FinanceAsia Awards 2025 — open now | FinanceAsia

By:
On:
In: Asia, Finance, South-East Asia

The FinanceAsia team is delighted to open submissions to the 29th edition of our annual flagship Awards, the FinanceAsia Awards 2025, which recognise the best banks, brokers, rating agencies, consultants, law firms and non-bank financial institutions across the region.

In 2024 markets grappled with significant challenges, including higher than expected interest rates, a slow Chinese economy and several high-profile elections.

On a more positive note, the year saw a number of large M&A deals, IPOs and bond offerings, with markets such as India and Japan performing particularly well. A combination of new technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), data centres, and the drive towards net zero, will continue to be seen as key investment opportunities in the region.

The FinanceAsia team is once again inviting market participants to showcase their capabilities when supporting clients. We want to celebrate those institutions that have shown a determination to deliver desirable outcomes for their clients, through a display of commercial and technical acumen.

We look forward to meeting the winners and highly commendeds at the FinanceAsia Awards Ceremony in June.

Enter now here: https://bit.ly/3Ptn5KA.

Key Dates

Launch date: January 14, 2025

Entry and submission deadline: February 27, 2025

Winners announced: Week of April 7, 2025 

Awards ceremony / gala dinner: June 26 

Eligibility period: All entries should relate to acheivements from the period January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024 


¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

Continue Reading

Xi urges head-on approach for China amid external threats ahead of annual two sessions

By:
On:
In: Asia

He also emphasized that the emerging and future business should be the main drivers of growth, ensuring a smooth transition between the old and new development engines.

The 24-member Politburo of the Communist Party convened on the same day for the” two sessions” of the country’s two-weekly meetings of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference ( CPPCC), the country’s top advisory body, and the National People’s Congress ( NPC ), the country’s legislature.

According to a display of the conference released by Xinhua on Friday,” We will implement more vigilant macro guidelines, expand domestic demand, and encourage the inclusion of technology and industrial innovation.”

The government even reiterated its intent to stabilize the property and real estate markets, raise the standard of living for people, and continue to support high-level opening up.

The readout reading readout stated that” we will stop and solve risks in key areas and the external shocks, stabilize expectations, promote vitality, and promote ongoing economic recuperation and improvements.”

Instead of introducing new legislation directions, Ding Shuang, the captain greater China scholar at Standard Chartered Bank, said the readout served more as a reiteration of the prior policy direction that was outlined at the central monetary work conference in December.

According to Ding,” Beijing has always had a top priority on technical development.” It was placed at the top of the government function report next year, and it was moved to the bottom of the list, just ahead of boosting consumption, at the December economic work conference.

Continue Reading

Asia easing fast and furious against Trump’s tariffs – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, Finance

Japan — It’s been years since financial activities in Bangkok had global repercussions. But the Bank of Thailand’s surprise rate cut on Wednesday ( February 26 ) signals how rapidly Donald Trump’s trade curbs are upending Asia’s 2025.

Bangkok was the site of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the next day it experienced financial conflict. Back then, the economy of Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea collapsed in spectacular currency crises style.

That dark time isn’t always about to repeat itself. The area has come a very long approach: banks are healthier, currencies trade more widely, governments are more visible, markets are more tenacious and main banks have enormous foreign exchange reserves.

But the BOT’s 25 basis-point cut to 2 %, its lowest level since July 2023, follows similar moves in Jakarta and Seoul to counter downside risks that bear US President Trump’s prints.

Bank Indonesia kicked points off with a 25 % interest rate cut in the middle of January. Governor&nbsp, Perry Warjiyo&nbsp, called the split “pro-stability and development” given “global and regional economic relationships”.

The Bank of Korea hit the economic fuel this year. On Tuesday, Governor Rhee Chang-Yong’s team sharply reduced its economic growth projection as it cut prices to 2.75 %. In the BOK’s speech, it cited Trump’s fast-expanding business conflict as the main motivator for easing.

Due to deteriorating socioeconomic sentiment and US price policies, the BOK predicted that local demand growth and export growth would be slower than originally anticipated. It is believed that local economic growth will continue to be stable while inflation will continue to grow.

Of course, the BOK is burying the result, financially speaking. Trump, it’s obvious, is only just getting started. And in a way that sends the three markets into a whirl and battens down the doors. On Thursday, for example, Trump said he’ll double tariffs on China to 20 %.

” While industry have begun to respond to these advances, deep tax risks are still being underpriced”, says Kamakshya Trivedi, a leading global strategist at Goldman Sachs.

Deborah Tan, an analyst at Moody’s Ratings, says Asia’s “overall plan response may be crucial in determining the total effect on credit power. We expect governments will probably work pragmatically, aiming to avoid increase with the US, preferring to communicate on a diplomatic basis, as shown by new developments”.

Even Trump seems unsure about where he’ll impose tariffs next and the scope of the curbs, according to earlier statements. Trump immediately addressed tariffs in Canada and Mexico at a Cabinet meeting this week about the latter being a done deal. Then, he suggested no taxes will ultimately be imposed.

” I have to tell you that, you know, on April 2, I was going to do it on April 1″, Trump said. ” But I’m a little bit superstitious, I made it April 2, the tariffs go on. Not all of them, but many of them.

In a note to clients, Capital Economics claims that Donald Trump’s victory in the November presidential election has only increased the uncertainty by causing significant penalties, tariffs, and the potential upheaval of traditional geopolitical alliances, which could also cause the rest of the world to become more uncertain.

The uncertainty, Capital Economics warns,” could end up weighing on global investment and consumer spending for an extended period, particularly if Trump repeatedly pushes back his tariff deadlines”.

To Paul Donovan, chief economist at UBS Global Wealth Management, the bewilderment factor makes for a uniquely challenging year for markets.

Case in point, he says, is” Trump’s very big announcement on reciprocal tariffs, which turned out to be a plan to investigate taxing US consumers at a future date. Markets had to decide whether the president was being a pushover or a protectionist, and for the time being, they are leaning in favor of pushover.

Of course “delay is seen as an opportunity to do’ deals,'” Donovan says. ” So far, such deals have been more spin than substance”.

