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The decision by India to” embargo” non-basmati rice exports, which had formerly accounted for a third of the country’s milled rice output, in July 2023 has drawn harsh criticism. & nbsp,

Critics have further argued that India’s decision, which is the largest exporter of rice in the world, could jeopardize its claim to & nbsp, lead the Global South, and go far from its pledges to address global food challenges under the presidency of the G20 in 2023.

India’s export restrictions can also be viewed as reckless if they are motivated more by political considerations than local food safety. India’s urban middle class needs to be placated by lowering rising food costs before the March 2024 votes.

The situation in India is getting worse by the month, and the government has not yet normalized its grain business. Parboiled corn, which makes up 42 % of India’s milled wheat exports, was subject to additional restrictions in January 2023 by New Delhi. & nbsp,

Since then, rice prices have risen to levels comparable to the global food price crisis of 2007 – 2008. Since August 2023, Myanmar & nbsp has also outlawed rice exports as a potential impetus for additional nations to join the bandwagon.

When the American government andnbsp announced in late August 2023 that it would permit exports to nations facing serious food security challenges like Bhutan, Mauritius, and Singapore, a small concession was made, though this hasn’t done much to quiet foreign markets.

In any case, acknowledging the intricate balancing work they perform within the worldwide food order should be the first step in a more positive approach to engaging India and food exporting says more generally. Food-exporting nations have a double obligation to meet the food security needs of their own citizens while also acting as an honest dealer in the global food market.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when India stepped up to fill the space in global wheat exports caused by the conflict, it is possible to understand the complexity of this double authority. India’s wheat exports increased to over 1.4 million kilograms in April 2022, which is about five times higher than the amount exported in that year. & nbsp,

Nevertheless, rising domestic and international wheat prices and increased maize exports caused home shortages, which culminated in India’s export ban in May 2022 and lasts through 2023.

In addition to outlawing wheat exports, India even rolled back its extensive Covid-19 food supply system, Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana, on January 1, 2023.

The government decided to reallocate these grains to domestic markets to & nbsp, quell inflation, and satisfy the urban middle class instead of the program’s previous allocation of additional grains for public distribution to poorer consumers.

It is easier to understand India’s current export bans on rice as an expansion of the issues the wheat industry is currently facing. Grains shortages feed into the wheat lack because wheat and rice are substitutes in India’s corn stockpiles. & nbsp,

Due to this routine, local food prices quickly increased in the middle of 2022, necessitating the need for a minimum export price restriction on rice by September of that year. In July 2023, India’s food price prices continued to rise by 11.5 %, prompting the government to impose the most recent import restrictions on corn.

Addressing the” double burden” that lies at the heart of India’s export restrictions would be a more effective strategy than pressuring the country to normalize its corn trade. A bilateral strategy might be a” end way” to stop the spread of an global food price crisis. & nbsp,

In order to close India’s financing gaps in private subsidies and guarantee affordable prices for both its lower-income and middle-class populations, this strategy would entail offering foreign capital assistance. By keeping food prices low and eliminating the need to outlaw grain exports, these subsidies may help supplement the population’s true incomes.

A bilateral strategy would also enable India to keep exporting grain abroad, predicated on the assistance it anticipates in return. In the current worldwide food attempt, this solution would make up for India’s function as a net food exporter. & nbsp,

The Global Food Import Financing Facility & nbsp, proposed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to the International Monetary Fund, could be expanded upon by implementing this multilateral approach. & nbsp,

This ability, which may be expanded to include India and other lower-income food exporting nations, aims to assist poorer food-importing nations dealing with balance of payments issues or budget shortages.

Countries that depend on grain business for profit, imports, and usage may start to reflect on prices andnbsp as they seek to maximize profits and reduce costs, possibly causing a situation similar to the 2008 global food price crisis. A international solution may also result in an increase in international grain prices, but the likelihood of a worse crisis could be reduced.

If an expanded American export ban resulted in an international cost crisis, this may undoubtedly cause more price instability. In light of Russia’s conflict in Ukraine and anticipated declines in grain harvests during the El Nino period, exploring international solutions is essential for the previously precarious global food supply network.

Jose Ma Luis Montesclaros is a study fellow with the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies.

This post, which was previously published by the East Asia Forum, has been republished with a Creative Commons license.

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A recent US Congress report urges a strategic defensive posture review of simultaneous near-peer conventional and nuclear threats.  

This month, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the US released a report urging the country to be prepared for a two-front conflict against China and Russia.

The report says that US defense strategy and strategic posture must change to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with the two nuclear-armed adversaries while advocating that critical decisions should be made now to address nuclear threats expected to arise during the 2027-2035 timeframe.

It also assessed that the US needs to address the looming nuclear threat with a comprehensive strategy and force structure adjustments. Although it says the fundamentals of US deterrence strategy remain sound, size and composition adjustments are needed to its nuclear capabilities.

The report also emphasizes the importance of non-nuclear capabilities for the US strategic posture, including strengthened infrastructure and risk reduction efforts. It notes allies and partners are crucial to the US approach in the new emerging threat environment.

The report recommends that the US Congress fund the expansion of the US nuclear weapons defense industrial base and the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear security enterprise. It also suggests that Congress should ensure funding stability for the defense industry to respond to innovative Department of Defense (DOD) contracting approaches.

The report’s recommendations include deploying a stronger space architecture with offensive and defensive elements, prioritizing funding for long-range precision strike programs, developing homeland missile defense systems and transferring missile defense responsibility to the Military Departments by October 2024.

The report says that the US should maintain and strengthen its network of alliances and partnerships to deter aggression, ensure regional security and boost economic prosperity through access to international markets.

