Commentary: A possible Trump win muddies an already-chaotic economic debate in China

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WILL BEIJING’S PRIORITIES CHANGE?

Until recently, Xi’s stimulus was entirely a domestic affair.

Ministry-level officials have promised the largest one-time debt swap in recent years to improve municipal finances. The state will also buy unsold housing to stabilise property prices, as well as boost banks’ capital buffer to increase their willingness to lend in a weak economy.

All these are sensible blueprints to lift China out of deflation. 

But a Trump win can change Beijing’s priorities again. His hawkish rhetoric on Chinese imports, as well as the wide latitude that the US president enjoys in setting and imposing tariffs, directly threatens Xi’s ultimate passion of transforming China into a high-end manufacturing powerhouse.

China has certainly reacted to Trump’s moves before. After Huawei was placed on the US trade blacklist in 2019, state resources were poured into industrial upgrades. Huawei alone received over US$1 billion in government grants last year, more than quadruple the amount in 2019, in part a reflection that President Joe Biden has furthered Trump’s tough trade policies. 

Bank lending to industrial firms has also soared in that time; meanwhile, real estate developers are struggling to refinance. In July, the government said it would spend 300 billion yuan (US$42 billion) to expand an existing trade-in and equipment upgrade programme as a way to boost consumption but also to absorb industrial production.

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BRICS+ wants new world order sans shared values or identity – Asia Times

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The last two summits of BRICS countries have raised questions about the coalition’s identity and purpose. This began to come into focus at the summit hosted by South Africa in 2023, and more acutely at the recent 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia.

At both events the alliance undertook to expand its membership. In 2023, the first five Brics members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – invited Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join.

All bar Saudi Arabia have now done so. The 2024 summit pledged to admit 13 more, perhaps as associates or “partner countries.”

On paper, the nine-member BRICS+ strikes a powerful pose. It has a combined population of about 3.5 billion, or 45% of the world’s people. Combined, its economies are worth more than US$28.5 trillion – about 28% of the global economy. With Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as members, BRICS+ produces about 44% of the world’s crude oil.

Based on my research and policy advice to African foreign policy decision-makers, I would argue that there are three possible interpretations of the purpose of BRICS+.

  • A club of self-interested members – a kind of Global South cooperative. What I’d label as a self-help organization.
  • A reforming bloc with a more ambitious goal of improving the workings of the current global order.
  • A disrupter, preparing to replace the Western-dominated liberal world order.

Analyzing the commitments that were made at the meeting in Russia, I would argue that BRICS+ sees itself more as a self-interested reformer. It represents the thinking among Global South leaders about the nature of the global order and the possibilities of shaping a new order.

This, as the world moves away from the financially dominant, yet declining Western order (in terms of moral influence) led by the US. The move is to a multipolar order in which the East plays a leading role.

However, the ability of BRICS+ to exploit such possibilities is constrained by its make-up and internal inconsistencies. These include a contested identity, incongruous values and lack of resources to convert political commitments into actionable plans.

Summit outcomes

The trend towards closer trade and financial cooperation and coordination stands out as a major achievement of the Kazan summit. Other achievements pertain to global governance and counterterrorism.

When it comes to trade and finance, the final communiqué said the following had been agreed:

  • adoption of local currencies in trade and financial transactions. The Kazan Declaration notes the benefits of faster, low-cost, more efficient, transparent, safe and inclusive cross-border payment instruments. The guiding principle would be minimal trade barriers and non-discriminatory access.
  • establishment of a cross-border payment system. The declaration encourages correspondent banking networks within BRICS and enables settlements in local currencies in line with the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative. This is voluntary and nonbinding and is to be discussed further.
  • creation of enhanced roles for the New Development Bank, such as promoting infrastructure and sustainable development.
  • a proposed BRICS Grain Exchange, to improve food security through enhanced trade in agricultural commodities.

All nine BRICS+ countries committed themselves to the principles of the UN Charter – peace and security, human rights, the rule of law, and development – primarily as a response to the Western unilateral sanctions.

The summit emphasised that dialogue and diplomacy should prevail over conflict in, among other places, the Middle East, Sudan, Haiti and Afghanistan.

Faultlines and tensions

Despite the positive tone of the Kazan declaration, there are serious structural fault lines and tensions inherent in the architecture and behavior of BRICS+. These might limit its ambitions to be a meaningful change agent.

The members don’t even agree on the definition of BRICS+. President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa calls it a platform. Others talk of a group (Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi) or a family (Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jianan).

So what could it be? BRICS+ is state-driven – with civil society on the margins. It reminds one of the African Union, which pays lip service to citizens’ engagement in decision-making.

One possibility is that it will evolve into an intergovernmental organization with a constitution that establishes its agencies, functions and purposes. Examples include the World Health Organization, the African Development Bank and the UN General Assembly.

But it would need to cohere around shared values. What would they be?

Critics point out that BRICS+ consists of democracies (South Africa, Brazil, India), a theocracy (Iran), monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia) and authoritarian dictatorships (China, Russia).