Even though the headlines about US import tariffs continue to be a hot topic, according to Thierry Wizman, global rates strategist at Macquarie Bank,” there has been a clear deceleration of the” tax train.” There’s a sense that the administration’s approach to economic and national security issues is more transactional and less punitive”.

One explanation for the ever-shifting trade war plans is that Trump does indeed have his “kryptonite” ,&nbsp, notes Benjamin Tal, economist at CIBC World Markets. Shortly after the stock market reacted negatively to the news, Canada and Mexico were granted 30-day extensions on the 25 % tariff, Tal says.

One world leader who’s not confused about the turbulence to come is Xi Jinping, whose economy is Trump 2.0’s main obsession. Trump’s most recent announcement is a plan to levy an additional 10 % on imports from mainland China.

However, this week, China’s leader sounded more jittery than confident when he urged officials to stay calm as Beijing’s economic storm clouds loom.

China “must strengthen its political will and calmly respond to challenges brought about by changes in the domestic and international situation,” Xi told Politburo and State Council party members, according to Xinhua News Agency.

As Trump raises the stakes, Xi’s economic team begins. Trump has so far avoided paying 60 % tariffs on China, which he frequently threatened during the campaign trial. And now he’s reversing his previous approach, Joe Biden, and specifically focusing on the trade war.

For all its Biden criticisms, Team Trump is mulling ways to expand Biden’s curbs on Chinese semiconductors. The White House is also encouraging influential allies around the world to intensify efforts to stop China’s chip industry from expanding.

DeepSeek, a Chinese AI startup, is being investigated in the US. White House investigators are looking into DeepSeek‘s suspicions that it violated export controls to purchase sophisticated Nvidia chips in Singapore through a third party.

Tariffs, though, are still the main Trumpian event, raising collateral damage risks for Asia. And Trump trade advisors, like China hawk Peter Navarro, are angling for more.

” Trump’s new ‘ America First Investment Plan ‘ seals the fate of a deepening US-China conflict, reinforcing the earlier America First Trade Plan”, says Yale University’s Stephen Roach, formerly chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia.

” This isn’t an artful ploy for a grand deal with Beijing. Trump’s MAGA base is incredibly anti-China, which makes it all but impossible for him to change his tune. He’s cornered”!

From Trump World, new ways to complicate China’s year keep coming in. Case in point: possible fees on China-made commercial ships used for moving goods to slow China’s domination of ship-building.

China’s place in harm’s way has officials in Bangkok, Jakarta, Seoul and elsewhere slashing rates – and odds are there’s more monetary easing to come. That includes the Philippine central bank, which cut interest rates by 25 basis points in December.

It’s not that developing Asia worries about sustaining direct hits from Trump’s tariffs. It’s prepping for the indirect, but still devastating, blows to come as mainland China’s trade, investment and tourism shifts into reverse. China, which is subject to Trump’s tariffs, poses a serious threat to all of the world’s South.

Risks abound as Trump and his unelected enforcer Elon Musk systematically monitor US institutions that safeguard the value of US Treasury securities and the dollar, which are crucial to developing Asia’s trade-dependent economies. A US national debt that is close to$ 37 trillion would be significantly increased by the trillions of dollars in proposed tax cuts, according to Trump.

Trump and Musk are undermining the Internal Revenue Service’s function, which could alarm investors and credit rating organizations. This includes Asian central banks, which have nearly$ 3 trillion in assets.

Regardless, there are numerous economists who disagree on whether Trump’s bite will be as bad as his bark. &nbsp,

Our “aggressive Trump” scenario, which assumes high trade tariffs and significant deportations, would be stagflationary for the US economy and likely plunge the rest of the world into recession, according to Schroders ‘ economists in a note.

But, Schroders argues, “upside risks are also emerging. While DeepSeek could speed up AI adoption, macroeconomic reform is back on the agenda for governments looking for growth, and bank lending displays signs of life.

The economists add that” steep falls in oil prices could also conceivably relieve inflation pressures later in 2025″ at the same time.

Of course, the inflationary effects of Trump’s tariffs could dominate global pricing dynamics instead.

According to Chief Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius, Trump’s tariffs will increase personal consumption expenditures (PCE), the preferred measure of the US Federal Reserve, by about 1 %. Already, that rate is running at 2.8 % annually.

According to our general rule,” We estimate that the proposed tariff increases would increase core PCE prices by 0.9 % if implemented, based on the assumption that every 1percentage point ] increase in the effective tariff rate would raise core PCE prices by 0.1 %.”

Gene Ma, head of China research at the Institute of International Finance, adds that “tariff-driven inflation complicates monetary policy, raising uncertainty for the Fed”. And for developing nations who fear that Trump might restore Asian financial crises.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

Continue Reading

Japan’s birth crisis is a leadership failure – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

The birth rate in Japan is falling because of a lack of political authority and no simple answer. It is a statistical crisis.

The sharp reduction in births, which is the lowest birth rate in 125 years, has exposed the powerless and impotentiary effects of Chinese state intervention.

Policymakers have consistently attempted to reverse this trend by using scant incentives, flimsy reforms, and expressive social campaigns, only to have their efforts continue to decline.

The stark reality is this: Japan’s officials are not just facing a shrinking people, they are failing to ensure the government’s long-term practicality. The inability to change the pattern suggests that political tactics have been rooted in stale stereotypes about work, community, and social structure.

Politicians have long believed that people should own children if they receive financial support. However, the steady decline in delivery charges demonstrates that the issue is not related to money only.

Deeper factors are at play, including historical shifts, financial pressures, and a firm work environment, which make raising children difficult for some young Japanese.

Political leaders have shown a glaring lack of resilience, holding onto outdated options instead of promoting true, fundamental alter. Just offering incentives and tax cuts will not be much, there must be a rethinking of how the state supports people, particularly in areas like work-life stability, housing, and education.

This crisis has also laid bare an unpleasant fact about management: Japan’s deeply rooted government struggles to address issues that require mobility, technology and long-term perspective.

Local governments have tried policies like a four-day week, but these are still isolated initiatives rather than a part of a federal technique.

