Kuhn notes that introducing the F-35A and modernized B61-12 nuclear bombs with enhanced precision-guidance capabilities marks a significant shift in the alliance’s capabilities against potential Russian aggression. He says that the F-35A offers NATO an unprecedented ability to penetrate sophisticated air defenses, thus improving the alliance’s nuclear deterrent.

He also says that the F-35A will facilitate increased cooperation among NATO members, allowing pilots from Eastern European countries to train in Western Europe for nuclear missions.

However, a modernized US extended deterrence posture in Europe based on F-35As armed with B61-12 nuclear bombs faces significant operational and strategic criticisms.

In a June 2023 article for The Defense Horizon Journal (TDHJ), Severin Pleyer mentions that criticism of the F-35A’s role in nuclear deterrence revolves around its generational classification, stealth capabilities and operational limitations.

Despite the F-35A’s marketing as a 5th-generation fighter, there’s a lack of clear, quantifiable metrics defining the category, especially regarding stealth, Pleyer notes. He says that advancements in radar technology by adversaries have cast new doubt on the longevity and efficacy of stealth as a singularly viable capability.

Pleyer also mentions operational concerns regarding the F-35A’s network-centric warfare approach, which emphasizes information sharing and battlefield awareness.

He says that while designed to enhance force interoperability, the aircraft’s limitations in payload capacity for nuclear munitions and dependence on external assets for mission success present substantial risks.

Moreover, Tytti Erästö, in a December 2023 article for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), argues that augmenting NATO’s already formidable conventional forces with an increased reliance on nuclear capabilities may not yield the intended deterrent effect.

Romanian Special Forces operators prepare to execute a simulated breach during NATO exercise Steadfast Defender 2021. Photo: NATO

Erästö points out this could escalate and exacerbate arms race dynamics rather than foster long-term security solutions. She also argues the rationale for deploying US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe may be outdated, as the conventional military balance now heavily favors NATO.

Despite that, Erästö says that the symbolic value of US nuclear weapons in Europe persists, underlining the transatlantic bond amid growing anxieties over Russian militarization and a possible spread of the Ukraine war into Europe.

Erästö also questions the idea of a limited nuclear war, pointing out the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any nuclear weapon use.

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Two Sessions: China touts openness while tightening control

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Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) speaks to Premier Li Qiang at the opening of the NPC, or National People's Congress, at the Great Hall of the People on March 5, 2024 in Beijing, ChinaGetty Images
By Tessa Wong
Asia Digital Reporter

The National People’s Congress is usually capped off by the premier’s press conference. But this year, and for the rest of the term, the tradition has been mysteriously nixed.

Officials have said there was no need for it given there were other opportunities for journalists to ask questions. But many observers saw it as another sign of consolidation and control, in what became a running theme for the congress, even as top officials preached openness.

The cancellation of the press conference also effectively diminishes Premier Li Qiang’s profile. Though the event was scripted, it was a rare chance for foreign journalists to ask questions and gave the country’s second-in-command some room to flex his muscles.

In years past, it even yielded some unexpected moments. In 2020 then-premier Li Keqiang disclosed figures that stoked debate over a government claim that they had eradicated poverty.

The dimming of the spotlight on the premier, along with a shorter congress this year, are all signs of ongoing structural change within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) where President Xi Jinping is increasingly accumulating power at the expense of other individuals and institutions, noted Alfred Wu, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore who studies Chinese governance.

But to the outside world, the party is keen on projecting a different kind of image as it battles dwindling foreign investor confidence and a general malaise in its economy.

Addressing international journalists last week, foreign minister Wang Yi insisted China was still an attractive place to invest in and do business.

“China remains strong as an engine for growth. The ‘next China’ is still China,” he said, before citing ways in which “China is opening its door wider”.

This year’s economic blueprint, delivered by Mr Li at the start of the session, laid out plans to open up more areas to foreign investment and reducing market access restrictions in sectors such as manufacturing and services.

These moves come after foreign investors were spooked by recent anti-espionage and data protection laws, as well as several sudden high-profile detentions of Chinese and foreign businessmen. Foreign direct investment in China recently fell to a 30-year low.

“There are fewer political checks and balances, there is no transparency. This is the bigger concern for investors… you cannot predict what’s going to happen, so you avoid the risk,” said Dr Wu.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi speaks during a press conference for domestic and foreign journalists as part of the National People's Congress and Two Sessions on March 7, 2024 in Beijing.

Getty Images

But last week Mr Wang dismissed such concerns. “Spreading pessimistic views on China will end up harming oneself. Misjudging China will result in missed opportunities,” he said, as he focused on talking up China’s prospects.