For South Africa, this creates a domestic headache. At the Kazan summit, its president declared Russia a friend and ally. At home, its coalition partner in the government of national unity, the Democratic Alliance, declared Ukraine as a friend and ally.

There are also marked differences over issues such as the reform of the United Nations. For example, at the recent UN Summit of the Future the consensus was for reform of the UN Security Council. But will China and Russia, as permanent Security Council members, agree to more seats, with veto rights, on the council?

As for violent conflict, humanitarian crises, corruption and crime, there is little from the Kazan summit that suggests agreement around action.

Unity of purpose

What about shared interests? A number of BRICS+ members and partner countries maintain close trade ties with the West, which regards Russia and Iran as enemies and China as a global threat.

Some, such as India and South Africa, use the foreign policy notions of strategic ambiguity or active non-alignment to mask the reality of trading with east, west, north and south.

The harsh truth of international relations is there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. The BRICS+ alliance will most likely cohere as a Global South co-operative, with an innovative self-help agenda but be reluctant to overturn the current global order from which it desires to benefit more equitably.

Trade-offs and compromises might be necessary to ensure “unity of purpose.” It’s not clear that this loose alliance is close to being able to achieve that.

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is professor of international and diplomacy studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South Africa

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Strategic vision

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Mr Uthai has been instrumental in fostering strategic partnerships that have expanded Sansiri's growth, both domestically and internationally. Varuth Hirunyatheb
Mr Uthai has been instrumental in fostering strategic partnerships that have expanded Sansiri’s growth, both domestically and internationally. Varuth Hirunyatheb

Uthai Uthaisangsuk has been instrumental in leading SET-listed developer Sansiri Plc to record-breaking performances over the past three to four years, particularly during the pandemic period, notably adopting a “speed to market” strategy.

In early 2020 when Covid-19 first started to spread, nobody knew how long the impact would last. Yet Sansiri quickly made decisive moves, especially as the condo segment was facing obstacles.

At the time, the company held a substantial inventory of condos valued at around 20 billion baht, most of which were ready-to-move-in units. Sansiri was the first to launch special promotional discounts on these properties.

While this meant sacrificing some profit, it provided crucial cash flow during a stagnant market.

Despite the pandemic in 2020, Sansiri reported 30.6 billion baht in revenue from residential sales, a 60% increase from 19.1 billion baht in 2019.

This surge was primarily driven by condo sales, which more than doubled from 5.36 billion baht to 12.1 billion baht.

Though residential sales revenue dipped to 26.17 billion baht in 2021, it rebounded to 30.71 billion baht in 2022 and climbed to 32.83 billion baht in 2023.

Last year, the company recorded 49 billion baht in presales and 39 billion baht in consolidated revenue, both new highs.

Net profit also grew consistently, improving from 1.67 billion baht in 2020 to 2 billion baht in 2021, 4.28 billion baht in 2022 and reaching an all-time high of 6 billion baht last year.

Net profit margins improved from 4.8% in 2020 to 6.82% in 2021, 12.23% in 2022 and 15.51% in 2023.

“Speed to market was the key strategy that helped us navigate through 2020-21,” said Mr Uthai, Sansiri’s president, who has been awarded Bangkok Post CEO of the Year 2024 award in the residential development sector.

Sansiri has continued to rely on this strategy, maintaining agility and competitiveness in the face of various market challenges.

This approach has enabled the company to swiftly adapt to changing conditions, ensuring a steady and healthy cash flow.

In August 2024, the company announced that it would sell its 71% stake in US-based lifestyle hotel group Standard International Holdings, LLC, to the Hyatt Group for US$355 million.

This move once again demonstrates Sansiri’s speed and agility in strengthening its financial position during a time when the residential market appears sluggish and the debenture market remains unfavourable due to recent defaults by several companies.

Sansiri has debentures totalling 11 billion baht due in the next six months, with 4.9 billion baht maturing in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 6.1 billion baht due in February next year.

In terms of overall business performance, Sansiri recorded 37 billion baht in presales in the first nine months, or 71% of its annual target of 52 billion baht.

Its transfers have reached 31 billion baht, accounting for 72% of the milestone set at 43 billion baht.

“Speed will be impossible without a solid foundation,” said Mr Uthai, who was appointed Sansiri’s president in February this year after Srettha Thavisin resigned last year to become a prime ministerial candidate.

“One of our foundational strengths is our attention to detail, along with a focus on quality and after-sales service, which we have maintained throughout our 40 years,” he said.

Mr Uthai, who was previously chief operating officer, has over 30 years of extensive experience in property development and investment.

Known for his sharp market insight and strategic vision, he has played a key role in many of Sansiri’s landmark projects.

Under his leadership, Sansiri has launched iconic luxury developments, including the renowned 98 Wireless on Wireless Road.

This achievement cemented Sansiri’s reputation for quality and innovation in the high-end property market.

Mr Uthai has also been instrumental in fostering strategic partnerships that have expanded Sansiri’s growth, both domestically and internationally.