The social class, apparently mired in gravity and resistant to change, must shift from short-term democratic cycles to millennial planning. As the population ages, younger workers may bear an even greater financial burden to support social service and income systems.

Any efforts to increase birth costs will be pointless without a basic change in how Japan supports its labor.

The effects of silence extend beyond finance. A declining people weakens regional endurance, making it more difficult to maintain industries, maintain equipment and uphold global impact.

Japan’s industrial and manufacturing supremacy is not immune to demographic swings. To keep companies dynamic, a shrinking workforce means fewer entrepreneurs, fewer entrepreneurs, and fewer experienced employees.

This fact, which impacts everything from customer industry to international trade agreements, threatens the stability of the economy.

Japan must employ a number of detailed measures that address the root causes of its declining delivery rate in order to change this downward trend.

Initially, work culture may undergo dramatic transformation. Couples are discouraged from having children because of the region’s famous extra culture and lack of parental keep options. Parenthood would become more available by requiring shorter operating hours, expanding care options, and encouraging employers to offer more flexible working arrangements.

Next, the cost of raising children may be substantially reduced. While financial opportunities only have proven inadequate, direct interventions in education, care, and accommodation costs may ease the financial stress on young families.

More people would be encouraged to consider starting families by expanding access to free or discounted nursery, increasing child allowances, and reducing education costs.

Third, immigration plan may be reconsidered. Japan has generally resisted large-scale emigration, but with an aging population and shrinking labor, integrating experienced foreign workers may help maintain economic growth.

The effects of a declining native population may be mitigated by more stringent visa regulations, stronger support for immigrant families, and programs that promote long-term residency.

This conundrum is made more urgent by a changing global landscape. South Korea, a nation struggling with demographic issues, has seen a slight rise in fertility rates, an indication that changes in policy and social norms can affect change.

Meanwhile, nations like China, grappling with their own population declines, are increasingly looking at long-term economic sustainability rather than short-term fixes.

In a world where workforce size is a increasingly important metric of competitiveness, if Japan fails to adapt, it runs the risk of not only demographic decline but also economic stagnation.

For Japan’s political leaders, this should be a moment of reckoning. Their persistent inaction will be remembered as the catalyst for Japan’s population crisis’s descent into economic and social collapse.

Is the nation willing to change the traditional workplace culture to encourage parenthood? Will it change its immigration practices to make up for population decline? Can leaders support policies that address the wider social reluctance to marry and raise a family?

These are existential challenges that demand bold, imaginative leadership.

The political establishment can no longer afford to treat this crisis as a rambling issue that can be resolved incrementally. It calls for urgent, radical changes to Japanese society’s fundamental foundations.

The long-term effects of continuing to stifle lawmakers ‘ reluctance could be catastrophic, stifling economic growth, lowering national security, and leaving Japan struggling to maintain its position in an increasingly competitive world.

In the coming years, whether Japan’s leaders are capable of governing in the long run or remain shackled to policy stagnation.

George Prior is a global political and economics expert.

Continue Reading

China’s AI boom bigger than just DeepSeek – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, Technology

A family of extremely efficient and fiercely competitive AI models was released last month by a small Chinese artificial intelligence ( AI ) company called DeepSeek, which shocked the world’s tech community. The launch revealed China’s growing modern skills. Additionally, it demonstrated a distinct Foreign perspective on the development of AI.

This strategy is characterised by proper investment, useful innovation and cautious regulatory oversight. And it’s obvious throughout China’s broader AI scenery, of which DeepSeek is just one person.

In fact, the state has a great habitat of AI businesses.

They may not be as well-known as another Artificial companies like DeepSeek, OpenAI, and Anthropic, as they are not. Each has carved out a distinct niche and is assisting in the development of this quickly evolving systems, though.

Tech companies and companies

The companies of China’s tech industry include Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. All of these businesses are making significant investments in AI creation.

Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu earlier this month said the multibillion-dollar business plans to “aggressively commit” in its pursuit of developing AI that is equal to, or more sophisticated than, human knowledge.

The business is now collaborating with Apple to include its existing AI systems into Chinese smartphones. ( Outside China, iPhones offer similar integration with OpenAI’s ChatGPT. )

But a new era of smaller, specialized Artificial companies has also emerged.

For instance, Shanghai-listed Cambricon Technologies focuses on AI device creation. Healthcare and intelligent town applications are the areas of focus for Yuitu Technology.

While iFLYTEK develops voice recognition technology, Megvii Technology and CloudWalk Technology have carved out niches in photo identification and computer perspective.

Orange company sign on the facade of a glass building.
Alibaba, a multibillion dollar Chinese technology firm, intends to make significant investments in AI tests. Image: Stock via The Chat

Modern pathways to victory

Despite United States ‘ device sanctions and China’s restricted data setting, these Chinese AI firms have found roads to success.

Big language models have been trained by US businesses using the open online, such as OpenAI. However, Chinese businesses have used sizable data from regional platforms like Weibo, Weibo, and Zhihu. They even use government-authorized information sources.

Some Chinese AI firms also embrace open-source creation. This entails publishing detailed technical documents and releasing their models for others to use as inspiration. Instead of utilizing natural computing power, this approach places an emphasis on effectiveness and practical application.

The end result is a decidedly Chinese technique to AI.

Interestingly, China’s state assistance for AI development has also been significant. Besides the central state, local and provincial governments have provided huge money through opportunity funds, incentives and tax incentives.

In recent years, China has established at least 48 information markets across various cities. These are certified marketplaces where AI companies may purchase sizable datasets in a controlled environment.

By 2028, China even plans to establish more than 100″ trusted data spots”.

These are safe, compliant environments that aim to regulate files exchanges across sectors and regions. A complete national data marketplace with access to and use of various data within a controlled platform will be built on top of them.

Solid learning push

The expansion of the AI sector in China is also attributed to a significant force for AI education. In 2018, China’s Ministry of Education launched an action strategy for accelerating AI technology in institutions.

According to publicly available information, 535 institutes have established AI academic majors, and 43 specialized AI schools and studies institutes have been established since 2017. ( In contrast, there are at least 14 colleges and universities in the US offering formal AI undergraduate degrees. )

Collectively, these institutions are building an AI skills network in China. Beijing’s goal of leading the world Artificial innovation market by 2030 is crucial to accomplishing this.

