Frugal innovation upside in a high-spend, high-tech age – Asia Times

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The US and China’s high-stakes conflict or their desire to dominate artificial intelligence are two topics that are currently at the forefront of the global conversation on tech: one, the significant offers announced during US President Donald Trump’s explore to the Gulf, and two.

The wave and spread of reduced- and mid-tech technology that is improving everyday life in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is a quieter collection of evolving technology innovations and relationships that are overlooked in this narrative. &nbsp,

The Global South currently accounts for 40 % of the nation’s economic production, and it is anticipated to account for the majority of development in the coming years. This economic development is being fueled by useful, robust solutions to pressing public needs, including financial inclusion, digital ID, and low-carbon energy supplies. Additionally, they promote unheard social participation and assistance between the South and the South. &nbsp,

More than 40 million kilograms of greenhouse gas emissions have already been reduced in India by blending alcohol into gasoline. Mobile wealth and SMS-based services are driving financial participation in all of Africa, while online resources are modernizing fish and disease prevention.

One of the inventions competing for the Africa&nbsp Prize for Engineering Innovation is clean cooking gasoline made from recycled plastic and electricity-free consumable goods cold storage.

Unified Payments Interface ( UPI), which was introduced in 2016, accounts for nearly 80 % of India’s digital payments and facilitates billions of instant transactions. 140 million people use Pix, the Portuguese equal. According to the Atlantic Council, one in every eleven people worldwide uses Pix or UPI to send or receive payments right away.

Partner in the Global North have been a significant source of the funding for many of these advances, a feat that has decreased in recent months as a result of USAID closing and wider challenges to development finance.

China also plays a significant function, with a rumored three out of every four money going to countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes both physical and digital equipment.

However, the funding environment is changing. Between 2020 and 2022, Masdar, the United Arab Emirates, signed agreements across Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Tanzania, almost double its renewable energy capacity.

The UAE invested US$ 110 billion in Africa from 2019 to 2023, surpassing China, the UK, and France, and it only invested$ 72 billion in solar power. By the year 2024, it had surpassed all other investors in new American firm ventures. &nbsp,

Countries in the Global South are expected to suffer from US tariffs that range from 48 % for Laos to 49 % for Cambodia, and shock figures are being assigned to South East Asian solar panel producers.

By reshaping supply chains, promoting economic restructuring, and incentivizing regional partnerships, it may unintentionally contribute to this surge in new technical partnerships across the Global South.

For instance, India has assisted Zambia in turning fabric byproducts into low-carbon electricity, focusing on affordable, low-tech solutions that help rural communities.

Numerous American nations have collaborated to create disaster risk management systems, utilizing local information and frequently using low-tech techniques like community-based early warning systems. These “frugal innovation” projects had encourage inclusive growth by addressing issues that arise in traditionally underrepresented markets. &nbsp,

Tech participation in the Global South extends beyond capital flows; it also provides models for how nations can hatch and trade indigenous technologies that address issues that are shared across borders.

Regional relationships are expanding, placing a premium on shared technical standards and electronic equipment on which real improvements can be built, like ASEAN’s Digital Masterplan 2025 and Africa’s AfCFTA. &nbsp,

Policymakers and company directors must pay attention to both technologies and management in order to promote this engagement. The best way forward is in split innovation strategies, which combine robust low-tech, high-impact innovations with areas of competitive edge in more innovative technologies, on the technical level.

Aadhar, whose implementation is being evaluated by other nations, is based on fairly “low tech,” but it now has an AI layer to facilitate citizen-state interactions.

Nandan Nilekani, a co-founder and president of Infosys, has argued that India should concentrate on becoming a worldwide “use case money” for AI, avoiding a target on foundation models. With this method, India’s innovators could create practical solutions that both meet local needs and are sellable to nations with similar challenges. &nbsp,

Diversification should be proper on the policy-related front, avoiding the possibility of getting lost in an alliance that is overabundant.

The ability to choose, coordinate, and participate in forums may become more important as diplomatic technology agreements and minilaterals grow in the Global South. They ought to pay attention to the safeguards that ensure that electronic equipment and systems advance the common good.

Minilateral organizations in the Global South with an emphasis on technology business and management may be uniquely positioned to help assistance on a range of global issues, from preventing terrorist financing to promoting food security to supporting communities on the frontlines of climate change through simple cellular communications strategies. The objectives should be clearly stated. &nbsp,

Public-interest innovation that can be cultivated through cooperative blocs has the potential to promote economic growth and support local economies. It could also increase the Global South’s geopolitical influence by positioning its nations as adept at resolving issues at the forefront of global changes.