These include JVs with partners such as BTS Group for transit-oriented developments and Japan’s Tokyu Corporation for low-rise and high-rise projects.

Beyond real estate, he has been proactive in diversifying Sansiri’s business portfolio, venturing into promising sectors like hospitality, financial services and clean energy.

This strategic expansion not only drives business growth but also aligns with the company’s long-term vision for sustainability.

His commitment to sustainability is a driving force behind Sansiri’s ongoing initiatives.

Under his leadership, Sansiri became the first real estate developer in Thailand to pledge to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

His vision for sustainability encompasses creating impactful environmental changes, ensuring Sansiri remains a pioneering force in the industry’s green transition.

Uthai Uthaisangsuk

President of Sansiri Public Company Limited

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Japan’s LDP rocked and roiled in an election earthquake – Asia Times

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As political miscalculations go, it’s hard to top Shigeru Ishiba’s decision to hold a snap election Sunday, just 30 days after his own shock rise to Japan’s premiership.

Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost its majority for only the third time since 1955. But this latest indignity for a party that long took for granted the priorities of Japan’s 125 million people could be the most impactful yet.

Ishiba’s blunder, and the political upheaval it’s causing, come amid a bewildering array of headwinds zooming the nation’s way.

They include slowing growth at home, China’s downshift, North Korea’s provocations and the increasing odds Americans will return Donald Trump and his trade wars to the White House.

It comes as Japanese inflation outpaces wages at a moment when the Bank of Japan mulls whether to continue hiking interest rates. It comes as investors assess whether the Nikkei 225 Stock Average’s surge to record highs is sustainable as policy instability reigns in Tokyo.

At the very least, Ishiba seems more destined than ever for short-timer status as Japanese leader following Sunday’s disastrous election showing for his LDP.

“Japan now enters a period of political uncertainty about whether a new coalition government can be formed,” says David Boling, analyst at Eurasia Group. Economist Takeshi Yamaguchi at Morgan Stanley MUFG adds that “political uncertainty will remain high in the near term.”

Granted, one silver lining for the LDP is that opposition parties didn’t join forces to win a majority or cobble together a governing coalition. Yet the best-case scenario for the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito is to find additional seats via a third party.

Still the damage has been done, particularly to Ishiba and his ability to retain the premiership or claim he has a mandate to lead.

Though predecessor Fumio Kishida stuck around for three years and mentor Shinzo Abe lasted nearly eight, most Japanese prime ministers get 12 months to make their mark – and most don’t.

Chalk it up to leaders spending so much time keeping their jobs there’s no time to do their jobs. The cycle, especially prevalent since the mid-1990s, seems certain to come for Ishiba. Even before Sunday’s repudiation from voters, Ishiba had suffered one of the most precipitous drops in public approval political observers had ever seen.

In late September, when Ishiba shocked the political establishment by navigating past the two front runners for the premiership, Ishiba enjoyed support rates north of 50%. But after four weeks of policy U-turns and managerial chaos, his numbers fell into the 20s.

That’s far from what Kishida had expected when he stepped aside last month. With his own approval in the low 20s amid scandals and soft economic conditions, Kishida opted to let his party head into Sunday’s contest with a fresh face.

It surprised many that this meant swapping one 67-year-old conservative with another. Ishiba’s man-of-the-people persona led LDP bigwigs to hope he might revive the party’s image.

Instead, reality caught up with Ishiba – and fast. For years, Boling notes, Ishiba polled very favorably with the public.

He benefited from being seen as an outsider within the LDP because he was willing to criticize the party. That made him unpopular with many LDP lawmakers but popular with the public.

But “since becoming prime minister, he has made some missteps that have opened him to attack,” Boling notes. That Sunday’s results mean Ishiba is “weakened” and that the “odds would be against him rebounding.”

If Ishiba does stay in, he’ll be busy struggling to save his premiership. Odds are he’ll be too preoccupied to address the economic headwinds racing Japan’s way.

Chief among them is an economy fast losing altitude. This might come as quite a surprise to LDP elders who encouraged Kishida to stand down.

Back in mid-September, when these machinations were in motion, the party figured the economy was on sound footing.

At the time, the Nikkei index was testing all-time highs amid stable economic growth, 10 years of corporate governance reforms were gaining traction and hopes were high that wages gains would accelerate.

Earlier this year, labor unions scored the biggest wage bump in 33 years. That fueled optimism that the “virtuous cycle” Tokyo had craved for decades had arrived.

All this encouraged the BOJ to begin exiting 25 years of zero interest rates and quantitative easing. On July 31, BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda’s team hiked short-term rates to 0.25%, the highest since 2008. That sent the yen skyrocketing.

Since then, a clear deceleration in retail sales, exports, industrial production, machine tool orders and other sectors has Team Ueda hitting the pause button on additional tightening moves.

It also had Ishida’s government pivoting to the kinds of short-term stimulus maneuvers he claimed his government would avoid. A long-time fiscal hawk, Ishiba also was a proponent of higher rates and a stronger yen. Not anymore.