China’s AI technique combines considerable state support with focused regulation. Authorities have developed a focused approach to managing AI risks rather than imposing cover settings.

The 2023 rules on conceptual AI are particularly concealing of Beijing’s strategy.

They impose content-related standards on conceptual AI services that are accessible to the public, such as ensuring that all created and delivered material adheres to fundamental socialist principles and respects intellectual property rights.

These responsibilities, but, exclude conceptual AI used for business, research and development. This allows for some unlimited technology.

A hedge-lined entrance to a university campus.
There are 43 specialised AI research institutes and universities in China, including Renmin University in Beijing. Image: humphery/Shutterstock via The Talk

China and the US dominate the global AI environment. However, there are several important people emerging somewhere.

For instance, France’s Mistral AI has raised over 1 billion dollars to time to build huge language versions. In contrast, OpenAI raised US$ 6.6 billion in a new funding round and is in talks to raise a deeper US$ 40 billion.

Other Western companies are focused on specific applications, particular industries or regional markets. For instance, Germany’s Aleph Alpha offers an Artificial tool that allows businesses to personalize third-party designs for their own purposes

Wayve is creating automatic driving AI systems in the United Kingdom, while Graphcore is producing AI cards.

Challenging regular intelligence

DeepSeek’s discovery last month demonstrated that a billion dollar budget and massive computing infrastructure aren’t usually necessary for the successful development of AI.

For those invested in the humankind’s potential, companies that achieve DeepSeek-level efficiency could considerably influence the path of AI advancement.

While remaining within communities dominated by American and Chinese benefits in expertise, data, and investment, we may see a global environment where modern AI companies from other countries can make strides.

Who will rule the race may not be the only factor in shaping AI’s coming. Alternatively, it may be determined by how various strategies shape the technology’s growth.

China’s type provides valuable training for other nations looking to expand their AI abilities while managing certain dangers.

Mimi Zou is doctor, School of Personal &amp, Commercial Law, UNSW Sydney

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading

China’s grand plan for food self-sufficiency – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

China’s plans to become an agrarian self-sufficiency by 2025 are crucial for both home stability and the broader international food landscape as global food security becomes a pressing issue.

While China remains the world’s largest food producer and exporter, with the largest meal supply system, Beijing remains vigilant about the long-term balance of its foods source.

Beijing continues to promote measures aimed at reducing dependence on outside sources while also boosting local manufacturing and securing outside agricultural investments to assure self-reliance in agrarian production.

Agriculture, the foundation of China’s business, is undergoing a critical change. The nation is transitioning from a “big nation with little farmers” to a “big and robust agricultural nation.”

In light of rising geopolitical tensions, shifting business relations, and environmental concerns, China’s approach to this problem and its ability to maintain its proper position on the global stage will be significant.

In a precarious political climate, China has increased its efforts to ensure a credible and lasting food supply. It also recognizes the urgency of safeguarding the country’s agricultural future.

According to Chinese President Xi Jinping,” The foods of the Chinese people must be produced by and be in the hands of the Taiwanese.” Xi and China’s policymakers have consistently placed food security at the forefront, recognizing it as a” top national priority” ( 国之大者 ) amid an increasingly complex global environment.

Resilience in the food supply has become more important than ever as a result of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions, climate change, trade disruptions, systemic tensions with the US ( US), and unstable international food markets.

In reply, China has recently raised political objectives for food safety and endurance. &nbsp, &nbsp,

The transfer of China’s 2025″ No. 1 Central Document” on February 23 more underscores this commitment to ensuring national food safety. The report, an important policy speech from the central government, outlines important national targets.

For 2025, it focuses on remote regeneration, agricultural development, and securing the world’s food supply amid domestic and international issues.

The 2025 template highlights six key areas of focus: ensuring a steady supply of grain and important agrarian products, consolidating the gains of poverty alleviation, developing native industries, advancing remote construction, improving remote governance, and optimizing resource allocation in remote areas.

This report emphasizes the importance of self-sufficiency and steadiness in China’s food supply, positioning the nation to manage international uncertainties. Two key priorities for the nation’s food security strategy for 2025 include:

Ensuring grain supplies

China, the largest agricultural producer and importer in the world, has a significant influence on global grain markets, importing more than 157 million metric tons of soybeans and grains last year. Grain security remains central to China’s food policy, reflecting its crucial role in safeguarding the nation’s long-term food supply.

China’s need to increase output continues to grow despite record-high grain production in recent years, largely due to population growth and dietary changes, which are being driven by China’s growing population’s growing need for more meat, eggs, and dairy products. Maintaining a stable and trustworthy grain supply has become even more important as dietary habits change.

Grain production remains a cornerstone of China’s food security strategy. The 2025″ No. 1 Document” outlines a multi-pronged strategy: stabilizing grain planting areas, raising yields, and improving crop quality.

It uses biotechnology and targeted subsidies to boost the production of soybeans and oilseeds ( like canola and peanuts ) while putting a top priority on expanding production. For instance, pilot loan programs aim to incentivize grain and oilseed production in key regions, alongside inter-provincial coordination to optimize distribution.

At a press conference held by the State Council on February 24, officials stated that food security is still a top priority. Han Wenxiu, director of the Central Rural Affairs Office, warned against complacency, stating,” Grain production must be strengthened, not relaxed. The possibility of temporary price fluctuations shouldn’t let us forget that food security is still fragile.

To safeguard farmer morale, the central government also plan aims to introduce a policy toolkit that includes minimum purchase rates for rice and wheat, with market support purchases in various provinces ( such as Henan, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, and Anhui ), alongside the expansion of grain storage in key provinces.

These efforts build on the 2024 Central Rural Work Conference, which reaffirmed the government’s commitment to stabilizing domestic grain supply, with a focus on “absolute” stability in wheat and rice production—key pillars of China’s food security.