Both Mr Wang and Mr Li repeatedly used buzzwords like “high quality development” and “new productive forces” to signal a new stage in China’s development, though neither fully explained what they meant. China is aiming to hit an ambitious goal of around 5% GDP growth this year.

“Beijing is changing how it opens to the world,” said Neil Thomas, a fellow in Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

He said it is now focused on attracting high-end foreign technology and advanced manufacturing operations to help Chinese companies in key future industries.

“Foreign investment and trade are less important for China’s economy than they once were, but Beijing still wants to avoid a rush to the exits that could further shake its growth prospects.”

An employee works at a permanent magnet motor workshop of Shengli Oilfield Shuntian Energy Saving Technology Co., Ltd. on March 6, 2024 in Dongying, Shandong Province of China.

Getty Images

At the same time, officials were keen to emphasise the government’s ultimate goal.

“Stability is of overall importance, as it is the basis for everything we do,” said Mr Li. Elsewhere in his report, he made it clear that while China pursues growth, it would also prioritise greater national security.

Some may question how successfully China can achieve a thriving open economy while increasing control.

But “from Beijing’s perspective, there is no contradiction between high-quality development, especially with foreign investment, and greater security needs,” said Jacob Gunter, lead analyst with Merics specialising in China’s economy.

For instance, when it comes to critical technologies where Chinese firms have yet to catch up, it would want to ensure as much of it as possible is produced within its borders, pointed out Mr Gunter. This reduces the risk of rivals – such as the US and its allies – stealing the technology or blocking their exports to China.

Beijing also signalled it would continue to clamp down on problematic areas in its economy, such as the floundering real estate sector and ballooning local government debts.

Mr Li promised more measures to defuse financial risks and improve supervision, and pledged to crack down on illegal financial activities.

While these problems have existed for several years, “the debt levels and size of the property bubble have gotten big enough that they have to solve it now and can’t back off”, said Mr Gunter.

“The economy is performing really poorly right now. The fact that they haven’t gone back to kicking this can down the road signals this is a longer term priority and not something they will back off on.”

As China’s annual parliamentary sitting comes to a close after a hectic week of meetings, a glaring void looms on Monday’s final agenda.

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Hayao Miyazaki scoops second Oscar with The Boy And The Heron

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Celebrated Japanese animator Hayao Miyazaki won his second Oscar on Sunday (Mar 11) with The Boy And The Heron – the Studio Ghibli co-founder’s first film in a decade, and potentially his last.

It bested top rival Spider-Man: Across The Spider-Verse, Disney’s Elemental, Netflix’s Nimona and the dialogue-free Robot Dreams. Miyazaki was not present in Los Angeles to accept the award.

The film, about a boy who moves to the countryside during World War II, won best animated feature, the same award scooped in 2003 by Miyazaki’s Spirited Away.

Like other Ghibli titles, The Boy And The Heron is a visual feast in which mysterious creatures and strange characters cavort through a fantastical world.

After his mother dies in the haunting fire-bombing of Tokyo during World War II, the boy, Mahito, struggles to accept his new life with his father and pregnant stepmother, who goes missing.

Everything changes when Mahito meets a talking heron and embarks on a journey to an alternate universe shared by the living and the dead.

The film’s rural setting was “created mostly from my memory”, Miyazaki said in a Japanese pamphlet for The Boy And The Heron, whose original title translates as How Do You Live?.

Miyazaki, 83, also lived in a big country house during the war.

And while he did not set out to make an autobiography, the film’s father character “is very much like my own father”, he said.

The animator co-founded production house Studio Ghibli in 1985, building a cult following with his highly imaginative depictions of nature and machines.

Ghibli characters, like cuddly forest spirit Totoro and princess warrior Nausicaa, are now beloved by children and adults worldwide.

Spirited Away is about a girl who gets lost in a mystical world where her parents, who she tries to save, are turned into pigs.

FINAL FILM? 

In 2013, Miyazaki said he would no longer make feature-length films, because he could not maintain the hectic intensity of his perfectionist work ethic.

However, in an about-turn four years later, his production company said he was coming out of retirement to make what would be “his final film, considering his age”.

That was The Boy And The Heron, which was released in Japan last July without trailers or other advertising, meaning cinema audiences had little idea of what to expect.

The movie was nonetheless a box office success in Japan and reached number one in North America, where it was promoted as usual.

A star-studded cast voiced the English dub, featuring Robert Pattinson as the heron alongside Willem Dafoe, Florence Pugh, Christian Bale and Mark Hamill.