Ishiba’s reversal on these and other policies has sent the yen tumbling past the 150-to-the-dollar mark. It’s also generating increased volatility in Japanese government bond yields.

For one thing, Ishiba’s government having to rely on opposition parties to retain power makes it harder to champion fiscal consolidation and monetary liquidity normalization. For another, the clock is now ticking faster and faster for Japanese leaders to act on implementing economic reforms.

The LDP’s stumble could not be worse timed for Asia’s second-biggest economy. The export boost on which Tokyo was betting is in growing doubt as Chinese growth slows. China is slow-walking moves to address a property crisis that many compare to Japan’s 1990s bad-loan debacle.

Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management, notes that Beijing is “trying to talk the talk, with more noise about stabilizing the property market.” Generally speaking, though, Innes says, “China’s property mess isn’t something that can be patched up with a few speeches and half-baked measures.”

Macquarie Bank economist Larry Hu adds that measures taken so far “may not be enough to turn the housing market around.”

Meanwhile, Germany’s recession weighs on Europe’s prospects. The US is showing signs of wear. The geopolitical environment is hardly ideal as Middle East tensions flare and Russia’s Ukraine invasion drags on.

The rising odds that Trump might be re-elected on November 5 to supersize trade wars is a major source of global uncertainty.

Amid such uncertainty, investors have valid reasons to question Tokyo’s ability to get the reform process back on track. In the 12 years since the LDP returned to power, few big-picture upgrades have been implemented.

In 2012, the Prime Minister Abe pledged to modernize labor markets, reduce bureaucracy, increase innovation and productivity, empower women and strengthen corporate governance. Abe succeeded with this last endeavor.

The Nikkei’s surge to record highs is partly a result of steps to increase returns on equity, give shareholders a louder voice and diversify boardrooms. It’s also the result of ultra-low interest rates.

Yet surging stocks have meant little to the average Japanese household. Wages have generally lagged the rate of inflation. Japan ranks 30th among the 38 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members in productivity.

What so-called Abenomics did, ultimately, was prove that “trickle-down economics” still doesn’t work. And that sporadic stimulus packages don’t alter economic trajectories nearly as much as structural changes. Now, the clock is already ticking as Japan’s latest government inherits a uniquely lopsided economic trajectory.

On the one hand, the inflation Tokyo had been craving for 25 years is here. And the BOJ is finally trying to normalize a super-aggressive interest-rate regime. On the other, that very rising-price dynamic is wrecking household and business confidence. It makes Japan the economic equivalent of the dog that caught the car. Consumers find themselves missing deflation, which many viewed as a stealth tax cut.

This balancing act proved too much for Kishida, who took power in early October 2021. Ostensibly, Kishida’s dismal approval ratings reflected political funding scandals within his LDP. In reality, it was mostly an underperforming economy that ended his tenure.

Like his mentor Abe, Kishida did himself no favors by prioritizing foreign policy over reforms. Ishiba, a former defense minister, irked voters by appearing to do the same. An old-school China hawk who favors creating an “Asian NATO,” Ishiba seemed more interested in creating a bulwark against Beijing than tackling kitchen-table issues.

Now, with political winds shifting, Tokyo seems even more captive to events in Beijing and Washington.

Recently, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s government conceded that the globe’s No 2 economy is in trouble.

Earlier this month, Beijing unveiled aggressive stimulus measures to support an economy grappling with a deepening property crisis. The People’s Bank of China announced its first simultaneous cut in key short-term rates and banks’ reserve requirements since at least 2015.

Mainland stocks have tried to rally on the news. And PBOC Governor Pan Gongsheng is hinting at further cuts in the amount of cash banks must hold as reserves.

The faster Beijing puts a floor under the economy, the more Japan’s prospects will improve. China is by far Japan’s biggest trading partner. Having the top customer for your goods battling deflation is rarely a plus for economic confidence.

On top of that, the specter of Trump trade 2.0 is keeping many Tokyo officials up at night. Preparing for a Trump or Kamala Harris administration will be a major preoccupation for LDP officials. Yet not as great as figuring out whether the nation’s dominant party can find a way forward. With, or without, Ishiba in the mix.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Social healing with conditions

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Teerayut: Lodge crucial petitions
Teerayut: Lodge crucial petitions

Just because something is dormant, it doesn’t mean it’s dead. That was how sceptics described efforts in parliament to push through an bill granting amnesty to political offenders in the name of social healing after years of bitter divisions in the country.

These efforts have reached the stage where an ad hoc House committee has finalised a study on the design of the amnesty bill, which has run into problems over whether offenders of Section 112 of the Criminal Code, or the lese majeste law, should be granted an amnesty too.

Critics have argued that most lese majeste offenders, particularly those charged in connection with the youth-led protest movement in recent years, are facing the consequences for defaming the monarch, which is a criminal offence and for that reason, they should be punished.

A source noted only two parties, the ruling Pheu Thai Party and the main opposition People’s Party (PP), backed an amnesty covering lese majeste law violators.