From 2003 to 2013, domestic grain production rose from 430 million metric tons to <a href="https://bioone.org/journals/journal-of-resources-and-ecology/volume-11/issue-4/j.issn.1674-764x.2020.04.004/Changes-in-Chinas-Grain-Production-Pattern-and-the-Effects-of/10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2020.04.004.full”>over 600 million metric tons, especially in key regions like the Yangtze River, Northeast China, and the North China Plains. Additionally, China has &nbsp, designated key areas&nbsp, for the production of staple crops like double-cropping rice and high-quality wheat in the Yangtze River Economic Belt.

Recent achievements underscore this momentum. In 2024, China’s grain output reached a record high of 706.5 million metric tons, a 1.6 percent increase from the previous year. At the same time, the national average yield per mu ( 0.0067 hectares ) rose to 394.7 kilograms (kg ), an increase of 5.1 kg from 2022. This is largely due to yield improvements contributing to&nbsp, more than 80 percent&nbsp, of the overall grain production increase.

To sustain this trajectory, the MARA released a statement in January outlining ambitious targets: raising annual grain production by&nbsp, 50 million metric tons by 2030&nbsp, ( a 7 percent increase ) and maintaining over&nbsp, 1.75 billion &nbsp, mu&nbsp, ( 117 million hectares ) of farmland dedicated to grain cultivation.

In line with these objectives, China’s current&nbsp, Five-Year Agricultural Plan&nbsp, targets annual grain production exceeding 770 million tons, alongside a push to increase domestic soybean production to 23 million tons by 2025. In response to uncertainty surrounding global trade, the central government aims to lessen its reliance on imports from Western nations.

Agricultural innovation and technology

Amid rising supply chain uncertainties and climate challenges, China has prioritized agricultural security and technological self-sufficiency. China’s current” No. 1 document” emphasizes agricultural technology as central to its food security strategy.

The central government plans to accelerate the research and application of advanced, domestically produced agricultural machinery and smart farming systems, including artificial intelligence ( AI), 5G, big data, and low-altitude systems, to enhance efficiency across the sector.

To support this, China aims to establish 500 national-level agricultural industrialization consortiums by 2025. These consortiums will foster collaboration among research institutions, agribusinesses, and farmers, focusing on drought-resistant crops, smart machinery, and sustainable practices.

China is expected to continue encouraging efforts in agricultural innovation, particularly regarding the&nbsp, productivity of key grains and oilseeds&nbsp, ( like rice, wheat, corn, soybeans, and rapeseed ) to achieve national food production and related food security goals.

To this end, &nbsp, Beijing&nbsp, has &nbsp, consistently emphasized&nbsp, the need for increased local production, evident in policy measures, &nbsp, targets, and&nbsp, five-year plans.

More broadly, to support this technological transformation and help safeguard the country’s food future, China has already heavily invested in biotechnology and digital technologies. Despite some public opposition, this includes supporting the development of genetically modified ( GM ) crops like soybeans and corn.

Although the country’s plans for food security still contain the commercialization of GM crops, a number of things suggest that it is moving in this direction. Notably, in late 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs ( MARA ) approved safety certificates for 12 GM crop varieties, signaling a long-term strategy to integrate biotechnology into China’s food security framework.

More recently, in February 2025, MARA released the Key Areas of National Agricultural Technology Innovation ( 2024-2028 ) which outlines 10 key priority areas: the cultivation of new agricultural varieties, soil quality improvement, agricultural

machinery equipment development, pest and disease prevention in crops, livestock and aquatic diseases control, efficient planting and breeding, green and low-carbon agriculture, agricultural product processing and food manufacturing, agricultural product quality and safety, and rural development.

The document further underscores the importance of technological innovation in China’s pursuit of global ( agricultural ) leadership, particularly in AI and biotechnologies.

Concurrently, the central Chinese government is pushing to create new seed varieties. Chinese President Xi has called for an independent seed industry in recent years. This goes against previous leadership objectives to bring about technological advancements in seed development.

In order to reduce reliance on imported seeds, current research also looks at high-yield hybrid seed technologies for important crops. These efforts are more broadly linked to national five-years ( such as the&nbsp, National Medium and Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan ( 2021-2035 ) and the 14th Five-Year Agricultural Plan ( 2021-2025 ), which emphasize the creation of new food sources to achieve China’s broader strategy of agricultural self-sufficiency.

Simultaneously, the country is embracing&nbsp, digitization&nbsp, to modernize agriculture, as exemplified by a multitude of national plans like the&nbsp, National Smart Agriculture Implementation Plan ( 2024-2028 ) &nbsp, and the 14th Five-Year Plan for Agricultural Modernization ( 2021-2025 ).

The former includes, among others, the construction of&nbsp, “digital villages” &nbsp, and modern agricultural parks aimed at enhancing productivity through technological innovation. China’s goal of transforming agriculture through improved efficiency and digital technologies is crucial to these initiatives.

Food challenges

Significant domestic and international challenges face China’s agricultural transformation and wider efforts to ensure food security. In addition to concerns about growing import reliance on key agricultural products ( such as edible oil ), which reshape the country’s food consumption, and extreme weather events that destroy parts of local production, other factors should be considered.

Despite these successes, challenges remain. Demographic and environmental pressures, which call for significant investment and structural shifts in technology and infrastructure, make scaling up grain production difficult to achieve. China’s ability to accomplish these lofty objectives will depend on how far it can go.

China’s agricultural model, primarily based on small family farms scattered across the country, faces significant challenges to modernization, particularly in adopting&nbsp, agricultural technologies&nbsp, and standardizing practices.

Some initiatives, like the&nbsp, National Agricultural Technology and Education Cloud Platform, &nbsp, aim to address these gaps through online training. However, more aggressive efforts are required to expand agricultural innovation to ensure long-term food security.

Additionally, growing certain agricultural products can be&nbsp, much more expensive&nbsp, in China than in other countries, such as the US, and the yield may be much lower too. According to data from the United Nations&nbsp, Food and Agriculture Organization, corn and soybean yields in China are roughly half as high as those in many of the Americas ‘ exporting nations, which have comparatively high yields per hectare.

When it comes to soybeans, for instance, the average yield for soybeans in the US is about 3.5 tons per hectare in comparison to China’s 1.6 tons per hectare.