StateUp was founded by Dr. Tanya Filer, the founder and CEO of the University of Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy.

Dr. N. Janardhan is the research director at the Abu Dhabi-based Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy.

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APEC ‘concerned’ over challenges to global trade

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South Korea’s Minister for Trade, Cheong In-Kyo, said the joint statement was hard-won, with” major variations” in positions apparent early on in the discussions. But at the last minute, the countries “dramatically” reached an agreement, he said, with the APEC emphasising the importance of global trading mechanisms such as theContinue Reading

Indonesian manufacturers eye new foreign markets as US tariffs squeeze exports

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RECIPING UP NEW MARKETS

Exports worth US$ 4.6 billion last year were a significant source of income for Indonesian cotton manufacturers, which is a significant source of income for them.

However, the Indonesian Textile Association warned that after the US announced steep taxes to tackle trade imbalances, require could drop by as much as 30 %. &nbsp,

The sector is now desperately looking for new areas.

” Southeast Asia and its surrounding areas have extremely large market potential,” according to Danang Girindrawardana, the agency’s executive producer. &nbsp,

” We haven’t tapped into them effectively because Indonesia has grown weary of or be obstinate by the world’s existing businesses. We have fallen for neighboring nations, which may be involved in the import-export operation of textile and garment goods, as a result.

In light of the uncertainty surrounding the world economy, Indonesia is developing a White Paper to assist regional manufacturers in their collaboration. &nbsp,

The nation is in the lead of the ASEAN ( Association of Southeast Asian Nations ) Federation of Textile Industries, which stands for the objectives of Southeast Asia’s textile and clothing companies.

Trump’s taxes have likewise rekindled calls for Southeast Asia to boost domestic trade to lessen political shocks.

Non-tariff obstacles are on the rise and present new challenges for local integration, according to observers, despite nearly all intra-bloc tariffs having been lifted. &nbsp,

According to International Economic Association secretary-general Lili Yan Ing,” some non-tariff measures can also serve as barriers, particularly when it comes to the procedures ( and ) obtaining the licensing.” &nbsp,

” That’s things that ASEAN and I can work together on in terms of simplifying methods, licensing, and how to get specific credentials to enhance intra-ASEAN trade.”

Airlangga Hartarto, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, led a group to Washington in April to demand better trade conditions.

In order to promote new market access and promote trade, Jakarta is likewise accelerating international cooperation, such as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Indonesia and the European Union. &nbsp,

The free trade agreement agreements are expected to wrap up this season, having begun in 2016.

Companies are urging stronger shelter for labor-intensive companies, which have long experienced an influx of low-cost imports from China, while the state works to open up new markets.

Businesses told CNA that the condition is still uncertain despite the fact that conflicts in the US-China trade conflict may have eased a little.

Growing concerns are that Taiwanese producers might divert extra supply to Indonesia, causing local markets to flood and put even more pressure on domestic manufacturers.

” We are currently living in a time when nothing is certain. However, I’m convinced that demand will increase once more, which likewise opens up a window for businesses that can supply the goods required,” Leonardi said.

” I’m also enthusiastic because this kind of situation won’t last forever,” I said.

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A good, but not great, China trade deal – Asia Times

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Unquestionably, the US-China trade deal is beneficial. People who have criticized the Trump taxes are pleased to see it, like me. However, it’s certainly a wonderful thing, despite what it is. And it’s undoubtedly hardly a victory for the leader.

It’s good because, if we had adhered to the trade-war tariffs, which are ours at 145 % and theirs at 125 %, then commerce between the nations would have almost stopped completely.

Routine commerce, including agricultural trade, will at least be possible at the new levels of 30 % and 10 %, but it will be challenging in many cases. Instead, the US can concentrate on reducing its reliance on China for important goods that it can’t already obtain elsewhere. That ought to be the primary objective.

Some business is good, while others is bad. The US doesn’t like “generalized decoupling” from China, as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent put it. It desires” corporate decoupling.”

Financial markets were pleased that Peter Navarro, the White House secretary, was the crucial figure behind the enormous tariffs on China and other nations, was speaking for the management on tariffs this period.

The agreement also raises the possibility of further improvements to US-China business agreements as discussions progress. For instance, American farmers and ranchers would like to see China’s taxes and other obstacles to US agricultural goods completely eliminated.

Because it’s simply a 90-day expulsion, the tariff levels are still very large and imposed on both important and non-critical products, which is not a good thing.

More important, it’s not great because the management is also wasting the chance by coordinating China’s taxes and professional plans with our allies, which would have the best chance of reducing America’s dangerous dependence on China.

China is investing heavily to advance its position in global developing. China wants to concentrate on the rest of the world for very little and had the rest of the world rely on it for a lot of non-critical products, including many from metal to electronics.