No other parties have stepped forward to support them.

Even the opposition Thai Sang Thai Party has warned that including Section 112 violators among amnesty beneficiaries would derail the law’s original goal of absolving political offenders.

Critics have chastised Pheu Thai and the PP for having a vested interest in making an “all-in” amnesty law a reality.

Pheu Thai’s alleged de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, was arraigned on June 18 on lese majeste and computer crime charges, which stem from comments he made during an interview with the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo on May 21, 2015.

Thaksin allegedly defamed the monarchy by claiming privy councillors supported the 2014 military coup that ousted his younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra.

Thaksin was released on 500,000-baht bail and is prohibited from leaving the country without court permission.

The PP, on the other hand, has a lot riding on the youth-led protest leaders and members — several of whom are being tried or were convicted on multiple lese majesty counts — being amnestied.

The movement trumpets reform and advocates radical changes to Section 112, deemed by conservatives as vital for defending the monarchy. The reforms sought by the protest group, which commands a large student and young voter following, are closely aligned, if not identical, to those of the Move Forward Party (MFP), which was dissolved for allegedly attempting to overthrow the constitutional monarchy. The MFP was reborn as the PP.

The source said the PP stands to gain more than it loses from having youth-led protest leaders exonerated with an amnesty law.

The party, through successive dissolutions of its predecessors going right back to the Future Forward Party, could be running out of luminaries among its leadership, who exude magnetism and the calibre needed to maintain and expand the PP’s support ahead of the next general election in three years.

Leaders of the youth movement, such as former human rights lawyer Anon Nampa, currently jailed on a lese majeste charge, could fill a void in the party, according to the source.

However, some observers have argued that admitting protest figures to a political party has significant risks. For one, there is no telling if, after an exoneration, they will insult the monarchy again, which could cause the party’s downfall.

Many observers believe the prospect of Section 112 offenders being incorporated into an amnesty bill that will be passed by parliament is very slim, and the Senate is unlikely to support it.

A credible gauge of the Senate’s stance on the issue may be the Bhumjaithai Party’s position not to support an amnesty law covering lese majeste offenders. After all, some 150 of the 200 senators have been labelled as having a “blue” affiliation. Blue is the colour of Bhumjaithai.

As resistance mounts against the amnesty push in parliament, the House study panel has delayed tabling its report on the bill to lawmakers for consideration.

The PP and Pheu Thai are pushing for an amnesty to be accepted by parliament. However, the push is stalled pending a parliamentary debate on the study panel report.

According to the panel, there are three camps: those who want the Section 112 offence excluded from the amnesty bill, those who favour its inclusion, and those who want it included under special conditions.

Last week, the study report reached parliament, and a lengthy debate got underway, only to be cut short by Deputy House Speaker Pichet Chuamuangpan, who adjourned the session. Mr Pichet said he had to call a halt as the debate had become a drawn-out affair and inconclusive.

Nikorn Chamnong, secretary to the study committee, said the committee’s report recommends the government sponsor the amnesty bill but an amnesty should only be limited to 25 crimes.

As for Section 112, he agreed it is a delicate issue which requires deeper discussion.

Despite what some observers have interpreted as the committee’s aptness to backtrack on its commitment to have an amnesty bill enacted, the source said the moves seeking amnesty for Section 112 offenders may be losing momentum. However, they can eventually succeed as long as Pheu Thai and the PP are up for it.

The Senate may not pose a hindrance if Pheu Thai can cut an irresistible political deal with Bhumjaithai, compelling it to soften its opposition to Section 112 offenders gaining an amnesty.

Signs point to ominous times

Despite not yet accepting a petition against former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Pheu Thai Party, the Constitutional Court’s request for details from the Office of Attorney-General (OAG) is expected to create unease within the ruling party, according to political observers.

Pichet: Had to halt debate

Pichet: Had to halt debate

First, the petition in question was lodged by lawyer Teerayut Suwankesorn, who previously earned recognition for his petition asking the court to order the then Move Forward Party (MFP) to cease all activities related to the lese majeste law.

The court ruled in Mr Teerayut’s favour in January this year, and the ruling triggered a series of events that resulted in the disbandment of the MFP and political bans for the party’s executives.

Next, the accusation against Thaksin echoed those made against the MFP. Mr Teerayut also requested that the court stop Thaksin from committing actions that might undermine the constitutional monarchy by influencing the Pheu Thai Party.

Mr Teerayut outlined six key events to back his allegation against the Pheu Thai patriarch.

They covered Thaksin’s extended stay at the Police General Hospital (PGH), the government’s plan to negotiate with Cambodia over territorial claims and the Pheu Thai’s charter rewrite bid. They all involved Thaksin pulling the ruling party’s strings, according to Mr Teerayut.

The government policy statement delivered to parliament by PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, his daughter, also reflected Thaksin’s vision outlined at a forum on Aug 22.