Similarly, for corn, the average on-farm yield of corn is 11-12 tons per hectare in the US, while China’s average corn yield is 6.2 tons per hectare. Given China’s major water, soil, and arable land constraints, addressing yield gaps is important for Beijing to achieve its food production goals. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

Additionally, disposable income increases are causing the country’s changing food consumption structure, with consumers demanding more of the pricey animal protein and dairy, as well as sugar, edible oils, and processed foods. This is reflected in the country’s changing food consumption structure. &nbsp, By 2025, China is expected to account for 31 % of the&nbsp, total global increase of protein consumption.

China’s overall food demand is projected to increase by 16 to 30 % by 2050, while demand for meat like beef and dairy products is projected to nearly double due to the middle class’s continued growth. To meet this demand, some&nbsp, researchers&nbsp, argue that up to 12, 000 square kilometers of additional agricultural land within China is necessary. &nbsp,

Financial barriers exacerbate challenges. Smallholder farmers, who manage&nbsp, more than 70 % &nbsp, of China’s agricultural land, are particularly burdened by these financial constraints. Many also struggle with&nbsp, limited access to credit.

Studies show that 18.87 % of family farms in China&nbsp, face a gap in operating funds, with&nbsp, around 26.20 percent&nbsp, unable to fully bridge funding gaps even after securing lands, further deterring investments in agricultural technologies.

At the same time, local governments are trapped in a vicious cycle of&nbsp, high debt and dwindling revenues. This implies that they may struggle to raise money for rural initiatives or put a lower price on them. While the government has &nbsp, introduced measures&nbsp, such as&nbsp, a 10 billion yuan ( US$ 1.38 billion ) in one-off subsidy&nbsp, in 2023 to boost farmers ‘ incomes, these efforts fail to tackle the underlying financial and structural barriers.

A 2024 debt relief package of&nbsp, 10 trillion yuan&nbsp, ($ 1.4 trillion ) also offers limited respite, as municipalities grapple with plummeting revenues from land sales —a consequence of the ongoing real estate crisis.

Local governments will be under even greater fiscal strain as total government debt is projected to rise by nearly 150 percent of the GDP by 2030. As a result, this could put investments into agriculture—such as rural infrastructure and technological innovation—at risk.

Concurrently, China grapples with demographic challenges, including&nbsp, declining fertility rates&nbsp, and a shrinking workforce. In 2022, approximately&nbsp, 176.6 million people&nbsp, — or 24.1 percent of the workforce — were employed in agriculture, fishing, and related industries.

The vast majority of this workforce (90 % ) are &nbsp, smallholder farmers. Nevertheless, the average age of agricultural workers is 53, with over a quarter aged 60 or older. This growing population poses a significant challenge to agricultural productivity and, conversely, wage growth. &nbsp,

Projections are also grim. By 2050, the proportion of the country’s agricultural workforce in China could plunge to&nbsp, around 3 %, while the total agricultural labor force may fall to under&nbsp, 31 million.

These workforce issues, which are essential to the agricultural supply chain, extend beyond agriculture and affect industries like transportation and logistics. By the end of 2021, China faced a shortage of 4 million truck drivers, a problem likely to worsen as the working-age population declines and younger people pursue&nbsp, better opportunities&nbsp, in cities.

In 2021, the number of&nbsp, rural migrant workers&nbsp, reached&nbsp, 292.51 million, a 2.4 % ( 6.91 million ) year-on-year increase. Due to this demographic shift, China will soon experience a shrinking agricultural workforce and fewer rural workers available for crucial industries like transportation and logistics, which are essential to maintaining food supply chains.

China has made significant advancements in ensuring its food security. But the path to agricultural self-sufficiency by 2025 is fraught with challenges. In the end, the country’s ability to provide a stable and resilient food supply to its expanding population will depend on how well it can overcome these obstacles, which range from technological limitations to demographic shifts.

Continue Reading

Trump risks backlash with fast and loose US debt claims – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia, Finance

The US senator, Donald Trump, is challenging official numbers around the country’s national debt, suggesting probable fraud in its analysis. The government’s comment have given a contentious twist to a problem that is both significant and significant for the United States. And it has implications for both the global market and the financial markets as well.

The total amount of cash the US government owes is the total amount spent on paying over its income in addition to years of borrowing. Over time, this volume has grown considerably, becoming a focal point for political disputes and financial forecasts.

The US bill time indicates an amount of debt of over US$ 36 trillion, related to$ 107, 227 per US resident.

Based on the US overall public debt collection, this number is based. The US bill has grown noticeably since the 2008 crisis, with a further increase occurring during the Covid crisis, is obvious.

This results in a US national debt that is roughly 121 % of the GDP. For comparison, the UK’s Office for Budget Responsibility puts American federal debt at 99.4 % of GDP in 2024.

Given that it is necessary to spend money to support their markets during recessions, this style is prevalent in developed economies.

Trump has also asserted that the US may include less debt than was initially believed as a result of this alleged fraud. Putting off possible fraud, it is well known that the title debt figure exaggerates the amount of national debt.

Due to the fact that it includes debts held by the Federal Reserve Banks as well as debt owed to one portion of the US state to another, When these payments are taken out of the US national debt data, we can determine how much debt is held by the general public. Although this is substantially lower, it continues to grow in a similar way over time.

How much more of the US’s GDP has grown as a percentage of GDP:

The conventional wisdom ( kindness of Mr Micawber, a figure in Charles Dickens ‘ book David Copperfield ) is that an income greater than expenses equal pleasure, while the same results in pain. However, this does not always apply to public loan.

In the end, we have a loan to ourselves ( and our future generations ). What truly matters is its long-term conservation, meaning that the debt-to-GDP amount is not following an incendiary design.

This kind of design could lead to a higher risk premium ( in other words, the interest ) being demanded by investors, which would have a negative effect on private opportunities and growth prospects. Moreover, it likely raises the risk of definition.

Our research has demonstrated that there is no universally accepted level below which debts can become untenable. Instead, each case requires context-specific analysis looking at macroeconomic fundamentals such as inflation and unemployment, financial crises as well as the ( potentially self-fulfilling ) market expectations.