In a documentary aired by Japanese public broadcaster NHK in December, Miyazaki was visibly affected by the 2018 death of his Ghibli co-founder Isao Takahata.

The animation master said he had based the character of the granduncle in The Boy And The Heron on Takahata, with whom he shared a “love-hate relationship”.

“The truth about life isn’t shiny, or righteous. It contains everything, including the grotesque,” Miyazaki said.

“It’s time to create a work by pulling up things hidden deep within myself.”

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‘It is all about Xi’: Double-edged sword for China as President Xi Jinping rewrites rulebook again, say analysts

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Separately, a sweeping anti-corruption effort driven by President Xi since taking power more than a decade ago has sustained its momentum, standing out both for its sweeping reach and how far up the ranks it has stretched.

The highest-profile casualty was Zhou Yongkang, who was brought down early on in the graft-busting effort. Before his downfall in 2012, he was a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member and national security chief. 

Zhou’s case shattered the taboo against investigating retired members of the PSC, breaking an unspoken rule – known in Chinese as “xing bu shang chang wei” – of letting them enjoy their golden years in peace.

More recently, in terms of the numbers, the Global Times reported in 2022 that the anti-graft watchdog had punished some 4.7 million people as of April that year.

That the anti-corruption drive has endured till now is a testament to Mr Xi’s growing influence over the party and state, say analysts.

From the perspective of the party elite, the political status quo also affords more stability, Dr Lim Tai Wei, an adjunct senior fellow at NUS’ East Asian Institute, told CNA.

“(To them), there is certainty in the command structures, and less avenue for alternative lobbying capacity or rival factional strife,” added Dr Lim.

A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?

But centralising power under the party and Mr Xi is a double-edged sword, observers note.

“In some ways, looking at the People’s Republic of China politics is easier. It is all about Xi,” said NUS’ Dr Chong.

“However, that also means decision-making processes are more opaque and subject to the whims of one person.”

Similarly, Mr Lye from ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute told CNA the moves have made it more challenging to access or understand China’s politics and policies, especially for the outside world.

“Issues which can be readily understood or addressed by approaching it from a purely technocratic or problem-solving approach have now given way to a higher order priority that includes maintaining the Party’s primacy in various fields and upholding national security,” he added.

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Xi Jinping: China’s president of precedents and new norms, but at what cost?

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Separately, a sweeping anti-corruption effort driven by President Xi since taking power more than a decade ago has sustained its momentum, standing out both for its sweeping reach and how far up the ranks it has stretched.

The highest-profile casualty was Zhou Yongkang, who was brought down early on in the graft-busting effort. Before his downfall in 2012, he was a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member and national security chief. 

Zhou’s case shattered the taboo against investigating retired members of the PSC, breaking an unspoken rule – known in Chinese as “xing bu shang chang wei” – of letting them enjoy their golden years in peace.

More recently, in terms of the numbers, the Global Times reported in 2022 that the anti-graft watchdog had punished some 4.7 million people as of April that year.

That the anti-corruption drive has endured till now is a testament to Mr Xi’s growing influence over the party and state, say analysts.

From the perspective of the party elite, the political status quo also affords more stability, Dr Lim Tai Wei, an adjunct senior fellow at NUS’ East Asian Institute, told CNA.

“(To them), there is certainty in the command structures, and less avenue for alternative lobbying capacity or rival factional strife,” added Dr Lim.

A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?

But centralising power under the party and Mr Xi is a double-edged sword, observers note.

“In some ways, looking at the People’s Republic of China politics is easier. It is all about Xi,” said NUS’ Dr Chong.

“However, that also means decision-making processes are more opaque and subject to the whims of one person.”

Similarly, Mr Lye from ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute told CNA the moves have made it more challenging to access or understand China’s politics and policies, especially for the outside world.

“Issues which can be readily understood or addressed by approaching it from a purely technocratic or problem-solving approach have now given way to a higher order priority that includes maintaining the Party’s primacy in various fields and upholding national security,” he added.

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Maldives: Indian troops to exit country as China gains foothold

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Maldives' President Mohamed Muizzu speaks during the World Government Summit in Dubai on 13 February 2024Getty Images
By Anbarasan Ethirajan
BBC News

India is set to pull its first batch of military personnel from the Maldives on Sunday as the island nation moves closer to China.

The phased withdrawal of about 80 Indian troops must meet a May deadline set by President Mohamed Muizzu, who is widely seen to be pro-China.

India has said its military personnel were stationed in the Maldives to maintain and operate two rescue and reconnaissance helicopters and a small aircraft it had donated years ago. Removing Indian troops was an election promise made by Mr Muizzu, who came to power in November.