A gathering of core coalition party figures at his Bangkok home to find a prime ministerial candidate after Srettha Thavisin was removed from office on Aug 14, and the coalition expulsion of a faction led by Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) leader Gen Prawit Wongsuwon, were examples of the influence exerted over Pheu Thai, the petitioner alleged.

And should Mr Teerayut’s claim stick, the case is shaping up to be more than just a legal battle, according to observers. It will be a fight for survival for the party and its leader, Ms Paetongtarn, who has had a more difficult start as premier than most of her predecessors.

Thanaporn Sriyakul, director of the Political and Public Policy Analysis Institute, told the Bangkok Post that the court’s action clearly demonstrates court president Nakharin Mektrairat’s commitment to supporting public scrutiny of politicians and political parties.

Mr Teerayut initially submitted the complaint with the OAG on Sept 24, asking it to investigate and forward the case to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. He went on to file the complaint directly with the court after the OAG failed to act on his request within 15 days.

According to Mr Thanaporn, the court’s request for information from the OAG can be seen as a signal that the court might step in and consider the petition itself if the OAG fails to act.

Of the six events listed by Mr Teerayut, the one surrounding Thaksin’s extended stay at the PGH can put Thaksin in a particularly tight spot, considering the court’s rulings regarding actions that undermine the constitutional monarchy, said the analyst.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was the first independent agency to look into the matter and submitted its damning findings to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) to consider further action.

The NHRC concluded that the Department of Corrections (DoC) gave privileged treatment to Thaksin, and both the DoC and the PGH helped Thaksin serve all his jail time in comfort in the PGH instead of a prison cell or in the DoC’s hospital.

Mr Thanaporn expressed scepticism about the Pheu Thai legal team’s ability to counter the allegations, saying the party rarely won cases brought before the Constitutional Court and other independent agencies.

According to the analyst, Thaksin’s only legal victory was in 2001 when the Constitutional Court ruled 8:7 in his favour to clear him of an asset concealment charge. He narrowly escaped a political ban and removal from office.

The NACC had charged Thaksin with failing to declare the transfer of shares worth more than 600 million baht to his driver, gardeners and close associates, although he did declare ownership of a 60-billion-baht stake in Shin Corporation.

“It is the only time he won a case. He can’t rely on the party’s legal team and will need to employ similar tactics [as he did in the asset concealment case] to get himself out of this situation, especially since he coined the phrase, ‘politics is the art of mystery’,” said Mr Thanaporn.

However, Pheu Thai heavyweight Chousak Sirinil said earlier that the accusation against Thaksin and the party lacked sufficient grounds to be considered actions aimed at undermining the constitutional monarchy.

Mr Chousak, who is the ruling party’s legal adviser, argued that the petitioner tried to draw a comparison between Pheu Thai’s actions and those that led to the court’s ruling against the MFP.

He insisted that the two cases were entirely different.

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Karthik Shenoy joins Bank of Singapore in transformation push | FinanceAsia

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Karthik Shenoy joined Bank of Singapore as head of platforms and transformation, chief operating office, last month.

Shenoy (pictured) reports to Bank of Singapore’s global chief operating officer Jacky Ang, and has been tasked with driving the implementation of the bank’s three year strategic plan to enhance its internal infrastructure and platforms.

Shenoy has over two decades of experience in the financial services industry, and has held senior positions in both business and technology domains. Prior to joining Bank of Singapore, Shenoy worked at Credit Suisse (now part of UBS) where he was most recently its global head of financing technology and head of Asia Pacific (Apac) wealth technology. Before that, he was head of Apac banking & lending platform and head of Apac markets platform.

He has experience across markets including Singapore, Tokyo, and Hong Kong, and has been involved in conceptualising, designing and delivering complex applications and platforms involving pricing, trade lifecycle, risk, and portfolio management domains, according to a media release.  

Ang commented: “Karthik’s exceptional combination of business acumen and technology expertise positions him well to drive the implementation of our three-year strategic plan in enhancing our infrastructure and platforms. His ability to collaborate well will also be instrumental in developing intricate client and front-office applications, which are critical deliverables of our three-year strategic plan.”

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Citi boosts Asia markets team with two hires from JP Morgan | FinanceAsia

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Citi is adding to its Asia markets team with two appointments from JP Morgan who are both set to start at Citi in December. 

Anand Goyal is set to join Citi’s FX team as head of FX institutional sales for Japan, Asia North & Australia and Asia South clusters. Based in Singapore, Goyal (pictured right) will report to Cécile Gambardella, head of sales for markets for Japan, Asia North and Australia clusters and Sam Hewson, global head of FX sales.

Goyal was previously head of macro FX (MacroX) and real money sales for Asia Pacific (Apac) at JP Morgan, where he began his career over 20 years ago, according to his LinkedIn profile. 

In addition, Hooi Wan Ng will join Citi as head of markets for Malaysia. Ng (pictured left) will report to Sue Lee, head of markets for the Asia South cluster and Vikram Singh, Citi country officer and banking head for Malaysia. She was most recently head of local corporate sales and private side sales at JP Morgan, where she has served since 2011.