Trump’s taking

Without providing any supporting evidence, Trump has just questioned the validity of the methods used to determine the national debt. He asserts that potential fraud has been discovered by the Elon Musk-led Department of Government Efficiency ( DOGE ). If confirmed, these findings could drastically affect perceptions of the country’s economic status.

His controversial claim that the US is” not that wealthy right now” has also been highlighted by reports. We owe$ 36 trillion because we let all of these countries exploit us. The US debt, which was the result of decades of fiscal policy choices in the wake of various economic shocks, is a source of perplexity for these claims. Bill itself doesn’t raise any concerns for experts.

Although foreign stakeholders ‘ holdings of US federal debt have increased over time, less than 30 % of GDP is currently attained. This is down from an all-time deep of 35 % during Trump’s second name back in 2020 during the pandemic.

Of the US national debt held by foreign nations, the largest quantities are owned by Japan, China, and the UK. However, when other nations hold US federal loan, it has nothing to do with” taking benefits” of the US.

In fact, the US dollar is the world’s powerful car money. It is on one side of 88 % of all trades in the foreign exchange market, which has a global daily turnover of$ 7.5 trillion.

As such, the US gains from a so-called “exorbitant opportunity”. This benefit is derived from the worldwide demand for the US Treasury securities’ and the US dollar’s status as” secure have ns,” which has allowed the US to issue debt with interest rates that are relatively lower.

According to research, the US dollar’s” safe have n” status has increased the US’s highest level of sustainable debt by about 22 %. What’s more, it’s estimated to have saved the US government 0.7 % of GDP in annual interest payments.

These benefits come from the fact that US Treasury securities have historically been viewed as risk-free property. Because they are backed by the US government’s full faith and credit, this is especially true during times of severe international financial strain. The US has a proven track record of paying its debts responsibility.

Trump’s remarks, however, could lead to merchants reevaluate the accuracy of official information and the potential risks associated with US Treasury securities and undermine the confidence of monetary areas. These remarks, whether true or false, effect on delicate issues of authorities transparency and fiscal responsibility.

Any advice that the US president’s debt figures are uncertain could be disruptive. Because of this, they may raise questions about the US governmental system’s dependability among the foreign buyers and the holding companies of these securities.

Similar to Trump’s tariff threats, it may be difficult to claim that various nations who own a sizable portion of the US government’s debt are opportunistic. The president’s political diplomatic relations with key debts may become strained, which could lead to greater uncertainty in global financial markets.

For maintaining confidence in the US economy and the ecology of the global financial system, distinguishing between politically charged rhetoric and governmental ecology of the US federal debt will be crucial.

Gabriella Legrenzi is senior teacher in economics and finance, Keele University, Reinhold Heinlein is senior lecturer in finance, University of the West of England, and Scott Mahadeo is senior lecturer in finance, University of Portsmouth

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

Continue Reading

A coming age of changing borders – Asia Times

By:
On:
In: Asia

The US senator has been putting pressure on NATO allies for weeks as he continues to deliberate Donald Trump’s programs for trying to resolve problems in Ukraine and Israel.

After his 2024 election win, Trump repeatedly raised the possibility of annexing the Danish province of Greenland, having initially done so in 2019. His new attack on a vital ally shocked Europe and the world community, which he had previously dismissed as absurd.

Trump has reiterated his position and also reiterated his intention to create the state’s 51st express in November 2024. Up until the middle of the 20th century, there was violent conflict between the two countries, but violent annexation is now unthinkable due to operational difficulties, close ties, and pleasant relations between the US and Canada.

Trump has since doubled down, adding that his comments about capturing the Panama Canal and Gaza have heightened fears that the world’s most powerful nation is genuinely interested in expanding its territory.

Trump’s motivations—whether a business strategy against Canada, securing greater military right in Greenland, or another reasons—remain vague. However, Washington’s interventionist policy tilt coincides with fast-moving negotiations with Russia to try to end the war in Ukraine, good by ceding area to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Israel is considering its unique border combination, including probably permanent pogroms of Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, and formalizing its invasion of Syria’s Golan Heights.

Trump’s actions, which were once seen as social theater, now appear to be a part of wider efforts to alter the debate on borders, which could lead to an unpredictably new era of regional conflicts.

Following World War II, the global community generally resisted border modifications, even in the context of independence, in dread of spreading instability, independence, and conquest. The 1975 Helsinki Accords, in change, cemented Europe’s postwar borders, discouraging harsh shifts while allowing for peaceful and mutually agreed changes.

After the Cold War, aspiring innovators hoped this design would continue. Germany’s unification in 1990 was followed by Czechoslovakia’s affectionate cut in 1992, and European regional issues had by then been reduced to legal fights, as part of a international, administrative approach to conflict resolution that was expected to spread into Eastern Europe and beyond.

Territories erupted in the newly independent states emerging from former communist Europe, despite having no clear ways of resolving them. In the former Soviet Union, Russian-backed separatists in Moldova and Georgia kept conflicts unresolved.

Uneasy peace was brought on by US and NATO involvement in former Yugoslavia until Western support for Kosovo’s 2008 independence sprang up tensions and divided allies.

Similarly, Western-supported independence efforts in Eritrea ( 1993 ) and South Sudan ( 2011 ) led to prolonged violence, while other secessionist and annexation movements continued to test the West’s commitment to managing territorial integrity globally.

Despite these difficulties, the US-led efforts to uphold the status quo largely lasted until 2022, when Russia launched the largest territorial expansion campaign in Europe since World War II.

Russia’s incursion as it unfolded on NATO’s doorstep was unavoidable despite the fact that Western powers have provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine and prevented Russia from acquiring Kyiv. Since then, confidence in the permanence of established borders has been shattered by the exposed limits of Western deterrence.

Trump appears eager to normalize it and designate the US as its primary beneficiary if a new era of territorial changes has begun. While negotiating border changes elsewhere, the US asserts dominance in a changing world order and even assumes more de facto control over Greenland or the strategically important Panama Canal.

In his first term, Trump hinted at recognizing Crimea, seized from Ukraine by Russia in 2014, and appears to accept that Ukraine will not return to its pre-2022 or even pre-2014 borders. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio convened in Saudi Arabia on February 18, 2025, to discuss Ukraine peace talks.