By accumulating significant manufacturing capacity, it achieves scale levels that prevent unusual competitors from being able to meet its prices.

There is general agreement on whether or not this will harm the US. Additionally, it presents a threat to conventional US allies like Japan, South Korea, the European Union, Canada, and others. No country can defend itself by acting only, as I’ve already made clear in my previous post. China’s rewards on a level are simply too great.

The administration treats friends as if they were enemies, not to coordinate tax and professional policies with allies. Our “reciprocal” tax on Chinese goods has increased by 24 %. The most significant trade of Japan is autos, which are subject to 25 % tariffs. 20 % of our “reciprocal” price on the European Union.

Although the tariffs are no mutual in the traditional sense of the word, the different countries aren’t imposing the similar tariff on US exports.

China’s 90-day “reciprocal” tariff, on the other hand, includes a 20 % penalty tariff on fentanyl, while the 30 % tariff, on the other hand, includes 10 %. China has indicated that it is willing to impose restrictions on morphine. If it does, China might receive lower US taxes than Japan or the EU.

That would not be ideal.

The supervision is undoubtedly referring to the deal as a success. However, the Chinese believe that the success is ours. They are correct.

Chinese President Xi Jinping didn’t back down or sigh when Trump imposed the 145 % taxes in the first few days of April. He responded by imposing 12 % tariffs on US imports. He advised Taiwanese people to get ready for a business war.

Trump acknowledged that the tariffs would have to go down because he realized the Chinese were ready to tough it out and faced nervous financial markets and miserable American businesses. The final agreement his negotiators finally reached just reversed each team’s price levels by 115 portion points. There were no Chinese agreements involved.

According to the Wall Street Journal editorial section, the agreement represented a “major flee” by the administration and a “win for financial reality.”

Trump’s taxes on supporters have eroded trust in the US. This hope that it’s not too late to correct the error and win at least some more people’s respect.

Both the US and its allies cannot manage to rely on China for important goods. Working with our friends rather than against them is the best way to prevent that from occurring.

Urban Lehner, a former long-time Asia journalist and director for the Wall Street Journal, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus.

This post, which was originally published on May 14 by the latter news business and is now being republished by Asia Times with authority, is entitled” Copyright 2025 DTN/The Progressive Farmer.” All trademarks are reserved. Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on&nbsp, X @urbanize&nbsp,

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China’s strategic pivot paying off in South Caucasus – Asia Times

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After Azerbaijan’s restoration of its full geographical authority, the Western powers have generally failed to effectively engage with it. Filling the gap, China has been deepening its influence in the country while extending its approach into Georgia and yet Armenia.

Beijing has increased opportunities in the country’s modern equipment and has been funding energy projects. In this crucial juncture area, nations like Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf claims have been putting their weight in the process.

American actors have only just begun to try to handle the results of their failure to adapt their local approaches after the 2020 Next Karabakh War.

In this regard, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Beijing on April 2025 marked a turning point for China’s relationship with the South Caucasus. This has now led to the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership ( CSP), which is the highest level of bilateral cooperation in the Chinese diplomatic hierarchy.

This upgrade builds on momentum since 2022, when the two sides formalized a strategic partnership at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) summit. By 2024, bilateral trade had reached US$ 3.74 billion, up 20.7 % from the previous year, making China Azerbaijan’s fourth-largest trading partner.

The partnership, which has been elevated to a comprehensive position, shows how in line with Azerbaijan’s development programs, such as the” Silk Road Revival” and the 2030 Socio-Economic Development programs, is China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing no more treats the South Caucasus as a silent hall but considers it an effective network in trans-Caspian and trans-Eurasian connectivity.

Aliyev and Xi Jinping’s joint statement emphasizes global cooperation in the fields of transportation and logistics, as well as automation, intellectual property, and aircraft.

Additionally, agreements address cooperative projects in the fields of metallurgy, automotive, and machinery. China will therefore enter key Georgian commercial sectors, complementing Baku’s drive to expand its economy beyond hydrocarbon fuels.

The West’s hesitant answer

China’s expansion in the South Caucasus was facilitated by the 2020 Minute Karabakh War’s strategic pump. After Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia and the Russia-brokered ceasefire, the traditional Western-led peace process ( the OSCE Minsk Group ) was effectively sidelined.

Washington and Brussels attempted to resolve Armenia and Azerbaijan’s differences, which led to some fruitful achievement, but they failed to come up with a strong local vision at a time when the political landscape was changing.