The upcoming move follows the appointment of Ngo Hong Minh as head of markets and country treasurer for Vietnam who joined Citi in December 2023 from JP Morgan.

Commenting on Goyal’s appointment, Hong Kong-based Gambardella said, “As Apac’s leading markets and FX franchise, we have opportunities for growth across our network. With his extensive experience and deep understanding of regional market trends, we are well positioned to further strengthen and grow our client relationships under Anand’s leadership.”

Commenting on Ng’s appointment, Singh said: “Malaysia is a key market for Citi globally, where we are seeing strong growth across our interconnected businesses. Malaysia is at the forefront of investments, both foreign and domestic, as it continues to benefit from supply chain shifts. I’m confident under Hooi Wan’s leadership Citi’s growth momentum will continue.”

Citi’s Q3 2024 results 

 

Meanwhile, on October 15, Citigroup revealed that its net profit was $3.2 billion in the third quarter 2024, compared to net profit of $3.5 billion in Q3 2023. 

The bank said this was driven by the higher cost of credit, which was  partially offset by the higher revenues and the lower expenses.

Citigroup revenues of $20.3 billion in Q3, an increase of1%, on a reported basis. Excluding divestiture-related impacts, primarily consisting of the approximately $400 million gain from the sale of the Taiwan consumer banking business in the prior-year period, revenues were up 3%. This increase in revenues was driven by growth across all businesses.

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Xiaomi is said to have designed its own 3nm chip – Asia Times

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In: Asia, Technology

Xiaomi Inc, a Beijing-based smartphone maker, is said to have “taped out” its first 3 nanometer system-on-chip ( SoC ) processor, which is to be mass produced in the first half of 2025.

Tapeout is a term used in the semiconductor industry to describe the long-awaited point in the development operation when the final design files are kept in storage and sent for processing. It was used in the days of reel-to-reel electrical tape.

Tang Jianguo, the chief economist of Beijing Municipal Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, made the disclosure of the data on Xiaomi’s 3nm chip on Beijing Satellite TV on October 20. &nbsp,

Xiaomi’s success in chip design would be a historic milestone for China, according to Chinese media, as it would be the first 3nm device to be created by a Chinese company if the reports were accurate.

There has been no information regarding the 3nm chipset’s central processing unit ( CPU) cluster, graphic processing unit ( GPU) or architecture. &nbsp,

In an article published on Monday, a technology columnist using the pseudonym” Uncle Biao” claims that it is likely that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co ( TSMC) will manufacture the new 3nm chip in conjunction with Xiaomi and Taiwan’s MediaTek. &nbsp,

Wccftech.com, a United States-based IT tool site, says it is possible that Xiaomi may become sanctioned by the United States due to its discovery in designing 3nm cards. &nbsp,

According to the article, if Xiaomi has successfully achieved the tapeout reputation for its 3nm soc, it means that another Chinese companies, including Huawei Technologies, who has been sanctioned, can also use this processor in their products. &nbsp,

Wccftech.com reported in August that Xiaomi may release a system-on-chip computer in the first quarter of 2025, the device to be mass produced via TSMC’s N4P method, which can enhance a chip’s performance, power efficiency and transistor density. &nbsp,

US trade handles

Chinese companies have been prohibited from using the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security ( BIS ) since August 15, 2022, because it has blocked access to the country’s electronic computer-aided design (ECAD ) software, which is used by the military and aerospace defense industries for designing complex integrated circuits in a variety of applications.

Chinese analysts said at that time that the new US trade handles of electronic design automation (EDA) software would not have an immediate impact on China, which did not design 3nm chips. 

In a report released in October 2022, Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS), stated that one of the four choke points being used to stifle the Chinese chip design industry is America’s dominance of the EDA software market. &nbsp,

Other obstacles included the United States ‘ export ban on high-end AI chips, chip-making tools, and related parts to China. &nbsp,

The three leading players in the semiconductor EDA industry are Mentor Graphics, Cadence Design Systems, and Synopsys. Despite the fact that Mentor is a division of Siemens in Europe, all three have their headquarters in the US and employ the majority of their employees there. &nbsp,

A 10-year excursion

How Xiaomi gained admittance to American EDA program is a mystery. But most critics believe that the company’s chip-design systems primarily came from MediaTek. &nbsp,

In November 2014, Pinecore, a fabless chipmaker in which Xiaomi is reported to have a 51 % stake and Leadcore Technology a 49 % stake, said it decided to acquire a chip-making package called SDR1860 from Leadcore for 103 million yuan ( US$ 14.5 million ). Leadcore is a cooperative venture between MediaTek and China’s Datang Telecom Technology. &nbsp,

In 2017, Xiaomi launched its first laptop device called S1, which is an octa-core SoC. It was fabricated on TSMC’s 28nm high-performance compact plus ( 28HPC ) technology, which features high performance and low power advantages. Nevertheless, the S1 device was later found to have a major burning problem.