What does Trump want, though, given that Trump’s intentions regarding Ukraine remain vague, leaves room for improvement? Cutting costs, positioning the US as a peacemaker, calming international markets and potentially securing access to Ukrainian resources are among the possibilities.

However, crafting a deal that looks like a win for US foreign policy will be difficult, making the perception of Washington’s own territorial expansion key.

While increasing control over Canada seems unlikely, Moscow is” closely watching” Trump’s remarks about Greenland. Trump’s open proposal has some weight, following a covert attempt by the US to buy Greenland in 1946.

Russia’s officials and media have suggested that Greenland should be divided equally, but they take it more seriously because they think Washington is pressuring Denmark for more military access.

Given their growing Arctic military presence, proposals for agreements like a Compact of Free Association with Greenland after its potential independence from Denmark would likely sputter heavily on Russia and China. Moscow’s resistance may be softened by concessions in Ukraine, though this remains uncertain.

Washington’s openness to bilateral territorial adjustments, bypassing multilateral arbitration, will still require Ukraine’s consent and consideration of Greenlanders ‘ ( or any other territory’s ) wishes.

Any US-Russian territorial agreement could have an impact on Israel’s territorial ambitions in Gaza and Syria following Bashar al-Assad’s government’s demise in December 2024.

In 2019, Trump recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a strategically important Syrian region under Israeli control since the 1967 Six-Day War.

His decision, which the Biden administration later upheld, established a precedent for the US acknowledging Israeli territorial claims. Israeli forces quickly retreated to the UN-designated buffer zone to take control of the country after Assad’s government fell, and the Israeli government announced plans to expand its population there.

The Golan Heights provides Israel with a strategic, elevated military position, critical freshwater reserves, and other natural resources. Israel faces little resistance to reinforcing its hold and potentially expulsion the UN in the process, with Syria’s government collapse and Damascus no longer a significant threat.

Strengthening its influence may also allow Israel to portray its most recent military operations as victories, as well as the deterioration of” Iran’s proxy network.”

Russia wants to keep a military presence in Syria despite the fall of Assad, which could stifle other countries from blocking Israeli incursions into the Golan Heights while using its influence over Hamas in Gaza to control tensions.

By deepening cooperation with Israel—closely tied to Trump—Moscow may hope to secure concessions in Ukraine. On February 24, 2025, Israel was one of 18 countries, including the US, to vote against a UN resolution condemning Russia as an aggressor for its actions in Ukraine.

Trump’s unwavering support for Israel strengthens its position and compels other regional nations to do the same. Jordan, which relies on water from the Golan Heights, will likely be compelled to accept Israeli actions, a dynamic that also extends to Gaza.

After Trump had suggested their relocation, King Abdullah II of Jordan met with Trump on February 11, 2025, to discuss the relocation of Palestinians from Gaza. The King, wary of Jordan’s past instability with Palestinian refugees, firmly rejected Trump’s proposal for large-scale Palestinian resettlement.

However, his offer to immediately take in 2, 000 injured children was a tacit acknowledgment of the feasibility of limited relocation, inadvertently lending a degree of credibility to Trump’s larger proposal.

Although the timing of these agreements is still uncertain, agreements with Russia and Israel could reshape international border laws and lead to uncontrollable consequences as the US withdraws from enforcing territorial integrity. Russia and Israel are likely to increase their gains.

Syria is engaged in conflict with Kurdish independence movements and Turkish control in the north. Kurdish independence aspirations extend into Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, directly clashing with those countries, while Turkey‘s ambitions of a “greater Turkey” include expansive control over Cyprus and the Aegean Islands.

Sudan and Ethiopia have territorial disputes in Africa, whereas Ethiopia has longstanding disputes with Eritrea and Somalia. Meanwhile, the country’s growing internal divisions threaten to worsen.

Additionally, the decades-long conflict between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Western Sahara reignited in 2020. In exchange for Morocco’s recognition of Israel in December 2020, the US became the first nation to do so during Trump’s final weeks of office.

Yet here, Trump appears to have paved the way for a new direction, with Israel recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2023 and France following in 2024. Numerous other nations have since increased their support for Morocco’s position, but they have abstained completely.

Unabhängig of whether the US was simply ahead of the curve in Morocco, a risky escalation is looming elsewhere. China, observing Russia’s potential acquisitions in Ukraine, has numerous territorial disputes it could escalate, a traditional part of its geopolitical strategy.

Tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea, in particular, could lead to clashes with the US and its allies. China and India continue to fight over their Himalayan border despite recent de-escalation, while India and Pakistan continue to be locked in a conflict over Kashmir, with the threat of nuclear war raising the stakes even more.

Closer to home, tensions along the Belize-Guatemala border also carry the risk of escalation. And, since 2023, Venezuela’s growing claims to Guyana’s Essequibo region, 70 % of Guyana’s territory, have marked a significant shift in the Americas.

An increase in violence on the US southern border could worsen the migrant crisis, putting the question on American borders whether they are strong enough to handle additional pressures.

Despite efforts to defend border integrity, colonial-era boundaries, long-established grievances, and sudden state collapses after the end of the Cold War have challenged territorial stability, with the West largely attempting to maintain order.

His administration instead concentrates on strengthening borders at home while utilizing vulnerabilities abroad, which suggests that global territorial management is not worthwhile.

Changes in Ukraine and Israel may not occur overnight, but years of groundwork, coupled with ongoing deliberations, could accelerate the process and potentially include US territorial expansion.

It’s uncertain whether other nations or upcoming administrations will accept these decisions. However, if Washington sets a new standard, it will prompt other nations to pursue territorial changes more openly, inviting ethnic cleansing and even genocides.

Washington’s ability to control this dynamic is unproven, as is its response to emerging foreign disputes and potential internal secession attempts. What will come after agreements with Russia and Israel over territory allow the White House political breathing room, it’s not clear what will happen.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book,” Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas”, was published in December 2022.

The Independent Media Institute’s Economy for All project produced this article. It is republished with permission.

Continue Reading