Just in 2022 did the West begin to lose ground because of Russia’s redistribution of the South Caucasus. The European Union launched counseling summits in Brussels and deployed a border surveillance mission to Armenia in 2023 – which, rather than de-escalating tensions, has rarely had the same effect.

By 2023-2024, the United States had increased its focus, according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who convened multilateral meetings, and appointed a special minister for the area. However, these initiatives frequently lag behind local developments.

Facing no like boundaries, China pressed forward with a trained financial plan that expanded its footprints through logistics, modern equipment and power financing.

As Yerevan’s disillusion with Moscow grew, the United States and France began to adopt a more pro-Armenian position. Social support increased, and dialogues of security assistance grew more lively. France became the largest arms dealer to Armenia as Russian sales almost collapsed.

The Biden administration declined to maintain the waiver for Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act, which prohibits direct support to Azerbaijan. Any American leadership has done this for the first time in more than 20 years.

Just days before the end of the Trump administration, Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed a US-Armenian corporate relationship contract with Yerevan’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.

By 2025, the EU had begun revising the importance of the area, both as a source of energy and trade as well. Although funding for the South Caucasus Pipeline’s growth is still a mystery, Azerbaijan and its document from July 2022 aimed to increase its fuel exports to Europe by 2027.

The EU’s Global Gateway initiative today openly favors Middle Corridor growth, coordinating purchase across Central Asia. A Transport Corridor Alliance was established to support trans-Caspian routes at an EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in April 2024.

Although these initiatives are still in development, they indicate that South Caucasus will soon be recognized as a component of a wider Eurasian connectivity network. Still, the Western response remains fundamentally reactive.

The region is no longer dependent solely on Euro-Atlantic frameworks. The South Caucasus now has real alternatives and the means to exercise agency there because China offers extensive partnerships grounded in infrastructure, trade, and long-horizon investment.

Logistics and connectivity: the Middle Corridor in focus

China was historically cautious in the South Caucasus, interpreting it as Russia’s sphere of influence and favoring routes through Russia or Iran for its trade pacific with Europe. The original Belt and Road corridors did not even include the South Caucasus.

The twin shocks of the 2020 Second Karabakh War and especially the 2022 Russian war against Ukraine disrupted Russian transit routes and changed all that. Azerbaijan and its neighbors are now seen by Beijing as crucial components of an alternative East-West artery connecting China to Europe.

Aliyev has made it known that, after China, Azerbaijan is the second-largest investor in Belt and Road projects. Baku has spent enormously to upgrade ports, railways and highways to attract Belt and Road traffic.

China’s support for Azerbaijan as a crucial transit node linking China, Central Asia, and Europe confirms its intention to convert the Middle Corridor from a secondary fallback route to a primary conduit.

The Middle Corridor’s potential was previously hindered by shoddy infrastructure and increased competition from faster Russian rail lines. Before 2022, only 2-3 % of China-EU overland freight used the Middle Corridor.

However, this calculus was altered by the sanctions and instability brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhstan saw a 63 % increase in freight along this route in 2023-2024 ( to 4.1 million tons ), and Azerbaijan handled 18.5 million tons of cargo, a 5.7 % increase.

In late 2023, the rail companies of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia formed a joint venture to integrate customs and digital tracking systems, with a view to cutting freight times between China and Europe.

Azerbaijan, for its part, upgraded the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and increased the capacity of the new Port of Alat on the Caspian. Azerbaijan and China came to a consensus to simplify customs and finalize new road transportation agreements to advance direct trans-Caspian routes connecting China and Europe via Azerbaijan.

Shippers in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan project that Middle Corridor container volume will reach 96, 000 twenty-foot equivalent units ( TEUs, a standard measure equivalent to about 33 cubic meters ). Although the volume is modest compared to Northern Corridor levels still transiting Russia, this is a significant increase.

Energy and digital footprints: China’s techno-economic statecraft

China’s expanding influence in the South Caucasus is not limited to trains and ports. As they have already done in Central Asia, particularly in Azerbaijan and Georgia, digital infrastructure and energy financing are becoming important components of Beijing’s statecraft in the region. These industries serve as a gateway to local development needs while expanding China’s footprint.

In Azerbaijan, the new partnership prioritizes the digital economy and technology cooperation. Over the past ten years, Chinese telecom companies Huawei and ZTE have provided equipment for telecom networks in each of the three countries. The two cities have now agreed to support the “digital transformation of industry” and establish joint tech R&amp, D platforms.

Chinese soft power accompanies these tech investments. With Beijing’s assistance, a new Chinese language school has recently been established in Yerevan. Confucius Institutes are present in Baku and Tbilisi. Although not particularly large, these initiatives foster goodwill and familiarity with Chinese standards and technology.