Xiaomi attempted to introduce a new S2 chipset in 2020, but the tape-out approach was unsuccessful and the device was unable to be used.

Xiaomi’s founder and CEO Lei Jun once said that chip design is a high-risk activity that you end up costing nothing after a lot of money. &nbsp, &nbsp,

A journalist from Yunnan, China, claims in an article published in August this year that it is important for Xiaomi to create its own chips because Qualcomm’s Chipset processors are becoming more expensive. He says the start of a fresh SoC next month is only one of Xiaomi’s techniques to try to reach self-sufficiency. &nbsp,

With a global market share of 39 %, MediaTek maintained its position as the top laptop computer manufacturer in the first quarter of this year. It shipped 1.14 billion bits, up 17 % year-on-year, during the time, according to Canalys, a global technology industry analyst. &nbsp,

Xiaomi, Samsung, and OPPO were the top three contributors, representing 23 %, 20 %, and 17 % of MediaTek’s smartphone processor shipments, respectively.

For comparison, Qualcomm’s smartphone processor shipments grew by 11 % to reach 75 million units in the first quarter, with 46 % of the shipments coming from Samsung and Xiaomi. &nbsp,

Read more: US examines whether TSMC actually cut relations with Huawei.

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Investors welcome China’s rate cuts but want fiscal catalyst – Asia Times

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One of the most drastic interventions by the People’s Bank of China ( PBOC ) in recent years is China’s slashing of its key lending rates on Monday. &nbsp,

The one-year loan prime rate ( LPR ) was reduced by 25 basis points to 3.1 %, and the five-year LPR, widely used as the benchmark for mortgages, fell by a similar margin to 3.6 %. &nbsp,

For global investors, this news could n’t come at a better time. The second-largest economy in the world has experienced slow growth, mostly as a result of a combination of negative pressures, deflationary pressures, and weak consumer demand.

These rate reduces underscore the necessity of Chinese politicians ‘ efforts to revive a growth trend that has been sluggish for decades. &nbsp,

For traders, this is a pleasant walk. Lower borrowing costs should help businesses and households, bringing in new liquidity and regaining the economic speed that has been severely lacking. &nbsp,

However, while monetary easing will undoubtedly be a powerful lever, it’s increasingly clear that a more potent fiscal response – especially targeting households – will be the key to achieving the country’s year-end target of 5 % GDP growth.

Ripple result

When China’s central bank makes a decisive move to boost its economy, international markets typically sigh a collective sigh of relief. &nbsp,

Many global investors have been watching China’s financial challenges with growing suspicion, and the PBOC’s price reductions may include a rippling effect, boosting optimism among them. &nbsp,

Lower interest rates are anticipated to encourage customer saving and investment in vital businesses, creating a more positive environment for Chinese stocks and bonds.

These actions may also ease worries about China’s troubled property market, which is a major boon for the world economy. &nbsp,

A more affordable payment climate could assist property developers in need and, in turn, stabilize a market that accounts for almost 30 % of China’s GDP. If the new PBOC cuts manage to recover some trust in this field, it could have a significant impact on all major financial markets, starting from commodities to equities.

Moreover, with China being the largest consumer of raw materials and an engine of global demand, a treatment in its property market may possibly result to a broad-based protest in goods, boosting industry worldwide.

Good but inadequate?

However, investors are aware that monetary policy alone may only bring about positive outcomes despite the quick praise these cuts will bring. &nbsp,

Lower interest rates will ease the economic burden on businesses and individuals, but they do little to tackle the deeper structural issues that China faces because they are multidimensional.

Consumer confidence in China is also small, hurt by the continuous property slump and worries about deflation. &nbsp,

Companies, too, have been anxious to ramp up purchase, given the weak demand. This implies that despite the advantages of monetary easing, lower rates may not produce the solid consumption or investment required to ignite a meaningful recovery.

The difficulty lies in the fact that many of the problems that are stifling China’s market are demand-side in nature. &nbsp,

It’s not that consumers and businesses ca n’t borrow – it’s that they’re hesitant to spend and invest. &nbsp,

Fiscal policy must be complemented by striking fiscal measures designed to stimulate consumption and investment in order for China’s growth engine to really revive it.

A significant fiscal response that gives households the cash they need is what China desperately needs right then. &nbsp,

A massive, targeted fiscal item, whether through tax breaks, subsidies or direct cash transfers, did go a long way toward reigniting need.

Additionally, a fiscal push intended to boost household incomes may help to offset the problem of rising living costs and stagnant wages, which have been significant factors in the diminished consumer sentiment. &nbsp,

Households are more likely to invest, especially on enclosure, with more disposable income, which would help relieve pressures on the property field.

China may help create a much stronger recovery, one that will last a long time, by combining fiscal stimulus with the most recent wave of economic easing. &nbsp,

Beijing may increase its chances of meeting its 5 % GDP growth target for 2024 by doing so, as well as comfort the world’s confidence that it has the resources and the will to combat its economic downturn.

deVere Group was founded by Nigel Green as its CEO.

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