India has long wielded influence over the Maldives, whose strategic location in its backyard allowed it to monitor a crucial part of the Indian Ocean. But the relationship between the countries has soured over the past few months, partly due to Mr Muizzu’s strong rhetoric against Delhi. It’s a gap China is looking to exploit as the Asian powers jostle for influence in the region.

Even then, Delhi and Male (the capital of the Maldives) managed to agree that Indian civilian technical staff would replace military troops to operate the aircraft – the first team has already reached the islands.

“The aircraft will remain in the Maldives, and Indian [civilian] personnel will continue to be there to maintain them. So both sides seem to have reached a compromise,” says Shyam Saran, a former Indian foreign secretary.

Some in the Maldives see the replacement of troops by civilians as a climbdown by Mr Muizzu after his high-voltage ‘India Out’ campaign.

Mr Muizzu’s office did not respond to requests for comment.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu attend a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China 10 January 2024.

Reuters

Some analysts warn that the Maldives, a nation of just over half a million people, faces the risk of being caught up in the Asian power rivalry.

China has loaned more than a billion dollars to the Maldives over the years, mostly for infrastructure and economic development.

Both Beijing and Male elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership in January when Mr Muizzu went to China on a state visit – he is yet to visit India, unlike previous Maldivian leaders.

Earlier this week, the Maldivian government signed a “military assistance” agreement with China that has caused some concern in Delhi.

The Maldivian defence ministry said the agreement was “gratis” (without payment) without providing more details. But addressing a public meeting on Tuesday, Mr Muizzu said China would offer non-lethal weapons for free as well as train the Maldivian security forces (both India and the US have trained the Maldivian military so far).

“This is unprecedented. It’s the first time the Maldives has signed a defence agreement with Beijing to provide military assistance,” Azim Zahir, a Maldivian political analyst, told the BBC.

“We knew that Mr Muizzu would forge closer ties with China in terms of investment and capital, but no one expected him to go to this extent,” he said.

But Beijing denies having any long-term military plans in the Maldives.

“It’s a normal relationship between two countries. If China wants to have a military presence in the Indian Ocean, maybe it has better choices than the Maldives,” says Dr Long Xingchun, president of the Chengdu Institute of World Affairs think-tank.

People conduct business and stand outside of the bank of Maldives during the daily life in Male, Maldives on December 05, 2023.

Getty Images

Despite Beijing’s assurances, many believe that China is moving swiftly to take advantage as the previous government, led by President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, had an “India-first” approach.

During his election campaign, Mr Muizzu had accused the previous administration of not disclosing the fine print of Male’s agreements with Delhi. He now faces similar criticism.

“We don’t have any details of most of the agreements he signed during his visit to Beijing. Mr Muizzu is no better than the previous government when it comes to disclosing details of such accords,” says Mr Zahir.

Last month, Mr Muizzu’s administration allowed a Chinese research ship, Xiang Yang Hong 3, to dock at Male despite opposition from Delhi. Male argued that it was a port call “for rotation of personnel and replenishment”.

But that did not convince some Indian experts who feared it may be a mission to collect data which could be used by the Chinese military later in submarine operations.

Amid the ongoing irritants in relations, Delhi has commissioned a new naval base in the Indian archipelago Lakshadweep, close to the Maldives.

India's naval base at the Minicoy Island close to the Maldives

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The Indian navy said the INS Jatayu in the Minicoy island would enhance its efforts in “anti-piracy and anti-narcotics operations in the Western Arabian Sea”.

While some have read it as a message to Male, Indian experts say the move is not a response to the current tensions.

“I don’t think that is something new. As far as I am aware, this has been in the works for some time,” said Mr Saran, the former Indian diplomat.

Mr Muizzu’s anti-India moves have also worried many in his country. The Maldives depends on India for imports of essential food items, medicines and construction material. Post the Covid pandemic, India was also sending the highest number of tourists to the Maldives.

But this has changed after a recent controversy which led to a social media call for Indians to “boycott” the Maldives after some officials made controversial comments about Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The controversy broke while Mr Muizzu was in Beijing, and he asked Chinese authorities to start sending more tourists to regain the top spot the country held before the pandemic.

Since then, Chinese tourists have started visiting in sizeable numbers. According to tourism ministry data, of the nearly 400,000 tourists who visited the Maldives in the first two months of the year, 13% were from China. India has slipped to the fifth position.

Some also expect Mr Muizzu’s rhetoric to intensify as the parliamentary elections on 21 April draw closer and he aims for a majority in the house.

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