In Georgia, a visa-free regime with China took effect in 2024, boosting tourism and business travel. Similar a regime is currently in place between China and Azerbaijan. Beijing has subtly been shaping the information environment in this regard, presenting itself as a new development partner for the Caucasus.

Chinese companies have stepped in alongside Middle Eastern investors to finance solar and wind projects. One example is the 100-megawatt ( MW) Gobustan solar plant, which is currently supported by China’s Universal Energy.

China is now promoting a” Global Clean Energy Partnership,” which aligns with Baku’s plans to develop large renewable energy projects in its sunny plains and windy Caspian coast, aimed at both domestic electricity consumption and future exports to European markets.

In Georgia, Chinese firms have bid on hydropower plant tenders and acquired shares in the Poti Free Industrial Zone, which could include oil storage facilities. Chinese miners and investors are active in the copper and metals industry in Armenia.

Armenia sends copper concentrate to China, and it has also given money to China for energy-saving items like solar panels and transformers. These moves ensure China has a stake in the Caucasus energy landscape.

Both China and Turkey want open, stable corridors. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian nations are also stepping up their involvement. Kazakhstan, in particular, is investing heavily to make the trans-Caspian link viable by financing port upgrades and purchasing new ferries.

The Gulf Arab states have come to represent yet another group of players. The United Arab Emirates ( UAE ) and Saudi Arabia also see the region as an extension of their own bid to be Eurasian hubs.

Dubai-based logistics company DP World has provided advice on Azerbaijan’s Alat Free Economic Zone, and businesses are reportedly looking into investing in South Caucasus infrastructure. ACWA Power in Saudi Arabia and Masdar in the UAE have signed significant agreements to build solar and wind farms in Azerbaijan’s liberated territories.

The South Caucasus gains agency

The South Caucasus is acquiring autonomous agency as a result of these trends as a whole. In particular, Azerbaijan has capitalized on its geographic position to increase its strategic significance.

Georgia, long a supporter of alternative corridors, signed a free trade agreement with China in 2017 and then, in 2023, surprised many by elevating relations with Beijing to a strategic partnership. After Georgia felt a little distaste for the West and was looking for new investors, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili made the announcement during his visit to China.

Beijing’s interest is particularly strong in the long-planned deep-sea port on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, Anaklia. A Chinese state firm, China Harbor Engineering Company, has been contracted to develop the port, increasing Georgia’s dependence on Chinese capital.

Without significant investments, China’s economic footprint in Armenia continues to be thin. Aid is primarily symbolic, similar to a new TV tower studio and school buses.

The emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic network has made Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia more transactional in engaging all outside powers.

The signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and China and President Aliyev’s visit to Beijing in 2025 demonstrate how Beijing’s expanding footprint is changing the region’s geopolitical compass.

This trend is reinforced by Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states ‘ involvement. Their investments and ambitions further anchor the Caucasus as a hub of trans-Caspian and trans-regional networks.

Due to the West’s lagging response, particularly from the US and EU, China has so far left a more dynamic role to play. Western countries must step beyond outdated frameworks and offer their own tangible connectivity and investment initiatives if they want to maintain their standing in the South Caucasus.

The lesson of the past five years is that the South Caucasus will not remain a geopolitical backwater or mere bridge by default. It is actively transforming itself into a central node of Eurasian connectivity, in complex-system terms autopoietic. The Beijing trip of Aliyev is a clear example of that new reality.

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Trump’s trade beef more with Global South than China – Asia Times

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As Donald Trump gears up for his big trade battle with Xi Jinping’s China, is the US president fighting the wrong economic war?

A perusal of Federal Reserve data shows, rather convincingly, that the US now imports roughly four times as much from Global South nations, ex-China, than from Asia’s biggest economy.

In March, for example, the US imported about US$29.3 billion worth of goods from China and $114 billion from the Global South.

This is no aberration, as the accompanying chart shows. US-bound shipments from Latin America, Africa, Turkey, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and elsewhere are, taken together, increasingly bigfooting those directly from the mainland.

Caveats abound, of course. The magnitude of indirect trade passing through third countries and re-exported to another is literally off the charts. The nature of modern-day supply chains is that economies like Mexico or Vietnam use Chinese components in their wares, which are then put on tankers to American shores.

Graphic: Asia Times

Even so, the extreme bilateralization of trade as a foundational concept in the Trumpian mindset unravels, circa 2025, when you look at the biggest sources of US trade flows. It’s a reminder that Trump’s economic strategy is ripped from the pages of the mid-1980s.