It warns that withdrawing from these relationships would benefit adversaries, increase the risk of aggression and reduce the US and its allies’ security and economic prosperity.

It also recommends exploring nuclear arms control opportunities and researching potential verification technologies to support future negotiations in the US national interest that seek to limit all nuclear weapon types.

The foundation of US national defense, including the defense of allies and support of military operations, is based on the concept of nuclear deterrence that has been in place since 1945.

In a January 2023 article for the US Naval Institute, Daniel Post outlines the value and limits of nuclear deterrence. Post says that the unparalleled destructiveness of nuclear weapons underpins their deterrent value, making them desirable to acquire alongside conventional military capabilities.

Given that, he says the US nuclear strategy must aim at manipulating the rational calculations of adversaries by understanding how its capabilities are perceived by the other.

Post also says nuclear weapons are useless to coerce other states but are effective when held in reserve as a defensive capability, denying benefits and imposing costs on aggressors once deterrence has failed, noting that they deter nuclear and other major strategic attacks on the US and its allies and major state-on-state wars between nuclear powers.

Along with nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence is more applicable to a broader range of circumstances, has greater flexibility than nuclear weapons and is not subject to the political constraints of the former.

Robert Haffa Jr argues in a 2018 article for Strategic Studies Quarterly that the US should reinforce the logic of conventional deterrence as a central concept of its defense policy. However, Haffa points out that the main issue with conventional deterrence is its tendency to fail. Given that, he says Cold War-era conventional deterrence strategies are inadequate for today’s great power competition.

According to Haffa, a modern approach to deterring US adversaries should focus on non-nuclear threats, be intense and overwhelming in threat, focus on US and allied strengths and adversary weaknesses, and be able to punish, deny and utilize advanced technologies and weapons systems across the globe.

China and Russia have multiple approaches to negate US nuclear and conventional deterrence, running a spectrum between threatening to use nuclear weapons and unconventional means.  

In a September 2022 article for the Heritage Foundation, Patty-Jane Geller says that China’s growing nuclear forces could potentially increase the risk of unintentional escalation.

Geller says that if China perceives a favorable nuclear balance of power over the US, it may become more tempted to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. She also says that if the US lacks tactical nuclear capabilities, China may perceive a US response to limited nuclear use in the Indo-Pacific as unreliable.

She notes China’s nuclear arsenal expansion, including the acquisition of delivery methods that can threaten the US homeland, could weaken US extended deterrence commitments, making the US less willing to defend its allies. This situation, coupled with the risk of unintentional escalation due to miscalculations or mistakes, increases the potential for a Chinese nuclear strike, Geller argues.

In terms of China’s challenging of US conventional deterrence, Andrew Erickson writes in the 2023 book “Modernizing Deterrence: How China Coerces, Compels, and Deters that the conventional missile component of the People’s Liberation Army-Rocket Force (PLA-RF) is increasingly important in China’s deterrence and warfighting, supporting the goal of achieving information dominance, command of the air and control of the sea to thwart a US and allied intervention in Taiwan.

Erickson says that PLA-RF doctrine anticipates and seeks to respond effectively to strategic, operational and technical trends. He notes that such trends may include the ability for rapid global precision attacks, placing more stress on mobility, rapid reaction, force survival and protection, and developing penetration aids.

In the case of Russia, Lydia Wachs notes in a November 2022 article for Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik that with Russia’s dwindling arsenal of conventional precision weapons and NATO’s strategic adaptation, Russia’s strategy is likely to change, with an increase in reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. Wachs notes that Russia’s perceived conventional inferiority compared to US precision strike capabilities has driven Moscow’s increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons.

She says that the increased role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s deterrence strategy and strengthened posture in areas bordering NATO could weaken European security and stability. Wachs says this could exacerbate Moscow’s threat perception and influence escalation dynamics, impacting the stability of potential crises between NATO and Russia.

She adds that if Russia’s reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons increases, Moscow’s appetite for arms control on short- and medium-range missiles will likely erode further.

In terms of conventional deterrence, Tim Sweijs and others write in a January 2022 report for the Hague Institute of Strategic Studies (HCSS) that Russia poses a hybrid threat to NATO and Europe through using proxies, covert activities, cyber capabilities, political subversion and economic influence.

In conjunction with that, Ruben Tavenier notes in a February 2018 article for the JASON Institute for Peace and Security Studies that Russia uses a combination of non-military (covert) and military (overt) deterrence to destabilize adversaries, limit potential threats and guarantee victory in a potential conflict.

Tavenier mentions that Russia accomplishes those ends by deterring, coercing or containing an adversary by destabilizing it covertly and reducing its military, political and economic capabilities.

Given the near-peer challenges facing the US deterrent posture, Doreen Horschig and Nicholas Adamopoulos write in an article this month for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US should consider a Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) strategy that emphasizes greater coherence between conventional and nuclear forces to manage escalation in regional conflicts, develop integrated options to strengthen deterrence and deny adversaries any advantages gained by nuclear use in a regional conflict.

Horschig and Adamopoulos believe that CNI can improve the resiliency of conventional forces in nuclear war by dispersing operational bases, improving operational capability in potentially contaminated environments, and hardening of command, control and communications (C3) systems.

This way, they say, adversaries will be deterred from limited nuclear escalation, thus ensuring that US and allied forces can still achieve their warfighting objectives.

Such a strategy, Horschig and Adamopoulos say, can give decision-makers more flexibility and reduce the prospects for a limited nuclear war. However, they also point out that CNI blurs the lines between conventional and nuclear forces, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear escalation.

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