The rationale behind Trump’s tariff policies dates back to a time when the five most industrialized nations held vast sway over economic dynamics. His obsession with a weaker dollar is inspired by a deal struck 40 years ago in New York’s Plaza Hotel, an iconic property Trump owned for a while. His tax priorities have critics linking them to the “trickle-down economics” era.

The problem with a US leader having his head stuck in 1985, aside from the obvious, is that “Made in China 2025” is upending the global economy now. And at a moment when China is investing in where it thinks the world will be in 2035. This goes, too, for a Global South that’s increasingly forging its own path – one that barely factors in where the US might fit in a decade from now.

“The world economy is splitting into competing groups instead of a single connected system of globalization of the 1990s,” says Gilles Moëc, chief economist at AXA Investment.

So, despite what Trump appears to believe, nothing he does with tariffs is going to shrink cross-border trade. What Trump World missed is that “instead of bringing production back to the countries where products are used, global companies have been reorganizing their supply chains around groups of countries or “clubs with similar values or security concerns.”

Moëc adds that “this rejig is a diluted version of globalization but can still keep the wheels moving. As long as clubs include both low-wage nations and high-spending economies, the adverse effects of fragmentation – such as inflation and lower efficiency – could be mitigated.”

Now that Trump seems to have segued from pushing tariffs to pushing Boeing planes and American semiconductors, the hope is that his assault on China Inc is losing momentum. But the reordering of global trade dynamics, evidenced by Fed data, suggests the Trump administration is firing tariffs at the wrong economic foe.

That is becoming even truer as traditional US allies like the European Union pivot to where the real future growth is.

“China is likely to double down on ties with the Global South and Europe, the latter now its most crucial market given its purchasing power and relatively restrained trade stance,” says Lauren Gloudeman, analyst at Eurasia Group.

Of course, China’s ability to reroute exports from the US to Europe will probably be quickly curtailed by forthcoming EU measures to prevent dumping by other countries,” Gloudeman notes. Still, this is trade that Trump is leaving on the table with policies that look backwards, not to the decade ahead.

Trump doesn’t have a monopoly on Panglossian views of the future. The Chinese side can also go too far with half-glass-full takes on the magnanimity of Beijing’s policy mix. Or the Chinese economy’s perceived invulnerability.

Take Yang Guangbin, international relations expert at Renmin University, who argues that “unlike the order brought to the world by the rise of the West, the new form of human civilization created by Chinese modernization will be shared development rather than beggar-thy-neighbor, common security rather than security dilemmas and civilization mutual learning rather than civilization conflicts.”

In Yang’s view, China’s policy priorities “set an example for Global South countries to independently and autonomously move towards modernization and will inevitably be emulated by some countries.”

Perhaps, but even BRICS nations — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — compete far more amongst each other than they cooperate. Yet, at the same time, the more Global South to Global South trade there is, the less there might be old-school trade with big roles for US companies.

As Fabian Zuleeg, chief economist at the European Policy Center, notes, multipolarity is often linked to countries aligning flexibly with other powers, rather than being forced into camps, or worse, becoming unwilling parties in a cold war or open conflict between superpowers.

“On one level,” Zuleeg says, “multipolarity is a description of the emerging global landscape. It also reflects the justified dissatisfaction with the global economic and governance system that was designed, and has been dominated by, the West, led by the US. This system is neither fair, nor is it underpinned any longer by the support of the US, let alone of the Global South.”

However, he stresses, “multipolarity is not an ordering principle, especially if it lacks a clear plan for reformed and inclusive international organizations able to define jointly acceptable rules, allowing for the peaceful mitigation of conflict.”

Yet Aparna Bharadwaj, managing partner at the Boston Consulting Group, adds that the US takes the Global South for granted at its own peril. She points out that global attention lately has fixated on the challenges and tensions fracturing the Western-led world order, such as “America First” policies, the fraying of decades-old alliances, dramatic US tariff increases on all its global trade partners, and Europe’s struggle to remain competitive.

“Less-noticed,” Bharadwaj says, “has been a development with perhaps even greater long-term implications for the global economy—the rise of a ‘third front’ on the world stage spanning more than 130 nations outside the orbits of the West and China and that accounts for more than three-fifths of global population. Nations in the Global South … are emerging from the shadows to craft their own paths in a multipolar world.”

And that world is now, collectively, becoming a bigger trading force for the US than the one over which Trump obsesses. This linear focus, of course, also dates back to the 1980s. Back then, it was Japan that Trump accused of exploiting US workers. Now it’s China in the role of economic bogeyman.

One could look at the destination of the first overseas trip of Trump’s second presidency — the Middle East — as a sign of situational awareness. But Trump family business seems to be the main objective of this Gulf tour, not spreading America’s economic wings.

The good news for the global economy is that Trump is retreating on tariffs, at least for now. “The transition from tariff rates, retaliation and ultimately to trade deals is an important sequence for the recovery in US equity markets,” says Adam Turnquist, chief technical strategist at LPL Financial.

And the recovery in global markets, too. But Trump can’t be happy about the dominant narrative that he blinked on his ballyhooed trade war. Nor is he likely to sit quietly as Xi’s government fails to offer loads of trade concessions in the days and weeks ahead. The odds are still high that “Tariff Man” returns, wreaking fresh havoc in stock, bond and currency markets around the globe.

The dollar has strengthened since Donald Trump's election.Photo: AFP / Jewel Samad
Trump’s tariff policies are driving de-dollarization. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Jewel Samad

The dollar is of particular concern as the US national debt races toward $37 trillion and Team Trump angles for more tax cuts. Markets worry, too, about Trump’s assault on the Federal Reserve’s independence.

And his musings over time about engineering a weaker dollar. As Trump continues to do his worst to trading partners and foes alike, the dollar’s future as the top reserve currency is becoming more and more wobbly.

The market is “re-assessing the structural attractiveness of the dollar as the world’s global reserve currency and is undergoing a process of rapid de-dollarization,” says Deutsche Bank economist George Saravelos. “Nowhere is this more evident than the continued and combined collapse in the currency and US bond market” in recent weeks.

What’s not collapsing, though, is US trade, thanks largely to the Global South, ex-China set. If Trump wants to boost US exports, he might want to start looking to the world that exists beyond China. 

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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US uses ‘poison pills’ to isolate China from supply chains – Asia Times

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After the two nations lowered their tariffs for each other, the United States has begun pushing for a” tactical dispersion” from China, primarily in the metal, medical, and semiconductor sectors.

A US and UK trade agreement signed on May 8 demonstrated that Washington wants veto power over China’s purchases of American steel and pharmaceutical companies. Some Chinese experts anticipated that the US would include these “poison capsules” in upcoming trade agreements with other nations.

In addition, the US Commerce Department issued three recommendations in three rules that organizations worldwide should not use Chinese superior computing cards, permit the teaching of Chinese AI versions with US artificial intelligence chips, or re-export National high-end chips to China.

The US and China agreed to a 90-day “reciprocal” tariff delay in a joint statement released on Monday. In addition to the typical 20 % tariff that the US imposed during the Trump administration’s first trade war against China in 2018, the US also lowered its tariffs on Chinese goods from 145 % to 30 %. China lowered its tariffs on US goods from 125 % to 10 % in exchange.

US Secretary of State Scott Bessent stated on Monday that the country prefers a proper coupling over a general decoupling with China. He stated that the US will establish strong supply chains for important metals like semiconductors and material. &nbsp,

The UK’s metal industry was hit by US President Donald Trump’s 25 % tariff on all imports of aluminum, steel, and derivative goods on March 12. Every year, the UK export about$ 700 million ( US$ 931 million ) of steel and aluminum to the US along with$ 2.2 billion in gym and equipment.

According to the recently signed US-UK “economic prosperity agreement” ( EPD), the US will offer modified reciprocal tariff treatment for some important UK imports based on the two nations ‘ “balanced” trading relationship and shared national security priorities. Any modifications will be in line with those shared national security interests, including those that may be addressed in upcoming US Section 232 examinations. &nbsp,

What are the main points of the partnership, in this case:

  • For UK electrical goods at a 10 % price, the US will establish a limit of 100 000 automobiles.
  • For UK steel, aluminum, and some derivative steel and aluminum products, the US will establish a quota at most-favored nation ( MFN) rates.
  • The US and the UK intend to reach agreement on tremendously preferential treatment outcomes for materials and medicine.
  • With a view to a significantly favorable outcome, the US and the UK may engage in negotiations regarding different sectors that are subject to Area 232 investigations or another tariff measures.
  • The UK made commitments to abide by US standards for the protection of the US&nbsp supply chains for steel and aluminum products and for the ownership of important production facilities.

According to The Telegraph, the UK’s recent Labor government has the authority to veto Chinese investments in the country’s steel and drug sectors under the terms of the agreement. &nbsp,

The Bureau of Industry and Security ( BIS ) of the US Commerce Department ( BIS ) launched Section 232 investigations in 2018 into the impact of imports of steel and aluminum on US national security. To encircle China’s access to North American steel and aluminum markets and potentially alter its economic relationship with Canada and Mexico, it included the so-called “poison pill” clause in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement ( USMCA ). &nbsp,

The BIS launched new Part 232 investigations in March and April 2025 regarding the exports of copper, lumber, semiconductors, chip-making equipment, medications, and their components, trucks, and processed important minerals and generic products. &nbsp,

Zhang Yansheng, a senior scholar at the&nbsp, China Academy of Macroeconomic Research, &nbsp, told the Financial Times,” This type of’poison supplement’ is really worse than the taxes.

Zhang claimed that the US-UK trade agreement demonstrated Washington’s push to impose similar conditions on other nations during industry discussions. He claimed that China may “bluntly raise the issue in discussions with the UK,” but that at this point it may hold off on retaliation right away. &nbsp,

China has made images to the UK and asked for clarification, according to a declaration from the Chinese Embassy in the UK on Wednesday. Cooperation between nations does not violate or defame any third party’s objectives. China is steadfastly opposed to any party seeking a package that hurts China’s objectives.

The Chinese Embassy stated that it will continue to monitor the condition and act as needed.

A blogger from Shandong, China, claimed it is not worthwhile to sacrifice the opportunity to work with China in the device and pharmaceutical industries by imposing a 100, 000 car export quota on the UK’s annual US exports.

Reversing the propagation rule for AI

The Biden administration made the announcement of the AI propagation law on January 15, a novel regulatory framework that will allow for responsible propagation of cutting-edge AI systems. &nbsp,

If US businesses, primarily Nvidia and AMD, trade high-end AI chips to different nations besides the United States, they must submit an application for export licenses under the framework. On May 15, it was scheduled to start meeting its compliance needs.

The US Commerce Department confirmed on Tuesday that the BIS would not abide by the AI propagation law.

According to the section,” These new regulations would have stifled American innovation and placed costly new regulatory requirements on businesses.” The diffusion law also would have hampered US diplomatic ties with “many nations” by lowering their position to” second-tier.”

The BIS also announced three changes to improve trade controls for AI chips from other countries:

  • educating the market on the dangers of using certain Huawei Ascend cards and PRC advanced computing ICs.
  • A public safety precaution is being taken regarding the potential repercussions of allowing the use of US AI bits for Chinese AI models.
  • Demanding US businesses to protect supply chains from diversion strategies ( China’s strategies to obtain AI chips via third countries ).

Additionally on Tuesday, Trump led a group of systems luminaries on a trip to the Middle East, including Lisa Su from AMD and Jensen Huang from Nvidia. 18, 000 Blackwell cards will be shipped to Saudi Arabia, according to Nvidia.

A Shaanxi-based journalist asks,” Why did the US taking action against Huawei’s Ascend AI microprocessor?” The Ascend 910C device is comparable to some of Nvidia’s bits, the company claims. It won’t take long for it to surpass Nvidia.”

She claims that Washington’s efforts to halt the Ascend chip’s expansion into the world market are pointless because it now targets primarily local customers. She claims that China will continue to outlaw the US from exporting its crucial materials.

According to Chinese media, the Ascend 910C performs similarly to the H100 device from Nvidia. Huawei’s production capacity is still constrained because Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp ( SMIC ), its contract manufacturer, does not employ extreme ultraviolet ( EUV) lithography to create high-end chips. &nbsp,

Read more: US eases trade conflict and pursues” secret coupling” with China.

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US-China tariff pause may help trade-reliant Singapore avoid a recession, say experts

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According to the Trump administration, this 10 % work is still in position as a “baseline.”

The HSBC economist predicted that due to the “overhanging” doubt that the US business plan changes have “injected into the world business,” funding actions will probably continue to be halted.

Mr. Ng of SMBC stated that if the US and Chinese markets experience a mild demand response from this momentary tariff increase, it might help Singapore’s exports and overall growth prospects.

He noted that US-US tax negotiations are also continuing between other nations.

Mr. Ng said that if these discussions lead to more business being diverted from Singapore, it might deteriorate the country’s economic prospects.

CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL ON EXTERNAL OUTLOOK

Mr. Ng claimed that the US and China’s temporary tariff reductions may contribute to the strengthening of both countries ‘ assets, leading to a small recovery in the Singaporean yen.

He stated that a box of Singapore’s major trading partners ‘ economies should still continue to perform reasonably well.

According to Mr. Neumann,” I also believe there are some risks or disruptions to global business,” noting that constrained investment activity may also cause Singapore to face headwinds in sectors exposed to external trade flows.

He continued, stating that the financial services industry is performing quite well, with private consumption still serving as a significant development driver for Singapore’s economy.

Mr. Neumann said it is still important for Singapore to concentrate on more domestic-oriented sectors, which he believes are more resilient in this price confusion, as other nations continue to engage in negotiations with the US.

Experts are still sticking to their full-year projections for about 2 percent rise for Singapore’s market for the time being.

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